Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Rogers Commission Report) by Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
Framingham State University
Digital Commons at Framingham State University
Challenger STS-51L: Reports Challenger STS-51L Documents Collection
6-6-1986
Report to the President By the Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident (Rogers Commission Report)
Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.framingham.edu/challenger_reports
Part of the Aeronautical Vehicles Commons, American Politics Commons, Aviation Safety and
Security Commons, Propulsion and Power Commons, Public Policy Commons, Science and
Technology Policy Commons, Space Vehicles Commons, and the Structures and Materials
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Challenger STS-51L Documents Collection at Digital Commons at Framingham State
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Challenger STS-51L: Reports by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Framingham
State University. For more information, please contact vgonzalez@framingham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, "Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Rogers Commission Report)" (1986). Challenger STS-51L: Reports. Book 2.
http://digitalcommons.framingham.edu/challenger_reports/2
 Report to the President  
 
By the  
 
PRESIDENTIAL  
COMMISSION  
 
On the Space Shuttle  
Challenger Accident  
   
 
 
 
 
 
June 6th, 1986  
Washington, D.C.  
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IN MEMORIAM  
  
"The future is not free: the story of all human progress is one of a struggle against all 
odds. We learned again that this America, which Abraham Lincoln called the last, best 
hope of man on Earth, was built on heroism and noble sacrifice. It was built by men and 
women like our seven star voyagers, who answered a call beyond duty, who gave more 
than was expected or required and who gave it little thought of worldly reward." 
  
- President Ronald Reagan January 31, 1986  
  
Francis R. (Dick) Scobee  
Commander 
  
Michael John Smith  
Pilot 
  
Ellison S. Onizuka  
Mission Specialist One 
  
Judith Arlene Resnik  
Mission Specialist Two 
  
Ronald Erwin McNair  
Mission Specialist Three 
  
S.Christa McAuliffe  
Payload Specialist One 
  
Gregory Bruce Jarvis  
Payload Specialist Two 
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Preface 
  
  
The accident of Space Shuttle Challenger, 
mission 51-L, interrupting for a time one of 
the most productive engineering, scientific and 
exploratory programs in history, evoked a 
wide range of deeply felt public responses. 
There was grief and sadness for the loss of 
seven brave members of the crew; firm 
national resolve that those men and women be 
forever enshrined in the annals of American 
heroes, and a determination, based on that 
resolve and in their memory, to strengthen the 
Space Shuttle program so that this tragic event 
will become a milestone on the way to 
achieving the full potential that space offers to 
mankind. 
The President, who was moved and troubled 
by this accident in a very personal way, 
appointed an independent Commission made 
up of persons not connected with the mission 
to investigate it. The mandate of the 
Commission was to: 
1. Review the circumstances surrounding the 
accident to establish the probable cause or 
causes of the accident; and 
2. Develop recommendations for corrective or 
other action based upon the Commission's 
findings and determinations. 
Immediately after being appointed, the 
Commission moved forward with its 
investigation and, with the full support of the 
White House, held public hearings dealing 
with the facts leading up to the accident. In a 
closed society other options are available; in 
an open society-unless classified matters are 
involved-other options are not, either as matter 
of law or as a practical matter. 
In this case a vigorous investigation and full 
disclosure of the facts were necessary. The 
way to deal with a failure of this magnitude is 
to disclose all the facts fully and openly; to 
take immediate steps to correct mistakes that 
led to the failure; and to continue the program 
with renewed confidence and determination. 
The Commission construed its mandate 
somewhat broadly to include 
recommendations on safety matters not 
necessarily involved in this accident but which 
require attention to make future flights safer. 
Careful attention was given to concerns 
expressed by astronauts because the Space 
Shuttle program will only succeed if the 
highly qualified men and women who fly the 
Shuttle have confidence in the system. 
However, the Commission did not construe its 
mandate to require a detailed investigation of 
all aspects of the Space Shuttle program; to 
review budgetary matters; or to interfere with 
or supersede Congress in any way in the 
performance of its duties. Rather, the 
Commission focused its attention on the safety 
aspects of future flights based on the lessons 
learned from the investigation with the 
objective being to return to safe flight. 
Congress recognized the desirability, in the 
first instance, of having a single investigation 
of this national tragedy. It very responsibly 
agreed to await the Commission's findings 
before deciding what further action might be 
necessary to carry out its responsibilities. 
For the first several days after the accident- 
possibly because of the trauma resulting from 
the accident-NASA appeared to be 
withholding information about the accident 
from the public. After the Commission began 
its work, and at its suggestion, NASA began 
releasing a great deal of information that 
helped to reassure the public that all aspects of 
the accident were being investigated and that 
the full story was being told in an orderly and 
thorough manner. 
Following the suggestion of the Commission, 
NASA established several teams of persons 
not involved in the mission 51-L launch 
process to support the Commission and its 
panels. These NASA teams have cooperated 
with the Commission in every aspect of its 
work. The result has been a comprehensive 
and complete investigation. 
The Commission believes that its investigation 
and report have been responsive to the request 
of the President and hopes that they will serve 
the best interests of the nation in restoring the 
United States space program to its preeminent 
position in the world.  
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Chapter I: Introduction  
  
  
The Space Shuttle concept had its 
genesis in the 1960s, when the Apollo 
lunar landing spacecraft was in full 
development but had not yet flown. 
From the earliest days of the space 
program, it seemed logical that the goal 
of frequent, economical access to space 
might best be served by a reusable 
launch system. In February, 1967, the 
President's Science Advisory Committee 
lent weight to the idea of a reusable 
spacecraft by recommending that studies 
be made "of more economical ferrying 
systems, presumably involving partial or 
total recovery and use." 
In September, 1969, two months after 
the initial lunar landing, a Space Task 
Group chaired by the Vice President 
offered a choice of three long-range 
plans: 
A $8-$10 billion per year program 
involving a manned Mars expedition, a 
space station in lunar orbit and a 50-
person Earth-orbiting station serviced by 
a reusable ferry, or Space Shuttle.  
An intermediate program, costing less 
than $8 billion annually, that would 
include the Mars mission.  
A relatively modest $4-$5.7 billion a 
year program that would embrace an 
Earth-orbiting space station and the 
Space Shuttle as its link to Earth.1  
In March, 197O, President Nixon made 
it clear that, while he favored a 
continuing active space program, 
funding on the order of Apollo was not 
in the cards. He opted for the shuttle-
tended space base as a long-range goal 
but deferred going ahead with the space 
station pending development of the 
shuttle vehicle. Thus the reusable Space 
Shuttle, earlier considered only the 
transport element of a broad, multi-
objective space plan, became the focus 
of NASA's near-term future. 
  
The Space Shuttle Design 
 
The embryo Shuttle program faced a 
number of evolutionary design changes 
before it would become a system in 
being. The first design was based on a 
"fly back" concept in which two stages, 
each manned, would fly back to a 
horizontal, airplane- like landing. The 
first stage was a huge, winged, rocket-
powered vehicle that would carry the 
smaller second stage piggyback; the 
carrier would provide the thrust for 
liftoff and flight through the atmosphere, 
then release its passenger-the orbiting 
vehicle-and return to Earth. The Orbiter, 
containing the crew and payload, would 
continue into space under its own rocket 
power, complete its mission and then fly 
back to Earth. 
The second-stage craft, conceived prior 
to 1970 as a space station ferry, was a 
vehicle considerably larger than the later 
Space Shuttle Orbiter. It carried its 
rocket propellants internally, had a flight 
deck sufficiently large to seat 12 space 
station-bound passengers and a cargo 
bay big enough to accommodate space 
station modules. The Orbiter's size put 
enormous weight-lifting and thrust-
generating demands on the first-stage 
design. 
This two-stage, fully reusable design 
represented the optimum Space Shuttle 
in terms of «routine, economical access 
to space," the catchphrase that was 
becoming the primary guideline for 
development of Earth-to-orbit systems. 
It was, 
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however, less than optimum in terms of 
the development investment required: an 
estimated $10-13 billion, a figure that 
met with disfavor in both Congress and 
the Office of Management and Budget. 
 
In 1971, NASA went back to the 
drawing board, aware that development 
cost rather than system capability would 
probably be the determining factor in 
getting a green light for Shuttle 
development. Government and industry 
studies sought developmental economies 
in the configuration. One proposal found 
acceptance: eliminate the Orbiter's 
internal tanks and carry the propellant in 
a single, disposable External Tank. It 
provided a smaller r, cheaper Orbiter r 
without substantial performance loss. 
 
For the launch system, NASA examined 
a number of possibilities. One was a 
winged but unmanned recoverable 
liquid-fuel vehicle based on the 
eminently successful Saturn 5 rocket 
from the Apollo Program. Other plans 
envisioned simpler but also recoverable 
liquid-fuel systems, expendable solid 
rockets and the reusable Solid Rocket 
Booster. NASA had been using solid-
fuel vehicles for launching some small 
unmanned spacecraft, but solids as 
boosters for manned flight was a 
technology new to the agency. Mercury, 
Gemini and Apollo astronauts had all 
been rocketed into space by liquid-fuel 
systems. Nonetheless, the recoverable 
Solid Rocket Booster won the nod, even 
though the liquid rocket offered 
potentially lower operating costs. 
  
 
 
Artist's drawing depicts Space Shuttle 
stacked for launch in view from dorsal 
side of Orbiter (left) and from the left 
side of the stack. 
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The overriding reason was that pricing 
estimates indicated a lower cost of 
development for the solid booster. 
Emerging from this round of design 
decision making was the Space Shuttle: a 
three-element system composed of the Orbiter, 
an expendable external fuel tank carrying 
liquid propellants for the Orbiter's engines, 
and two recoverable Solid Rocket Boosters. It 
would cost, NASA estimated early in 1972, 
$6.2 billion to develop and test a five-Orbiter 
Space Shuttle system, about half what the two-
stage "fly back" design would have cost. To 
achieve that reduction, NASA had to accept 
somewhat higher system operating costs and 
sacrifice full reusability. The compromise 
design retained recoverability and reuse of two 
of the three elements and still promised to trim 
substantially the cost of delivering payloads to 
orbit. 
The final configuration was selected 
in March, 1972. 
  
The Space Shuttle Development  
In August, 1972, NASA awarded a 
contract to Rockwell International 
Corporation's Space Transportation Systems 
Division for design and development of the 
Space Shuttle Orbiter. Martin Marietta Denver 
Aerospace was assigned development and 
fabrication of the External Tank, Morton 
Thiokol Corporation was awarded the contract 
for the Solid Rocket Boosters, and Rocketdyne, 
a division of Rockwell, was selected to 
develop the Orbiter main engines. 
NASA div ided managerial 
responsibility for the program among three of 
its field centers. Johnson Space Center, 
Houston, Texas, was assigned management of 
the Orbiter. Marshall Space Flight Center, 
Huntsville, Alabama, was made responsible 
for the Orbiter's main engines, the External 
Tank and the Solid Rocket Boosters. Kennedy 
Space Center, Merritt Island, Florida, was 
given the job of assembling the Space Shuttle 
components, checking them out and 
conducting launches. Because these three 
centers will be mentioned repeatedly in this 
report, they will hereafter be identified simply 
as Johnson, Marshall and Kennedy. 
It was in an increasingly austere fiscal 
environment that NASA struggled through the 
Shuttle development years of the 1970s. The 
planned five-Orbiter fleet was reduced to four. 
Budgetary difficulties were compounded by 
engineering problems and, inevitably in a 
major new system whose development pushes 
the frontiers of technology, there was cost 
growth. This combination of factors induced 
schedule slippage. The initial orbital test 
flights were delayed by more than two years. 
The first Shuttle test flights were 
conducted at Dryden Flight Research Facility, 
California, in 1977. The test craft was the 
Orbiter Enterprise, a full-size vehicle that 
lacked engines and other systems needed for 
orbital flight. The purpose of these tests was to 
check out the aerodynamic and flight control 
characteristics of the Orbiter in atmospheric 
flight. Mounted piggyback atop a modified 
Boeing 747, the Enterprise was carried to 
altitude and released for a gliding approach 
and landing at the Mojave Desert test center. 
Five such flights were made. They served to 
validate the Orbiter's computers and other 
systems. They also demonstrated the craft's 
subsonic handling qualities, in partic ular its 
performance in the precise unpowered 
landings that would be required on all Shuttle 
flights. 
The Enterprise test flights were 
followed-in 1977-80-by extensive ground tests 
of Shuttle systems, including vibration tests of 
the entire assembly-Orbiter, External Tank and 
Solid Rocket Boosters-at Marshall. Main 
engine test firings were conducted at National 
Space Technology Laboratories at Bay St. 
Louis, Mississippi, and on the launch pad at 
Kennedy. 
By early 1981, the Space Shuttle was 
ready for an orbital flight test program. This 
was carefully crafted to include more than 
1,000 tests and data collection procedures. All 
flights were to be launched from Kennedy and 
terminate at Edwards Air Force Base, where 
the Dryden Flight Research Facility is located 
(actually the third flight landed at White Sands 
Test Facility, New Mexico, because the 
normally dry lakebed at Edwards was flooded). 
Originally intended as a six-mission program, 
the orbital test series was reduced to four 
flights: 
  
· STS-1 (Space Transportation System-1), 
April 12-14, 1981, Orbiter Columbia, was 
a two-day demonstration of the Orbiter's 
ability to go into orbit and return safely. 
Its 
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main payload was a flight instrumentation 
pallet containing equipment for recording 
temperatures, pressures and acceleration levels 
at various points around the Orbiter. In 
addition, there were checkouts of the cargo 
bay doors, attitude control system and orbital 
maneuvering system.  
· STS-2, November 12-14, 1981, Orbiter 
Columbia, marked the first test of the Remote 
Manipulator System and carried a payload of 
Earth survey instruments. This was the first 
time any spacecraft had flown twice. Failure 
of a fuel cell shortened the flight by about 
three days.  
· STS-3, March 22-3O, 1982, Orbiter Columbia, 
was the longest of the initial test series, 
staying aloft eight days. Activities included a 
special test of the manipulator in which the 
robot arm removed a package of instruments 
from the payload bay but did not release it into 
space. The flight included experiments in  
materials processing.  
· STS-4, June 27-July 4, 1982, Orbiter 
Columbia, featured another test of the robot 
arm, which extended a scientific payload over 
the side of the payload bay, then reberthed it. 
Materials processing experiments were 
conducted, as were a number of scientific 
investigations. This flight carried the first 
Department of Defense payload.  
 With the landing of STS-4, the orbital flight test 
program came to an end with 95 percent of its 
objectives accomplished. The interval between 
flights had been trimmed from seven months to 
four, then three. NASA declared the Space Shuttle 
"operational," a term that has encountered some 
criticism because it erroneously suggests that the 
Shuttle had attained an airline-like degree of 
routine operation. In any event, NASA regarded all 
flights after STS-4 operational in the sense that 
payload requirements would take precedence over 
spacecraft testing, requiring larger crews. 
After completing the orbital test in mid- 1982, 
NASA began the "operational phase" of the Space 
Shuttle program, beginning with STS-5. The STS -
for Space Transportation System- sequential 
numbering was still in effect at that time; after 
STS-9 NASA changed the method of numbering 
missions. Thereafter each flight was designated by 
two numbers and a letter, such as 41-B. The first 
digit indicates the fiscal year of the scheduled 
launch (4 for 1984). The second digit identifies the 
launch site (1 is Kennedy, 2 Vandenberg Air Force 
Base, California). The letter corresponds to the 
alphabetical sequence for the fiscal year, B being 
the second mission scheduled. Here is a brief 
summary of the 21 missions launched from late 
1982 to January, 1986: 
· STS-5, November 11-16, 1982, Orbiter 
Columbia, launched two communications 
satellites, which later were boosted to 
geosynchronous orbit by attached propulsion 
systems.  
· STS-6, April 4-9, 1983, Orbiter Challenger, 
was highlighted by the first Shuttle-based 
spacewalk, or extravehicular activity. The 
crew successfully deployed the 5,000-pound 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite, first of 
three planned NASA communications 
satellites.  
· STS-7, June 18-24, 1983, Orbiter Challenger, 
delivered a second pair of commercial 
communications satellites. The mission also 
included additional payload release and 
recapture tests us ing the Remote 
Manipulator System. This flight marked the 
first retrieval of an object from orbit.  
· STS-8, August 30-September 6, 1983, 
Orbiter Challenger, included more robot arm 
tests plus deployment of a 
commercial/public service communications 
satellit e. STS-9, November 28-December 8, 
1983, Orbiter Columbia, carried the first 
Spacelab in the payload bay. The mission 
marked Columbia's return to service after a 
year's hiatus, during which it had been 
extensively modified.  
· Flight 10 (41-B), February 3-11, 1984, 
Orbiter Challenger, was highlighted by the 
introduction of the Manned Maneuvering 
Unit, a backpack propulsion unit that allows 
astronauts to maneuver in space independent 
of the Orbiter. The mission also launched 
two communications satellites, but their 
boosters failed to put them into 
geosynchronous orbit. For the first time, the 
Shuttle landed on the concrete runway at 
Kennedy Space Center.  
  
· Flight 11 (41-C), April 6-13, 1984, Orbiter 
Challenger, featured an important 
demonstration of Shuttle ability: the 
retrieval, repair and redeployment of the 
malfunctioning Solar Maximum Mission 
spacecraft with the help of a Manned  
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Maneuvering Unit. Other activity included 
deployment of the Long Duration Exposure 
Facility, a large cylinder containing materials 
samples to be retrieved and examined after 
long exposure to the space environment.  
 
· Flight 12 (41-D), August 30-September 5, 
1984, Orbiter Discovery, was devoted 
primarily to launch of three 
communications satellites. The mission 
demonstrated repeated deployment and 
retraction of a large, foldable solar array 
to investigate the practicability of using 
such solar wings as power sources for 
extended Shuttle missions, space 
platforms or the space station.  
· Flight 13 (41 -G), October 5- 13, 1984, 
Orbiter Challenger, launched the NASA 
Earth Radiation Budget Explorer. A cargo 
bay pallet carried instruments for Earth 
observations, including an advanced 
imaging radar.  
· Flight 14 (51-A), November 8-16, 1984, 
Orbiter Discovery, launched two 
communications satellites and retrieved 
two others that had been sent into 
unusable orbits after deployment on Flight 
10.  
· Flight 15 (51-C),January 24-27, 1985, 
Orbiter Discovery, carried a Department 
of Defense payload.  
· Flight 16 (51-D), April 12-19, 1985, 
Orbiter Discovery, deployed two 
commercial satellites; one, Leasat-3, 
remained in low orbit when the upper 
stage booster failed to activate.  
· Flight 17 (51-B), April 29-May 6, 1985, 
Orbiter Challenger, carried a second 
Spacelab mission and materials processing 
experiments.  
· Flight 18 (51 -G), June 17 -24, 1985, 
Orbiter Discovery, delivered three 
communications satellites, deployed a 
low-cost Spartan scientific satellite and 
retrieved it after a period of free flight.  
· Flight 19 (51-F), July 29-August 6, 1985, 
Orbiter Challenger, carried the third 
Spacelab mission, which covered a broad 
range of experiments in plasma physics, 
astrophysics, solar astronomy and 
materials processing.  
· Flight 20 (51-I), August 27-September 3, 
1985, Orbiter Discovery, deployed three 
communications satellites. The Leasat-3 
satellite which failed to activate after 
deployment on Flight 16 was retrieved, 
repaired and successfully redeployed.  
· Flight 21 (51-J), October 3-1O, 1985, 
Orbiter Atlantis was devoted to another 
Department of Defense mission.  
· Flight 22 (61-A), October 30-November 6, 
1985, Orbiter Challenger, carried the 
fourth Spacelab mission, devoted to 
materials processing experimentation.  
· Flight 23 (61-B), November 26-December 
3, 1985, Orbiter Atlantis, was highlighted 
by an experiment in astronaut assembly of 
structures in orbit and attendant study of 
extravehicular dynamics and human 
factors. The mission also deployed three 
communications satellites.  
· Flight 24 (61-C), January 12-18, 1986, 
Orbiter Columbia, launched a commercial 
communications satellite, deployed a 
Hitchhiker secondary payload, conducted 
experiments in infrared imaging, acquired 
photos and spectral images of Comet 
Halley.  
· Flight 25 (51-L), January 28, 1986, 
Orbiter Challenger. The accident.  
 
Including the initial orbital tests, the Space 
Shuttle flew 24 successful missions over a 57-
month period. Columbia made seven trips into 
space, Discovery six and Atlantis two. 
Challenger flew most frequently-nine times 
prior to its fateful last flight. 
In those 24 flights, the Shuttle 
demonstrated its ability to deliver a wide 
variety of payloads; its ability to serve as an 
orbital laboratory; its utility as a platform for 
erection of large structures; and its use for 
retrieval and repair of orbiting satellites. 
  
Elements of the Space Shuttle   
 
The Space Shuttle is the principal 
component of a national Space Transportation 
System designed to accommodate not only 
NASA's predictable needs but also those of the 
Department of Defense and commercial 
payload sponsors. Technically speaking, 
transportation system hardware embraces not 
only the Shuttle but its Spacelab laboratory 
component, the upper stage propulsion units, 
contemplated heavy lift vehicles 
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and space tugs for moving payloads from one 
orbit to another. To provide for the broadest 
possible spectrum of civil/military missions, the 
Space Shuttle was designed to deliver 65,000 
pounds of payload to an easterly low Earth orbit 
or 32,000 pounds to polar orbit. The following 
sections describe the main elements of the 
Shuttle system. 
 
The Orbiter 
 
The Orbiter is as large as a mid-size 
airline transport and has a structure like that of 
an aircraft: an aluminum alloy skin stiffened with 
stringers to form a shell over frames and 
bulkheads of aluminum or aluminum alloy. The 
major structural sections of the Orbiter are the 
forward fuselage, which encompasses the 
pressurized crew compartment; the mid fuselage, 
which contains the payload bay; the payload bay 
doors; the aft fuselage, from which the main 
engine nozzles project; and the vertical tail, 
which splits open along the trailing edge to 
provide a speed brake used during entry and 
landing. 
The crew compartment is divided into 
two levels -the flight deck on top and the 
middeck below. Besides working space, the crew 
compartment contains the systems needed to 
provide a habitable environment (atmosphere, 
temperature, food, water, the crew sleep facilities 
and waste management). It also houses the 
electronic, guidance and navigation systems. 
The Orbiter crew may include as many 
as eight people, although generally the limit is 
seven. The crew consists of the commander, the 
captain of the ship; the pilot, second in command; 
and two or more mission specialists. One or 
more payload specialists can also be 
accommodated. A mission specialist coordinates 
activities of the Orbiter and crew in support of a 
given payload objective. A payload specialist 
may manage specific experiments. The 
commander, pilot and mission specialists are 
career astronauts assigned to the mission by 
NASA. Payload specialists do not come from the 
Astronaut Office. They are assigned, by payload 
sponsors in coordination with NASA. 
Cargoes up to 24 tons have been carried 
in the payload bay. Clamshell doors on the top of 
the Orbiter meet along the craft's spine to enclose 
the bay, which is 15 feet wide and 60 feet long. 
The payload bay is designed to hold 
securely a wide range of objects. They may 
include one or more communications satellites to 
be launched from orbit, an autonomous Spacelab 
for experiments in space, or cargo disposed on 
special pallets. To handle cargo in orbital flight, 
the payload bay has the 50-foot mechanical arm 
that is controlled from within the crew 
compartment. A television camera and lights 
mounted near the end of the arm enable the 
operator to see what the "hand" is doing. 
Just as important as delivering cargo to 
orbit is recovering a satellite and bringing it back 
to Earth-retrieving a satellite in need of 
refurbishment, for example. The Orbiter can 
carry 16 tons of cargo back from space. 
The feasibility of a reusable Space 
Shuttle hinges on a particularly vital requirement: 
protecting the Orbiter from the searing heat 
generated by friction with the atmosphere when 
the craft returns to Earth. Temperatures during 
entry may rise as high as 2,750 degrees 
Fahrenheit on the leading edge of the wing and 
600 degrees on the upper fuselage, the "coolest" 
area. The thermal protection system devised for 
the Orbiter must prevent the temperature of the 
aluminum skin from rising above 350 degrees 
during either ascent or entry. 
The Orbiter has four kinds of external 
insulation that are applied to various parts of the 
structure according to the temperature each is 
likely to experience. The craft's nose cap and the 
leading edges of the wings are protected with an 
all-carbon composite consisting of layers of 
graphite cloth in a carbon matrix. The outer 
layers are converted chemically to silicon 
carbide, the same material that has long been 
used as an abrasive in grindstones. Areas 
subjected to the next greatest heat are shielded 
with high-temperature ceramic tiles about six 
inches square and varying in thickness from one 
to five inches, depending on the protection 
needed. So-called "low temperature" tiles are of 
the same material- nearly pure glass, of which 90 
percent of the volume is "air"-for use on areas 
requiring less protection. (Low-temperature is 
relative; tiles so designated can withstand a 
temperature of 1,200 degrees Fahrenheit.) About 
3O,000 tiles, each different, are installed on each 
Orbiter. 
  
Space Shuttle Main Engines 
 
The three high-performance rocket engines in the 
aft section of the Orbiter fire for about the first 8 
1/2 minutes of flight after liftoff. At sea level, 
each engine generates 375,000 pounds of thrust 
at 100 percent throttle. 
The propellants for the engines are the fuel  
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(liquid hydrogen) and the oxidizer (liquid 
oxygen) carried in the External Tank. 
Combustion takes place in two stages. First, the 
propellants are mixed and partly burned in pre-
burners. Hot gases from the pre-burners drive the 
high-pressure turbopumps which deliver 
propellants to the main injector. Combustion, 
once initiated by electrical igniters, is self-
sustaining. Before firing, the very cold liquid 
propellant is allowed to flow into the system as 
far as the pre-burners and combustion chamb er 
to cool the pumps and ducts so that the hydrogen 
and oxygen in the system will remain liquid 
when the engine is started. 
The main engines have been throttled 
over a range of 65 to 104 percent of the thrust at 
sea level. At liftoff, they are thrusting at 100 
percent. Computers command engine thrust to 
104 percent as soon as the Shuttle clears the 
tower. They throttle to 65 percent to reduce the 
maximum aerodynamic loads that occur at an 
altitude of about 34,000 feet. Thereafter, the 
thrust is again increased to provide an 
acceleration of three times that of gravity in the 
last minute or so of powered flight. 
  
External Tank 
 
The External Tank carries the 
propellants for the Orbiter's main engines-
143,000 gallons of liquid oxygen and 383,000 
gallons of liquid hydrogen, which is much lighter 
than a comparable volume of oxygen. Together, 
the propellants weigh a little more than 790 tons. 
Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace, Michoud, 
Louisiana, builds the tank, a welded aluminum 
alloy cylinder with an ogive nose and a 
hemispherical tail. It is 154 feet long and 27 1/2 
feet in diameter. 
Because the Orbiter and the two Solid 
Rocket Boosters are attached to it at liftoff, the 
External Tank absorbs the thrust of the combined 
propulsion system. It withstands complex load 
effects and pressures from the propellants. 
The liquid oxygen tank forms the nose 
of the External Tank. It contains oxidizer kept 
liquid at a temperature of - 297 degrees 
Fahrenheit. A removable conical nose cap acts as 
an aerodynamic fairing. Inside the tank, baffles 
reduce sloshing and the associated control 
problems. The liquid hydrogen tank does not 
need baffles because the fuel is so light that 
sloshing does not induce significant forces. The 
liquid hydrogen tank accounts for the greater part 
of the External Tank. Its contents are even colder 
than the LOX: - 423 degrees Fahrenheit. 
The intertank structure or "intertank" 
connects the two propellant tanks. It is a 
cylindrical structural section that houses 
instruments and receives and distributes most of 
the thrust load from the Solid Rocket Boosters. 
The front end of each booster is connected to the 
External Tank at the intertank midsection. 
A multi-layered thermal coating covers 
the outside of the External Tank to protect it 
from extreme temperature variations during pre-
launch, launch, and the first 8 1/2 minutes of 
flight. That insulation reduces the boil-off rate of 
the propellants, which must be kept at very low 
temperatures to remain liquid. It also is meant to 
minimize ice that might form from condensation 
on the outside of the propellant tanks. 
In addition to the Solid Rocket Booster 
forward attachment points on either side of the 
intertank, three other attachment points link each 
booster to the aft major ring frame of the 
External Tank. The boosters are thus connected 
to the tank at four points, one forward and three 
aft. 
Three structural elements link the 
Orbiter to the External Tank. A "wishbone" 
attachment beneath the crew compartment 
connects the forward end of the Orbiter to the 
tank. The two aft connections are tripods at the 
base of the External Tank. 
A command from the Orbiter computer 
jettisons the External Tank 18 seconds after main 
engine cutoff, about 8 /2 minutes after liftoff. To 
ensure that it will travel a predictable path, a 
tumble system rotates the tank end-over-end at a 
minimum rate of two revolutions per minute. 
The tank breaks up upon atmospheric entry, 
falling into the planned area of the Indian or 
Pacific Ocean about an hour after liftoff. The 
External Tank is the only main component of the 
Space Shuttle that is not recovered and reused. 
  
Solid Rocket Boosters 
 
The two solid-propellant rocket 
boosters are almost as long as the External Tank 
and attached to each side of it. They contribute 
about 80 percent of the total thrust at liftoff; the 
rest comes from the Orbiter's three main engines. 
Roughly two minutes after liftoff and 24 miles 
down range, the solid rockets have exhausted 
their fuel. Explosives separate the boosters from 
the External Tank. Small rocket motors move 
them away from the External Tank and the 
Orbiter, which continue toward orbit under thrust 
of the Shuttle's main engines. 
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The Solid Rocket Booster is made up of several 
subassemblies: the nose cone, Solid Rocket 
Motor and the nozzle assembly. Marshall is 
responsible for the Solid Rocket Booster; Morton 
Thiokol, Inc., Wasatch Division, Brigham City, 
Utah, is the contractor for the Solid Rocket 
Motors. Each Solid Rocket Motor case is made 
of 11 individual cylindrical weld free steel 
sections about 12 feet in dia meter. When 
assembled, they form a tube almost 116 feet long. 
The 11 sections are the forward dome section, 
six cylindrical sections, the aft External Tank-
attach ring section, two stiffener sections, and the 
aft dome section.  
The 11 sections of the motor case are 
joined by tang-and-clevis joints held together by 
177 steel pins around the circumference of each 
joint. 
After the sections have been machined 
to fine tolerances and fitted, they are partly 
assembled at the factory into four casting 
segments. Those four cylindrical segments are 
the parts of the motor case into which the 
propellant is poured (or cast). They are shipped 
by rail in separate pieces to Kennedy. 
Joints assembled before the booster is 
shipped are known as factory joints. Joints 
between the four casting segments are called 
field joints; they are connected at Kennedy when 
the booster segments are stacked for final 
assembly. 
  
Orbital Maneuvering System 
 
The two engine pods on the aft fuselage 
of the Orbiter contain maneuvering engines and 
their propellant-monomethyl hydrazine (the fuel) 
and nitrogen tetroxide (the oxidizer). Helium 
pressurizes the propellant tanks, and the fuel and 
the oxidizer ignite on contact. 
Forty-four small rocket motors in the 
Orbiter's nose and aft section maneuvering 
system pods allow adjustments of the vehicle's 
attitude in pitch, yaw, and roll axes. They also 
may be used to make small changes of velocity 
along one of the Orbiter's three axes. 
  
Flight of a Shuttle 
 
Except for ascent and entry, all of the 
Shuttle's typical seven-day mission is in orbit. 
That is where the goals of a given mission are 
accomplished: scientific experiments carried out; 
satellites deployed into orbit, retrieved or 
repaired; observations made of the Earth and the 
solar system. The Shuttle makes one revolution 
of the Earth approximately every 90 minutes 
during the satellite mission. 
When it comes out of orbit, the Shuttle 
is moving at about 17, 500 miles an hour. 
Reaction engines position the Orbiter nose 
forward again for entry into the atmosphere. 
Those thrusters continue to control the Orbiter's 
attitude until the atmosphere becomes dense 
enough for the aerodynamic surfaces to take 
effect. 
The Shuttle enters the ever-thickening 
blanket of atmosphere at 400,000 feet of altitude 
and a speed of more than 17,000 miles an hour 
(about Mach 25). The Orbiter's nose is 
positioned 40 degrees above its flight path. That 
attitude increases aerodynamic drag, thus helping 
to dissipate the tremendous amount of energy 
that the spacecraft has when it enters the 
atmosphere. Friction heats the surface of the 
Orbiter, which is protected by thermal tiles, and 
ionizes the surrounding air, preventing radio 
communication with Earth for the next 13 
minutes. 
The flight control system's computer 
program allows use of the reaction thrusters and 
aerodynamic surfaces in combination to control 
the spacecraft. At Mach 4.2, the rudder is 
activated, and the last reaction thrusters are 
deactivated at Mach 1. Thereafter, the craft is 
entirely maneuvered like an airplane by 
movement of the aerodynamic control surfaces: 
elevons, rudder, speed brake, and body flap. 
In the landing approach, the Orbiter has 
no propulsion. It has only its velocity and 
altitude. Its energy must be carefully managed to 
maneuver the Shuttle aerodynamically to a safe 
landing. Beginning this terminal phase, the glide 
slope is steep-19 degrees-as the Orbiter descends 
toward the runway. Half a minute before 
touchdown and two miles from the runway, the 
craft flares to a shallow, almost flat 1.5 degree 
glide slope. Touchdown occurs at 225 miles per 
hour. On the runway, the Orbiter rolls to a stop, 
and the mission is complete. . 
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Chapter II: Events Leading Up to the Challenger Mission 
  
 
 
 
 
  
Preparations for the launch of mission 51-L were 
not unusual, though they were complicated by 
changes in the launch schedule. The sequence of 
complex, interrelated steps involved in 
producing the detailed schedule and supporting 
logistics necessary for a successful mission 
always requires intense effort and close 
coordination. 
Flight 51-L of the Challenger was 
originally scheduled for July, 1985, but by the 
time the crew was assigned in January, 1985, 
launch had been postponed to late November to 
accommodate changes in payloads. The launch 
was subsequently delayed further and finally 
rescheduled for late January, 1986. 
After the series of payload changes, the 
Challenger cargo included two satellites in the 
cargo bay and equipment in the crew 
compartment for experiments that would be 
carried out during the mission. The payloads 
flown on mission 51-L are listed in this table: 
 
Mission 51-L Payloads  
 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite-B  
Spartan-Halley Satellite  
Comet Halley Active Monitoring Program  
Fluid Dynamics Experiment  
Phase Partitioning Experiment  
Teacher in Space Project  
Shuttle Student Involvement Program  
Radiation Monitoring Experiment  
 
The primary payloads were the 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (a NASA 
communications satellite) and the Spartan 
satellite that would be deployed into orbit 
carrying special instruments for the observation 
of Halley's Comet. 
The NASA communications satellite 
was to have been placed in a geosynchronous 
orbit with the aid of a booster called the Inertial 
Upper Stage. The satellite would have supported 
communications with the Space Shuttle and up 
to 23 other spacecraft. 
The Spartan satellite was to have been 
deployed into low Earth orbit using the remote 
manipulator system. The Spartan instruments 
would have watched Halley's Comet when it was 
too close to the Sun for other observatories to do 
so. Subsequently, the satellite would have been 
retrieved and returned to Earth in the Shuttle 
payload bay. 
  
Crew Assignments 
On January 27, 1985, one year before 
launch, NASA announced the names of the 
astronauts assigned to mission 51-L: 
 
Commander  Francis R. Scobee  
Pilot  Michael J. Smith  
Mission Specialist One  Ellison S. Onizuka  
Mission Specialist Two  Judith A. Resnik  
Mission Specialist Three  Ronald E. McNair  
 
The mission commander, Francis R. 
(Dick) Scobee, first flew on the Space Shuttle as 
the pilot of mission 41-C in April, 1984. Mr. 
Scobee, a native of Auburn, Washington, 
received his bachelor's degree in aerospace 
engineering from the University of Arizona. A 
former Air Force 
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Space Shuttle 51-L on Pad 39-B of Kennedy Space Center's launch complex. 
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test pilot with 7,000 hours in 45 aircraft types, he 
became an astronaut in 1978. 
 
The mission pilot, Captain Michael J. Smith, 
USN, was on his first Shuttle flight after being 
selected as an astronaut in 1980. A native of 
Beaufort, North Carolina, Captain Smith, a 1967 
graduate of the United States Naval Academy, 
received a master's degree from the Naval 
Postgraduate School. He was a Navy test pilot 
with extensive experience in a variety of aircraft.  
 
Mission specialist Lieutenant Colonel Ellison S. 
Onizuka, USAF, from Kealakekua, Kona, 
Hawaii, received his master's degree in 
aerospace engineering at the University of 
Colorado. A flight test engineer in the Air Force, 
he became an astronaut in 1978 and flew on the 
first military mission (51-C) in January, 1985, 
aboard the Space Shuttle Discovery 
 
Mission specialist Judith A. Resnik, Ph.D., flew 
on the first flight of the Orbiter Discovery on 
mission 41-D in August, 1984. Born in Akron, 
Ohio, Dr. Resnik received her doctorate in 
electrical engineering from the University of 
Maryland in 1976. After working for several 
industrial firms, she became an astronaut in 1978.  
 
Mission specialist Ronald E. McNair, Ph.D., a 
native of Lake City, South Carolina, received his 
doctorate in physics from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology in 1976. After working 
as a research physicist in civilian industry, he...  
 
 
 
Diagram shows the scheduling of various preparatory milestones in the months that preceded the launching 
of the Mission 51-L Shuttle. 
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became an astronaut in 1978 and first flew on 
mission 41-B in February, 1984, aboard the 
Space Shuttle Challenger. 
Payload specialists are members of a 
Space Shuttle crew who are not career astronauts. 
Two such specialists, Christa McAuliffe and 
Gregory B. Jarvis, were added to the crew of 
mission 51L. 
Ms. McAuliffe was born in Boston and raised in 
Framingham, Massachusetts, where she 
graduated from Framingham State College. After 
teaching a variety of junior high and high school 
subjects in Maryland and New Hamphire, she 
was selected as the Teacher in Space. She was 
assigned to the 51-L crew in July, 1985. 
Mr. Jarvis was a former Air Force 
engineer who specialized in satellite design. He 
was born in Detroit, Michigan, and received his 
master's degree in electrical engineering from 
Northeastern University in Boston. He was 
assigned to the 51-L crew in October, 1985, as a 
representative of the Hughes Aircraft Company. 
The payload specialists each had 
responsibilities for mission 51-L. Ms. McAuliffe 
was to conduct a series of classroom lessons 
from orbit and conduct several basic classroom 
experiments. Mr. Jarvis was to perform a series 
of fluid dynamics experiments that would 
support satellite redesign.  
  
Preparations for Flight 
Planning for mission 51-L began in 
1984, but 10 major change documents adding or 
deleting payload items caused some disruption in 
the preparation process. Because the 12- to 18-
month process is a series of repetitive cycles that 
define a flight design in progressively more 
specific detail, significant changes can require 
extensive time and effort to incorporate. The 
closer to the planned launch date the changes 
occur, the more difficult and disruptive it 
becomes to repeat the cycles necessary to 
complete a mission plan. (See the Mission 51-L 
Milestone Summary chart.) Although there were 
several significant changes to the cargo manifest, 
most occurred early enough in the planning cycle 
to minimize their impact on the flight preparation. 
The cargo integration review is one of 
the crucial coordination meetings in the flight 
preparation process. At that meeting, 
requirements for all payloads are examined to 
ensure that, collectively, they are within the 
capabilities of the vehicle and crew. 
For mission 51-L, the cargo integration 
review was rescheduled six times, primarily 
because of payload changes. All major payload 
changes were made, however, before the review 
eventually took place on June 18, 1985, seven 
months before the launch. Until the cargo 
integration review for a mission is completed, 
the development of the final flight design 
products cannot really get underway. Because 
the mission 51-L payload changes were made 
before the cargo integration review, however, 
changes to the manifest did not seriously disrupt 
the preparation cycle. 
Once the principal payload items were 
determined and the cargo integration review was 
completed, the flight design process became 
relatively straightforward. The flight design 
process is the central element in flight 
preparation. The process transforms the broad 
objectives of the flight into a detailed sequence 
of events from launch to landing. For mission 51 
-L, the objectives consisted of placing one 
satellite in orbit, deploying and retrieving 
Spartan, and conducting the six experiments. 
From that base, the flight design process 
produced a detailed schedule of events, trajectory 
data, requirements for consumable items, 
communications requirements and the necessary 
computer programing for the Orbiter, the 
Mission Control Center, and the Shuttle 
simulator used to train the crew for this 
particular mission. 
The launch minus five months Flight 
Planning and Stowage Review was conducted on 
August 20, 1985, to address any unresolved 
issues and any changes to the plan that had 
developed to that point. Ideally, the mission 
events are firmly determined before the review 
takes place. For mission 51-L, however, Mr. 
Jarvis was not added to the crew until October 
25, 1985, and his activities could not be 
incorporated into mission planning until that 
time. The crew activity plan, the formal flight 
requirements and the flight design status were 
reviewed as well as the current status of the 
engineering integration, the photo and TV 
requirements, and crew compartment stowage. 
The Flight Planning and Stowage Review did 
identify the need for further consideration of the 
launch window and of the then undefined 
requirements for the Teacher-in-Space program. 
There were changes to middeck 
payloads, resulting from the addition of Mr. 
Jarvis, that occurred less than three months 
before launch. The most negative result of the 
changes was a 
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delay in publishing the crew activity plan. The 
crew activity plan specifies the in-flight schedule 
for all crew members, which in turn affects other 
aspects of flight preparation. Because the NASA 
communications satellite training requirements 
were quite similar to those for a previous flight, 
the crew training began using that existing crew 
activity plan and associated checklists.  
Considerable time was saved as a result. 
The requirements unique to Spartan did not 
involve major departures from the standard 
satellite deployment and rendezvous techniques 
that had been developed on mission 51-G, the 
experiment packages did not require any new 
Orbiter procedures, and the ascent and entry 
techniques were standard. Thus, mission 51-L 
did not involve radical departures from previous 
flight patterns. 
The crew began training 3 7 weeks 
before launch. Preparation in the Shuttle Mission 
Simulator, a fully instrumented mock-up of the 
Shuttle interior, began at launch minus 36 weeks. 
Integrated training in the simulator, which allows 
the crew to train with the flight controllers who 
will be controlling the flight in both the Mission 
Control Center and remote centers, began at 
launch minus nine weeks. For the crew, Shuttle 
simulator training included preparation for the 
use of the robot arm, a rendezvous in space, 
Inertial Upper Stage deployment, ascent and 
entry procedures, and a variety of other activities
 
 
Graph compares training workloads of crews for six Shuttle missions in the nine weeks that preceded the launching of the 
space flights. 
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that must be practiced repeatedly if a Shuttle 
mission is to be carried out successfully. 
All NASA crew members exceeded the 
number of training hours required and were 
certified proficient in all mission tasks. The two 
payload specialists also fulfilled their training 
requirements. All mission 51 -L astronauts and 
flight controllers were certified ready for flight. 
From a flight design process point of view, 
mission 51-L was a fairly typical mission. The 
most noticeable effect of the delays in the 
production process was a delay in the start of 
Shuttle Mission Simulator training specific to the 
flight. That training began at launch minus nine 
weeks for the crew of 51-L, two weeks later than 
the original schedule required. 
Compressed training time was 
becoming a concern in late 1985. The crew of 
mission 51-L trained for an average of 48.7 
hours per week during those nine weeks before 
launch, with peaks reaching 65 to 70 hours per 
week. Much more compression in their training 
schedule would not have been possible. (See the 
Crew Workload Comparisons graph.) 
Launch date delays for mission 61-C 
also became a scheduling factor for the 
integrated simulations for mission 51-L. 
Originally scheduled for the third week in 
December, the 61-C launch was delayed until 
January 12, 1986. During the last six weeks 
before the Challenger launch, the 51-L schedule 
was changed several times as a result of launch 
delays of 61-C. The final impact on the 
Challenger crew training was reduced spacing 
between the ascent and entry simulations during 
the last two weeks before launch, but no training 
time was lost. 
  
Flight Readiness Review 
 
The Level I Flight Readiness Review 
for mission 51-L took place on January 15, 1986. 
The Flight Readiness Review should address all 
aspects of flight preparation about which any 
questions have arisen. In addition, attendees 
confirm that all equipment and operational plans 
have been certified ready by the responsible 
manager within NASA. Solid Rocket Booster 
joints were not discussed during the review on 
January 15. 
The period during the day when a 
particular flight can be launched is determined 
by the requirements of the Orbiter and the 
payloads. The launch period for mission 51-L 
was limited in order to provide the best lighting 
conditions for Spartan's observations of Halley's 
Comet. The resulting «launch window" was a 
topic of some discussion at the Flight Readiness 
Review. The Challenger launch originally had 
been scheduled for a morning lift off. When 
Spartan was added to the mission, the launch 
window was changed to the afternoon. This 
change would have required a landing at night if 
a transatlantic abort landing had become 
necessary. Because the alternate transatlantic site, 
Casablanca, was not equipped for a night landing, 
the afternoon launch eliminated that back-up site.  
As January drew to a close, however, 
the conditions for optimum telescopic viewing of 
the comet could not be met. The launch window 
was shifted back to the morning hours so that the 
transatlantic abort site would be in daylight and a 
back-up site (Casablanca) would be available. 
The results of the flight design process 
were summarized at the Flight Readiness Review. 
The predicted ascent performance, including 
expected trajectory, main engine throttling 
profile, expected dynamic pressure and the 
amount of propellant reserve expected at main 
engine cutoff, were presented and discussed. The 
expected landing parameters, weight and center 
of gravity figures were also presented for a 
variety of contingencies. It should be noted that a 
waiver was required because the weight of the 
Orbiter exceeded the allowable limits for an 
abort landing. The flight design data presented at 
the Flight Readiness Review are available in the 
Appendix in the NASA Mission Planning and 
Operations Team Report. No outstanding 
concerns were identified in the discussion of 
flight design. 
The detailed flight plan and schedule of 
crew activities also were presented at the Flight 
Readiness Review. The Challenger was to circle 
the Earth for six days at an orbital altitude of 
approximately 153 nautical miles, landing early 
on the seventh day at Kennedy in Florida. 
The major activities were to include 
deployment of the tracking and data relay 
satellite 10 hours after launch, deployment of the 
Spartan satellite on the third day of the flight and 
subsequent retrieval of the Spartan two days later. 
A summary of the planned activities is provided 
in the table that follows. 
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Mission 51-L Orbital Activity Schedule 
Day One 
   
After arriving in orbit, the crew had two periods of scheduled high 
activity. First, they were to check the readiness of the NASA satellite 
prior to planned deployment. After a lunch break, they were to 
deploy the satellite and Inertial Upper Stage and to perform a series 
of separation maneuvers. The first sleep period was scheduled to 
be eight hours long starting about 18 hours after crew wake-up on 
launch morning. 
   
Day Two 
   
The Comet Halley Active Monitoring Program experiment was 
scheduled to begin on the second day. Also scheduled were the 
initial teacher-in-space video taping and a firing of the orbital 
maneuvering engines to place the Orbiter at the 1 52-mile orbital 
altitude from which the Spartan would be deployed. 
   
Day 
Three  
   
The third day was to start with the crew programing the Spartan 
satellite with data sent from Johnson. The satellite was to be 
deployed using the remote manipulator system (the robot arm), and 
then the Orbiter would be maneuvered to produce, by day four, a 
90-mile separation from Spartan. 
   
Day Four The Orbiter was to begin closing on Spartan while Jarvis continued 
the fluid dynamics experiments started on day two and day three. In 
addition, two lessons telecast live were to be conducted by Ms. 
McAuliffe. 
   
Day Five  After rendezvous with Spartan, the crew was to use the robot arm to 
capture the satellite and re-stow it in the payload bay. 
   
Day Six  Entry preparations were to dominate the last full day in space: flight 
control system checks, test firing of maneuvering jets needed for 
entry, and cabin stowage. A crew news conference also was 
scheduled following the lunch period, if requested by the NASA 
Public Affairs Office. 
   
Day 
Seven  
 
The seventh day would have been spent preparing the Space 
Shuttle for deorbit and entry into the atmosphere. The Challenger 
was scheduled to land at Kennedy 144 hours and 34 minutes after 
launch.  
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Launch Delays 
 
The launch of mission 51-L was 
postponed three times and scrubbed once from 
the planned date of January 22, 1986. The first 
postponement was announced on December 23, 
1985. That change established the launch date as 
January 23, 1986, in order to accommodate the 
final integrated simulation schedule that resulted 
from the slip in the launch date of mission 61-C. 
On January 22, 1986, the Program 
Requirements Change Board first slipped the 
launch from January 23 to January 25. That date 
subsequently was changed to January 26, 1986, 
primarily because of Kennedy work 
requirements produced by the late launch of 
mission 61-C. 
The third postponement of the launch 
date occurred during an evening management 
conference on January 25, 1986, to review the 
weather forecast for the Kennedy area. Because 
the forecast was for unacceptable weather 
throughout the launch window on January 26, 
early countdown activities that had already 
started were terminated. 
The launch attempt of January 27 began 
the day before as the complex sequence of events 
leading to lift off commenced. Fueling of the 
External Tank began at 12:30 a.m. Eastern 
Standard Time. The crew was awakened at 05:07 
a.m., and events proceeded normally with the 
crew strapped into the Shuttle at 07:56 a.m. At 
09: 10, however, the countdown was halted 
when the ground crew reported a problem with 
an exterior hatch handle. By the time the hatch 
handle problem was solved at 10:30 a.m., winds 
at the Kennedy runway designated for a return-
to-launchsite abort had increased and exceeded 
the allowable velocity for crosswinds. The 
launch attempt for January 27 was canceled at 
12:35 p.m. Eastern Standard Time; the 
Challenger countdown was rescheduled for 
January 28. 
The weather was forecast to be clear 
and very cold, with temperatures dropping into 
the low twenties overnight. The management 
team directed engineers to assess the possible 
effects of temperature on the launch. No critical 
issues were identified to management officials, 
and while evaluation continued, it was decided to 
proceed with the countdown and the fueling of 
the External Tank. 
Ice had accumulated in the launch pad 
area during the night and it caused considerable 
concern for the launch team. In reaction, the ice 
inspection team was sent to the launch pad at 
01:35 a.m., January 28, and returned to the 
Launch Control Center at 03:00 a.m. After a 
meeting to consider the team's report, the Space 
Shuttle program manager decided to continue the 
countdown. Another ice inspection was 
scheduled at launch minus three hours. 
Also, during the night, prior to fueling, 
a problem developed with a fire detector in the 
ground liquid hydrogen storage tank. Though it 
was ultimately tracked to a hardware fault and 
repaired, fueling was delayed by two and one-
half hours. By continuing past a planned hold at 
launch minus three hours, however, the launch 
delay was reduced to one hour. Crew wake -up 
was rescheduled for 06:18 a.m., January 28, but 
by that time the crew was already up. 
Because of forecast rain and low 
ceilings at Casablanca, the alternate abort site, 
that site was declared a"no-go" at 07:30 a.m. The 
change had no mission impact, however, because 
the weather at the primary transatlantic abort 
landing site at Dakar, Senegal, was acceptable. 
The abort-once-around site was Edwards Air 
Force Base, California. 
With an extra hour, the crew had more 
than sufficient time to eat breakfast, get a 
weather briefing and put on flight gear. At the 
weather briefing, the temperature and ice on the 
pad were discussed, but neither then nor in 
earlier weather discussions was the crew told of 
any concern about the effects of low temperature 
on the Shuttle System. The seven crew members 
left the crew quarters and rode the astronaut van 
to launch pad B, arriving at 08:03. They were in 
their seats in the Challenger at 08:36 a.m. 
At 08:44 a.m. the ice team completed its 
second inspection. After hearing the team's 
report, the program manager decided to allow 
additional time for ice to melt on the pad. He 
also decided to send the ice team to perform one 
final ice assessment at launch minus 20 minutes. 
When the count was resumed, launch had been 
delayed a second hour beyond the original lift off 
time of 09:38 a.m., Eastern Standard Time. 
At 11: 15 the ice inspection was 
completed, and during the hold at launch minus 
nine minutes, the mission 51-L crew and all 
members of the launch team gave their "go" for 
launch. The final flight of the Challenger began 
at 11:38:00.010 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, 
January 28, 1986. 
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The Flight of the Challenger 
 
The events that followed lift off were brief: 
Launch Time  Event 
.  
- 6.6 sec.  Space Shuttle engines ignition   
O sec.  Solid Rocket Booster ignition  
+ 7 sec.  "Roll program." (Challenger)  
 "Roger, roll, Challenger." (Houston)  
+ 24 sec.  Main engines throttled down to 94%   
+ 42 sec.  Main engines throttled down to 65%   
+ 59 sec.  Main engines throttled up to 104%   
+ 65 sec.  "Challenger, go at throttle up."  
 (Houston) "Roger. Go at throttle up." (Challenger)  
+ 73 sec.  Loss of signal from Challenger   
  
  
From lift off until the signal from the 
Shuttle was lost, no flight controller observed 
any indication of a problem. The Shuttle's main 
engines throttled down to limit the maximum 
dynamic pressure, then throttled up to full thrust 
as expected. Voice communications with the 
crew were normal. The crew called to indicate 
the Shuttle had begun its roll to head due east 
and to establish communication after launch. 
Fifty-seven seconds later, Mission Control 
informed the crew that the engines had 
successfully throttled up and all other systems 
were satisfactory. The commander's 
acknowledgment of this call was the last voice 
communication from the Challenger. 
There were no alarms sounded in the 
cockpit. The crew apparently had no indication 
of a problem before the rapid break-up of the 
Space Shuttle system. The first evidence of an 
accident came from live video coverage. Radar 
then began to track multiple objects. The flight 
dynamics officer in Houston confirmed to the 
flight director that "RSO [range safety officer] 
reports vehicle exploded," and 30 seconds later 
he added that the range safety officer had sent 
the destruct signal to the Solid Rocket Boosters. 
During the period of the flight when the 
Solid Rocket Boosters are thrusting, there are no 
survivable abort options. There was nothing that 
either the crew or the ground controllers could 
have done to avert the catastrophe. . 
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Chapter III: The Accident 
 
 
 
 
Flight of the Space Shuttle Challenger 
on Mission 51-L began at 11:38 a.m. Eastern 
Standard Time on January 28, 1986. It ended 73 
seconds later in an explosive burn of hydrogen 
and oxygen propellants that destroyed the 
External Tank and exposed the Orbiter to severe 
aerodynamic loads that caused complete 
structural breakup. All seven crew members 
perished. The two Solid Rocket Boosters flew 
out of the fireball and were destroyed by the Air 
Force range safety officer 110 seconds after 
launch. 
The ambient air temperature at launch 
was 36 degrees Fahrenheit measured at ground 
level approximately 1,000 feet from the 51-L 
mission launch pad 39B. This temperature was 
15 degrees colder than that of any previous 
launch. 
The following description of the flight 
events is based on visual examination and image 
enhancement of film from NASA operated 
cameras and telemetry data transmitted from the 
Space Shuttle to ground stations. The last 
telemetry data from the Challenger was received 
73.618 seconds after launch. 
At 6.6 seconds before launch, the 
Challenger's liquid fueled main engines were 
ignited in sequence and run up to full thrust 
while the entire Shuttle structure was bolted to 
the launch pad. Thrust of the main engines bends 
the Shuttle assembly forward from the bolts 
anchoring it to the pad. When the Shuttle 
assembly springs back to the vertical, the Solid 
Rocket Boosters' restraining bolts are 
explosively released. During this prerelease 
"twang" motion, structural loads are stored in the 
assembled structure. These loads are released 
during the first few seconds of flight in a 
structural vibration mode at a frequency of about 
3 cycles per second. The maximum structural 
loads on the aft field joints of the Solid Rocket 
Boosters occur during the "twang," exceeding 
even those of the maximum dynamic pressure 
period experienced later in flight. 
Just after liftoff at .678 seconds into the 
flight, photographic data show a strong puff of 
gray smoke was spurting from the vicinity of the 
aft field joint on the right Solid Rocket Booster. 
The two pad 39B cameras that would have 
recorded the precise location of the puff were 
inoperative. Computer graphic analysis of film 
from other cameras indicated the initial smoke 
came from the 270 to 310-degree sector of the 
circumference of the aft field joint of the right 
Solid Rocket Booster. This area of the solid 
booster faces the External Tank. The vaporized 
material streaming from the joint indicated there 
was not complete sealing action within the joint. 
Eight more distinctive puffs of 
increasingly blacker smoke were recorded 
between .836 and 2.500 seconds. The smoke 
appeared to puff upwards from the joint. While 
each smoke puff was being left behind by the 
upward flight of the Shuttle, the next fresh puff 
could be seen near the level of the joint. The 
multiple smoke puffs in this sequence occurred 
at about four times per second, approximating 
the frequency of the structural load dynamics and 
resultant joint flexing. Computer graphics 
applied to NASA photos from a variety of 
cameras in this sequence again placed the smoke 
puffs' origin in the 270-to 310-degree sector of 
the original smoke spurt. 
As the Shuttle increased its upward 
velocity, it flew past the emerging and expanding 
smoke puffs. The last smoke was seen above the 
field joint at 2.733 seconds. At 3.375 seconds the 
last  
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smoke was visible below the Solid Rocket 
Boosters and became indiscernible as it mixed 
with rocket plumes and surrounding atmosphere. 
The black color and dense composition of the 
smoke puffs suggest that the grease, joint 
insulation and rubber O-rings in the joint seal 
were being burned and eroded by the hot 
propellant gases. 
Launch sequence films from previous 
missions were examined in detail to determine if 
there were any prior indications of smoke of the 
color and composition that appeared during the 
first few seconds of the 51-L mission. None were 
found. Other vapors in this area were determined 
to be melting frost from the bottom of the 
External Tank or steam from the rocket exhaust 
in the pad's sound suppression water trays. 
Shuttle main engines were throttled up to 104 
percent of their rated thrust level, the Challenger 
executed a programmed roll maneuver and the 
engines were throttled back to 94 percent. 
At approximately 37 seconds, 
Challenger encountered the first of several high-
altitude wind shear conditions, which lasted until 
about 64 seconds. The wind shear created forces 
on the vehicle with relatively large fluctuations. 
These were immediately sensed and countered 
by the guidance, navigation and control system. 
Although flight 51-L loads exceeded prior 
experience in both yaw and pitch planes at 
certain instants, the maxima had been 
encountered on previous flights and were within 
design limits.  
The steering system (thrust vector 
control) of the Solid Rocket Booster responded 
to all commands and wind shear effects. The 
wind shear caused the steering system to be more 
active than on any previous flight. 
At 45 seconds into the flight, three 
bright flashes appeared downstream of the 
Challenger's right wing. Each flash lasted less 
than one-thirtieth of' a second. Similar flashes 
have been seen on other flights. Another 
appearance of a separate bright spot was 
diagnosed by film analysis to be a reflection of 
main engine exhaust on the Orbital Maneuvering 
System pods located at the upper rear section of 
the Orbiter. The flashes were unrelated to the 
later appearance of the flame plume from the 
right Solid Rocket Booster. 
Both the Shuttle main engines and the 
solid rockets operated at reduced thrust 
approaching and passing through the area of 
maximum dynamic pressure of 720 pounds per 
square foot. Main engines had been throttled up 
to 104 percent thrust and the Solid Rocket 
Boosters were increasing their thrust when the 
first flickering flame appeared on the right Solid 
Rocket Booster in the area of the aft field joint. 
This first very small flame was detected on 
image enhanced film at 58.788 seconds into the 
flight. It appeared to originate at about 305 
degrees around the booster circumference at or 
near the aft field joint. 
One film frame later from the same 
camera, the flame was visible without image 
enhancement. It grew into a continuous, well-
defined plume at 59.262 seconds. At about the 
same time (60 seconds), telemetry showed a 
pressure differential between the chamber 
pressures in the right and left boosters. The right 
booster chamber pressure was lower, confirming 
the growing leak in the area of the field joint. 
As the flame plume increased in size, it 
was deflected rearward by the aerodynamic 
slipstream and circumferentially by the 
protruding structure of the upper ring attaching 
the booster to the External Tank. These 
deflections directed the flame plume onto the 
surface of the External Tank. This sequence of 
flame spreading is confirmed by analysis of the 
recovered wreckage. The growing flame also 
impinged on the strut attaching the Solid Rocket 
Booster to the External Tank. 
At about 62 seconds into the flight, the 
control system began to react to counter the 
forces caused by the plume and its effects. The 
left So lid Rocket Booster thrust vector control 
moved to counter the yaw caused by reduced 
thrust from the leaking right Solid Rocket 
Booster. During the next nine seconds, Space 
Shuttle control systems worked to correct 
anomalies in pitch and yaw rates. 
The first visual indication that swirling 
flame from the right Solid Rocket Booster 
breached the External Tank was at 64.660 
seconds when there was an abrupt change in the 
shape and color of the plume. This indicated that 
it was mixing with leaking hydrogen from the 
External Tank. Telemetered changes in the 
hydrogen tank pressurization confirmed the leak. 
Within 45 milliseconds of the breach of the 
External Tank, a bright sustained glow 
developed on the black-tiled underside of the 
Challenger between it and the Ext ernal Tank. 
Beginning at about 72 seconds, a series 
of events occurred extremely rapidly that 
terminated  
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the flight. Telemetered data indicate a wide 
variety of flight system actions that support the 
visual evidence of the photos as the Shuttle 
struggled futilely against the forces that were 
destroying it.  
At about 72.20 seconds the lower strut 
linking the Solid Rocket Booster and the 
External Tank was severed or pulled away from 
the weakened hydrogen tank permitting the right 
Solid Rocket Booster to rotate around the upper 
attachment strut. This rotation is indicated by 
divergent yaw and pitch rates between the left 
and right Solid Rocket Boosters. 
At 73.124 seconds, a circumferential 
white vapor pattern was observed blooming from 
the side of the External Tank bottom dome. This 
was the beginning of the structural failure of the 
hydrogen tank that culminated in the entire aft 
dome dropping away. This released massive 
amounts of liquid hydrogen from the tank and 
created a sudden forward thrust of about 2.~3 
million pounds, pushing the hydrogen tank 
upward into the intertank structure. At about the 
same time, the rotating right Solid Rocket 
Booster impacted the intertank structure and the 
lower part of the liquid oxygen tank. These 
structures failed at 73.137 seconds as evidenced 
by the white vapors appearing in the intertank 
region. 
Within milliseconds there was massive, 
almost explosive, burning of the hydrogen 
streaming from the failed tank bottom and the 
liquid oxygen breach in the area of the intertank. 
At this point in its trajectory, while traveling at a 
Mach number of 1.92 at an altitude of 46,O00 
feet, the Challenger was totally enveloped in the 
explosive burn. The Challenger's reaction control 
system ruptured and a hypergolic burn of its 
propellants occurred as it exited the oxygen-
hydrogen flames. The reddish brown colors of 
the hypergolic fuel burn are visible on the edge 
of the main fireball. The Orbiter, under severe 
aerodynamic loads, broke into several large 
sections which emerged from the fireball. 
Separate sections that can be identified on film 
include the main engine/tail section with the 
engines still burning, one wing of the Orbiter, 
and the forward fuselage trailing a mass of 
umbilical lines pulled loose from the payload 
bay. 
Evidence in the recovered wreckage 
from the 51-L mission hardware supports this 
final sequence of events.  
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At right, the boosters diverge farther; the External Tank wreckage is obscured by 
smoke and vapor. The Orbiter engines still firing, is visible at bottom center.  
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At about 76 seconds, unidentifiable fragments of the Shuttle vehicle can be seen 
tumbling against a background of fire, smoke and vaporized propellants from the 
External Tank (left).  
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In the photo at right, the left booster (far right) soars away, still thrusting. The 
reddish-brown cloud envelops the disintegrating Orbiter. The color is 
characteristic of the nitrogen tetroxide oxidizer in the Orbiter Reaction Control 
System propellant
 34 
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At 11:44 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, a GOES environment-monitoring satellite 
operated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration acquired this 
image of the smoke and vapor cloud from the 51-L accident. The coast of Florida 
is outlined in red. 
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STS 51-L Sequence of Major Events 
 
Mission Time  
(GMT, in 
hr:min:sec) 
Event  Elapsed Time (secs.) Source  
.  
16:37:53.444  ME - 3 Ignition Command  - 6.566  GPC  
37:53.564  ME - 2 Ignition Command  - 6.446  GPC  
37:53.684  ME - 1 Ignition Command  - 6.326  GPC  
38:00.010  SRM Ignition Command (T=O)  0.000  GPC  
38:00.018  Holddown Post 2 PIC firing  0.008  E8 Camera  
38:00.260  First Continuous Vertical Motion  0.250  E9 Camera  
38:00.688  Confirmed smoke above field joint on RH SRM  0.678  E60 Camera  
38:00.846  Eight puffs of smoke (from 0.836 thru 2.500 sec MET)  0.836  E63 Camera  
38:02.743  Last positive evidence of smoke above right aft SRB/ET attach ring  2.733  
CZR-1 
Camera  
38:03.385  Last positive visual indication of smoke  3.375  E60 Camera  
38:04.349  SSME 104% Command  4.339  E41M2076D  
38:05.684  RH SRM pressure 11.8 psi above nominal  5.674  B47P2302C  
38:07.734  Roll maneuver initiated  7.724  V9OR5301C  
38:19.869  SSME 94% Command  19.859  E41M2076D  
38:21.134  Roll maneuver completed  21.124  V9OR5301C  
38:35.389  SSME 65% Command  35.379  E41M2076D  
38:37.000  Roll and Yaw Attitude Response to Wind (36.990 to 62.990 sec)  36.990  V95H352nC  
38:51.870  SSME 104% Command  51.860  E41M2076D  
38:58.798  First evidence of flame on RH SRM  58.788  E207 Camera  
38:59.010  Reconstructed Max Q (720 psf)  59.000  BET  
38:59.272  Continuous well defined plume on RH SRM  59.262  E207 Camera  
38: 59.763  Flame from RH SRM in + Z direction (seen from south side of vehicle)  59.753  E204 Camera  
39:00.014  SRM pressure divergence (RH vs. LH)  60.004  B47P2302  
39:00.248  First evidence of plume deflection, intermittent  60.238  E207 Camera  
39:00.258  First evidence of SRB plume attaching to ET ring frame  60.248  E203 Camera  
39:00.998  First evidence of plume deflection, continuous  60.988  E207 Camera  
39:01.734  Peak roll rate response to wind  61.724  V9OR5301C  
39:02.094  Peak TVC response to wind  62.084  B58H1150C  
39:02.414  Peak yaw rate response to wind  62.404  V9OR5341C  
39:02.494  RH outboard elevon actuator hinge moment spike  62.484  V58P0966C  
39:03.934  RH outboard elevon actuator delta pressure change  63.924  V58P0966C  
39:03.974  Start of planned pitch rate maneuver  63.964  V9OR5321C  
39:04.670  Change in anomalous plume shape (LH2 tank leak near 2058 ring frame)  64.660  E204 Camera  
39:04.715  Bright sustained glow on sides of ET  64.705  E204 Camera  
39:04.947  Start SSME gimbal angle large pitch variations  64.937  V58HllOOA  
39:05.174  Beginning of transient motion due to changes in aero forces due to plume  65.164  V9OR5321C  
39:05.534  LH outboard elevon actuator delta pressure change  65.524  V58P0866C  
39:06.774  Start ET LH2 ullage pressure deviations  66.764  T41P1700C  
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39:12.214   Start divergent yaw rates (RH vs. LH SRB)  72.204  V9OR2528C  
39:12.294   Start divergent pitch rates (RH vs. LH SRB)  72.284  V9OR2525C  
39:12.488   SRB major high-rate actuator command  72.478  V79H2111A  
39:12.507   SSME roll gimbal rates 5 deg/sec  72.497  V58HllOOA  
39:12.535   Vehicle max + Y lateral acceleration ( + .227 g)  72.525  V98A1581C  
39:12.574   SRB major high-rate actuator motion  72.564  B58H1151C   
39:12.574   Start of H2 tank pressure decrease with 2 flow control valves open  72.564  T41P1700C  
39:12.634   Last state vector downlinked   72.624  Data reduction 
39:12.974   Start of sharp MPS LOX inlet pressure drop  72.964  V41P1330C  
39:13.020   Last full computer frame of TDRS data   73.010  Data reduction 
39:13.054   Start of sharp MPS LH2 inlet pressure drop   73.044  V41Pl lOOC  
39:13.055   Vehicle max -Y lateral acceleration (-.254 g)  73.045  V98A1581C  
39:13.134   Circumferential white pattern on ET aft dome (LH2 tank failure)  73.124  E204 Camera  
39:13.134   RH SRM pressure 19 psi lower than LH SRM  73.124  B47P2302C  
39:13.147   First hint of vapor at intertank  73.137  E207 Camera  
39:13.153   All engine systems start responding to loss of fuel and LOX inlet pressure   73.143  SSME team   
39:13.172   Sudden cloud along ET between intertank and aft dome  73.162  E207 Camera  
39:13.201   Flash between Orbiter and LH2 tank  73.191  E204 Camera  
39:13.221   SSME telemetry data interference from 73.211 to 73.303  73.211  .  
39:13.223   Flash near SRB fwd attach and brightening of flash between Orbiter and ET  73.213  E204 Camera  
39:13.292   First indication intense white flash at SRB fwd attach point  73.282  E204 Camera  
39:13.337   Greatly increased intensity of white flash  73.327  E204 Camera  
39:13.387   Start RCS jet chamber pressure fluctuations   73.377  V42P1552A  
39:13.393  All engines approaching HPFT discharge temp redline limits   73.383  E41TnO1OD   
39:13.492   ME-2 HPFT disch. temp Chan. A vote for shutdown; 2 strikes on Chan. B  73.482  MEC data  
39:13.492   ME-2 controller last time word update   73.482  MEC data  
39: 13.513  ME-3 in shutdown due to HPFT discharge temperature redline exceedance  73.503  MEC data  
39:13.513   ME-3 controller last time word update   73.503  MEC data  
39:13.533   ME-1 in shutdown due to HPFT discharge temperature redline exceedance  73.523  Calculation   
39:13.553   ME-1 last telemetered data point  73.543  Calculation   
39:13.628   Last validated Orbiter telemetry measurement  73.618  V46P0120A  
39:13.641   End of last reconstructed data frame with valid synchronization and frame count  73.631  Data reduction 
39:14.140   Last radio frequency signal from Orbiter  74.130  Data reduction 
39:14.597   Bright flash in vicinity of Orbiter nose  74.587  E204 Camera  
39:16.447   RH SRB nose cap sep/chute deployment  76.437  E207 Camera  
39:50.260  RH SRB RSS destruct  110.250   E202 Camera  
39:50.262   LH SRB RSS destruct  110.252   E230 Camera  
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ACT POS  - Actuator Position  MEC  - Main Engine Controller  
APU  - Auxiliary Power Unit  MET  - Mission Elapsed Time  
BET  - Best Estimated Trajectory  MPS  - Main Propulsion System   
CH  - Channel  PC  - Chamber Pressure  
DISC  - Discharge   PIC  - Pyrotechnics Initiator Controller  
ET  - External Tank  psf  - Pounds per square foot  
GG  - Gas Generator  RCS  - Reaction Control System   
GPC  - General Purpose Computer  RGA  - Rate Gyro Assembly  
GMT  - Greenwich Mean Time  RH  - Righthand  
HPFT  - High Pressure Fuel Turbopump  RSS  - Range Safety System   
LH  - Lefthand  SRB  - Solid Rocket Booster  
LH2  - Liquid Hydrogen  SRM  - Solid Rocket Motor  
LO2  - Liquid Oxygen  SSME - Space Shuttle Main Engine  
MAX Q  - Maximum Dynamic Pressure  TEMP  - Temperature  
ME  - Main Engine (same as SSME)  
 
TVC  - Thrust Vector Control  
 
Note: The shuttle coordinate system used in Chapter 2 is, relative to the Orbiter, as follows: 
+ X direction = forward (tail to nose)  
- X direction = rearward (nose to tail)  
+ Y direction = right (toward the right wing tip)  
- Y direction = left (toward the leftwing tip)  
+ Z direction = down  
+ Z direction = up  
 
 Shuttle to Ground Telemetry Channels 
 
 Channel 
Identifier 
Sample Rate  
(Samples/sec) 
Sample Period  
(sec)  Description 
.  
B47P1302C  12.5   .080  LH SRM CHAMBER PRESSURE  
B47P2302C  12.5   .080  RH SRM CHAMBER PRESSURE  
B58H1150C   25 .040  LH SRB TVC TILT ACT POS  
B58H1151C   25 .040  LH SRB TVC ROCK ACT POS  
E41M2076D  25 .040  ME-3 VEHICLE COMMAND  
E41T1O1OD   25 .040  ME-1 HPFT DISC TEMP-CH A  
E41T2010D  25 .040  ME-2 HPFT DISC TEMP-CH A  
E41T3010D  25 .040  ME-3 HPFT DISC TEMP-CH A  
T41P1700C  5 .200  ET LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE  
V41P11OOC  12.5   .080  MPS LH2 INLET PRESS (ME-1)  
V41P1330C  12.5   .080  MPS LO2 INLET PRESS (ME-3)  
V42P1552A  25 .040  RCS THRUSTER PC  
V46P0120A  100  .010  APU-1 GG CHAMBER PRESS  
V58H11OOA  25 .040  ME-PITCH ACTUATOR POS  
V58P0866C  12.5   .080  LH OB ELEVON PRI DELTA P  
V58P0966C  12.5   .080  RH OB ELEVON PRI DELTA P  
V79H2111A  25 .040  LH SRB TILT ACT DRIVER  
V90R2525C   5 .200  SEL LH SRB PITCH RATE  
V90R2528C   5 .200  SEL RH SRB YAW RATE  
V90R5301C   5 .200  SELECTED RGA ROLL RATE  
V90R5321C   5 .200  SELECTED RGA PITCH RATE  
V90R5341C   5 .200  SELECTED RGA YAW RATE  
V95H3522C   12.5   .080  BODY YAW ATTITUDE ERROR  
V95H3523C   12.5   .080  BODY ROLL ATTITUDE ERROR   
V98A1581C  25 .040  LATERAL ACCELERATION  
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Chapter IV: The Cause of the Accident 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The consensus of the Commission and 
participating investigative agencies is that the 
loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger was caused 
by a failure in the joint between the two lower 
segments of the right Solid Rocket Motor. The 
specific failure was the destruction of the seals 
that are intended to prevent hot gases from 
leaking through the joint during the propellant 
burn of the rocket motor. The evidence 
assembled by the Commission indicates that no 
other element of the Space Shuttle system 
contributed to this failure. 
In arriving at this conclusion, the 
Commission reviewed in detail all available data, 
reports and records; directed and supervised 
numerous tests, analyses, and experiments by 
NASA, civilian contractors and various 
government agencies; and then developed 
specific failure scenarios and the range of most 
probable causative factors. The sections that 
follow discuss the results of the investigation . 
  
Analysis of the Accident 
The results of the accident investigation 
and analysis will be presented in this and the 
following sections. Throughout the investigation 
three critical questions were central to the 
inquiry, namely: 
What were the circumstances 
surrounding mission 51-L that contributed to the 
catastrophic termination of that flight in contrast 
to 24 successful flights preceding it?  
What evidence pointed to the right 
Solid Rocket Booster as the source of the 
accident as opposed to other elements of the 
Space Shuttle?  
Finally, what was the mechanism of 
failure?  
Using mission data, subsequently 
completed tests and analyses, and recovered 
wreckage, the Commission identified all possible 
faults that could originate in the respective flight 
elements of the Space Shuttle which might have 
the potential to lead to loss of the Challenger. 
Potential contributors to the accident examined 
by the Commission were the launch pad 
(exonerated in Chapter IX of this report), the 
External Tank, the Space Shuttle Main Engines, 
the Orbiter and related equipment, 
payload/Orbiter interfaces, the payload, Solid 
Rocket Boosters and Solid Rocket Motors. 
In a parallel effort, the question of 
sabotage was examined in detail and reviewed by 
the Commission in executive session. There is no 
evidence of sabotage, either at the launch pad or 
during other processes prior to or during launch . 
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External Tank 
 
The External Tank contains propellants 
used by the Orbiter's three main engines during 
Shuttle launch and ascent to orbit. Structurally 
the tank is attached to and serves as the backbone 
of the Orbiter and the two Solid Rocket Boosters. 
Three primary structures-the liquid oxygen tank, 
the intertank and the liquid hydrogen tank-
comprise the configuration. (Figure 1) 
The External Tank delivers oxidizer and 
fuel from the propellant tanks to the Orbiter. The 
electrical subsystem includes instrumentation 
sensors, heaters, range safety electronics and 
explosives, and lightning protection and 
associated cabling. All flight instrumentation and 
electrical power are wired directly to the Orbiter. 
The thermal protection subsystem is the 
insulation applied to the tank's exterior. Its 
function is to prevent heat leakage into the 
propellants, to protect the External Tank from 
overheating during flight and to minimize ice 
formation while the Shuttle is on the pad. 
Approximately 20 percent of the 
External Tank structure was recovered after the 
accident and the majority of the pieces were 
from the intertank and liquid hydrogen tank.1 
The Commission initially considered all External 
Tank systems and subsystems in identifying 
possible faults or failures potentially contributing 
to the Challenger accident.  
Those potential contributors were: 
· Premature detonation of the External 
Tank range safety system  
· Structural flaw  
· Damage at lift-off  
· Load exceedance  
· Overheating  
·  
The Commission examined the 
possibility that the STS 51-L accident could have 
been triggered by accidental detonation of the 
range safety system explosives. This potential 
fault was assessed using flight data, observed 
events, and recovered hardware. Most of the 
explosive charges for the External Tank 
emergency destruction system were recovered.2 
Examination of this material established that 
none of it had exploded and thus could not have 
contributed to the accident (Photo C & D). Flight 
data verified that the External Tank range safety 
system was not activated . 
The possibility of an imperfection 
existing in either the pressurized or 
nonpressurized External Tank structural 
elements that could grow to a sufficient size to 
cause structural failure was examined in detail. 
All construction history, structural qualification 
test data, proof test inspection records and x-rays 
were reviewed. One previously 
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undetected imperfection that was discovered 
during a reexamination of the x-rays was found 
in recovered hardware with no propagation 
indicated.3 Other data from the pre-launch ice 
and frost team inspections, film and video 
coverage, pressurization records and flight data 
revealed no evidence of leakage. The 
Commission concluded that no structural 
imperfections existed that could have grown to a 
size to create a leak or cause catastrophic failure 
of the External Tank. 
Possible damage to the liquid hydrogen 
tank at lift off was considered. The ice and frost 
team observed no vapor or frost that would 
indicate a leak. The liquid hydrogen vent arm 
retracted as expected during launch and did not 
recontact the tank or solid booster.4 Photo 
analysis and television monitoring did not 
indicate that any debris contacted the tank. 
Therefore, damage to the liquid hydrogen tank at 
lift off was determined to be highly improbable. 
The possibility that abnormally high 
structural loads caused an External Tank failure 
was examined. Analysis indicated that there were 
no excessive loading conditions based on lift off 
and flight data prior to the explosion. The 
maximum structural load produced was less than 
80 percent of the allowable design load.5 The 
structural implications of vent and flow control 
valve operation was examined and found not to 
be a factor.  
The possibility of a structural failure 
due to overheating was assessed with several 
causes postulated: high heating due to abnormal 
trajectory, loss of the thermal protection system, 
a hot gas leak from the Solid Rocket Motor and a 
liquid hydrogen leak from the External Tank.  
The trajectory was normal until well 
after the Solid Rocket Motor leak was observed 
at 58 seconds. Maximum aerodynamic heating 
would not have occurred until approximately 90 
seconds.6 At 73 seconds, heating was well within 
tank component structural capability. Based on 
careful review of pre -launch and flight films and 
data, the Commission found no evidence that any 
thermal protection foam was lost during the 
launch and ascent.  
The possibility of a leak from the 
hydrogen tank resulting in overheating was 
addressed. Tests indicated that small leaks (0.037 
lbs/second) would have been visible. In addition, 
if there was a liquid hydrogen leak at lift off, it 
would have been ignited by either the Solid 
Rocket Booster ignition or Space Shuttle Main 
Engine ignition.7 
The resultant flame would have ignited 
the Solid Rocket Booster attach ring foam 
insulation almost immediately. Copious 
quantities of dense black smoke and open flames 
would be evident in such a case and would have 
continued for as long as the leak burned. Smoke 
and flames in these quantities were not observed 
at lift off nor anytime throughout the flight. It is 
therefore concluded that an initial liquid 
hydrogen tank leak was improbable, and that the 
only possible cause for overheating the tank was 
the impingement of leaking Solid Rocket Motor 
gases. This resulted in the ultimate breakup of 
the External Tank. 
The recovered external foam insulation 
on the External Tank was scorched and 
discolored in various locations.8 Burn patterns 
across the pieces of insulation on the External 
Tank indicate that various areas were subjected 
to fire both before and after the External Tank 
broke up in flight. 
The Commission reviewed the External 
Tank's construction records, acceptance testing, 
pre-launch and flight data, and recovered 
hardware and found nothing relating to the 
External Tank that caused or contributed to the 
cause of the accident. 
  
Space Shuttle Main Engines  
A cluster of three Space Shuttle Main 
Engines operates simultaneously with the Solid 
Rocket Boosters during the initial ascent phase 
of flight and provides primary propulsion until 
the Shuttle has attained orbital velocity. These 
engines use liquid hydrogen as the fuel and 
liquid oxygen as the oxidizer. Both the liquid 
hydrogen and oxygen are stored in the External 
Tank and are transferred to the engines under 
pressure. During the mission the engines operate 
for about 8.5 minutes. 
Engine thrust is controlled by throttling 
and has ranged from 65 to 104 percent of a 
specified thrust level. At sea level, 100 percent 
equals 375,000 pounds of thrust per engine.  
Pitch, yaw and roll control of the Orbiter is 
provided by gimbals on each engine. Gimbaling 
is operated by two hydraulic servo-actuators, one 
for pitch motion and the other for yaw motion, 
with roll controlled by a combination of both 
pitch and yaw. These servo-actuators are 
commanded by the Orbiter's computer.  
An electronic controller is attached to 
the forward end of each engine. Each controller 
is a self 
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contained system that monitors engine checkout, 
control and status, and sends the data to the 
Orbiter. Each of the three engine interface units 
in turn sends its data to the Orbiter computers 
and relays commands from the computers to the 
engines. 
A propellant management subsystem of 
manifolds, distribution lines and valves controls 
the flow of liquids from the External Tank to the 
engines, and the flow of gaseous hydrogen and 
oxygen from the engines into the External Tank 
to maintain pressurization. 
All three main engines from the 
Challenger, No. 2020 in position 2, No. 2021 in 
position 3, and No. 2023 in position 1, were 
recovered in large part on February 23, 1986, off 
the Florida coast in about 85 feet of water. All 
parts were recovered close to one another, and 
the engines were still attached to the thrust 
structure.9 All engine gimbal bearings had failed, 
apparently because of overload on water impact. 
All metallic surfaces were damaged by 
marine life, except titanium surfaces or those 
parts that were buried under the ocean bottom. 
The metal fractures, examined at 3x 
magnification, showed rough texture and shear 
lips, which appeared to be caused by overloads 
due to water impact.10 No pre-accident material 
defects were noted.  
The engine nozzles were sheared at the 
manifolds. The main combustion chambers, 
main injectors and preburners of each engine 
were attached to one another. The six hydraulic 
servo-actuators used to control engine gimbaling 
were attached to segments of the Orbiter thrust 
structure.11 
Sections of the main propulsion system 
fuel and liquid oxygen feedlines and feedline 
manifolds were recovered, as well as the 
External Tank/Orbiter disconnect assembly in 
the mated configuration. A portion of the 
oxidizer inlet duct was attached to the interface 
of engine 2020. All preburner valves were 
recovered.12 
The main engine controllers for both 
engines 2020 and 2021 were recovered. One 
controller was broken open on one side, and both 
were severely corroded and damaged by marine 
life. Both units were disassembled and the 
memory units flushed with deionized water. 
After they were dried and vacuum baked, data 
from these units were retrieved.13 
All engines had burn damage caused by 
internal overtemperature typical of oxygen-rich 
shutdown. Thus, the loss of hydrogen fuel 
appears to have initiated the shutdown. The 
Commission reviewed engine and ground 
measurements made while the three engines 
were prepared for launch. Ambient temperature 
during pre-launch was the coldest to date, but 
preflight engine data were normal.14 These data 
were also compared with Challenger engine data 
during the flight 61-A pre-flight period. All 
differences seen between the two missions were 
due either to planned variations in the pre -launch 
sequence or the cold amb ient conditions during 
the preflight period for flight 51-L. These 
differences did not affect engine  
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performance during the powered flight phase of 
the mission. 
Preflight data gave no evidence of any 
propellant leaks (fuel or oxidizer) in the aft 
compartment. For the powered flight phase all 
the parameters of the engine aft compartment 
that could give an indication of a leak were 
selected from the overall flight 51-L 
measurement list. The majority of those 
parameters were either ground measurements or 
those recorded during the flight but not 
telemetered to the ground.15 Among parameters 
that were telemetered during the flight were skin 
temperature measurements that gave no 
indication of a hot gas or other leak in the engine 
compartment. 
Analysis of the engine start data showed 
all three engine starts were normal and no 
anomalies were found.  
An assessment of the engine 
performance in the final seconds of the mission 
before the accident was compared with similar 
periods on all flights of the Challenger engines. 
The assessment showed the engine performance 
on flight 51-L was consistent with previous 
flights.16 
The first abnormal engine indication 
was a drop in engine fuel tank pressure at 72.564 
seconds. As fuel pressure dropped, the control 
system automatically responded by opening the 
fuel flowrate valve. The turbine temperatures 
then increased because of the leaner fuel mixture. 
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The increased temperature caused an increase in 
pump speed. This could not, however, increase 
the fuel pressure because of a decrease in fuel 
tank top (ullage) pressure resulting from the 
burned through hydrogen tank leakage. When the 
fuel pump pressures dropped below 140 pounds 
per square inch, the programed control system 
disqualified the measured data because it was 
past reasonable limits. This caused the fuel 
flowrate and high-pressure fuel pump discharge 
pressure to decrease, while the lack of load 
allowed the pump's speed to increase. The 
decreased fuel flow caused a drop in fuel 
preburner chamber pressure, though the fuel 
preburner oxygen valve was then advancing 
toward a more open position. The mixture ratio 
in the fuel preburner became leaner, which raised 
high-pressure fuel turbine discharge 
temperatures above the redline limits. This 
caused the engine control system to start 
automatic shutdown of the engine. 
The engine flight history showed that 
engine 2023 flew four p revious times while 
engines 2020 and 2021 had flown five previous 
missions.17 The flight data from flight 51-L 
compared well with flight data from all previous 
flights. 
The analysis of flight data confirmed 
that the Space Shuttle Main Engines operated 
properly while reacting to changing external 
conditions. Previous engine tests suggest that the 
highpressure pumps are the most likely 
components to fail, because of either bearing or 
turbine blade failure. There was no evidence of 
either in flight 51-L. Engine operation was 
normal until the fuel inlet pressure dropped. As 
the pressure decreased, the engine responded in a 
predictable manner. Automatic shutdown of 
engine 2023 was verified by telemetry data. Data 
recovered from the salvaged engine 2021 control 
computer verify that this engine also had begun 
shutdown. Salvaged control computer data from 
engine 2020 showed that this engine was within 
20 milliseconds of shutdown when the computer 
stopped.18 Inspection of recovered engine 
hardware verified that all engines were shut 
down in a fuel-lean or oxygen-rich condition 
which resulted in burn through and erosion of the 
engine hot gas circuits. 
The Commission concluded that the Space 
Shuttle Main Engines did not cause or contribute 
to the cause of the Challenger accident. 
  
Orbiter and Related Equipment  
The Orbiter subsystems include propulsion and 
power, avionics, structures, thermal and 
environmental control and life support, 
mechanical and interface, and other government 
furnished essential equipment. Onboard 
government furnished equipment for STS 51 -L 
included the remote manipulator arm system, 
extravehicular mobility units, extravehicular 
activity hardware, television, equipment worn by 
the crew, storage provisions and communication 
equipment. 
The significant pieces of Orbiter 
structure recovered included all three Space 
Shuttle Main Engines, the forward fuselage 
including the crew module, the right inboard and 
outboard elevons, a large portion of the right 
wing, a lower portion of the vertical stabilizer, 
three rudder speed brake panels and portions of 
mid-fuselage side walls from both the left and 
right sides.19 This represents about 30 percent of 
the Orbiter but does not provide sufficient 
evidence to establish conclusively the complete 
failure sequence of the entire Orbiter spacecraft. 
However, there was sufficient evidence to 
establish some of the structural failure modes 
that resulted in the Orbiter's destruction. 
All fractures and material failures 
examined on the Orbiter, with the exception of 
the main engines, were the result of overload 
forces, and they exhibited no evidence of internal 
burn damage or exposure to explosive forces. 
This indicated that the destruction of the Orbiter 
occurred predominantly from aerodynamic and 
inertial forces that exceeded design limits. There 
was evidence that during the breakup sequence, 
the right Solid Rocket Booster struck the 
outboard end of the Orbiter's right wing and right 
outboard elevon. Additionally, chemical analysis 
indicated that the right side of the Orbiter was 
sprayed by hot propellant gases exhausting from 
the hole in the inboard circumference of the right 
Solid Rocket Booster. Evaluation of the Orbiter 
main engines showed extensive internal thermal 
damage to the engines as a consequence of 
oxygen-rich shutdown that resulted from a 
depletion of the hydrogen fuel supply. The 
supply of hydrogen fuel to the main engines 
would have been abruptly discontinued when the 
liquid hydrogen tank in the External Tank 
disintegrated. 
The crew module wreckage was found 
submerged in about 90 feet of ocean water 
concentrated in an area of about 20 feet by 80 
feet. Portions of the forward fuselage outer shell 
structure were found among the pieces of crew 
module recovered.20 There was no evidence of 
an internal explosion, heat or fire damage on the 
forward 
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fuselage/crew module pieces. The crew module 
was disintegrated, with the heaviest 
fragmentation and crash damage on the left side. 
The fractures examined were typical of overload 
breaks and appeared to be the result of high 
forces generated by impact with the surface of 
the water. The sections of lower forward 
fuselage outer shell found floating on the ocean 
surface were recovered shortly after the accident. 
They also contained crush damage indicative of 
an impact on the left side. The consistency of 
damage to the left side of the outer fuselage shell 
and crew module indicates that these structures 
remained attached to each other until impact with 
the water. 
The Orbiter investigation consisted of a 
review of all Orbiter data and vehicle parts 
retrieved. Also reviewed were vehicle and 
equipment processing records and pre-mission 
analyses. 
All orbital maneuvering system 
measurements such as temperatures, pressures, 
events, commands, stimuli, and switch positions 
were reviewed with all related computer data. 
There were no indications of abnormal behavior.  
All temperature and pressure 
transducers active during ascent for the reaction 
control system were reviewed, including thruster 
chamber pressure, leak temperature, line 
temperature, propellant tank, helium tank and 
propellant line transducers. Nothing was found 
that could have contributed to the accident. 
Auxiliary power unit pressures and 
temperatures were reviewed, and no abnormal 
conditions were observed during ascent. Selected 
hydraulic measurements, including system 
pressures, fluid quantities and most temperatures 
in the aft compartment and in the wing cavity 
containing the elevon actuator supply lines, were 
reviewed by the Commission, and no 
abnormality was found. All fuel cells and power 
reactant storage and distribution subsystem 
measurements were reviewed and found to be 
normal during all phases of ground and flight 
operation prior to the accident. All available 
pyrotechnic firing control circuit measurements 
were reviewed, along with radiography, shear 
bolt review and debris reports, 
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Figure 6: 
 
and there were no unintentional firing command 
indications.21 All available data regarding range 
safety and recovery system batteries were 
reviewed, and no indications were found that the 
batteries were involved in initiating the accident. 
Guidance, navigation and control subsystems 
data were reviewed, and it appears that the 
subsystems performed properly. All subsystem 
sensors and software apparently performed as 
designed until data loss. Inertial measurement 
unit data from the preflight calibration through 
signal loss were found to be normal. All data 
processing system related data were reviewed, 
and nothing significant was found. Data review 
of the electrical power distribution and control 
subsystem indicated that its performance was 
normal until the time of the accident.22 All 
communication and tracking system parameters 
active during launch were evaluated and found to 
be normal. No instrumentation abnormalities 
were observed during the pre-launch and launch 
period before signal loss. 
Structures evaluation included analysis 
of ground and flight data (loads, temperatures, 
pressures and purge flows), hardware changes 
and discrepancy reports since the last Challenger 
flight, and wreckage. The Commission found 
that no Orbiter structural elements contributed to 
the accident. 
Orbiter structural pre-launch 
temperature measurements were evaluated and 
found to be within specified limits. 
Data related to the atmospheric 
revitalization system, which maintains cabin 
atmosphere, were evaluated.23 During pre-launch, 
launch and until signal loss, data indicated that 
both of the water coolant loops were normal, the 
pressure control system functioned normally, all 
fans functioned normally, and all switches and 
valve positions were proper.  
Active thermal control subsystem data indicated 
that both of the freon coolant loops functioned 
normally, the ammonia boiler system was 
normal, and all switch and valve positions were 
proper. 24 
The water management subsystem 
functioned  
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normally during the flight. The smoke detection 
and fire suppression subsystem and airlock 
support subsystem both functioned normally. 
The waste collection subsystem is inoperative 
during the launch phase, and no data were 
available.25 
No mechanical system abnormalities 
were identified. The vent doors remained open 
throughout the launch. The payload bay doors 
remained latched. All landing gear were up and 
locked, all doors remained closed and locked, 
and the remote manipulator system and payload 
retention system remained latched. Film and 
Orbiter interface data showed that there was no 
premature Orbiter/External Tank separation. 
Video tapes and photographs indicated 
the crew egress hatch, which caused the launch 
delay on the preceding day, operated properly. 
The onboard government furnished equipment 
configuration and pre-launch processing were 
reviewed and determined to have been 
flightready with no unusual or abnormal 
conditions. 
Based on this review and assessment, 
the Commission concluded that neither the 
Orbiter nor related equipment caused or 
contributed to the cause of the accident. 
  
Payload/Orbiter Interfaces  
Interfaces between the Orbiter and the 
payload serve to attach the cargo to the Orbiter 
or provide services from the Orbiter to cargo 
items. These interfaces are mechanical, thermal, 
avionics, power and fluid systems. 
The Spartan-Halley payload was located in the 
front of the payload bay, attached to the 
equipment support structure carrier. The 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) was 
attached to the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) 
booster rocket used to move the TDRS into 
geosynchronous orbit. In the aft flight deck, 
payload interfaces consisted of a standard switch 
panel, a payload deployment and retention 
system, and display and control panels for use 
with the payload. Payloads in the middeck area 
were in the stowage lockers. These were 
radiation monitoring, phase partitioning, fluid 
dynamics experiments, three student experiments, 
the Teacher in Space Project and the Comet 
Halley monitoring program. 
Thermal interfaces between the Orbiter 
and the payload in the aft flight deck and 
middeck consisted of the Orbiter's purge, vent 
and fluid heat exchanger systems. Thermal 
interface for TDRS/IUS, Spartan-Halley, and the 
experiments and projects were provided by the 
Orbiter environment control and life support 
system. 
Electrical power and avionics were 
provided to the payload through standard 
interface panels along both side of the cargo bay. 
In the aft flight deck, the control and display 
panels supplied by the Orbiter provided the 
avionics and power interfaces for TDRS/IUS. 
The experiments and projects constituting the 
middeck payload had no interfaces with avionics 
and power systems.  
The only direct payload loads data from 
STS 51-L were accelerometer data recorded 
through the Orbiter umbilical prior to lift off. 
Accelerometer data from the payload bay and the 
crew cabin compared favorably with previous 
flights. Results indicate that payload loads on 
STS 51-L were similar to those of STS-6 and 
were within design levels and pre-launch 
predictions. 
The Commission found that all payload 
elements had been certified safe for flight, and 
records for integration of hardware met 
engineering requirements. Temperatures during 
prelaunch and ascent were normal. 
Reconstructed lift off loads were below those 
used in the flight readiness certification. The 
relay satellite's rate gyro data correlated with 
those for the Orbiter and boosters during ascent. 
Fittings attaching the payloads to the Orbiter 
remained in operation, as shown by telemetered 
data from monitoring microswitches. 
The Commission found no 
discrepancies in the Orbiter/payload interface 
performance that might have contributed to the 
Challenger accident. 
  
Payloads, Inertial Upper Stage, and Support 
Equipment 
The payload bay of the Orbiter 
Challenger contained a Tracking and Data Relay 
Satellite (TDRS) attached to an Inertial Upper 
Stage (IUS) booster rocket, and associated 
airborne support equipment. The IUS contained 
two solid rocket motors (SRMs): SRM-1 and 
SRM-2. The combined weight of these 
components was about 40,000 pounds. About 
five percent of the payload, IUS, and support 
equipment package was recovered from the 
ocean. Components recovered included segments 
of the cases of both IUS SRMs, the ignition 
safe/arm device for each SRM, the igniter for 
SRM-2, fragments of unburned propellant from 
each SRM, five explosive 
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separation bolts that secure the two SRMs 
together, the forward support equipment 
trunnions, the aft trunnions with spreader beams, 
and an undetonated section of explosive 
fasteners. 
There was no evidence of scorching, 
burning, or melting on any of the components 
and structure recovered, and all fractures were 
typical overload fractures. The safe arm device 
for each IUS SRM was in the safe position, the 
five explosive SRM-1/SRM-2 separation bolts 
were intact, and pieces of propellant were not 
burned, indicating that the SRMs had not ignited. 
The two aft trunnion spreader beams were intact 
but were bent in the downward direction relative 
to the Orbiter. The right spreader beam was 
cracked and deformed about 7.5 inches, and the 
left spreader beam was cracked and deformed 
about 1.5 inches.26 These deformations indicate 
that the payload and upper stage package was 
intact and secure in the cargo bay while being 
subjected to significant inertial flight loads. 
 
The inertial upper stage is a two-stage, 
solidrocket-propelled, three-axis controlled, 
inertially navigated upper stage rocket used to 
deliver spacecraft weighing up to approximately 
5,000 pounds from the Shuttle parking orbit to 
geosynchronous orbit. It includes the stage 
structure; solid rocket motors; a reaction control 
subsystem; avionics for telemetry, tracking and 
command; guidance, navigation and control; data 
management; thrust vector control; electrical 
power sources and electrical cabling; and 
airborne software. 
Assessment of possible upper stage 
contribution to the accident centered on the 
elimination of three possible scenarios: 
Premature upper stage rocket ignition, 
explosion/fire in the payload bay, and payload 
shift in the payload bay. 
Premature ignition of either the upper 
stage stage 1 and/or stage 2 motor while still in 
the Orbiter bay would have resulted in 
catastrophic failure of the Orbiter.  Potential 
causes for premature ignition were electrostatic 
discharge, inadvertent ignition command and 
auto-ignition. Each would have caused a rapid 
increase in the Orbiter payload bay temperature 
and pressure, and would have been immediately 
followed by structural damage to the payload bay 
doors. The payload bay temperatures remained 
essentially constant, and the Orbiter 
photographic and telemetry data indicated the 
payload doors remained closed and latched from 
lift off until signal loss.27 Both indications 
verified that there was no ignition of the IUS 
solid rocket motors. 
An IUS component explosion or fire 
could have damaged critical systems in the 
Orbiter by overheating or imp act. Five sources 
other than an upper stage motor pre-ignition 
were identified as potential origins of a fire or 
explosion in the payload bay: (1) release and 
ignition of IUS hydrazine from the reaction 
control system tanks, (2) fire or explosion from 
an IUS battery, (3) 
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impact or rupture of a motor case and subsequent 
ignition of exposed propellant, (4) fire of 
electrical origin due to a short, and (5) fire or 
inadvertent ignition of pyrotechnic devices due 
to radio frequency radiation. Thermal 
measurements in the propellant tank and in 
components adjacent to the propellant tanks 
indicated no abnormalities. Pre-launch and 
thermal measurements in the Orbiter payload bay 
and in TDRS near the reaction control system 
were stable throughout the ascent period. A fire 
and/or explosion resulting in shrapnel from an 
IUS battery was eliminated based on pre-launch 
monitoring of open circuit voltages on all 
batteries, except the support equipment batteries. 
Location of these batteries made the potential for 
damage to critical systems very small if they 
burned or exploded. Motor case impact or 
rupture and resulting exposure and propellant 
ignition was determined improbable because 
batteries and reaction control system burning or 
explosion were eliminated by flight data analysis.  
They were the only potential sources for 
IUS heating and high velocity shrapnel. 
Propellant burning was not indicated by payload 
bay thermal measurements. Electrical shorting 
was eliminated as a fire source in the payload 
bay because IUS electrical and Orbiter voltage 
monitors were normal at launch and during STS 
51-L ascent. Fires initiated by radio frequency 
radiation due to inadvertent IUS, TDRS, or 
ground emittance were eliminated because data 
showed worst case radio frequency radiation 
during ascent was less than ground-emitted 
radiation to the payload bay during pre-launch 
checkout. The ground-emitted radiation was 
within specified limits. 
IUS/TDRS payload shifting or breaking 
free within the Orbiter due to structural failure or 
premature separation was investigated. Such a 
shift could have resulted in severe Orbiter 
damage from a direct impact, or could have 
induced a significant shift in the Challenger 
vehicle center of gravity and possibly affected 
flight control.28 Four possible faults that could 
have led to Orbiter damage or substantial 
payload shift were considered: IUS stage 
2/TDRS separation, IUS stage 1/stage 2 
separation, IUS/TDRS separation from the 
airborne support equipment and IUS/airborne 
support equipment separation from Orbiter. All 
were eliminated because dynamic response data 
conclusively showed that IUS/TDRS responded 
normally until the final loss of data. Further, 
TDRS data, which pass through the IUS stage 
1/stage 2 and support equipment, were 
continuous until data loss, verifying that these 
elements did not separate. 
The TDRS spacecraft weighs 
approximately 4,905 pounds and is 9.5 feet in 
diameter and 19.5 feet long. The forward 11 feet 
contain six deployable appendages, two solar 
arrays, one space-ground link antenna, and two 
single access antennas. The spacecraft body 
structure consists of a payload structure and a 
spacecraft structure. These structures house the 
tracking and telemetry and command subsystem, 
power subsystem, thermal control subsystem, 
ordnance subsystem, reaction control subsystem 
and attitude control subsystem. 
Telemetry data were transmitted from 
TDRS from approximately 48 hours prior to 
launch through signal loss. The telemetry system 
was functioning properly, and the data indicated 
that the telemetry processor was in its normal 
operational mode and all power supply voltages 
and calibration voltages were normal. There 
were no changes through the countdown to the 
time of structural breakup, when all telemetry 
abruptly halted. The telemetry tracking and 
control subsystems command and tracking 
elements were inactive during the countdown 
through ascent, and no changes were noted, 
indicating that the TDRS was not commanded to 
alter its launch configuration. 
The TDRS power subsystem had a total 
of 138 telemetry indications. These were the 
main data source used to determine the power 
subsystem activity. Analyzing this telemetry 
showed all subsystem elements performed 
normally. 
The TDRS thermal control subsystem 
was designed to maintain proper temperatures 
primarily by passive means. Also, there is a 
thermostatically controlled heater system to 
ensure minimum required temperatures are 
maintained. The thermal subsystem was 
monitored by 82 configuration status indicators 
and 137 analog temperature channels. This 
telemetry showed that the TDRS remained in its 
normal thermal configuration and experienced 
normal temperatures until signal loss. 
No data indicated that the IUS separated from 
TDRS, that any deployable appendage ordnance 
had been fired or that any appendage motion had 
begun. 
The TDRS reaction control system was 
inactive at launch and required an IUS command 
and two ground commands to activate any 
propellant. 
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Telemetry indicated no valve actuation, changes 
in tank pressures or temperatures, or propellant 
line temperature violations. Further, there was no 
telemetry that would suggest a hydrazine leakage 
or abnormality and no indications that the TDRS 
reaction control system contributed to the 
accident. 
During the launch phase, the attitude 
control subsystem was disabled except for the 
gyros and associated electronics necessary to 
provide the telemetry. All telemetry parameters 
reflecting attitude control subsystem 
configuration remained normal and unchanged 
during the STS 51-L pre -launch and post-launch 
periods. 
The TDRS was mounted in a 
cantilevered fashion to the IUS by an adapter 
ring that provided structural, communications 
and power interfaces. Structural integrity loss 
indications would have been observed by 
interruptions in telemetry or electrical power. 
TDRS telemetry during the launch phase was 
transmitted by electrical cable to the IUS and 
interleaved with upper stage data. If separation 
had occurred at either the TDRS/IUS interface or 
the IUS/support equipment interface, TDRS data 
would have stopped. There was no abnormal 
telemetry until signal loss of all vehicle telemetry. 
TDRS also received power from the Shuttle via 
the IUS through the same interfaces. There were 
no indications of TDRS batteries coming on line. 
This indicates that structural integrity at the 
TDRS and IUS interfaces was maintained until 
the structural breakup. Additionally, an 
inspection of the recovered debris gives the 
following indications that the TDRS/IUS 
remained intact until the structural breakup. First, 
the separation bank lanyards frayed at the end 
where they attached to the band, indicating that 
the spacecraft was pulled forcefully from the 
adapter. Second, the V-groove ring structure at 
the top of the adapter was torn from its riveted 
connection to the adapter, indicating that a strong 
shear existed between the spacecraft and IUS 
which would only be generated if the two were 
still attached. Finally, the adapter base was torn 
where it attached to the IUS, again indicating 
high tension and shear forces. There were no 
indications from telemetry or recovered debris 
that showed that the structural integrity of the 
satellite or the satellite/stage interface had been 
compromised. 
The TDRS records at Kennedy were 
reviewed for technical correctness and to verify 
that no open safety related issues existed. There 
were no findings that revealed unsafe conditions 
or that any safety requirements had been violated 
or compromised. 
A review and assessment of Spartan 
Halley performance was conducted to establish 
any possible contributions to the STS 51-L 
accident. The Spartan Halley was unpowered 
except for the release/engage mechanism latch 
monitor. Its electrical current was in the order of 
milliamps and the telemetry records obtained 
from the Orbiter indicated that the latches were 
in the proper configuration and thus Spartan 
Halley remained firmly attached during flight. In 
addition, the TDRS spacecraft data indicated 
there was no interaction from Spartan. Therefore, 
the Spartan Halley and its support structure 
remained intact. The payload bay temperature in 
the vicinity of Spartan was 55 degrees Fahrenheit 
indicating no abnormal thermal conditions. 
As a result of detailed analyses of the 
STS 51-L Orbiter, the payload flight data, 
payload recovered hardware, flight film, 
available payload pre-launch data and applicable 
hardware processing documentation, the 
Commission concluded that the payload did not 
cause or contribute to the cause of the accident. 
  
Solid Rocket Booster 
The Solid Rocket Booster comprises seven 
subsystems: structures, thrust vector control, 
range safety, separation, electrical and 
instrumentation, recovery, and the Solid Rocket 
Motor. 
All recovered Solid Rocket Booster 
pieces were visually examined, and selected 
areas were extracted for chemical and 
metallurgical analysis. 
The exterior surfaces of the Solid Rocket 
Boosters are normally protected from corrosion 
by an epoxy resin compound. There were several 
small areas where this protective coating was 
gouged or missing on the pieces recovered and, 
as a result, the exposed metallic surfaces in the 
areas were corroded. The damage to the 
protective coating was most likely the result of 
detonation of the linear shaped charges and water 
impact. There was no obvious evidence of major 
external flame impingement or molten metal 
found on any of the pieces recovered. All 
fracture surfaces exhibited either the 
characteristic markings of rapid tensile overload, 
a complete bending failure due to overload, or a 
separation fracture due to the detonation of the 
linear shaped charges.  
 53 
Other pieces of the right Solid Rocket Motor aft 
field joint showed extensive burn damage, 
centered at the 307 degree position. 
Most of the Solid Rocket Motor case 
material recovered contained pieces of residual 
unburned propellant still attached to the inner 
lining of the case structure.29 The severed 
propellant edges were sharp, with no unusual 
burn patterns. Propellant recovered with a 
forward segment of the booster exhibited the star 
pattern associated with the receding shape of the 
propellant at the front end of the Solid Rocket 
Motor. There was no evidence found of 
propellant grain cracking or debonding on the 
pieces recovered. Casting flow lines could be 
distinguished on the propellant surfaces in 
several areas. This is a normal occurrence due to 
minor differences in the propellant cast during 
the installation of the propellant in the motor 
case structure.  
Hardness tests of each piece of the steel 
casing material were taken before the propellant 
was burned from the piece. All of the tests 
showed normal hardness values. 
One of the pieces of casing showed 
evidence of O-ring seal tracks on the tang of the 
field joint. The tracks were cleaned with hexane 
to remove the grease preservative that had been 
applied after recovery of the piece, and samples 
of the track material were removed for analysis. 
Chemical analysis of the track material showed 
that the tracks were not composed of degraded 
O-ring seal material. 
The possible Solid Rocket Booster 
faults or failures assessed were: structural 
overload, Solid Rocket Motor pressure integrity 
violation, and premature linear shaped charge 
detonation. 
Reconstructed lift off and flight loads 
were compared with design loads to determine if 
a structural failure may have caused the accident. 
The STS 51-L loads were within the bounds of 
design and capability and were not a factor. 
Photographic and video imagery confirmed that 
both Solid Rocket Boosters remained structurally 
intact until the time of the explosion except for 
the leak observed on right Solid Rocket Motor. 
The possibility that the range safety 
system prematurely operated, detonating the 
linear shaped charges was investigated. The 
linear 
  
 
 
Figure 8. Solid Rocket Booster drawing at top is exploded in lower drawing to show motor segments and other elements 
at forward and aft ends of booster. 
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Figure 9: Reconstructed STS 51-L Loads Compared to Measure and Design Loads. Table compares External 
Tank/Solid Rocket Booster strut loads for first seven Shuttle flights with those for the mission 51-L launch and the strut 
design loads for the vehicle. 
Measured Net Load  Reconstructed  
Design 
Loads Aft 
ET/SRB 
Struts  
STS 1 
(LBf  x 
103) 
STS 2 
(LBf  x 
103) 
STS 3 
(LBf  x 
103) 
STS 5 
(LBf  x 
103) 
STS 6 
(LBf  x 
103) 
STS 7 
(LBf  x 
103) 
STS 51-L 
(LBf  x 10
3) 
(LBf  x 10
3) 
P8  -86 -93 -78 -55 -76 -76 -139 -306 
P9  142 126 141 120 122 120 138 393 
P10  -150 -128 -105 -94 -105 -116 -108 -306 
P11  -93 -75 -71 -58 -85 -71 -141 -306 
P12*  137 138 124 116 116 121 140 393 
P13  -172 -108 -111 -111 -102 -106 -94 -306 
Aft External Tank/Solid Rocket Booster Liftoff Strut Loads  
* Strut Nearest Point of Failure.  
LBf = Pounds Force.  
    
shaped charges were photographically observed 
to destroy both Solid Rocket Boosters at 110 
seconds after launch when commanded to do so 
by the Range Safety Officer and therefore could 
not have discharged at 73 seconds after launch 
causing the accident. The possibilities of the 
Solid Rocket Boosters separating prematurely 
from the External Tank, the nozzle exit cone 
prematurely separating or early deployment of 
the recovery system were examined. Premature 
activation of the separation system was 
eliminated as a cause of failure based on 
telemetry that showed no separation commands. 
There were no indications that the nozzle exit 
cone separated. The recovery system was 
observed photographically to activate only after 
the Solid Rocket Boosters had exited the 
explosion. 
In addition to the possible faults or 
failures, STS 51-L Solid Rocket Booster 
hardware manufacturing records were examined 
in detail to identify and evaluate any deviations 
from the design, any handling abnormalities or 
incidents, any material usage issues, and/or other 
indication of problems that might have 
importance in the investigation. Based on these 
observations, the Commission concluded that the 
left Solid Rocket Booster, and all components of 
the right Solid Rocket Booster, except the right 
Solid Rocket Motor, did not contribute to or 
cause the accident. 
  
The Right Solid Rocket Motor   
As the investigation progressed, elements 
assessed as being improbable contributors to the 
accident were eliminated from further 
consideration. This process of elimination 
brought focus to the right Solid Rocket Motor. 
As a result, four areas related to the functioning 
of that motor received detailed analysis to 
determine their part in the accident: 
· Structural Loads Evaluation  
· Failure of the Case Wall (Case 
Membrane)  
· Propellant Anomalies  
· Loss of the Pressure Seal at the Case 
Joint  
· Where appropriate, the investigation 
considered the potential for interaction 
between the areas.  
  
Structural Loads Evaluation 
Structural loads for all STS 51-L launch 
and flight phases were reconstructed using 
testverified models to determine if any loading 
condition exceeded design limits.  
Seconds prior to lift off, the Space 
Shuttle Main Engines start while the Solid 
Rocket Boosters are still bolted to the launch pad. 
The resultant thrust loads on the Solid Rocket 
Boosters prior to lift off were derived in two 
ways: (1) through strain gauges on the hold-
down posts, and (2) from photographic coverage 
of Solid Rocket Booster and External Tank tip 
deflections. These showed that the hold-down 
post strain data were within design limits. The 
Solid Rocket Booster tip deflection ("twang") 
was about four inches less than seen on a 
previous flight, STS-6, which carried the same 
general payload weight and distribution as STS 
51-L. The period of oscillation was normal. 
These data indicate that the Space Shuttle Main 
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Engine thrust buildup, the resulting 
forces and moments, vehicle and pad stiffness, 
and clearances were as expected. The resultant 
total bending moment experienced by STS 51-L 
was 291 x 106 inch-pounds, which is within the 
design allowable limit of 347 x 106 inch-pounds. 
The STS 51-L lift off loads were 
compared to design loads and flight measured 
loads for STS-1 through STS-7 (Figure 9). The 
Shuttle strut identification is shown in Figure 10. 
The loads measured on the struts are good 
indicators of stress since all loads between 
Shuttle elements are carried through the struts. 
The STS 51-L lift off loads were within the 
design limit. 
Because the Solid Rocket Motor field 
joints were the major concern, the reconstructed 
joint loads were compared to design loads. Most 
of the joint load is due to the booster's internal 
pressure, but external loads and the effects of 
inertia (dynamics) also contribute. The Solid 
Rocket Motor field joint axial tension loads at 
lift off were within the design load limit (17.2 x 
106 pounds). The highest load occurred at the 
forward field joint, 15.2 x 106 pounds. The 
midjoint load was 13.9 x 106 pounds, while the 
aft joint showed 13.8 x 106 pounds load.  
Loads were constructed for all in-flight 
events, including the roll maneuver and the 
region of maximum dynamic pressure. A 
representative measure of these loads is the 
product of dynamic pressure (q) and the angle of 
attack (a) [Greek letter alpha]. Since the Shuttle 
is designed to climb out at a negative angle of 
attack, the product is a negative number. The 
loads in the q x a pitch plane are shown in Figure 
11. Although the q x a variations in loads due to 
wind shear were larger than expected, they were 
well within the design limit loads. 
The Solid Rocket Motor field joint axial 
tension loads were substantially lower at 
maximum dynamic pressure than at lift off: 11.6 
x 106 pounds for the forward field joint and 10.6 
x 106 pounds for the aft field joint. Compared to 
the internal pressure loads, the dynamic 
variations due to wind shear were small-about 
1/15 those of the pressure loads. These loads 
were well below the design limit loads and were 
not considered the cause of the accident. 
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The loads in the pitch plane are shown by the solid line marked "STS 51-L RECONST." The curve "STS 51-L 
PREDICTED" give the loads expected before the flight. The dashed lines show the limit of experience from STS-1 through 
61-B. The present design limits are the two lines marked "OV102/099 WING LIMIT" above, and "ET/SRB CAP. 
ASSESSMENT LIMIT LINE" below. (After STS-6, the wing was strenghtened. The previous design limits were "ET/SRB 
IVBC 2 DESIGN ENVELOPE" below, and a curve in the position region of q x a [alpha] above). 
  
Case Membrane Failure 
The case membrane is the half-inch thick steel 
wall of the rocket between the joints. The 
possibility that the failure was initiated by 
anomalies associated with the case membrane 
was evaluated by analysis of design and test 
criteria. Potential failure modes were constrained 
by the following flight data and photographic 
observations: 
(1) A burn through the membrane would have to 
occur at or near the aft field joint. 
(2) The failure could have little or no influence 
on motor internal pressure since no deviation in 
pressure occurred prior to 60 seconds. 
(3) The failure must cause a burn through the 
membrane in 58 seconds. 
The hypothesis of a membrane failure requires 
that the initial smoke observed at 0.678 seconds 
was an independent occurrence. It is an unlikely 
hypothesis for initiation of the accident. Fracture 
mechanics analysis indicates that a hole in the 
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case larger than one inch would cause the entire 
case to rupture in a few milliseconds. This would 
give rise to the appearance of a large longitudinal 
flame, an event that is contrary to the flight films. 
Evaluation of potential insulation or inhibitor 
(see Figure 12) flaws against the three criteria 
above resulted in elimination of all candidates 
except a defect in the forward-facing inhibitor. 
This potential failure mode was evaluated by 
assuming a 1-inch-diameter hole in the inhibitor. 
Analysis indicated that the change in motor 
internal pressure resulting from this failure 
would probably not be detected. However, an 
erosion rate substantially higher than the 
observed values would be required to burn 
through the membrane by 58 seconds. In 
addition, the assumed flaw is unlikely since the 
inhibitor is constructed by vulcanizing eight 
individual plies of the material. Subsequent 
damage of the magnitude required is improbable 
and would be easily detected. 
A review of the segment inspection and of proof 
tests was conducted. Prior to vehicle assembly, 
each segment was pressurized to 112 percent of 
the maximum design operational pressure. A 
magnetic particle inspection of each membrane 
was then conducted. These procedures are 
designed to screen critical flaws, and are capable 
of detecting cracks greater than 0.1 inches. 
Fracture mechanics analysis indicates that a flaw 
0.1 inch long and 0.050 inch deep would grow to 
only 0.122 inches long and 0.061 inches deep in 
80 uses of the segment. This flaw would be less 
than the critical size required to cause case 
rupture. Furthermore, as noted previously, a 
failure resulting in a case rupture is not 
consistent with photographic observations. 
Subsequent to these evaluations, sections of the 
right Solid Rocket Motor case containing holes 
burned through in the area of the aft field joint 
were recovered. Assessments of the sections do 
not support a failure that started in the 
membrane and progressed slowly to the joint, or 
one that started in the membrane and grew 
rapidly the length of the Solid Rocket Motor 
segment. 
  
Propellant 
An examination of propellant characteristics and 
flight data was accomplished to determine if any 
anomalous conditions were present in the STS 
51-L right Solid Rocket Motor. Propellant 
cracking and propellant mean bulk temperatures 
were evaluated. 
Historically, the propellant family used in the 
Solid Rocket Motor (TP-H1148) has exhibited 
good mechanical properties and an absence of 
grain structural problems. Should a crack occur,  
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however, the effects would be evident by 
changes in chamber pressure. Shortly after lift 
off, the STS 51-L right Solid Rocket Motor 
chamber pressure was 22 pounds per square inch 
higher than that of the left solid. This would 
correlate to a postulated radial crack through the 
grain spanning a 90-degree, pie -shaped wedge of 
the solid. However, with a crack of this nature, 
the chamber pressure would have remained high 
for approximately 60 seconds. Telemetry shows 
that the right Solid Rocket Motor chamber 
pressure did not remain high past 20-24 seconds 
and, therefore, the existence of a propellant crack 
was ruled out. 
Propellant mean bulk temperature 
calculations were made using the ambient 
temperature over the two-week period prior to 
launch. The lowest bulk temperature experienced 
was 57 degrees Fahrenheit on the day of the 
launch. This was 17 degrees Fahrenheit above 
the minimum specified. 
Based on this assessment and subscale 
lot-acceptance motor-firing evaluations, it is 
improbable that propellant anomalies 
contributed to the STS 51-L accident. 
  
Joint Seal Failure 
Enhanced photographic and computer-
graphic positioning determined that the flame 
from the right Solid Rocket Booster near the aft 
field joint emanated at about the 305-degree 
circumferential position. The smoke at lift off 
appeared in the same general location. Thus, 
early in the investigation the right Solid Rocket 
Booster aft field joint seal became the prime 
failure suspect. This supposition was confirmed 
when the Salvage Team recovered portions of 
both sides of the aft joint containing large holes 
extending from 291 degrees to 318 degrees. 
Several possible causes could have resulted in 
this failure. These possible causes are treated in 
the following paragraphs of this report. 
During stacking operations at the launch 
site, four segments are assembled to form the 
Solid Rocket Motor. The resulting joints are 
referred to as field joints, located as depicted in 
Figures 8 and 13. Joint sealing is provided by 
two rubber O-rings with diameters of 0.280 
inches (+0.005, -0.003), which are installed, as 
received from Morton Thiokol, during motor 
assembly. O-ring static compression during and 
after assembly is dictated by the width of the gap 
between the tang and the inside leg of the clevis. 
This gap between the tang and clevis at any 
location after assembly is influenced by the size 
and shape (concentricity) of the segments as well 
as the loads on the segments. Zinc chromate 
putty is applied to the composition rubber (NBR) 
insulation face prior to assembly. In the 
assembled configuration the putty was intended 
to act as a thermal barrier to prevent direct 
contact of combustion gas with the O-rings. It 
was also intended that the O-rings be actuated 
and sealed by combustion gas pressure 
displacing the putty in the space between the 
motor segments (Figure 14). The displacement 
of the putty would act like a piston and compress 
the air ahead of the primary O-ring, and force it 
into the gap between the tang and clevis. This 
process is known as pressure actuation of the O-
ring seal. This pressure actuated sealing is 
required to occur very early during the Solid 
Rocket Motor ignition transient. because the gap 
between the tang and clevis increases as  
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pressure loads are applied to the joint during 
ignition. Should pressure actuation be delayed to 
the extent that the gap has opened considerably, 
the possibility exists that the rocket's combustion 
gases will blow by the O-ring and damage or 
destroy the seals. The principal factor 
influencing the size of the gap opening is motor 
pressure; but, gap opening is also influenced by 
external loads and other joint dynamics. The 
investigation has shown that the joint sealing 
performance is sensitive to the following factors, 
either independently or in combination: 
 
(a) Damage to the joints/seals or generation of 
contaminants as joints are assembled as 
influenced by: 
(1) Manufacturing tolerances.  
(2) Out of round due to handling.  
(3) Effects of reuse.  
(b) Tang/clevis gap opening due to motor 
pressure and other loads. 
(c) Static O-ring compression. 
(d) Joint temperature as it affects O-ring 
response under dynamic conditions (resiliency) 
and hardness.  
(e) Joint temperature as it relates to forming ice 
from water intrusion in the joint. 
(f) Putty performance effects on: 
(1) O-ring pressure actuation timing.  
(2) O-ring erosion.  
 
The sensitivity of the O-ring sealing 
performance to these factors has been 
investigated in extensive tests and analyses. The 
sensitivity to each factor was evaluated 
independently and in appropriate combinations 
to assess the potential to cause or contribute to 
the 51-L aft field joint failure. Most of the testing 
was done on either laboratory or subscale 
equipment. In many cases, the data from these 
tests are considered to be directly applicable to 
the seal performance in full scale. However, in 
some cases there is considerable uncertainty in 
extrapolating the data to full-scale seal 
performance. Where such is the case, it is noted 
in the following discussions. 
  
Assembly Damage/Contamination 
It is possible that the assembly operation could 
influence joint sealing performance by damaging 
the O-rings or by generating contamination. The 
shapes of the solid rocket segments which 
include the tang and clevis, are not perfect circles 
because of dimensional tolerances, stresses, 
distortions..... 
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from previous use, and the effects of shipping 
and handling. The most important effect is from 
the load of propellant, a plastic and rubbery 
material, which can take a set that relaxes very 
slowly. For example, since the segments are 
shipped in a horizontal position on railroad cars, 
their weight can make them somewhat elliptical-
a shape they can maintain for some time. At 
assembly, after the lower segment (with the 
clevis on top) is placed vertically, the tang of the 
next segment is lowered into it. To make the fit 
easier, the upper segment is purposely reshaped 
by connecting the lifting crane in an appropriate 
position and, on occasion (51-L was one of 
these), directly squeezing the tang section with a 
special tool. To monitor the fit, the diameters of 
the clevis, DC, and the tang, DT (Figure 15) are 
measured at six positions 30 degrees apart, and 
difference of these measurements (DT - DC  are 
noted. When these differences are such that the 
tang encroaches somewhat into the outer clevis, 
slanted edges (chamfers) permit the pieces to 
slide together. If the difference is too great, flat 
areas of the tang meet flat areas of the clevis. 
What really counts, of course, are differences of 
radii, which diameter measurements alone do not 
determine, for one does not know during the 
assembly how far off the centers are. This is a 
circumstance to be avoided, but one that can be 
detected during assembly. Experience has shown 
that a diameter difference of less than + 0.25 
inches usually permits assembly without a flat-
on-flat condition arising. A negative diameter 
difference means the tang encroaches on the 
inside of the clevis. The possibility was noted 
that contaminants from sliding metal and direct 
O-ring pinching might occur if this overlap is 
large. If it is too great, a flat-on-flat condition 
can arise inside the joint where it is very difficult 
to see. These dimensions shift as the pieces slide 
together and they change further as the 
propellant stresses relax during the period 
between assembly and launch. Therefore, a 
condition such as that which occurred during 
assembly of the aft segment for flight 51-L, 
wherein the maximum interference between tang 
and clevis at the O-rings was at approximately 
300 degrees, may or may not have persisted until 
launch-seven weeks after assembly. 
The O-rings are heavily greased to 
prevent damage. This grease adds another 
element of uncertainty to the configuration and 
action of the seal under pressurization, especially 
at low temperatures. 
Testing was conducted during the 
investigation to evaluate the potential for 
assemb ly damage and contaminant generation, 
and its effect on seal performance. A sub-scale 
section of a field joint was configured in a test 
fixture and simulated assembly operations were 
conducted. This section was much stiffer than 
the full-scale booster segments and did not fully 
simulate actual assembly conditions. However, 
under these test circumstances, metal slivers 
were generated during situations wherein the 
tang flat overlapped the flat end of the clevis leg 
by 0.005 to 0.010 inches. The metal slivers in 
turn were carried into the joint and deposited on 
and around the O-rings. A second finding from 
this test series was that the O-ring section 
increased in length as the tang entered the clevis 
and compressed the O-ring diameter. The 
implication of this finding is that canted tang 
entry in a full diameter segment, while unlikely, 
could chase the O-ring around the circumference, 
resulting in gathering (bulging from the groove) 
on the opposite side. This could make the O-ring 
more vulnerable to damage. There is no known 
experience of such bulging during previous 
assemblies. 
To understand the effects of potential 
contaminants on sealing performance, tests were 
conducted employing metal contaminants 
simulating those generated in the segment 
assembly tests. The tests were to determine if 
joints with metal shavings positioned between 
the O-ring and sealing surface could pass a static 
leak check but fail under dynamic conditions. 
The contaminants that passed the 50 pounds per 
square inch leak check were between 0.001 and 
0.003 inches thick. Testing to determine seal 
performance under dynamic conditions with 
these representative contaminations is not 
complete. However, the possibility cannot be 
dismissed that contamination generated under 
some assembly conditions could pass a leak 
check and yet cause the seal to leak under 
dynamic conditions. 
A second concern was structural 
damage to the clevis due to abnormal loading 
during assembly. An analysis was made to 
determine the deflections and stresses 
experienced during assembly of the right Solid 
Rocket Motor aft center segment to the aft 
segment. These stresses were then used in a 
fracture mechanics analysis of the O-ring groove 
to determine the maximum flaw size that would 
not fail under the 51-L case segment life cycle 
history. Included in this analysis was the single 
point load needed to deflect a suspended 
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segment to the side by 0.200 inches, and the 
maximum stress on the case clevis that this 
causes. The analysis further addressed a 
condition that has been encountered, where the 
tang sits on top of the inner clevis leg on one 
side and slips down into the clevis groove on the 
opposite side. 
The result of this analysis is that the 
stresses induced during the operation were low 
and would not have resulted in hardware damage. 
Also, the stresses would have resulted in 
significant growth of an undetected flaw, which 
then would be detectable by inspection on its 
next use. 
  
Gap Opening  
The gap to be sealed between the tang 
and the inside leg of the clevis opens as the 
combustion gas pressure rises. This gap opening 
was calculated as a function of pressure and time 
by an analysis that was calibrated to joint 
deflections measured on a structural test article. 
The analysis extended the results beyond test 
calibration conditions to include propellant 
effects and external loads. The initial static gap 
dimensions combined with the time history of 
the gap opening determined the minimum and 
maximum gap conditions used for testing the 
capability of the O-rings to seal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The joint deflection analysis established 
time histories for gap openings for primary and 
secondary O-rings for all field joints. For the aft 
field joints these data indicate gap opening 
increases of approximately 0.029 inches and 
0.017 inches for the primary and secondary O-
rings respectively. These values were used for 
sub-scale dynamic tests. Due to differences in 
motor pressure and loads, the gap opening 
increases for forward field joints are 
approximately 0.008 inches greater than for the 
aft field joints. Ga p opening changes (called 
delta gap openings) versus time are shown in 
Figure 17 for the aft field joints. The total gap at 
any time also depends on the initial static gap, on 
rounding effects during segment pressurization, 
and on loadings due to struts and airloads. Sub-
scale tests were run containing combinations of 
the above variables, but did not include the 
effects of the struts and airloads 
. 
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O-Ring Compression at Launch (Static) 
As noted previously, diameters 
measured just prior to assembly do not permit 
determination of conditions at launch because, 
among other things, the propellant slowly relaxes. 
For STS 51-L, the difference in the true 
diameters of the surfaces of tang and clevis 
measured at the factory was 0.008 inches. Thus, 
the average gap at the O-rings between the tang 
and clevis was 0.004 inches. The minimum gap 
could be somewhat less, and possibly metal-to-
metal contact (zero gap) could exist at some 
locations. 
During the investigation, measurements 
were made on segments that had been 
refurbished and reused. The data indicate that 
segment circumferences at the sealing surfaces 
change with repeated use. This expectation was 
not unique to this joint. 
Recent analysis has shown and tests 
tend to confirm that O-ring sealing performance 
is significantly improved when actuating 
pressure can get behind the entire face of the O-
ring on the upstream side of the groove within 
which the O-ring sits (Figure 18). If the groove is 
too narrow or if the initial squeeze is so great as 
to compress the O-ring to the extent that it fills 
the entire groove and contacts all groove surfaces, 
pressure actuation of the seal could be inhibited.  
This latter condition is relieved as the 
joint gap opens and the O-ring attempts to return 
to its uncompressed shape. However, if the 
temperature is low, resiliency is severely reduced 
and the O-ring is very slow in returning towards 
its original shape. Thus, it may remain 
compressed in the groove, contact all three 
surfaces of that groove, and inhibit pressure 
actuation of the seal. In addition, as the gap 
opens between the O-ring and tang surface 
allowing pressure bypass, O-ring actuation is 
further inhibited. 
Two sub-scale dynamic test fixtures 
were designed and built that simulated the initial 
static gap, gap opening rate, maximum gap 
opening and ignition transient pressures. These 
fixtures were tested over a temperature range 
with varying initial static gap openings. A 
summary of results with initial gap openings of 
0.020 and 0.004 inches is provided in Figure 19. 
The results indicate that with a 0.020-inch 
maximum initial gap, sealing can be achieved in 
most instances at temperatures as low as 25 
degrees Fahrenheit, while with the 0.004-inch 
initial gap, sealing is not achieved at 25 degrees 
Fahrenheit and is marginal even in the 40 and 50 
degree Fahrenheit temperature range. For the 
0.004-inch initial gap condition, sealing without 
any gas blow-by, did not occur consistently until 
the temperature was raised to 55 degrees 
Fahrenheit. To evaluate the sensitivity to initial 
gap opening, tour tests were conducted at 25 
degrees Fahrenheit with an initial gap of 0.010 
inch. In contrast to the tests at a 0.004 inch gap, 
these tests resulted in sealing with some minimal 
O-ring blow-by observed during the sealing 
process. 
These tests indicate the sensitivity of 
the O-ring seals to temperature and O-ring 
squeeze in a joint with the gap opening 
characteristics of the Solid Rocket Motors. 
It should be noted that the test fixture 
placed 
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Figure 19. Summary of Dynamic Test Results. Table plots results of tests  of .004 and .020 inch initial gap 
openings over the range of temperatures in left hand vertical column. 
 
the O-rings at a specific initial gap and squeeze 
condition uniformly around the circumference. It 
is not certain what the effect of differences in 
circumferential gaps might be in full size joints.  
Such effects could not be simulated in 
the subscale test results reported above. 
  
Joint Temperature 
Analyses were conducted to establish 
STS 51-L joint temperatures at launch. Some 
differences existed amo ng the six 51-L field 
joints. The joints on the right Solid Rocket 
Motor had larger circumferential gradients than 
those on the left motor at launch. It is possible 
that the aft field joint of the right Solid Rocket 
Booster was at the lowest temperature at launch, 
although all joints had calculated local 
temperatures as low as 28 +/- 5 degrees 
Fahrenheit. Estimated transient temperature for 
several circumferential locations on the joints are 
shown for the right Solid Rocket Motor aft field 
joint and the left motor aft field joint in Figures 
20 and 21. These data are representative of other 
joints on the respective Solid Rocket Motors. 
The investigation has shown that the low launch 
temperatures had two effects that could 
potentially affect the seal performance: (1) O-
ring resiliency degradation, the effects of which 
are explained above; and (2) the potential for ice 
in the joints. O-ring hardness is also a function of 
temperature and may have been another factor in 
joint performance. 
Consistent results from numerous O-
ring tests have shown a resiliency degradation 
with reduced temperatures. Figure 23 provides 
O-ring recovery from 0.040 inches of initial 
compression versus time. This shows how 
quickly an O-ring will move back towards its 
uncompressed shape at temperatures ranging 
from 10 to 75 degrees Fahrenheit. When these 
data are compared with the gap openings versus 
time from Figure 17, it can be seen that the O-
rings will not track or  
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Field Joint Distress 
Flight  Joint SRB (right or left)  Angular location  Joint Temp (°F) Previous Use of 
Segments (2) 
Type of Distress  
.  
STS-2  AFT  RH  090  70  none/none  Erosion  
41-B  FWD  LH  351  57  1/none  Erosion  
41-C  AFT  LH  n/a  63  1/1  O-ring heat  
41-D  FWD  RH  275/110  70  2/none  Erosion  
51-C  FWD  LH  163  53  1/none  Erosion  
51-C (3)  MID  RH  354  53  1/1  Erosion  
61-A  MID  LH  36-66  75  none/none  Blow-by  
61-A  AFT  LH  338/018  75  none/none  Blow-by  
61-C  AFT  LH  154  58  1/none  Erosion  
51-L  AFT  RH  307  28  1/2  Flame  
   
(1) Mean calculated (±5°F)  
(2) Refurbished after recovery  
(3) Both primary and secondary O-rings affected.  
Examination of the records shows that if one defines any sort of damage around the O-
ring as "distress", then there have been 10 "distressed" field joints, including the aft field 
joint on the right-hand booster of 51-L. These data, which are tabulated above, show 10 
instances of distress in a total of 150 flight exposures. One-half of the instances occurred 
in the aft joint, one-third in the forward joint, and one-fifth in the mid-joint. Sixty percent of 
the distress occurred in the left Solid Rocket Motor.  
 
recover to the gap opening by 600 milliseconds 
(gap full open) at low to moderate temperatures. 
These data show the importance of timely O-ring 
pressure actuation to achieve proper sealing. 
It is possible that water got into some, if 
not all STS 51-L field joints. Subsequent to the 
Challenger accident, it was learned that water 
had been observed in the STS-9 joints during 
restacking operations following exposure to less 
rain than that experienced by STS 51-L. It was 
reported that water had drained from the STS-9 
joint when the pins were removed and that 
approximately 0.5 inch of water was present in 
the clevis well. While on the pad for 38 days, 
STS 51-L was exposed to approximately seven 
inches of rain. Analyses and tests conducted 
show that water will freeze under the 
environmental conditions experienced prior to 
the 51-L launch and could unseat the secondary 
O-ring. To determine the effects of unseating, 
tests were conducted on the sub-scale dynamic 
test fixture at Thiokol to further evaluate seal 
performance. For these tests, water was frozen 
downstream of the secondary O-ring. With ice 
present, there were conditions under which the 
O-ring failed to seal. 
  
Putty Performance 
The significance of the possibility that 
putty could keep the motor pressure from 
promptly reaching the O-rings to pressure 
actuate and seal them was apparently not fully 
appreciated prior to the Challenger accident. 
During the investigation, it became evident that 
several variables may affect the putty 
performance and, in turn, seal performance. 
However, limited test data and lack of fidelity in 
full scale joint simulation prevented a complete 
engineering assessment of putty performance. 
 Tests were conducted over a range of 
putty conditions, including temperature at 
ignition, pretest conditioning to simulate the 
environmental effects, and dimensional 
variations within the joint. These test results 
demonstrated that putty performance as a 
pressure seal is highly variable. The results may 
be interpreted to indicate that the putty can 
maintain pressure during the ignition transient 
and prevent O-ring sealing. For example, one test 
conducted with putty, which had been 
conditioned for 10 hours at 80 percent relative 
humidity and 75 degrees Fahrenheit, delayed the 
pressure rise at the primary O-ring for 530 
milliseconds at a.... 
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Figure 23. O-Ring Recovery vs. Time. Graph plots O-ring shape recovery in inches against time in 
seconds for a variety of temperatures. Note: Average O-ring Recovery at Various Test Temperatures During 
First Second After Load Release. Initial Compression of 40 Mils was Maintained for 2 hours. 
 
temperature of 75 degrees. Tests at 20 degrees 
Fahrenheit with similarly conditioned putty 
delayed the pressurization time by 1.9 seconds. 
Such delays would allow full joint gap opening 
before a seal could pressure actuate. 
To evaluate this effect, a sub-scale test 
fixture was fabricated that effectively simulated 
gap opening at the time of putty rupture and 
pressure application. The tests simulate the O-
ring pressure actuation delay due to the putty 
temporarily holding the motor pressure. They 
were conducted over a range of temperatures, 
putty rupture time and initial O-ring squeeze. 
Test results (Appendix L, Fig. 6.5.1) 
demonstrated that sealing performance is 
dependent on temperature and initial squeeze, 
both of which affect the pressure actuation 
capability of the O-rings. The tests indicate that 
sealing capability is marginal for maximum 
squeeze conditions, i.e., a 0.004-inch gap, at 50 
degrees Fahrenheit with a pressure delay of 500 
milliseconds. For the temp erature and O-ring 
squeeze conditions that existed for several of the 
STS 51-L field joints, O-ring sealing was not 
achieved in these tests with simulated putty 
rupture times delayed to 250 to 500 milliseconds. 
Note that the sub-scale tests do not faithfully 
reproduce what happens in the real joint. These 
data do indicate, however, that the potential 
exists for O-rings not to seal as a result of 
variables related to the putty. 
The seal is checked by pressurizing the 
volume between the primary and secondary O-
rings. This action seats the secondary seal and 
drives the primary seal upstream into its groove. 
Because of concern that the putty could mask a 
leaking primary seal, the pressure was first 
increased from 50 psi to 100 psi and then to 200 
psi.
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The consequence of increasing the pressure is shown below. 
 .  
Stabilization 
Pressure, psi Number of Flights   
Percentage of Flights With O-
ring Anomalies. 
50 7 14 
100 2 0 
Field Joint  
200 15 56 
50 8 12 
100 8 56 
Nozzle joint  
200 8 88 
Clearly the increased pressure used in the leak 
check increased the likelihood of a gas path 
through the putty to the primary seal. That is, 
with increased pressure, blow holes in the putty 
are more likely with a resulting greater potential 
for erosion damage to the O-ring. On the positive 
side the blow holes tend to prevent the delay in 
pressurization discussed in the previous 
paragraphs. This further illustrates the influence 
of putty variables on the performance of the 
Solid Rocket Motor seals. 
  
The Dynamic Characteristics of the Field Joint 
Seal 
The discussion of static factors which 
affect joint performance is based on the 
assumption that motor segments remain perfectly 
round, and that stacked segments are always a 
perfectly straight column. At launch the boosters 
are subjected to forces which bend and twist 
them. These forces cause physical changes in the 
shape of the boosters, actually squashing them 
out-of-round and bending them along their entire 
length. The dynamic effects of this out-of-
roundness are most significant just after booster 
ignition when the hold-down bolts have been 
released because in the previous 6.6 seconds the 
boosters have actually been bent forward by the 
thrust from the main engines. The elastic energy 
stored in the entire system is then released, 
inducing a bending vibration in the boosters. 
This bending causes the case to change its shape 
from circular to elliptical, the maximum out-of-
roundness occurring on the 045-315 degree line 
on the outside of the right booster. This 
deflection is a consequence of a vibration and 
occurs at a frequency of about 3 cycles per 
second. The same occurs in the left booster, only 
the deflection axis is oriented differently, being a 
mirror image of that which takes place in the 
right side. The dynamic effects cause an increase 
in the joint rotation, and, hence, increase the gap 
between the tang and clevis by about 10 percent. 
Another dynamic load results from the geometry 
of the struts which attach the booster to the 
external tank. Strut P 12 is attached to the 
booster at about the 314 degree point and 
imposes additional inertial forces on the booster 
which tend to additionally increase the gap by 10 
to 21 percent. 
  
Analysis of the Wreckage 
The investigation of the sequence of events that 
led to the final breakup of the Challenger rests 
upon three primary sources of data: launch 
photographs, telemetry and tracking data, and the 
recovered pieces of the Shuttle wreckage. The 
third source of data is presented here, which is 
largely descriptive. It provides support for the 
conclusions reached through use of the data from 
the other two sources. A more detailed analysis 
that provides technical details to be used for 
subsequent redesign or accident analysis is 
available in the appendix. 
Figure 24 shows an overview of the search areas 
with the general location of parts of both the left 
and the right Solid Rocket Boosters indicated. 
The area is at the edge of the Gulf Stream in 
water depth that ranged from 100 to 1,200 feet. 
Pertinent pieces were examined by use of a 
remotely controlled submarine containing a flood 
light and a television camera. The television 
picture was available on ship board and was 
transmitted to Kennedy and to Marshall. The 
arrangement allowed a number of people who 
were familiar with the Solid Rocket Booster to 
comment upon the merit of recovering a 
particular piece. 
The aft left side of the Orbiter contained 
its original paint markings and showed no 
apparent sign of heat damage (photo A. All 
photo references are to color section, pp. 74-81). 
Thermal distress, however, was apparent on the 
right rudder speed brake panel and elevon (photo 
B). The paint was scorched and blackened on the 
right side panels of the aft part of the fuselage 
and vertical fin. The remaining recovered parts 
of the Orbiter did not seem to be affected by a 
hydrogen fire. The bottom side of the right wing 
showed some indentation on the tiles that make 
up the Thermal Protection System. This 
indentation was 
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consistent with impact with the right booster as it 
rotated following loss of restraint of one or more 
of its lower struts. 
The frustum of the nose cone of the 
right Solid Rocket Booster was damaged (photo 
E) as if it had struck the External Tank, but there 
were no signs of thermal distress. The frustum of 
the nose cone of the left Solid Rocket Booster 
(photo F) was essentially undamaged. 
A substantial part of the External Tank 
was recovered. Analysis of this recovered 
structure showed some interesting features. 
Interpretation of the photographs suggests that 
the flame from the right hand Solid Rocket 
Booster encircled the External Tank. A short 
time later the dome at the base of the External 
Tank was thought to break free. Since the 
internal pressure of the liquid hydrogen tank is at 
approximately 33 pounds per square inch, a 
sudden venting at the aft section will produce a 
large initial thrust that tails off as the pressure 
drops. The intertank region of the wreckage 
contained buckling in the fore and aft direction 
consistent with this impulsive thrust. Similarly, 
the right side of the intertank showed signs of 
crushing. This crushing is consistent with the 
rotational impact of the frustum of the right Solid 
Rocket Booster with the External Tank following 
complete loss of restraint at the aft lower strut 
attachment area. 
The telemetered signals from the rate 
gyros in the right Solid Rocket Booster clearly 
show a change in angular velocity of the booster 
with respect to the Orbiter. It is believed that this 
velocity change was initiated by a failure at or 
near the P12 strut connecting the booster to the 
External Tank. Photographs of the flight could 
not define the failure point and none of the 
connecting struts to the right Solid Rocket 
Booster or the corresponding area on the 
External Tank in this region were recovered. 
Therefore the exact location of initial separation 
could not be determined by the evidence. At the 
time of relative booster movement, the hole in 
the shell of the right Solid Rocket Booster was 
calculated to be six to eight inches in diameter 
located 12 to 15 inches forward and adjacent to 
the P12 
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Drawing depicts pieces of right Solid Rocket Booster aft segment recovered. At top is piece of aft center 
segment.  
 
 
strut. This location was within the center of the 
burned out zone on the right Solid Rocket 
Booster (photo G). As a matter of interest, the 
P12 strut is located close to the point on the 
circumference where the booster case 
experiences maximum radial deflection due to 
flight loads. It seems likely that the plume from 
the hole in the booster would impact near the 
location of the P12 strut connection and the 
External Tank. Using geometric considerations 
alone suggests this strut separated from the 
External Tank before it separated from the right 
hand Solid Rocket Booster. 
Figure 25 shows a sketch of an interior 
unrolled view of the aft part of the right hand 
Solid Rocket Booster with the recovered burned 
pieces 131 and 712 noted. The critical region is 
between parts 131, the upper segment tang 
region, and part 712, the lower clevis region of 
the joint. This burned area extends roughly from 
station 1476, in the upper section, to 1517 on the 
lower region. In a circumferential direction (see 
figure 26) the lower end of the eroded region 
extends from roughly 291 degrees to 320 degrees 
and the upper eroded section extends between 
296 and 318 degrees. Note that the region at 
about 314 degrees includes the attachment region 
of the strut to the attachment ring on the right 
Solid Rocket Booster. 
Some observations were made from a 
detailed examination of the aft center section of 
the joint, contact 131. This piece (photo I) shows 
a large hole that is approximately centered on the 
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Figure 26. Angular Coordinate System For Solid 
Rocket Boosters/Motors. 
 
 
307-degree circumferential position. Although 
irregular, the hole is roughly rectangular in shape, 
extending approximately 27 inches 
circumferentially along the tang (296 to 318 
degrees) with total burnout extension 
approximately 15 inches forward of the tang. At 
either side in the interior of the hole (photo K) 
the insulation and steel case material showed 
evidence of hot gas erosion that beveled these 
surfaces (indicative of combustion products 
flowing through the hole from the interior of the 
Solid Rocket Motor). The top surface of the hole 
was hardly beveled at all. The tang O-ring 
sealing surface next to either side of the hole 
showed distinct erosion grooves starting from the 
O-ring locations (photo J). These erosion 
grooves indicate the O-rings were sealing the 
joint away from the central area during the later 
stages of the trajectory. No other evidence of 
thermal distress, melting or burning was noted in 
the tang section of the joint. 
The part of the aft section of the right 
Solid Rocket Booster in the circumferential 
position of the hole was recovered (photos L and 
N). This piece, contact 712, showed evidence of 
a burned hole edge extending from 291 degrees 
to 318 degrees, approximately 33 inches long 
(see bracket, photo L). The burned surface 
extended into the aft attach stub region of the 
case adjacent to the P 12 strut attach point. The 
box structure of the aft attachment ring was 
missing from the attach stubs. The piece 
displayed fractures which led circumferentially 
or aft from the hole and the burned surface. 
Booster pieces on either side have not been 
recovered. Thus in the burn area no portion of 
the clevis or attachment ring other than the stubs 
was available for examination . 
The exterior surface of the aft case 
piece also contained a large heat affected area 
(photo M). The shape and location of this area 
indicates a plume impingement from the 
escaping gases. The light colored material at the 
downstream edge of the area is probably asbestos 
from the insulator. The rust colored line more or 
less parallel to the stubs may be a stagnation line 
produced in the gas flow when the gases passed 
around the attachment ring. Secondary flow of 
metal from the aft attach stub ring also shows 
this feature. There was a small burn hole in the 
case wall (arrow, photo O) which appeared to 
have penetrated the case from the exterior toward 
the interior. This may also have been due to a 
swirling flow of hot gases within the attachment 
ring box structure. The shadow of the insulation 
downstream of the attach box can also be seen. 
This evidence suggests strongly that a hot gas 
plume impinged against the attachment ring, 
passed around and through it, and ultimately 
destroyed its structural integrity, probably late in 
the flight of the Solid Rocket Booster. 
 
The photographs L, M, N, and O view 
the lower case piece in the inverted position. A 
correct orientation of this piece is  shown in a 
composite view of the burn area located in photo 
P. 
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Findings 
 
1. A combustion gas leak through the right Solid 
Rocket Motor aft field joint initiated at or shortly 
after ignition eventually weakened and/or 
penetrated the External Tank initiating vehicle 
structural breakup and loss of the Space Shuttle 
Challenger during STS Mission 51-L. 
 
2. The evidence shows that no other STS 51-L 
Shuttle element or the payload contributed to the 
causes of the right Solid Rocket Motor aft field 
joint combustion gas leak. Sabotage was not a 
factor. 
 
3. Evidence examined in the review of Space 
Shuttle material, manufacturing, assembly, 
quality control, and processing of 
nonconformance reports found no flight 
hardware shipped to the launch site that fell 
outside the limits of Shuttle design specifications. 
 
4. Launch site activities, including assembly and 
preparation, from receipt of the flight hardware 
to launch were generally in accord with 
established procedures and were not considered a 
factor in the accident. 
 
5. Launch site records show that the right Solid 
Rocket Motor segments were assembled using 
approved procedures. However, significant out-
of-round conditions existed between the two 
segments joined at the right Solid Rocket Motor 
aft field joint (the joint that failed). 
a. While the assembly conditions had 
the potential of generating debris or damage that 
could cause O-ring seal failure, these were not 
considered factors in this accident. 
b. The diameters of the two Solid 
Rocket Motor segments had grown as a result of 
prior use. 
c. The growth resulted in a condition at 
time of launch wherein the maximum gap 
between the tang and clevis in the region of the 
joint's O-rings was no more than .008 inches and 
the average gap would have been .004 inches. 
d. With a tang-to-clevis gap of .004 
inches, the O-ring in the joint would be 
compressed to the extent that it pressed against 
all three walls of the O-ring retaining channel. 
e. The lack of roundness of the 
segments was such that the smallest tang-to-
clevis clearance occurred at the initiation of the 
assembly operation at positions of 120 degrees 
and 300 degrees around the circumference of the 
aft field joint. It is uncertain if this tight 
condition and the resultant greater compression 
of the O-rings at these points persisted to the 
time of launch. 
 
6. The ambient temperature at time of launch 
was 36 degrees Fahrenheit, or 15 degrees lower 
than the next coldest previous launch. 
 
a. The temperature at the 300 degree 
position on the right aft field joint circumference 
was estimated to be 28degrees +/- 5 degrees 
Fahrenheit. This was the coldest point on the 
joint. 
b. Temperature on the opposite side of 
the right Solid Rocket Booster facing the sun 
was estimated to be about 50 degrees Fahrenheit. 
 
7. Other joints on the left and right Solid Rocket 
Boosters experienced similar combinations of 
tang-to-clevis gap clearance and temperature. It 
is not known whether these joints experienced 
distress during the flight of 51-L. 
 
8. Experimental evidence indicates that due to 
several effects associated with the Solid Rocket 
Booster's ignition and combustion pressures and 
associated vehicle motions, the gap between the 
tang and the clevis will open as much as .017 
and .029 inches at the secondary and primary O-
rings, respectively.  
 
a. This opening begins upon ignition, 
reaches its maximum rate of opening at about 
200-300 milliseconds, and is essentially 
complete at 600 milliseconds when the Solid 
Rocket Booster reaches its operating pressure. 
 
b. The External Tank and right Solid 
Rocket Booster are connected by several struts, 
including one at 310 degrees near the aft field 
joint that failed. This strut's effect on the joint 
dynamics is to enhance the opening of the gap 
between the tang and clevis by about 10-20 
percent in the region of 300-320 degrees. 
 
9. O-ring resiliency is directly related to its 
temperature. 
a. A warm O-ring that has been 
compressed will return to its original shape much 
quicker than will a cold O-ring when 
compression is relieved. Thus, a warm O-ring 
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will follow the opening of the tang-to-clevis gap. 
A cold O-ring may not. 
 
b. A compressed O-ring at 75 degrees 
Fahrenheit is five times more responsive in 
returning to its uncompressed shape than a cold 
O-ring at 30 degrees Fahrenheit. 
 
c. As a result it is probable that the O-
rings in the right solid booster aft field joint were 
not following the opening of the gap between the 
tang and clevis at time of ignition. 
 
10. Experiments indicate that the primary 
mechanism that actuates O-ring sealing is the 
application of gas pressure to the upstream (high-
pressure) side of the O-ring as it sits in its groove 
or channel. 
 
a. For this pressure actuation to work 
most effectively, a space between the O-ring and 
its upstream channel wall should exist during 
pressurization. 
 
b. A tang-to-clevis gap of .O04 inches, 
as probably existed in the failed joint, would 
have initially compressed the O-ring to the 
degree that no clearance existed between the O-
ring and its upstream channel wall and the other 
two surfaces of the channel. 
 
c. At the cold launch temperature 
experienced, the O-ring would be very slow in 
returning to its normal rounded shape. It would 
not follow the opening of the tang-to-clevis gap. 
It would remain in its compressed position in the 
O-ring channel and not provide a space between 
itself and the upstream channel wall. Thus, it is 
probable the O-ring would not be pressure 
actuated to seal the gap in time to preclude joint 
failure due to blow-by and erosion from hot 
combustion gases. 
 
11. The sealing characteristics of the Solid 
Rocket Booster O-rings are enhanced by timely 
application of motor pressure. 
 
a. Ideally, motor pressure should be 
applied to actuate the O-ring and seal the joint 
prior to significant opening of the tang-to-clevis 
gap (100 to 200 milliseconds after motor 
ignition). 
b. Experimental evidence indicates that 
temperature, humidity and other variables in the 
putty compound used to seal the joint can delay 
pressure application to the joint by 500 
milliseconds or more. 
 
c. This delay in pressure could be a 
factor in initial joint failure. 
 
12. Of 21 launches with ambient temperatures of 
61 degrees Fahrenheit or greater, only four 
showed signs of O-ring thermal distress; i.e., 
erosion or blow-by and soot. Each of the 
launches below 61. degrees Fahrenheit resulted 
in one or more O-rings showing signs of thermal 
distress. 
a. Of these improper joint sealing 
actions, one-half occurred in the aft field joints, 
20 percent in the center field joints, and 30 
percent in the upper field joints. The division 
between left and right Solid Rocket Boosters was 
roughly equal. Each instance of thermal O-ring 
distress was accompanied by a leak path in the 
insulating putty. The leak path connects the 
rocket's combustion chamber with the O-ring 
region of the tang and clevis. Joints that actuated 
without incident may also have had these leak 
paths. 
 
13. There is a possibility that there was water in 
the clevis of the STS 51-L joints since water was 
found in the STS-9 joints during a destack 
operation after exposure to less rainfall than STS 
51-L. At time of launch, it was cold enough that 
water present in the joint would freeze. Tests 
show that ice in the joint can inhibit proper 
secondary seal performance. 
 
14. A series of puffs of smoke were observed 
emanating from the 51-L aft field joint area of 
the right Solid Rocket Booster between 0.678 
and 2.500 seconds after ignition of the Shuttle 
Solid Rocket Motors. 
 
a. The puffs appeared at a frequency of 
about three puffs per second. This roughly 
matches the natural structural frequency of the 
solids at lift off and is reflected in slight cyclic 
changes of the tang-to-clevis gap opening. 
 
 
 
 73 
b. The puffs were seen to be moving 
upward along the surface of the booster above 
the aft field joint. 
c. The smoke was estimated to originate 
at a circumferential position of between 270 
degrees and 315 degrees on the booster aft field 
joint, emerging from the top of the joint. 
15. This smoke from the aft field joint at Shuttle 
lift off was the first sign of the failure of the 
Solid Rocket Booster O-ring seals on STS 51-L. 
16. The leak was again clearly evident as a flame 
at approximately 58 seconds into the flight. It is 
possible that the leak was continuous but 
unobservable or non-existent in portions of the 
intervening period. It is possible in either case 
that thrust vectoring and normal vehicle response 
to wind shear as well as planned maneuvers 
reinitiated or magnified the leakage from a 
degraded seal in the period preceding the 
observed flames. The estimated position of the 
flame, centered at a point 307 degrees around the 
circumference of the aft field joint, was 
confirmed by the recovery of two fragments of 
the right Solid Rocket Booster.  
a. A small leak could have been present 
that may have grown to breach the joint in flame 
at a time on the order of 58 to 60 seconds after 
lift off. 
b. Alternatively, the O-ring gap could 
have been resealed by deposition of a fragile 
buildup of aluminum oxide and other 
combustion debris. This resealed section of the 
joint could have been disturbed by thrust 
vectoring, Space Shuttle motion and flight loads 
induced by changing winds aloft. 
c. The winds aloft caused control 
actions in the time interval of 32 seconds to 62 
seconds into the flight that were typical of the 
largest values experienced on previous missions. 
  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
In view of the findings, the Commission 
concluded that the cause of the Challenger 
accident was the failure of the pressure seal in 
the aft field joint of the right Solid Rocket Motor. 
The failure was due to a faulty design 
unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors. 
These factors were the effects of temperature, 
physical dimensions, the character of materials, 
the effects of reusability, processing, and the 
reaction of the joint to dynamic loading.  
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The upper photos show, from left to right, the left side of the orbiter (unburned), the right lower and upper 
rudder speed brake (both burned damaged) and left upper seed brake (unburned), confirmation that the fire 
was on the right side of the Shuttle stack. 
 
 
The lower photos show the range safety destruct charges in the External Tank. These charges were 
exonerated when they were recovered intact and undetonated. 
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The upper photos show, from left to right, the left side of the orbiter (unburned), the right lower and upper 
rudder speed brake (both burned damaged) and left upper seed brake (unburned), confirmation that the fire 
was on the right side of the Shuttle stack. 
 
 
The lower photos show the range safety destruct charges in the External Tank. These charges were 
exonerated when they were recovered intact and undetonated. 
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The frustrums on the left page are parts of the Solid Rocket Booster forward assemblies that contain 
recovery parachutes, location aids and flotation devices. The frustrum of the left hand booster (lower left) is 
virtually undamaged. The right frustrum shows impact damage at top and burns along the base of the cone; 
evidence indicates it was damaged when it impacted with the External Tank. Shown at right above is 
another Solid Rocket Motor stack crosshatched to show the burned area of the right booster's aft joint 
(diagram at right). The flame from the hole impinged on the External Tank and caused a failure at the aft 
connection at the External Tank. 
 
 
The frustrums on the left page are parts of the Solid Rocket Booster forward assemblies that contain 
recovery parachutes, location aids and flotation devices. The frustrum of the left hand booster (lower left) is 
virtually undamaged. The right frustrum shows impact damage at top and burns along the base of the cone; 
evidence indicates it was damaged when it impacted with the External Tank. Shown at right above is 
another Solid Rocket Motor stack crosshatched to show the burned area of the right booster's aft joint 
(diagram at right). The flame from the hole impinged on the External Tank and caused a failure at the aft 
connection at the External Tank. 
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The frustrums on the left page are parts of the Solid Rocket Booster forward assemblies that contain recovery parachutes, 
location aids and flotation devices. The frustrum of the left hand booster (lower left) is virtually undamaged. The right 
frustrum shows impact damage at top and burns along the base of the cone; evidence indicates it was damaged when it 
impacted with the External Tank. Shown at right above is another Solid Rocket Motor stack crosshatched to show the 
burned area of the right booster's aft joint (diagram at right). The flame from the hole impinged on the External Tank and 
caused a failure at the aft connection at the External Tank. 
 
The frustrums on the left page are parts of the Solid Rocket Booster forward assemblies that contain recovery parachutes, 
location aids and flotation devices. The frustrum of the left hand booster (lower left) is virtually undamaged. The right 
frustrum shows impact damage at top and burns along the base of the cone; evidence indicates it was damaged when it 
impacted with the External Tank. Shown at right above is another Solid Rocket Motor stack crosshatched to show the 
burned area of the right booster's aft joint (diagram at right). The flame from the hole impinged on the External Tank and 
caused a failure at the aft connection at the External Tank. 
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Photos I, J & K [clockwise]  
: Examined at Kennedy Space Center after their recovery from the ocean, these fragments show the extent 
of burn through the right hand booster's aft field joint. On the left page are sections of the aft center motor 
above the joint. On the right page are sections (inverted) of the aft motor segment showing burn-hole below 
the joint (bracket). Except for the interior views on lower left, the camera is viewing the parts from outside 
the casing. 
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Photos L & M [top, bottom]  
Examined at Kennedy Space Center after their recovery from the ocean, these fragments show the extent of 
burn through the right hand booster's aft field joint. On the left page are sections of the aft center motor 
above the joint. On the right page are sections (inverted) of the aft motor segment showing burn-hole below 
the joint (bracket). Except for the interior views on lower left, the camera is viewing the parts from outside 
the casing. 
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Photos N & O [top, bottom]  
At upper left is the aft segment burn viewed from inside the casing; the lower photo is a closeup of the same 
section. The latter photo shows a hole (arrow) where the flame plume may have burned through the casing 
from the outside. At right is a composite view of the burn above and below the aft field joint. 
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At upper left is the aft segm ent burn viewed from inside the casing; the lower photo is a closeup of the same 
section. The latter photo shows a hole (arrow) where the flame plume may have burned through the casing 
from the outside. At right is a composite view of the burn above and below the aft field joint. 
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Chapter V: The Contributing Cause of The Accident 
  
 
The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made that decision were unaware of the 
recent history of problems concerning the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written 
recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit 
and the continuing opposition of the engineers at Thiokol after the management reversed its position. They 
did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's concern that it was not safe to launch because of ice on 
the pad. If the decisionmakers had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have decided 
to launch 51-L on January 28, 1986. 
  
 
 
 
Flaws In The Decision Making Process 
 
 
 
 
In addition to analyzing all available 
evidence concerning the material causes of the 
accident on January 28, the Commission 
examined the chain of decisions that culminated 
in approval of the launch. It concluded that the 
decis ion making process was flawed in several 
ways. The actual events that produced the 
information upon which the approval of launch 
was based are recounted and appraised in the 
sections of this chapter. The discussion that 
follows relies heavily on excerpts from the 
testimony of those involved in the management 
judgments that led to the launch of the 
Challenger under conditions described. 
That testimony reveals failures in 
communication that resulted in a decision to 
launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes 
misleading information, a conflict between 
engineering data and management judgments, 
and a NASA management structure that 
permitted internal flight safety problems to 
bypass key Shuttle managers. 
The Shuttle Flight Readiness Review is 
a carefully planned, step-by-step activity, 
established by NASA program directive SPO-PD 
710.5A, 1 designed to certify the readiness of all 
components of the Space Shuttle assembly. The 
process is focused upon the Level I Flight 
Readiness Review, held approximately two 
weeks before a launch. The Level I review is a 
conference chaired by the NASA Associate 
Administrator for Space Flight and supported by 
the NASA Chief Engineer, the Program Manager, 
the center directors and project managers from 
Johnson, Marshall and Kennedy, along with 
senior contractor representatives. 
The formal portion of the process is 
initiated by directive from the Associate 
Administrator for Space Flight. The directive 
outlines the schedule for the Level I Flight 
Readiness Review and for the steps that precede 
it. The process begins at Level IV with the 
contractors formally certifying-in writing-the 
flight readiness of the elements for which they 
are responsible. Certification is  made to the 
appropriate Level III NASA project managers at 
Johnson and Marshall. Additionally, at Marshall 
the review is followed by a presentation directly 
to the Center Director. At Kennedy the Level III 
review, chaired by the Center Director, verifies 
readiness of the launch support elements. 
The next step in the process is the 
Certification of Flight Readiness to the Level II 
Program Manager at Johnson. In this review 
each Space Shuttle program element endorses 
that it has satisfactorily completed the 
manufacture,  
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assembly, test and checkout of the pertinent 
element, including the contractors" certification 
that design and performance are up to standard. 
The Flight Readiness Review process culminates 
in the Level I review. 
In the initial notice of the review, the 
Level I directive establishes a Mission 
Management Team for the particular mission. 
The team assumes responsibility for each 
Shuttle's readiness for a period commencing 48 
hours before launch and continuing through post-
landing crew egress and the safing of the Orbiter. 
On call throughout the entire period, the Mission 
Management Team supports the Associate 
Administrator for Space Flight and the Program 
Manager. 
A structured Mission Management Team 
meeting-called L-1-is held 24 hours, or one day, 
prior to each scheduled launch. Its agenda 
includes closeout of any open work, a closeout 
of any Flight Readiness Review action items, a 
discussion of new or continuing anomalies, and 
an updated briefing on anticipated weather 
conditions at the launch site and at the abort 
landing sites in different parts of the world. It is 
standard practice of Level-I and II officials to 
encourage the reporting of new problems or 
concerns that might develop in the interval 
between the Flight Readiness Review and the L-
1 meeting, and between the L-1 and launch. 
In a procedural sense, the process 
described 
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was followed in the case of flight 51 -L. 
However, in the launch preparation for 51-L 
relevant concerns of Level III NASA personnel 
and element contractors were  not, in the 
following crucial areas, adequately 
communicated to the NASA Level I and II 
management responsible for the launch:  
The objections to launch voiced by Morton 
Thiokol c engineers about the detrimental effect 
of cold temperatures on the performance of' the 
Solid Rocket Motor joint seal.  
The degree of concern of Thiokol and Marshall 
about the erosion of the joint seals in prior 
Shuttle flights, notably 51-C (January, 1985) and 
51-B (April, 1985).  
On December 13, 1985, the Associate 
Administrator for Space flight, Jesse Moore, sent 
out a message distributed among NASA 
Headquarters, NASA field centers, and U.S. Air 
Force units, that scheduled the Flight Readiness 
Review for January 15, 1986, and prescribed the 
dates for the other steps in the standard 
procedure. 
The message was followed by directives from 
James A. (Gene) Thomas, Deputy Director of 
Launch and Landing Operations at Kennedy on 
January 2, 1986; by the National Space 
Transportation System Program Manager, 
Arnold Aldrich, on January 3; by William R. 
Lucas, the Marshall Center Director, on January 
7; and by the Marshall Shuttle Projects Office on 
January 8. Each of these implementing directives 
prescribed for Level III the preparatory steps for 
the Flight Readiness Review. 
The Flight Readiness Review was held, as 
scheduled, on January 15. On the following day, 
Aldrich issued the schedule for the combined 
Level I/Mission Management Team meetings; he 
also announced plans for the Mission 
Management Team meetings continuing 
throughout the mission and included the 
schedule for the L-1 review. 
On January 23, Moore issued a directive stating 
that the Flight Readiness Review had been 
conducted on the 15th and that 51-L was ready to 
fly pending closeout of open work, satisfactory 
countdown, and completion of remaining Flight 
Readiness Review action items, which were to 
be closed out during the L-1 meeting. No 
problems with the Solid Rocket Booster were 
identified. 
Since December, 1982, the O-rings had been 
designated a "Criticality 1" feature of the Solid 
 
The NASA Asscociate Administrator for 
Space Flight issued this notice of scheduling 
of the Flight Readiness Review for mission 
51-L.  
 Rocket Booster design, a term denoting a failure 
point-without back-up-that could cause a loss of 
'life or vehicle if' the component fails. In July 
1985, after a nozzle joint on STS 51-B showed 
erosion of a secondary O-ring, indicating that the 
primary seal failed, a launch constraint was 
placed on flight 51-F and subsequent launches. 
These constraints had been imposed and 
regularly waived by the Solid Rocket Booster 
Project Manager at Marshall, Lawrence B. 
Mulloy. 
Neither the launch constraint, the reason for it, or 
the six consecutive waivers prior to 51-L were 
known to Moore (Level I) or Aldrich (Level II) 
or Thomas at the time of the Flight Readiness 
Review process for 51-L. 
It should be noted that there were other and 
independent paths of system reporting that were 
designed to bring forward information about the 
Solid Rocket Booster joint anomalies. One path 
was the task force of Thiokol engineers and  
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Marshall engineers who had been conducting 
subscale pressure tests at Wasatch during 1985, a 
source of documented rising concern and 
frustration on the part of some of the Thiokol 
participants and a few of the Marshall 
participants. But Level II was not in the line of 
reporting for this activity. Another path was the 
examination at each Flight Readiness Review of 
evidence of earlier flight anomalies. For 51-L, 
the data presented in this latter path, while it 
reached Levels I and II, never referred to either 
test anomalies or flight anomalies with O-rings. 
In any event, no mention of the O-ring problems 
in the Solid Rocket Booster joint appeared in the 
Certification of Flight Readiness, signed for 
Thiokol on January 9, 1986, by Joseph 
Kilminster, for the Solid Rocket Booster set 
designated BI026.2 
Similarly, no mention appeared in the 
certification endorsement, signed on January 15, 
1986, by Kilminster and by Mulloy,3 No mention 
appears in several inches of paper comprising the 
entire chain of readiness reviews for 51-L.4 
In the 51-L readiness reviews, it appears that 
neither Thiokol management nor the Marshall 
Level III project managers believed that the O-
ring blow-by and erosion risk was critical. The 
testimony and contemporary correspondence 
show that Level III believed there was ample 
margin to fly with O-ring erosion, provided the 
leak check was performed at 200 pounds per 
square inch. 
Following the January 15 Flight 
Readiness Review each element of the Shuttle 
was certified as flight-ready. 
The L- 1 Mission Management Team 
meeting took place as scheduled at 11:00 a.m. 
Eastern Standard Time January 25. No technical 
issues appeared at this meeting or in the 
documentation and all Flight Readiness Review 
actions were reported closed out.  
Mr. Mulloy testified as follows 
regarding the Flight Readiness Review record 
about O-ring concerns: 5 
  
Chairman Rogers: . . . Why wasn't that a cause 
for concern on the part of the whole NASA 
organization? 
Mr. Mulloy: It was cause for concern, sir. 
Chairman Rogers: Who did you tell about this? 
Mr. Mulloy: Everyone, sir. 
Chairman Rogers: And they all knew about it at 
the time of 51-L? 
Mr. Mulloy: Yes, sir. You will find in the Flight 
Readiness Review record that went all the way to 
the L-1 review. 
  
It is disturbing to the Commission that 
contrary to the testimony of the Solid Rocket 
Booster Project Manager, the seriousness of 
concern was not conveyed in Flight Readiness 
Review to Level I and the 51-L readiness review 
was silent. 
The only remaining issue facing the 
Mission Management Team at the L-1 review 
was the approaching cold front, with forecasts of 
rain showers and temperatures in the mid-sixties. 
There had also been heavy rain since 51-L had 
been rolled out to the launch pad, approximately 
seven inches compared with the 2.5 inches that 
would have been normal for that season and 
length of exposure (35 days). 
At 12:36 p.m. on the 27th, the Mission 
Management Team scrubbed the launch for that 
day due to high cross winds at the launch site. In 
the accompanying discussion that ran for about 
half an hour, all appropriate personnel were 
polled as to the feasibility of a launch within 24 
hours. Participants were requested to identify any 
constraints. This meeting, aimed at launch at 
9:38 a.m. On January 28, produced no 
constraints or concerns about the performance of 
the Solid Rocket Boosters. 
At 2:00 p.m. on the 27th, the Mission 
Management Team met again. At that time, the 
weather was expected to clear, but it appeared 
that temperatures would be in the low twenties 
for about 11 hours. Issues were raised with 
regard to the cold weather effects on the launch 
facility, including the water drains, the eye wash 
and shower water, fire suppression system, and 
overpressure water trays. It was decided to 
activate heaters in the Orbiter, but no concerns 
were expressed about the O-rings in the Solid 
Rocket Boosters. The decision was to proceed 
with the countdown and with fueling, but all 
members of the team were asked to review the 
situation and call if any problems arose. 
At approximately 2:30 p.m. EST, at 
Thiokol's Wasatch plant, Robert Ebeling, after 
learning of the predicted low temperature for 
launch, convened a meeting with Roger Boisjoly 
and with other Thiokol engineers. A brief 
chronology of the subsequent chain of events 
begins on page 104. Ebeling was concerned 
about predicted cold  
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temperatures at Kennedy Space Center. In a 
post-accident interview, Mr. Ebeling recalled the 
substance of the meeting. 6 
"The meeting lasted one hour, but the 
conclusion of that meeting was Engineering-
especially Arnie, Roger Boisjoly, Brian Russell, 
myself, Jerry Burns, they come to mind-were 
very adamant about their concerns on this lower 
temperature, because we were way below our 
data base and we were way below what we 
qualified for." 
Later in the afternoon on the same day, 
Allan McDonald-Thiokol's liaison for the Solid 
Rocket Booster project at Kennedy Space 
Center- received a telephone call from Ebeling, 
expressing concern about the performance of the 
Solid Rocket Booster field joints at low 
temperatures. During testimony before the 
Commission on February 27, McDonald 
recounted that conversation:7 
  
Mr. McDonald: Well, I had first 
become aware of the concern of the low 
temperatures that were projected for the Cape, it 
was late in the afternoon of the 27th. I was at 
Carver Kennedy's house. He is a vice president 
of, as I mentioned, our space operations center at 
the Cape, and supports the stacking of the SRMs 
[Solid Rocket Motors]. 
And I had a call from Bob Ebeling. He 
is the manager of our ignition system an final 
assembly, and he worked for me as program 
manager at Thiokol in Utah. And he called me 
and said that they had just received some word 
earlier that the weatherman was projecting 
temperatures as low as 18 degrees Fahrenheit 
some time in the early morning hours of the 28th, 
and that they had some meetings with some of 
the engineering people and had some concerns 
about the O-rings getting to those kinds of 
temperatures. 
And he wanted to make me aware of 
that and also wanted to get some more updated 
and better information on what the actual 
temperature was going to be depicted, so that 
they could make some calculations on what they 
expected the real temperature the O-rings may 
see.... 
I told him that I would get that 
temperature data for him and call him back. 
Carver Kennedy then, when I hung up, called the 
launch operations center to get the predicted 
temperatures from pad B, as well as what the 
temperature history had been during the day up 
until that time. 
. . . He obtained those temperatures from the 
launch operations center, and they basically said 
that they felt it was going to get near freezing or 
freezing before midnight. It would get as low as 
22 degrees as a minimum in the early morning 
hours, probably around 6:00 o'clock, and that 
they were predicting a temperature of about 26 
degrees at the intended time, about 9:38 the next 
morning. 
I took that data and called back to the 
plant and sent it to Bob Ebeling and relayed that 
to him, and told him he ought to use this 
temperature data for his predictions, but I 
thought this was very serious and to make sure 
that he had the vice president, engineering, 
involved in this and all of his people; that I 
wanted them to put together some calculations 
and a presentation of material.  
 
Chairman Rogers: Who's the Vice President, 
Engineering? 
Mr. McDonald: Mr. Bob Lund is our Vice 
President, Engineering, at our Morton Thiokol 
facility in Utah. 
To make sure he was involved in this, 
and that this decision should be an engineering 
decision, not a program management decision. 
And I told him that I would like him to make 
sure they prepared some charts and were in a 
position to recommend the launch temperature 
and to have the rationale for supporting that 
launch temperature. 
I then hung up and I called Mr. Mulloy. 
He was staying at the Holiday Inn in Merritt 
Island and they couldn't reach him, and so I 
called Cecil Houston-Cecil Houston is the 
resident manager for the Marshall Space Flight 
Center office at KSC [Kennedy Space Center]-
and told him about our concerns with the low 
temperatures and the potential problem with the 
O-rings. 
And he said that he would set up a 
teleconference. He had a four-wire system next 
to his office. His office is right across from the 
VAB [Vehicle Assembly Building] in the trailer 
complex C over there. And he would set up a 
four-wire teleconference involving the 
engineering people at Marshall Space Flight 
Center at Huntsville, our people back at Thiokol 
in Utah; and that I 
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should come down to his office and participate at 
Kennedy from there, and that he would get back 
with me and let me know when that time would 
be. 
  
Soon thereafter Cecil Houston called Dr. 
Judson Lovingood, Deputy Shuttle Project 
Manager at Marshall Space Flight Center, to 
inform him of the concerns about the O-rings 
and asked Lovingood to set up a teleconference 
with senior project management personnel, with 
George Hardy, Marshall's Deputy Director of 
Science and Engineering, and with Morton 
Thiokol personnel. Lovingood called Stanley 
Reinartz, Shuttle Project Manager, a few minutes 
later and informed him of the planned telecon. 
 
The first phase of the teleconference 
began at 5:45 p. m. Eastern Standard Time; 
participants included Reinartz, Lovingood, 
Hardy, and numerous people at Kennedy, 
Marshall and Thiokol-Wasatch. (Allen 
McDonald missed this phase; he did not arrive at 
Kennedy until after 8:00 p.m.) Concerns for the 
effect of low temperature on the O-rings and the 
joint seal were presented by Morton Thiokol, 
along with an opinion that launch should be 
delayed. A recommendation was also made that 
Aldrich, Program Manager at Johnson (Level II), 
be informed of these concerns. 
 
The following are excerpts from 
testimony before the Commission relating to the 
teleconference: 8 
  
Dr. Keel: You just indicated earlier that, based 
upon that teleconference, you thought there was 
a good possibility of delay. Is that what Thiokol 
was recommending then, was delay? 
 
Dr. Lovingood: That is the way I heard it, and 
they were talking about the 51-C experience and 
the fact that they had experienced the worst case 
blow-by as far as the arc and the soot and so 
forth. And also, they talked about the resiliency 
data that they had.  
So it appeared to me-and we didn't have 
all of the proper people  there. That was another 
aspect of this. It appeared to me that we had 
better sit down and get the data so that we could 
understand exactly what they were talking about 
and assess that data. 
And that is why I suggested that we go ahead 
and have a telecon within the center, so that we 
could review that. 
 
Dr. Keel: So as early as after that first afternoon 
conference at 5:45, it appeared that Thiokol was 
basically saying delay. Is that right? 
 
Dr. Lovingood: That is the way it came across to 
me. I don't know how other people perceived it, 
but that's the way it came across to me. 
 
Dr. Keel: Mr. Reinartz, how did you perceive It? 
 
Mr. Reinartz: I did not perceive it that way. I 
perceived that they were raising some questions 
and issues which required looking into by all the 
right parties, but I did not perceive it as a 
recommendation delay. 
 
Dr. Keel: Some prospects for delay? 
 
Mr. Reinartz: Yes, sir, that possibility is always 
there.  
 
Dr. Keel: Did you convey that to Mr. Mulloy and 
Mr. Hardy before the 8:15 conference? 
Mr. Reinartz: Yes, I did. And as a matter of fact, 
we had a discussion. Mr. Mulloy was just out of 
communication for about an hour, and then after 
that I got in contact with him, and we both had a 
short discussion relating to the general nature of 
the concerns with Dr. Lucas and Mr. Kingsbury 
at the motel before we both departed for the 
telecon that we had set up out at the Cape. 
Dr. Keel: But based upon that, Mr. Lovingood, 
that impression, you thought it was a significant 
enough possibility that Mr. Aldrich should have 
been contacted? 
 
Dr. Lovingood: Yes. 
Dr. Keel: In addition, did you recommend that 
Mr. Lucas, who is director of Marshall, of course, 
and Mr. Kingsbury, who is Mr. Hardy's boss, 
participate in the 8:15 conference? 
Dr. Lovingood: Yes, I did. 
Dr. Keel: And you recommended that to whom? 
Dr. Lovingood: I believe I said that over the net. 
I said that I thought we ought to have an inter-
center meeting involving Dr. Lucas and Mr. 
Kingsbury, and then plan to go on up the line to 
Level II and Level I. 
And then it was after we broke off that 
first telecon I called Stan at the motel and told  
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him that he ought to go ahead and alert Arnie to 
that possibility. 
Dr. Keel: And Mr. Reinartz, you then visited the 
motel room of Mr. Lucas with Mr. Kingsbury, 
and also was Mr. Mulloy with you then? 
Mr. Reinartz: Yes, sir, he was. In the first couple 
of minutes I believe I was there by myself, and 
then Mr. Mulloy joined us.  
Dr. Keel: And did you discuss with them Mr. 
Lovingood's recommendation that the two of 
them, Lucas and Kingsbury, participate? 
Mr. Reinartz: No, sir. I don't recall discussing Mr. 
Lovingood's recommendations. I discussed with 
them the nature of the telecon, the nature of the 
concerns raised by Thiokol, and the plans to 
gather the proper technical support people at 
Marshall for examination of the data. And I 
believe that was the essence of the discussion.  
Chairman Rogers: But you didn't recommend 
that the information be given to Level II or Level 
I? 
Mr. Reinartz: I don't recall that I raised that issue 
with Dr. Lucas. I told him what the plans were 
for proceeding. I don't recall, Mr. Chairman, 
making any statement regarding that. 
Mr. Hotz: Mr. Reinartz, are you telling us that 
you in fact are the person who made the decision 
not to escalate this to a Level II item?  
Mr. Reinartz: That is correct, sir. 
 
At approximately 8:45 p.m. Eastern Standard 
Time, Phase 2 of the teleconference commenced, 
the Thiokol charts and written data having 
arrived at Kennedy Space Center by telefax. (A 
table of teleconference participants is included 
with Chronology of Events.) The charts 
presented a history of the O-ring erosion and 
blow-by in the Solid Rocket Booster joints of 
previous flights, presented the results of subscale 
testing at Thiokol and the results of static tests of 
Solid Rocket Motors. In the following testimony, 
Roger Boisjoly, Allan McDonald and Larry 
Mulloy expressed their recollections of this 
teleconference up to the point when an off-net 
caucus was requested: 9 
 
Mr. Boisjoly: I expressed deep concern about 
launching at low temperature. I presented Chart 
2-1 with emphasis -now, 2-1, if you want to see it, 
I have it, but basically that was the chart that 
summarized the primary concerns, and that was 
the chart that I pulled right out of the 
Washington presentation without changing one 
word of it because it was still applicable, and it 
addresses the highest concern of the field joint in 
both the ignition transient condition and the 
steady state condition, and it really sets down the 
rationale for why we were continuing to fly. 
Basically, if erosion penetrates the primary O-
ring seal, there is a higher probability of no 
secondary seal capability in the steady state 
condition. And I had two sub-bullets under that 
which stated bench testing showed O-ring not 
capable of maintaining contact with metal parts, 
gap, opening rate to maximum operating 
pressure. I had another bullet which stated bench 
testing showed capability to maintain O-ring 
contact during initial phase (0 to 170 
milliseconds of transient). That was my comfort 
basis of continuing to fly under normal 
circumstances, normal being within the data base 
we had. 
 
I emphasized, when I presented that chart about 
the changing of the timing function of the O-ring 
as it attempted to seal. I was concerned that we 
may go from that first beginning region into that 
intermediate region, from O to 170 being the 
first region, and 170 to 330 being the 
intermediate region where we didn't  have a high 
probability of sealing or seating. 
 
I then presented Chart 2-2 with added concerns 
related to the timing function. And basically on 
that chart, I started off talking about a lower 
temperature than current data base results in 
changing the primary O-ring sealing timing 
function, and I discussed the SRM -15 [Flight 51-
C, January, 1985] observations, namely, the 15A 
[Left SRM, Flight 51-C] motor had 80 degrees 
arc black grease between the O-rings, and make 
no mistake about it, when I say black, I mean 
black just like coal. It was jet black. And SRM-
15B [Right SRM, Flight 51-C] had a 110 degree 
arc of black grease between the O-rings. We 
would have low O-ring squeeze due to low 
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temperature which I calculated earlier in the day. 
We should have higher O-ring Shore hardness. 
Now, that would be harder. And what that 
material really is, it would be likened to trying to 
shove a brick into a crack versus a sponge. That 
is a good analogy for purposes of this discussion. 
I also mentioned that thicker grease, as a result 
of lower temperatures, would have a higher 
viscosity. It wouldn't be as slick and slippery as 
it would be at room temperature. And so it would 
be a little bit more difficult to move across it. 
We would have higher O-ring pressure actuation 
time, in my opinion, and that is what I presented. 
These are the sum and substance of what I just 
presented. If action time increases, then the 
threshold of secondary seal pressurization 
capability is approached. That was my fear. If 
the threshold is reached, then secondary seal may 
not be capable of being pressurized, and that was 
the bottom line of everything that had been 
presented up to that point. 
Chairman Rogers: Did anybody take issue with 
you? 
Mr. Boisjoly: Well, I am coming to that. 
I als o showed a chart of the joint with an 
exaggerated cross section to show the seal lifted 
off, which has been shown to everybody. I was 
asked, yes, at that point in time I was asked to 
quantify my concerns, and I said I couldn't. I 
couldn't quantify it. I had no data to quantify it, 
but I did say I knew that it was away from 
goodness in the current data base. Someone on 
the net commented that we had soot blow-by on 
SRM-22 [Flight 61-A, October, 1985] which was 
launched at 75 degrees. I don't remember who 
made the comment, but that is where the first 
comment came in about the disparity between 
my conclusion and the observed data because 
SRM-22 [Flight 61-A, October, 1985] had blow-
by at essentially a room temperature launch. 
 
I then said that SRM -15 [Flight 51-C, 
January, 1985] had much more blow-by 
indication and that it was indeed telling us that 
lower temperature was a factor. This was 
supported by inspection of flown hardware by 
myself. I was asked again for data to support my 
claim, and I said I have none other than what is 
being presented, and I had been trying to get 
resilience data, Arnie and I both, since last 
October, and that statement was mentioned on 
the net. 
Others in the room presented their 
charts, and the main telecon session concluded 
with Bob Lund, who is our Vice President of.... 
 91 
 
Initial Thikol recommendation Chart presented by Robert K. Lund at second teleconference prior to Thiolol 
caucus.  
 
Engineering, presenting his conclusions and 
recommendations charts which were based on 
our data input up to that point. Listeners on the 
telecon were not pleased with the conclusions 
and the recommendations.  
Chairman Rogers: What was the conclusion ? 
Mr. Boisjoly: The conclusion was we should not 
fly outside of our data base, which was 53 
degrees. Those were the conclusions. And we 
were quite pleased because we knew in advance, 
having participated in the preparation, what the 
conclusions were, and we felt very comfortable 
with that. 
Mr. Acheson: Who presented that conclusion? 
Mr. Boisjoly: Mr. Bob Lund. He had prepared 
those charts. He had input from other people. He 
had actually physically prepared the charts. It 
was about that time that Mr. Hardy from 
Marshall was asked what he thought about the 
MTI [Morton Thiokol] recommendation, and he 
said he was appalled at the MTI decision. Mr. 
Hardy was also asked about launching, and he 
said no, not if the contractor recommended not 
launching, he would not go against the contractor 
and launch. 
There was a short discussion that ensued about 
temperature not being a discriminator between 
SRM-15 [Flight 51-C] and SRM-22 [Flight 61-
A], and shortly after, I believe it was Mr. 
Kilminster asked if- excuse me. I'm getting 
confused here. Mr. Kilminster was asked by 
NASA if he would launch, and he said no 
because the engineering recommendation was 
not to launch. 
Then MTI management then asked for a five-
minute caucus. I'm not sure exactly who asked 
for that, but it was asked in such a manner that I 
remember it was asked for, a five-minute caucus, 
which we put on- the line on mute and went off-
line with the rest of the net. 
Chairman Rogers: Mr. Boisjoly, at the time that 
you made the-that Thiokol made the 
recommendation not to launch, was that the 
unanimous recommendation as far as you knew? 
Mr. Boisjoly: Yes. I have to make something 
clear. I have been distressed by the things that 
have been appearing in the paper and things that 
have been said in general, and there was never 
one positive, pro-launch statement ever made by 
anybody. There have been some feelings since 
then that folks have expressed that they would 
support the decision, but there was not one 
positive statement for launch ever made in that 
room. 
  
Mr. McDonald's testimony: 10 
  
Mr. McDonald: I arrived at the Kennedy Space 
Center at about 8:15 [p.m.], and when I arrived 
there at the Kennedy Space Center the others that 
had already arrived were Larry Mulloy, who was 
there-he is the manager, the project manager for 
the SRB for Marshall. Stan Reinartz was there 
and he is the manager of the Shuttle Project 
Office. He's Larry Mulloy's boss. 
Cecil Houston was there, the resident manager 
for Marshall. And Jack Buchanan was there. He 
happens to be our manager, Morton Thiokol's 
manager of our launch support services office at 
Kennedy. 
The telecon hadn't started yet. It came on  
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the network shortly after I got there. 
Chairman Rogers: Was it essentially a telephone 
conference or was there actually a network of 
pictures? 
Mr. McDonald: It was a telephone conference.... 
But I will relay . . . what I heard at the 
conference as best I can. The teleconference 
started I guess close to 9:00 o'clock and, even 
though all the charts weren't there, we were told 
to begin and that Morton Thiokol should take the 
lead and go through the charts that they had sent 
to both centers. 
The charts were presented by the 
engineering people from Thiokol, in fact by the 
people that had made those particular charts. 
Some of them were typed, some of them were 
handwritten. And they discussed their concerns 
with the low temperatures relative to the possible 
effects on the O-rings, primarily the timing 
function to seal the 0rings. 
They presented a his tory of some of the 
data that we had accumulated both in static test 
and in flight tests relative to temperatures and the 
performance of the 0rings, and reviewed the 
history of all of our erosion studies of the O-
rings, in the field joints, any blow-by of the 
primary O-ring with soot or products of 
combustion or decomposition that we had noted, 
and the performance of the secondary O-rings. 
And there was an exchange amongst the 
technical people on that data as to what it 
meant . . . But the real exchange never really 
came until the conclusions and recommendations 
came in. 
At that point in time, our vice president, 
Mr. Bob Lund, presented those charts and he 
presented the charts on the conclusions and 
recommendations. And the bottom line was that 
the engineering people would not recommend a 
launch below 53 degrees Fahrenheit. The basis 
for that recommendation was primarily our 
concern with the launch that had occurred about 
a year earlier, in January of 1985, I believe it was 
51-C. 
  
 
 
Mr. Mulloy's testimony: 11 
  
Mr. Mulloy: That telecon was a little late starting. 
It was intended to be set up at 8:15 . . . and the 
telecon was begun at 8:45. 
And Thiokol will then present to you 
today the data that they presented to us in that 
telecon. I will not do that. The bottom line of that, 
though, initially was that Thiokol engineering, 
Bob Lund, who is the Vice President and 
Director of Engineering, who is here today, 
recommended that 51-L not be launched if the 
O-ring temperatures predicted at launch time 
would be lower than any previous launch, and 
that was 53 degrees. 
 
Dr. Walker: May I ask a question? I wish you 
would distinguish between the predicted bulk 
temperatures and the O-ring temperatures. In fact, 
as I understand it, you really don't have any 
official O-ring temperature prediction in your 
models, and it seems that the assumption has 
been that the O-ring temperature is the same as 
the bulk temperature, which we know is not the 
case. 
 
Mr. Mulloy: You will see, sir, in the Thiokol 
presentation today that that is not the case. This 
was a specific calculation of what the O-ring 
temperature was on the day of the January 1985 
launch. It is not the bulk temperature of the 
propellant, nor is it the ambient temperature of 
the air. 
It was Thiokol's calculation of what the 
lowest temperature an O-ring had seen in 
previous flights, and the engineering 
recommendation was that we should not move 
outside of that experience base. 
I asked Joe Kilminster, who is the 
program manager for the booster program at 
Thiokol, what his recommendation was, because 
he is the gentleman that I get my 
recommendations from in the program office. He 
stated that, based on that engineering 
recommendation, that he could not recommend 
launch. 
At that point I restated, as I have 
testified to, the rationale that was essentially 
documented in the 1982 Critical Items List, that 
stated that the rationale had been that we were 
flying with a simplex joint seal. And you will see 
in the Thiokol presentation that the context of 
their presentation is that the primary ring, with 
the reduced temperatures and reduced resiliency, 
may not function as 
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a primary seal and we would be relying on 
secondary. 
And without getting into their rationale 
and getting ahead, the point, the bottom line, is 
that we were continuing-the assessment was, my 
assessment at that time was, that we would have 
an effective simplex seal, based upon the 
engineering data that Thiokol had presented, and 
that none of those engineering data seemed to 
change that basic rationale. 
Stan Reinartz then asked George Hardy, 
the Deputy Director of Science and Engineering 
at Marshall, what his opinion was. George stated 
that he agreed that the engineering data did not 
seem to change this basic rationale, but also 
stated on the telecon that he certainly would not 
recommend launching if Thiokol did not. 
At that time Joe Kilminster requested a five 
minute off-net caucus, and that caucus lasted 
approximately 30 minutes. 
  
The teleconference was recessed at 
approximately 10:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. 
The off-net caucus of Thiokol personnel started 
and continued for about 30 minutes at the 
Wasatch office. The major issues, according to 
the testimony of Jerry Mason, Senior Vice 
President for Wasatch Operations, were the 
effect of temperature upon the O-rings and the 
history of erosion of the O-rings: 12 
  
Mr. Mason: Now, in the caucus we revisited all 
of our previous discussions, and the important 
things that came out of that was that, as we had 
recognized, we did have the possibility that the 
primary O-ring might be slower to move into the 
seating position and that was our concern, and 
that is what we had focused on originally.  
The fact that we couldn't show direct 
correlation with the O-ring temperature was 
discussed, but we still felt that there was some 
concern about it being colder. 
We then recognized that, if the primary 
did move more slowly, that we could get some 
blow-by and erosion on the primary. But we had 
pointed out to us in that caucus a point that had 
not come across clearly in our earlier discussions, 
and that is that we had run tests where we 
deliberately cut large pieces out of the O-rings to 
see what the threshold of sealing was, and we 
found we could go to 125 thousandths of a cut 
out of the O-ring and it would still seal. 
  
Approximately 10 engineers 
participated in the caucus, along with Mason, 
Kilminster, C. G. Wiggins (Vice President, 
Space Division), and Lund. Arnold Thompson 
and Boisjoly voiced very strong objections to 
launch, and the suggestion in their testimony was 
that Lund was also reluctant to launch:13 
  
Mr. Boisjoly: Okay, the caucus started by Mr. 
Mason stating a management decision was 
necessary. Those of us who opposed the launch 
continued to speak out, and I am specifically 
speaking of Mr. Thompson and myself because 
in my recollection he and I were the only ones 
that vigorously continued to oppose the launch. 
And we were attempting to go back and rereview 
and try to make clear what we were trying to get 
across, and we couldn't understand why it was 
going to be reversed. So we spoke out and tried 
to expla in once again the effects of low 
temperature. Arnie actually got up from his 
position which was down the table, and walked 
up the table and put a quarter pad down in front 
of the table, in front of the management folks, 
and tried to sketch out once again what his 
concern was with the joint, and when he realized 
he wasn't getting through, he just stopped. 
I tried one more time with the photos. I 
grabbed the photos, and I went up and discussed 
the photos once again and tried to make the point 
that it was my opinion from actual observations 
that temperature was indeed a discriminator and 
we should not ignore the physical evidence that 
we had observed .  
And again, I brought up the point that 
SRM- 15 [Flight 51 -C, January, 1985] had a 110 
degree arc of black grease while SRM -22 [Flight 
61-A, October, 1985] had a relatively different 
amount, which was less and wasn't quite as black. 
I also stopped when it was apparent that I 
couldn't get anybody to listen. 
 
Dr. Walker: At this point did anyone else speak 
up in favor of the launch?  
Mr. Boisjoly: No, sir. No one said anything, in 
my recollection, nobody said a word. It was then 
being discussed amongst the management folks. 
After Arnie and I had 
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our last say, Mr. Mason said we have to make a 
management decision. He turned to Bob Lund 
and asked him to take off his engineering hat and 
put on his management hat. From this point on, 
management formulated the points to base their 
decision on. There was never one comment in 
favor, as I have said, of launching by any 
engineer or other nonmanagement person in the 
room before or after the caucus. I was not even 
asked to participate in giving any input to the 
final decision charts.  
 
I went back on the net with the final charts or 
final chart, which was the rationale for launching, 
and that was presented by Mr. Kilminster. It was 
hand written on a notepad, and he read from that 
notepad. I did not agree with some of the 
statements that were being made to support the 
decision. I was never asked nor polled, and it 
was clearly a management decision from that 
point. 
 
I must emphasize, I had my say, and I never 
[would] take [away] any management right to 
take the input of an engineer and then make a 
decision based upon that input, and I truly 
believe that. I have worked at a  lot of companies, 
and that has been done from time to time, and I 
truly believe that, and so there was no point in 
me doing anything any further than I had already 
attempted to do. 
 
I did not see the final version of the chart until 
the next day. I just heard it read. I left the room 
feeling badly defeated, but I felt I really did all I 
could to stop the launch. 
 
I felt personally that management was 
under a lot of pressure to launch and that they 
made a very tough decision, but I didn't agree 
with it. 
 
One of my colleagues that was in the meeting 
summed it up best. This was a meeting where the 
determination was to launch, and it was up to us 
to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that it was 
not safe to do so. This is in total reverse to what 
the position usually is in a preflight conversation 
or a flight readiness review. It is usually exactly 
opposite that. 
 
Dr. Walker: Do you know the source of the 
pressure on management that you alluded to? 
 
Mr. Boisjoly: Well, the comments made over the 
[net] is what I felt, I can't speak for them, but I 
felt it-I felt the tone of the meeting exactly as I 
summed up, that we were being put in a position 
to prove that we should not launch rather than 
being put in the position and prove that we had 
enough data to launch. And I felt that very real. 
Dr. Walker: These were the comments from the 
NASA people at Marshall and at Kennedy Space 
Center? Mr. Boisjoly: Yes. Dr. Feynman: I take 
it you were trying to find proof that the seal 
would fail? 
 
Mr. Boisjoly: Yes. 
 
Dr. Feynman: And of course, you didn't, you 
couldn't, because five of them didn't, and if you 
had proved that they would have all failed, you 
would have found yourself incorrect because five 
of them didn't fail.  
 
Mr. Boisjoly: That is right. I was very concerned 
that the cold temperatures would change that 
timing and put us in another regime, and that was 
the whole basis of my fighting that night. 
As appears from the foregoing, after the 
discussion between Morton Thiokol management 
and the engineers, a final management review 
was conducted by Mason, Lund, Kilminster, and 
Wiggins. Lund and Mason recall this review as 
an unemotional, rational discussion of the 
engineering facts as they knew them at that time; 
differences of opinion as to the impact of those 
facts, however, had to be resolved as a judgment 
call and therefore a management decision. The 
testimony of Lund taken by Commission staff 
investigators is as follows: 14 
  
Mr. Lund: We tried to have the telecon, as I 
remember it was about 6:00 o'clock [MST], but 
we didn't quite get things in order, and we started 
transmitting charts down to Marshall around 
6:00 or 6:30 [MST], something like that, and we 
were making charts in real time and seeing the 
data, and we were discussing them with the 
Marshall folks who went along. 
 
We finally got the-all the charts in, and when we 
got all the charts in I stood at the board and tried 
to draw the conclusions that we had out of the 
charts that had been presented, and we came up 
with a conclusions 
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chart and said that we didn't feel like it was a 
wise thing to fly. 
 
Question: What were some of the conclusions? 
 
Mr. Lund: I had better look at the chart. Well, we 
were concerned the temperature was going to be 
lower than the 50 or the 53 that had flown the 
previous January, and we had experienced some 
blow-by, and so we were concerned about that, 
and although the erosion on the O-rings, and it 
wasn't critical, that, you know, there had 
obviously been some little puff go through. It 
had been caught. 
There was no real extensive erosion of 
that O-ring, so it wasn't a major concern, but we 
said, gee, you know, we just don't know how 
much further we can go below the 51 or 53 
degrees or whatever it was. So we were 
concerned with the unknown. And we presented 
that to Marshall, and that rationale was rejected. 
They said that they didn't accept that rationale, 
and they would like us to consider some other 
thoughts that they had had. 
 
....Mr. Mulloy said he did not accept that, and Mr. 
Hardy said he was appalled that we would make 
such a recommendation. And that made me 
ponder of what I'd missed, and so we said, what 
did we miss, and Mr. Mulloy said, well, I would 
like you to consider these other thoughts that we 
have had down here. And he presented a very 
strong and forthright rationale of what they 
thought was going on in that joint and how they 
thought that the thing was happening, and they 
said, we'd like you to consider that when they 
had some thoughts that we had not considered. 
 
...So after the discussion with Mr. Mulloy, and 
he presented that, we said, well, let's ponder that 
a little bit, so we went offline to talk about what 
we- 
 
Question: Who requested to go off-line? 
 
Mr. Lund: I guess it was Joe Kilminster. 
And so we went off line on the telecon . . . so we 
could have a roundtable discussion here. 
Question: Who were the management people that 
were there? 
 
Mr. Lund: Jerry Mason, Cal Wiggins, Joe, I, 
manager of engineering design, the manager of 
applied mechanics. On the chart. 
  
Before the Commission on February 25, 1986, 
Mr. Lund testified as follows regarding why he 
changed his position on launching Challenger 
during the management caucus when he was 
asked by Mr. Mason "To take off his engineering 
hat and put on his management hat": 15 
  
Chairman Rogers: How do you explain the fact 
that you seemed to change your mind when you 
changed your hat? 
 
Mr. Lund: I guess we have got to go back a little 
further in the conversation than that. We have 
dealt with Marshall for a long time and have 
always been in the position of defending our 
position to make sure that we were ready to fly, 
and I guess I didn't realize until after that 
meeting and after several days that we had 
absolutely changed our position from what we 
had been before. But that evening I guess I had 
never had those kinds of things come from the 
people at Marshall. We had to prove to them that 
we weren't ready, and so we got ourselves in the 
thought process that we were trying to find some 
way to prove to them it wouldn't work, and we 
were unable to do that. We couldn't prove 
absolutely that that motor wouldn't work.  
 
Chairman Rogers: In other words, you honestly 
believed that you had a duty to prove that it 
would not work? 
 
Mr. Lund: Well, that is kind of the mode we got 
ourselves into that evening. It seems like we 
have always been in the opposite mode. I should 
have detected that, but I did not, but the roles 
kind of switched. . 
  
Supplemental testimony of Mr. Mason obtained 
in a Commission staff interview is as follows: 16 
  
Question: Do you recall Mr. Hardy and Mr. 
Mulloy's comments after-I think after Mr. 
Kilminster had got done, or Mr. Lund got done 
presenting the charts? They had some comments. 
Do you recall-  
 
Mr. Mason: Oh, yes, it was over and over. Hardy 
said that, "I'm appalled at your recommendation.  
 
Question: Well, did Mr. Hardy's n «appalled" 
remark and Mr. Mulloy's "can't launch, we won't 
be able to launch until April" 
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remark, how did that affect your thinking and 
affect your decision? 
 
Mr. Mason: My personal thinking, I just, you 
know, it didn't make that much difference . 
And the comments that they made, in my view, 
probably had got more reaction from the 
engineer[s] at the lower level than they would 
from the manager[s], because we deal with 
people, and managers all the time.... 
  
Mr. McDonald indicated that during the period 
of the internal Morton Thiokol caucus he 
continued to argue for delay with Mulloy, 
challenging, among other things, the rationale 
that the rocket motor was qualified down to 40 
degrees Farhenheit. Present were Reinartz, Jack 
Buchanan, the manager of Morton Thiokol 
Launch Support Services at Kennedy, and Cecil 
Houston. McDonald's testimony described that 
conversation: 17 
  
Mr. McDonald: . . . while they were offline, 
reevaluating or reassessing this data . . . I got 
into a dialogue with the NASA people about 
such things as qualification and launch commit 
criteria. 
The comment I made was it is my 
understanding that the motor was supposedly 
qualified to 40 to 90 degrees.  
I've only been on the program less than 
three years, but I don't believe it was. I don't 
believe that all of those systems, elements, and 
subsystems were qualified to that temperature. 
And Mr. Mulloy said well, 40 degrees is 
propellant mean bulk temperature, and we're 
well within that. That is a requirement. We're at 
55 degrees for that-and that the other elements 
can be below that . . . that, as long as we don't 
fall out of the propellant mean bulk temperature. 
I told him I thought that was asinine because you 
could expose that large Solid Rocket Motor to 
extremely low temperatures-I don't care if it's 
100 below zero for several hours-with that 
massive amount of propellant, which is a great 
insulator, and not change that propellant mean 
bulk temperature but only a few degrees, and I 
don't think the spec really meant that. 
But that was my interpretation because I 
had been working quite a bit on the filament 
wound case Solid Rocket Motor. It was my 
impression that the qualification temperature was 
40 to 90, and I knew everything wasn't qualified 
to that temperature, in my opinion. But we were 
trying to qualify that case itself at 40 to 90 
degrees for the filament wound case. 
I then said I may be naive about what 
generates launch commit criteria, but it was my 
impression that launch commit criteria was based 
upon whatever the lowest temperature, or 
whatever loads, or whatever environment was 
imposed on any element or subsystem of the 
Shuttle. And if you are operating outside of those, 
no matter which one it was, then you had 
violated some launch commit criteria. 
That was my impression of what that 
was. And I still didn't understand how NASA 
could accept a recommendation to fly below 40 
degrees. I could see why they took issue with the 
53, but I could never see why they would . . . of 
accept a recommendation below 40 degrees, 
even though I didn't agree that the motor was 
fully qualified to 40. I made the statement that if 
we're wrong and something goes wrong on this 
flight, I wouldn't want to have to be the person to 
stand up in front of board of inquiry and say that 
I went ahead and told them to go ahead and fly 
this thing outside what the motor was qualified 
to. 
I made that very statement. 
  
Mr. Mulloy's recollections of these discussion 
are as follows: 18 
  
Mr. Mulloy: Mr. Kilminster then requested an 
off-net caucus. It has been suggested, implied, or 
stated that we directed Thiokol to go reconsider 
these data. That is not true. Thiokol asked for a 
caucus so that they could consider the 
discussions that had ensued and the comments 
that Mr. Hardy and I and others had made. 
That caucus, as has been stated, was 
going to start at that point, and Mr. McDonald 
interjected into the teleconference. At that point, 
he made the first comment that he had made 
during this entire teleconference. 
Mr. McDonald testified for quite a 
while yesterday about his thoughts on this, but 
he did not say any of them until this point. At 
that point, he stated that he thought what George 
Hardy said was a very important  
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consideration, and that consideration was, and he 
asked Mr. Kilminster to be sure and consider the 
comment made by George Hardy during the 
course of the discussions, that the concerns 
expressed were for primary O-ring blow-by and 
that the secondary O-ring was in a position to 
seal during the time of blow-by and would do so 
before significant joint rotation had occurred. 
They then went into their caucus, having asked 
for five minutes- 
 
Mr. Hotz: . . . It figures quite prominently in the 
discussion that you were quoted as saying, do 
you expect us to wait till April to launch? 
 
Mr. Mulloy: Yes, sir. 
 
Dr. Walker: Is that an accurate statement or not? 
 
Mr. Mulloy: It is certainly a statement that is out 
of context, and the way I read the quote, sir-and I 
have seen it many times, too many times-the 
quote I read was: My God, Thiokol, when do 
you want me to launch, next April? 
Mr. McDonald testified to another quote that 
says: You guys are generating new Launch 
Commit Criteria. 
Now, both of those I think kind of go together, 
and that is what I was saying. I don't know 
whether that occurred during the caucus or 
subsequent to. I just simply can't remember that. 
 
Mr. Hotz: Well, never mind the timing. 
 
Mr. Mulloy: Well, yes, sir. I'm going to answer 
your question now. I think those quotes derive 
from a single thought that may have been 
expressed by me using some of those words. 
I have not yet encountered anyone other than 
those at KSC who heard those words, so I don't 
believe they were transmitted over the net. The 
total context I think in which those words may 
have been used is, there are currently no Launch 
Commit Criteria [LCC] for joint temperature. 
What you are proposing to do is to generate a 
new Launch Commit Criteria on the eve of 
launch, after we have successfully flown with the 
existing Launch Commit Criteria 24 previous 
times. With this LCC, i.e., do not launch with a 
temperature greater [sic] than 53 degrees, we 
may not be able to launch until next April. We 
need to consider this  carefully before we jump to 
any conclusions. 
It is all in the context, again, with challenging 
your interpretation of the data, what does it mean 
and is it logical, is it truly logical that we really 
have a system that has to be 53 degrees to fly? 
  
At approximately 11 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, 
the Thiokol/NASA teleconference resumed, the 
Thiokol management stating that they had 
reassessed the problem, that the temperature 
effects were a concern, but that the data were 
admittedly inconclusive. Kilminster read the 
rationale recommending launch and stated that 
that was Morton Thiokol's recommendation. 
Hardy requested that it be sent in writing by 
telefax both to Kennedy and to Marshall, and it 
was. The testimony of Mulloy and Hardy 
regarding the remainder of the teleconference 
and their rationale for recommending launch 
follows: 19 
  
Mr. Mulloy: Okay, sir. At the completion of the 
caucus, of course, Mr. Kilminster came back on 
the loop and stated they had assessed all the data 
and considered the discussions that had ensued 
for the past couple of hours and the discussions 
that occurred during their caucus. 
 
Chairman Rogers: Was it a couple of hours? 
 
Mr. Mulloy: Yes, sir. We started at 8:45 and I 
believe it was probably 11:00 o'clock before he 
came back on the loop. It was a long discussion. 
And I must emphasize that I had no knowledge 
of what interchange occurred during the caucus 
at Thiokol, because all sites were on mute. We 
were on mute at KSC. No communications 
occurred between myself and Mr. Hardy at 
Huntsville, nor did any communication occur 
between KSC and Thiokol during that caucus. 
After Mr. Kilminster made that 
recommendation, Mr. Reinartz then asked if 
there were any further comments, and to my 
recollection there were none. There were no 
further comments made. 
I then asked Mr. Kilminster to send me a copy of 
his flight readiness rationale and 
recommendation. The conference was then 
terminated at approximately 11:15. 
I have no knowledge of, as has been 
testified, of Mr. McDonald being asked to sign 
that documentation. That would have.... 
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been unusual, because Mr. Kilminster signs all 
flight readiness documentation. 
Now, after the teleconference was 
complete, Mr. McDonald informed Mr. Reinartz 
and me that if the Thiokol engineering concern 
for the effect of cold was not sufficient cause to 
recommend not launching, there were two other 
considerations, launch pad ice and recovery area 
weather. 
I stated that launch pad ice had been 
considered by the Mission Management Team- 
Chairman Rogers: Excuse me. Could you 
identify that discussion, where that took place? 
 
Mr. Mulloy: That was after the teleconference 
was completed, after Mr. Kilminster made his 
recommendation, after Mr. Reinartz asked are 
there any other comments. There were no other 
comments on the telecon from anyone.... 
I stated that launch pad ice had been 
considered by the Mission Management Team 
before deciding to proceed and that a further 
periodic monitoring of that condition was 
planned. I further stated that I had been made 
aware of the recovery area weather previously 
and planned to place a call to Mr. Aldrich and 
advise him that the weather in the recovery area 
exceeded the Launch Commit Criteria. 
So I stated earlier, when you asked what 
were the Launch Commit Criteria, one of them 
was that the recovery area weather has 
limitations on it. The report we had, that Mr. 
McDonald confirmed, was that we were outside 
of those limits. 
Now, I must point out that that is not a 
hard Launch Commit Criteria. That is an 
advisory call, and the LCC so states that. It does 
require that we discuss the condition.  
So at about 11:30 p.m., Mr. Cecil 
Houston established a teleconference with Mr. 
Aldrich and Mr. Sestile at KSC. I informed Mr. 
Aldrich that the weather in the 
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recovery area could preclude immediate recovery 
of the SRBs, since the ships were in a survival 
mode and they were moving back toward Cape 
Kennedy at about three knots, and the estimate 
provided to us by Mr. Sestile was that they 
would be probably 40 miles from the SRB 
impact area at the time of launch, at 9:38; and 
then, continuing at three knots, it was going to be 
some period of time before they could get back 
and locate the boosters. 
The concern I had for that was not loss 
of the total booster, but loss of the main 
parachutes for the booster, which are separated at 
water impact, and loss of the frustum of the 
boosters, which has the drogue parachute on it, 
which comes down separately, because with the 
50 knot winds we had out there and with the kind 
of sea states we had, by the time the recovery 
ships got back out there, there was little 
probability of being able to recover those. 
I informed Mr. Aldrich of that, and he 
decided to proceed with the launch after that 
information. I did not discuss with Mr. Aldrich 
the conversations that we had just completed 
with Morton Thiokol. 
Chairman Rogers: Could you explain why? Mr. 
Mulloy: Yes, sir. At that time, and I still consider 
today, that was a Level III issue, Level III being 
an SRB element or an external tank element or 
Space Shuttle main engine element or an Orbiter. 
There was no violation of Launch Commit 
Criteria. There was no waiver required in my 
judgment at that time and still today. 
And we work many problems at the 
Orbiter and the SRB and the External Tank level 
that never get communicated to Mr. Aldrich or 
Mr. Moore. It was clearly a Level III issue that 
had been resolved. 
. . . There were 27 full-scale seal tests with an O-
ring groove damage tolerances, damage in the 
grooves and damage tolerance on O-rings. And 
then there were two cold gas tests.  
And these data were presented on the 
night of the 27th. All of that was at ambient 
temperature. And then we did discuss what is a 
development qualification motor experience 
range, and that is shown on the chart. We had 
experience everywhere from 40 to 85 degrees. 
There then were data presented on two 
cold gas tests at 30 degrees, where the O-ring 
was pressurized at the motor pressurization rate 
at 30 degrees, which would indicate that an O-
ring would operate before joint rotation at 30 
degrees. 
Dr. Ride: Was that actually in a joint? 
Mr. Mulloy: No, it is not. It is a full-scale O-ring, 
full-scale groove, in a scaled test device, where 
the pressurize rate on that O-ring is zero to 900 
psi [pounds per square inch] in 600 milliseconds 
at a temperature of 30 degrees. 
Dr. Walker: You would say, then, the O-ring was 
qualified to a temperature of 30 degrees? Would 
that be an accurate statement? 
Mr. Mulloy: The day that we were looking at it, 
on the 27th, these two tests that we did indicated 
that it would perform at 30 degrees under the 
motor pressurization rate before the joint rotated. 
Dr. Walker: What about, let's consider 
the putty and the O-ring, because that is really 
the system that responds to the pressure surge. 
What temperature was the putty/O-ring system 
qualified to? 
Mr. Mulloy: The lowest that I'm aware of-and 
we're still flushing this out, because this is kind 
of what we talked about on the 27th, but the 
lowest that I'm aware of is the 40-degree test on 
one of the development motors. 
Dr. Walker: And, of course, during 
those tests the putty was modified before the test. 
The putty was not just laid up and then the seal 
made. The putty was then smoothed out or some 
attempt was made to remove the volcanoes, I 
think. 
Mr. Mulloy: Because the horizontal assembly 
caused that. 
Now, there's one other significant point 
on this chart that we did discuss, that we didn't 
have the quantities on on the 27th, and I 
mentioned this earlier. We have 150 case 
segment proof tests, with a large number of 
joints with a simulation of a cold O-ring. That is 
the 90 durometer with a .275, and that was at 
about 35 degrees. 
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So those are the certification data that we kind of 
discussed, all of which we didn't discuss. The 
two cold gas tests we did, the segment proof tests 
we did, the development and qualification motor 
test we did, as a basis for understanding what we 
could expect to happen at colder temperatures on 
the joints. 
Mr. Hardy testified as follows:20 
Mr. Hardy: At the teleconference on the evening 
of January 27, 1986, Thiokol engineering 
personnel in Utah reviewed charts that had been 
datafaxed to Huntsville and KSC participants 
just prior to the beginning of the conference. 
Now, I am not going to repeat a lot of what you 
have already heard, but I will give you some of 
my views on the whole matter. 
The presentations were professional in 
nature. There were numerous questions and 
answers. There was a discussion of various data 
and points raised by individuals at Thiokol or at 
Marshall or at Kennedy. I think it was a rather 
full discussion. There were some 14 charts 
presented, and as has been mentioned earlier, we 
spent about two, two and a half hours reviewing 
this. To my knowledge, anyone who desired to 
make a point, ask a question or express a view 
was in no way restrained from doing so. 
As others have mentioned, I have heard 
this particular teleconference characterized as a 
heated discussion. I acknowledge that there were 
penetrating questions that were asked, I think, 
from both, from all people involved. There were 
various points of view and an interpretation of 
the data that was exchanged. The discussion was 
not, in my view, uncharacteristic of discussions 
on many flight readiness issues on many 
previous occasions. Thiokol engineering 
concluded their presentation with 
recommendation that the launch time be 
determined consistent with flight experience to 
date, and that is the launch with the O-ring 
temperatures at or greater than 53 degrees 
Fahrenheit. 
Mr. Kilminster at Thiokol stated . . . to the best 
of my recollection, that with that engineering 
assessment, he recommended we not launch on 
Tuesday morning as scheduled. After some short 
discussion, Mr. 
Mulloy at KSC summarized his assessment of 
the data and his rationale with that data, and I 
think he has testified to that. 
Mr. Reinartz, who was at KSC, asked me for 
comment, and I stated I was somewhat appalled, 
and that was referring specifically to some of the 
data or the interpretation of some of the data that 
Thiokol had presented with respect to its 
influence on the joint seal performance relative 
to the issue under discussion, which specifically 
was the possibility that the primary seal may take 
longer to actuate and therefore to blow by the 
primary seal. The blow-by of the primary seal 
may be longer, and I am going to elaborate on 
that a little further in this statement. 
Then I went on to say that I supported 
the assessment of data presented essentially as 
summarized by Mr. Mulloy, but I would not 
recommend launch over Thiokol's objections.  
Somewhere about this time, Mr. 
Kilminster at Utah stated that he wanted to go 
off the loop to caucus for about five minutes. I 
believe at this point Mr. McDonald, the senior 
Thiokol representative at KSC for this launch 
suggested to Mr. Kilminster that he consider a 
point that I think I had made earlier, that the 
secondary O-ring is in the proper position to seal 
if blow-by of the primary O-ring occurred. 
I clearly interpreted this as a somewhat 
positive statement of supporting rationale for 
launch.... The status of the caucus by Thiokol 
lasted some 30, 35 minutes. At Huntsville during 
this Thiokol caucus, we continued to discuss the 
data presented. We were off the loop, we were 
on mute. We were around a table in small groups. 
It was not an organized type discussion. But I did 
take that opportunity to discuss my assessment 
and understanding of the data with several of my 
key advisors, and none of us had any 
disagreement or differences in our interpretation 
of what we believed the data was telling us with 
regard to the primary issue at hand. 
When Thiokol came back on line, Mr. 
Kilminster reviewed rationale that supported 
proceeding with the launch and so recommended. 
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Mr. Reinartz asked if anyone in the loop had a 
different position or disagreed or something to 
that effect, with the Thiokol recommendation as 
presented by Mr. Kilminster. There were no 
dissenting responses. 
The telecon was terminated shortly after, 
and I have no knowledge of any subsequent 
events or discussions between personnel at KSC 
or at Thiokol on this matter. 
At about 5:00 a. m . on January 28, a 
discussion took place among Messrs. Mulloy, 
Lucas, and Reinartz in which Mulloy reported to 
Lucas only that there had been a discussion with 
Thiokol over their concerns about temp erature 
effects on the O-rings, and that it had been 
resolved in favor of launch. The following 
testimony of Mr. Mulloy and Dr. Lucas recount 
that discussion: 21 
General Kutyna: .  . . Larry, let me follow through 
on that, and I am kind of aware of the launch 
decision process, and you said you made the 
decision at your level on this thing. 
If this were an airplane, an airliner, and 
I just had a two-hour argument with Boeing on 
whether the wing was going to fall off or not, I 
think I would tell the pilot, at least mention it. 
Why didn't we escalate a decision of this 
importance ? 
Mr. Mulloy: I did, sir. 
General Kutyna: You did? Mr. Mulloy: Yes, sir. 
General Kutyna: Tell me what levels  above you. 
Mr. Mulloy: As I stated earlier, Mr. Reinartz, 
who is my manager, was at the meeting, and on 
the morning, about 5:00 o'clock in the operations 
support room where we all were I informed Dr. 
Lucas of the content of the discussion. 
General Kutyna: But this is not in the launch 
decision chain.  
Mr. Mulloy: No, sir. Mr. Reinartz is in the 
launch decision chain, though.  
General Kutyna: And is he the highest level in 
that chain?  
Mr. Mulloy: No. Normally it would go from me 
to Mr. Reinartz to Mr. Aldrich to Mr. Moore. 
 Dr. Lucas' testimony is as follows:22 
Chairman Rogers: Would you please tell the 
Commission when you first heard about the 
problem of the O-rings and the seals insofar as it 
involves launch 51-L? And I don't want you to 
go way back, but go back to when you first heard. 
I guess it was on January 27th, was it? 
Dr. Lucas: Yes, sir. It was on the early evening 
of the 27th, I think about 7:00 p.m., when I was 
in my motel room along with Mr. Kingsbury. 
And about that time, Mr. Reinartz and Mr. 
Mulloy came to my room and told me that they 
had heard that some members of Thiokol had 
raised a concern about the performance of the 
Solid Rocket Boosters in the low temperature 
that was anticipated for the next day, specifically 
on the seals, and that they were going out to the 
Kennedy Space Center to engage in a telecon 
with the appropriate engineers back at Marshall 
Space Flight Center in Huntsville and with 
corresponding people back at the Wasatch 
division of Thiokol in Utah. 
And we discussed it a few moments and I said, 
fine, keep me informed, let me know what 
happens. 
Chairman Rogers: And when was the next time 
you heard something about that? 
Dr. Lucas: The next time was about 5:00 a.m. on 
the following morning, when I went to the 
Kennedy Space Center and went to the launch 
control center. I immediately saw Mr. Reinartz 
and Mr. Mulloy and asked them how the matter 
of the previous evening was dispositioned. 
Chairman Rogers: You had heard nothing at all 
in between? 
Dr. Lucas: No, sir. 
Chairman Rogers: So from 8:00 o'clock that 
evening until 5:00 o'clock in the morning, you 
had not heard a thing? 
Dr. Lucas: It was about 7:00, I believe, sir. But 
for that period of time, I heard nothing in the 
interim. . . 
Chairman Rogers: . . . And you heard Mr. 
Reinartz say he didn't think he had to notify you, 
or did he notify you? 
Dr. Lucas: He told me, as I testified, when I went 
into the control room, that an issue had been 
resolved, that there were some people 
 102 
at Thiokol who had a concern about the weather, 
that that had been discussed very thoroughly by 
the Thiokol people and by the Marshall Space 
Flight Center people, and it had been concluded 
agreeably that there was no problem, that he had 
a recommendation by Thiokol to launch and our 
most knowledgeable people and engineering 
talent agreed with that. So from my perspective, 
I didn't have-I didn't see that as an issue.  
 
Chairman Rogers: And if you had known that 
Thiokol engineers almost to a man opposed the 
flight, would that have changed your view?  
 
Dr. Lucas: I'm certain that it would. 
 
Chairman Rogers: So your testimony is the same 
as Mr. Hardy's. Had he known, he would not 
have recommended the flight be launched on that 
day. 
 
Dr. Lucas: I didn't make a recommendation one 
way or the other. But had I known that, I would 
have then interposed an objection, yes. 
 
Chairman Rogers: I gather you didn't tell Mr. 
Aldrich or Mr. Moore what Mr. Reinartz had 
told you? 
 
Dr. Lucas: No, sir. That is not the reporting 
channel. Mr. Reinartz reports directly to Mr. 
Aldrich. In a sense, Mr. Reinartz informs me as 
the institutional manager of the progress that he 
is making in implementing his program, but that 
I have never on any occasion reported to Mr. 
Aldrich. 
 
Chairman Rogers: And you had subsequent 
conversations with Mr. Moore and Mr. Aldrich 
prior to the flight and you never mentioned what 
Mr. Reinartz had told you? Dr. Lucas: I did not 
mention what Mr. Reinartz told me, because Mr. 
Reinartz had indicated to me there was not an 
issue, that we had a unanimous position between 
Thiokol and the Marshall Space Flight Center, 
and there was no issue in his judgment, nor in 
mine as he explained it to me. Chairman Rogers: 
But had you known, your attitude would have 
been totally different? 
 
Dr. Lucas: Had I had the advantage at that time 
of the testimony that I have heard here this week, 
I would have had a different attitude, certainly. 
Chairman Rogers: In view of the fact that you 
were running tests to improve the joint, didn't the 
fact that the weather was so bad and Reinartz had 
told you about the questions that had been raised 
by Thiokol, at least, didn't that cause you serious 
concern? Dr. Lucas: I would have been 
concerned if Thiokol had come in and said, we 
don't think you should launch because we've got 
bad weather. 
 
Chairman Rogers: Well, that's what they did, of 
course, first. That is exactly what they did. You 
didn't know that? 
 
Dr. Lucas: I knew only that Thiokol had raised a 
concern. 
 
Chairman Rogers: Did you know they came and 
recommended against the launch, is the question? 
Dr. Lucas: I knew that I was told on the morning 
of the launch that the initial position of some 
members of Thiokol-and I don't know who it 
was-had recommended that one not launch with 
the temperature less than 53 degrees Fahrenheit. 
 
Chairman Rogers: And that didn't cause you 
enough concern so you passed that information 
on to either Mr. Moore or Mr. Aldrich?  
 
Dr. Lucas: No, sir, because I was shown a 
document signed by Mr. Kilminster that 
indicated that that would not be significant, that 
the temperature would not be-that it would be 
that much lower, as I recall it.  
  
It is clear that crucial information about 
the O-ring damage in prior flights and about the 
Thiokol engineers' argument with the NASA 
telecon participants never reached Jesse Moore 
or Arnold Aldrich, the Levels I and II program 
officials, or J.A. (Gene) Thomas, the Launch 
Director for 51-L. The testimony of Aldrich 
describes this failure of the communication 
system very aptly:23 
  
Dr. Feynman: . . . have you collected your 
thoughts yet on what you think is the cause-I 
wouldn't call it of the accident but the lack of 
communication which we have seen and which 
everybody is worried about from one level to 
another? . . . 
Mr. Aldrich: Well, there were two specific 
breakdowns at least, in my impression, 
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about that situation. One is the situation that 
occurred the night before the launch and 
leading up to the launch where there was a 
significant review that has been 
characterized in a number of ways before 
the Commission and the Commission's 
Subpanels and the fact that that was not 
passed forward. 
And I can only conclude what has 
been reported, and that is that the people 
responsible for that work in the Solid Rocket 
Booster project at Marshall believed that the 
concern was not of a significance that would 
be required to be brought forward because 
clearly the program requirements specify 
that critical problems should be brought 
forward to Level II and not only to Level II 
but through myself to Level I. 
The second breakdown in 
communications, however, and one that I 
personally am concerned about is the 
situation of the variety of reviews that were 
conducted last summer between the NASA 
Headquarters Organization and the Marshall 
Organization on the same technical area and 
the fact that that was not brought through 
my office in either direction-that is, it was 
not worked through-by the NASA 
Headquarters Organization nor when the 
Marshall Organization brought these 
concerns to be reported were we involved. 
And I believe that is a critical 
breakdown in process and I think it is also 
against the documented reporting channels 
that the program is supposed to operate to. 
Now, it in fact did occur in that 
matter. In fact, there is a third area of 
concern to me in the way the program has 
operated. There is yet one other way that 
could have come to me, given a different 
program structure. I'm sure you've had it 
reported to you as it has been reported to me 
that in August or I think or at least at some 
time late in the summer or early fall the 
Marshall SRB project went forward to 
procure some additional Solid Rocket Motor 
casings to be machined and new 
configurations for testing of the joints. 
Now it turns out that the budget for 
that kind of work does not come through my 
Level II office. It is worked directly between 
the Marshall Center in NASA Headquarters 
and there again had I been responsible for 
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the budget for that sort of work, it would have to 
come through me, and it would have been clear 
that something was going on here that I ought to 
know about. 
And so there are three areas of' 
breakdown, and I haven't exactly answered your 
question. But I have explained it in the way that I 
best know it and-well, I can say a fourth thing. 
There was some discussion earlier about 
the amount of material that was or was not 
reported on O-ring erosion in the FRRs [Flight 
Readiness Reviews] and I researched the FRR 
back reports and also the flight anomaly reports 
that were forwarded to my center-to my office-
by the SRB [Solid Rocket Booster] project and 
as was in-dicated, there is a treatment of the 
Solid Rocket Motor O-ring erosion, I believe, for 
the STS 41-C FRR, which quantifies it and 
indicates some limited amount of concern. 
The next time that is mentioned, I believe it is 
the STS 51-E, FRR in January 1985 or early in 
February, and that indicates, again, a reference to 
it but refers back to the 41-C as the only 
technical data. 
And then from there forward the comment on O-
ring erosion only is that there was another 
instance and it is not of concern. 
Clearly the amount of reporting in the FRR is of 
concern to me, but in parallel with that, each of 
the flight anomalies in the STS program are 
required to be logged and reviewed by each of 
the projects and then submitted through the 
Level II system for formal close-out. 
And in looking back and reviewing the anomaly 
close-outs that were submitted to Level II from 
the SRB project, you find that O-ring erosion 
was not considered to be an anomaly and, 
therefore, it was not logged and, therefore, there 
are not anomaly reports that progress from one 
flight to the other. 
Yet, that is another way that that information 
could have flagged the system, and the system is 
set up to use that technique for flagging. 
But if the erosion is classified as not an anomaly, 
it then is in some other category and the system 
did not force it in that direction. None of those 
are very focused answers, but they were all 
factors. 
  The Commission Chairman, Mr. Rogers, 
asked four key officials about their knowledge of 
the Thiokol objections to launch: 24 
  
Chairman Rogers: . . . By way of a question, 
could I ask, did any of your gentlemen prior to 
launch know about the objections of Thiokol to 
the launch? 
Mr. Smith [Kennedy Space Center Director]: I 
did not. 
Mr. Thomas [Launch Director]: No, sir. Mr. 
Aldrich [Shuttle Program Director]: I did not. 
Mr. Moore [Associate Administrator for Space 
Flight]: I did not. 
  Additionally, in further testimony J.A. 
(Gene) Thomas commented on the launch.25 
Mr. Hotz: . . . Mr. Thomas, you are familiar with 
the testimony that this Commission has taken in 
the last several days on the relationship of 
temperature to the seals in the Solid Rocket 
Booster? 
Mr. Thomas: Yes, sir, I have been here all week. 
Mr. Hotz: Is this the type of information that you 
feel that you should have as Launch Director to 
make a launch decision? 
Mr. Thomas: If you refer to the fact that the 
temperature according to the Launch Commit 
Criteria should have been 53 degrees, as has 
been testified, rather than 31, yes, I expect that to 
be in the LCC. That is a controlling document 
that we use in most cases to make a decision for 
launch. 
Mr. Hotz: But you are not really very happy 
about not having had this information before the 
launch? 
Mr. Thomas: No, sir. I can assure you that if we 
had had that information, we wouldn't have 
launched if it hadn't been 53 degrees. 
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Findings 
l. The Commission concluded that there was a 
serious flaw in the decision making process 
leading up to the launch of flight 51-L. A well 
structured and managed system emphasizing 
safety would have flagged the rising doubts 
about the Solid Rocket Booster joint seal. Had 
these matters been clearly stated and emphasized 
in the flight readiness process in terms reflecting 
the views of most of the Thiokol engineers and 
at least some of the Marshall engineers, it seems 
likely that the launch of 51-L might not have 
occurred when it did. 
2. The waiving of launch constraints appears to 
have been at the expense of flight safety. There 
was no system which made it imperative that 
launch constraints and waivers of launch 
constraints be considered by all levels of 
management.  
3. The Commission is troubled by what appears 
to be a propensity of management at Marshall to 
contain potentially serious problems and to 
attempt to resolve them internally rather than 
communicate them forward. This tendency is 
altogether at odds with the need for Marshall to 
function as part of a system working toward 
successful flight missions, interfacing and 
communicating with the other parts of the 
system that work to the same end. 
4. The Commission concluded that the Thiokol 
Management reversed its position and 
recommended the launch of 51-L, at the urging 
of Marshall and contrary to the views of its 
engineers in order to accommodate a major 
customer.  
 Chronology of Events Related to Temperature Concerns Prior to Launch of Challenger (STS 51-L)  
.  
Time  Key Participants  Event  
.  
12:36 PM (EST)  
January 27, 1986  
NASA Project Managers and 
Contractor Support Personnel 
(including Morton Thiokol).  
· Launch Scrub . Decision is made to 
scrub due to high crosswinds at 
launch site.  
Approximately  
l :00 PM ( EST)  
Same as above. 
   
· Post-Scrub Discussion. All 
appropriate personnel are polled as 
to feasibility to launch again with 24-
hour cycle and it results in no SRB 
constraints for launch at 9:38 AM, 
28 January 1986.  
· Request is made for all participants 
to report any constraints.  
Kennedy Space Center  
(1) Boyd C. Brinton, Manager, Space 
Booster Project, MTI;  
(2) Lawrence O. Wear, Manager, 
SRM Project Office, Marshall.  
· Conversation. Wear asks Brinton if 
Thiokol had any concerns about 
predicted low temperatures and 
about what Thiokol had said about 
cold temperature effects following 
January 1985 flight 51-C.  
Approximately  
1:00 PM (EST)  
Morton Thiokol, Utah  
(1) Arnold R. Thompson, Supervisor, 
Rocket Motor Cases;  
(2) Robert Ebeling, Manager, Ignition 
System and Final Assembly SRM 
Project.  
· Brinton telephones Thompson and 
other MTI personnel to ask them to 
determine if there were concerns 
based on predicted weather 
conditions. Ebeling and other 
engineers are notified and asked for 
evaluation.  
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[Approximately  
2:00 PM (EST)  
NASA Levels I and II Management 
With Appropriate Program Managers 
and Contract Personnel 
(1) Jesse W. Moore, Associate 
Administrator, Space Flight, NASA 
HQ and Director, JSC;  
(2) Arnold D. Aldrich, Manager, 
Space Transportation Systems 
Program, JSC;  
(3) Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, 
SRB Project, Marshall Space Flight 
Center (MSFC)  
(4) Dr. William Lucas, Director, 
MSFC.  
· Mission Management Team 
Meeting. Discussion is centered 
around the temperature at the 
launch facility and weather 
conditions predicted for launch at 
9:38 AM on 28 January 1986.  
.  
Approximately  
2:30 PM (EST)  
At Thiokol, Utah  
(1) R. Boisjoly, Seal Task Force, 
Morton Thiokol, Utah;  
(2) Robert Ebeling, Manager, Ignition 
System and Final Assembly, SRM 
Project.  
· Boisjoly learns of cold temperatures 
at Cape at meeting convened by 
Ebeling  
.  
Approximately  
4:00 PM (EST)  
At Kennedy Space Center  
(1) Allan J. McDonald, Director, SRM 
Project, Morton Thiokol;  
(2) Carver Kennedy, Director of' 
Vehicle Assembly Building 
Operations, and Vice President of 
Space Operations at KSC, for 
Morton Thiokol. At Thiokol, Utah 
Robert Ebeling, Department 
Manager, Ignition System and Final 
Assembly, SRM Project.  
   
· Telephone Conversation. McDonald 
receives call at Carver Kennedy's 
residence from Ebeling expressing 
concern about performance of SRB 
field joints at low temperatures.  
· McDonald indicates he will call back 
latest temperature predictions up to 
launch time.  
· Carver Kennedy calls Launch 
Operations Center and received 
latest temperature information.  
· McDonald transmits data to Utah 
and indicates will set up telecon and 
asks engineering to prepare.  
.  
Approximately  
5:15 PM (EST)  
At Kennedy Space Center  
(1) Allan J. McDonald, Director, SRM 
Project, Morton Thiokol, Inc.;  
(2) Cecil Houston, MSFC Resident 
Manager, at KSC.  
· Telephone Conversation. McDonald 
calls Cecil Houston informing him 
that Morton Thiokol engineering had 
concerns regarding O-ring 
temperatures.  
· Cecil Houston indicates he will set 
up teleconference with Marshall 
Space Flight Center and Morton 
Thiokol.  
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Approximately  
5:25 PM (EST)  
At Kennedy Space Center  
Cecil Houston, MSFC Resident 
Manager, at KSC.  
At Marshall Space Flight Center  
Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy 
Manager, Shuttle Projects Office, 
MSFC. 
   
· Telephone Conversation. Cecil 
Houston calls Lovingood, informing 
him of the concerns of temperature 
on the O-rings and asks him to 
establish a telecon with:  
(1) Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, 
Shuttle Projects Office, MSFC (at 
Kennedy);  
(2) Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, 
SRB Project, MSFC (at Kennedy);  
(3) George Hardy, Deputy Director, 
Science and Engineering (at 
Marshall);  
(4) Thiokol Wasatch Division 
personnel.  
Approximately  
5:30 PM (EST)  
   
At Kennedy Space Center  
Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, 
Shuttle Projects Office, MSFC  
At Marshall Space Flight Center  
Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy 
Manager, Shuttle Projects Office, 
MSFC.  
· Telephone Conversation. 
Lovingood calls Reinartz to inform 
him of planned 5:45 PM (EST) 
teleconference.  
· Lovingood proposes that Kingsbury 
(Director of Science and 
Engineering MSFC), participate in 
teleconference.  
Approximately  
5:45 PM (EST)  
   
At Kennedy Space Center  
Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, 
Shuttle Projects Office (MSFC).  
At Marshall Space Flight Center  
Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy 
Manager, Shuttle Projects Office, 
MSFC.  
Plus other personnel at Kennedy, 
Marshall, and Thiokol, Utah.  
· First Teleconference. Concerns 
regarding temperature effects on 
the O-rings are discussed.  
· MTI is of the opinion launch should 
be delayed until Noon or afternoon.  
· It is decided that another telecon at 
8:15 PM will be set up to transmit 
the data to all of the parties and to 
have more personnel involved.  
· Lovingood recommends to Reinartz 
to include Lucas, Director, MSFC 
and Kingsbury in 8:45 PM 
conference and to plan to go to 
Level II if MTI recommends not 
launching.  
Approximately  
6:30 PM (EST)  
At Marshall Space Flight Center  
Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy 
Manager, Shuttle Projects Office 
MSFC.  
At Kennedy Space Center  
Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, 
Shuttle Projects Office, MSFC.  
· Telephone Conversation. 
Lovingood calls Reinartz and tells 
him that if Thiokol persists, they 
should not launch.  
· Lovingood also suggests advising 
Aldrich, Manager, National 
Transportation System (Level II), of 
teleconference to prepare him for 
Level I meeting to inform of possible 
recommendation to delay.   
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Approximately  
7:00 PM (EST)  
   
At Kennedy Space Center  
(1) Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, 
SRB Project, MSFC.  
(2) Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, 
Shuttle Projects Office, MSFC;  
(3) Dr. William Lucas, Director, 
MSFC;  
(4) Jim Kingsbury, Director of 
Science and Engineering, MSFC.  
· Conversation. Reinartz and Mulloy 
visit Lucas and Kingsbury in their 
motel rooms to inform them of 
Thiokol concern and planned 
teleconference.  
.  
Approximately  
8:45 PM (EST)  
At Morton Thiokol, Utah  
(1) Jerald Mason, Senior Vice 
President, Wasatch Operations;  
(2) Calvin Wiggins, Vice President 
and General Manager, Space 
Division, Wasatch;  
(3) Joe C. Kilminster, Vice President, 
Space Booster Programs, Wasatch;  
(4) Robert K. Lund, Vice President, 
Engineering;  
(5) Roger Boisjoly, Member Seal 
Task Force;  
(6) Arnold R. Thompson, Supervisor, 
Rocket Motor Cases.  
   
At Kennedy Space Center  
(1) Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, 
Shuttle Projects Office, MSFC;  
(2) Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, 
SRB Project, MSFC;  
(3) Allan J. McDonald, Director, SRM 
Project, MTI.  
   
At Marshall Space Flight Center  
(1) George B. Hardy, Deputy 
Director, Science and Engineering;  
(2) Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy 
Manager, Shuttle Project Office;  
(3) Ben Powers, Engineering 
Structures and Propulsion. Plus 
other personnel (see table page 
111).  
   
· Second Teleconference. Charts 
present a history of the O-ring 
erosion and blow-by for the primary 
seal in the field joints, including 
results of subscale tests, previous 
flights and static tests of Solid 
Rocket Motors.  
· The data shows that the timing 
function of the O-rings will be slower 
due to lower temperatures and that 
the worst blow-by occurred on SRM 
15 (STS 51-C) in January 1985 with 
O-ring temperatures of 53 degrees 
Fahrenheit.  
· Recommendation by Thiokol (Lund) 
is not to fly STS 51-L (SAM-25) until 
the temperature of the O-ring 
reached 53 degrees Fahrenheit, 
which was the lowest temperature 
of any previous flight.  
· Mulloy asks for recommendation 
from Kilminster.  
· Kilminster states that based upon 
the engineering recommendation, 
he can not recommend launch.  
· Hardy is reported by both McDonald 
and Boisjoly to have said he is 
"appalled" by Thiokol's 
recommendation.  
· Reinartz comments that he is under 
the impression that SRM is qualified 
from 40 degrees Fahrenheit to 90 
degrees Fahrenheit. ~ NASA 
personnel challenge conclusions 
and recommendations.  
· Kilminster asks for five minutes off  
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Time  Key Participants  Event  
.  
Approximately  
10:30 PM (EST)  
Thiokol Personnel 
(1) Jerald Mason, Senior Vice 
President, Wasatch Operations;  
(2) Joe C. Kilm inster, Vice President, 
Space Booster Program;  
(3) Calvin Wiggins, Vice President 
and General Manager, Space 
Division;  
(4) Robert K. Lund, Vice President, 
Engineering;  
(5) Arnold R. Thompson, Supervisor, 
Rocket Motor Cases;  
(6) Roger Boisjoly, Member, Seal 
Task Force;  
(7) Brian Russell, Special Projects 
SRM Program Office;  
(8) Robert Ebeling, Manager, Ignition 
System and Final Assembly, SRM 
Project.  
Plus other personnel  
   
· Thiokol Caucus. Caucus continues 
for about 30 minutes at Thiokol, 
Wasatch, Utah.  
· Major issues are (1) temperature 
effects on O-ring, and (2) erosion 
of the O-ring.  
· Thompson and Boisjoly voice 
objections to launch and indication 
is that Lund also is reluctant to 
launch.  
· A final management review is 
conducted with only Mason, Lund, 
Kilminster, and Wiggins.  
· Lund is asked to put on 
management hat by Mason.  
· Final agreement is: (1) there is a 
substantial margin to erode the 
primary O-ring by a factor of three 
times the previous worst case, and 
(2) even if the primary O-ring does 
not seal, the secondary is in 
position and will.  
   
Approximately  
10:30 PM to 11:00 PM 
(EST)  
   
At Kennedy Space Center  
(1) Allan J. McDonald, Manager, 
Space Booster Project, Morton 
Thiokol, Inc. (MTI);  
(2) Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, 
SRB Projects, MSFC;  
(3) Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, 
Shuttle Projects, MSFC;  
(4) Jack Buchanan, Manager, KSC 
Operations, for MTI;  
(5) Cecil Houston, MSFC Resident 
manager, at KSC.  
   
· Conversation at Kennedy. 
McDonald continues to argue for 
delay.  
· McDonald challenges Reinartz's 
rationale that SRM is qualified at 
40 degrees F. to 90 degrees F., 
and Mulloy's explanation that 
Propellant Mean Bulk 
Temperatures are within 
specifications.  
   
Approximately  
11:00 PM (EST)  
   
Same participants at 8:45 PM 
Teleconference.  
   
· Second Teleconference (Cont'd). 
Thiokol indicates it had 
reassessed; temperature effects 
are concern, but data is 
inconclusive.  
· Kilminster reads the rationale for 
recommending launch.  
· Thiokol recommends launch.  
· Hardy requests that Thiokol put: 
writing their recommendation and 
send it by fax to both Kennedy and 
Marshall.  
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Approximately  
11:15 to 11:30 PM (EST) 
At Kennedy Space Center  
(1) Allan J . McDonald, Manager, 
Space Booster Project, MTI;  
(2) Lawrence Mulloy, Manager, SRB 
Projects Office, MSFC;  
(3) Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, 
Shuttle Projects Office, MSFC;  
(4) Jack Buchanan, Manager, KSC 
Operations, for MTI;  
(5) Cecil Houston, Manager, MSFC 
Resident Office at KSC.  
   
· Conversation at Kennedy. 
McDonald argues again for delay 
asking how NASA could rationalize 
launching below qualification 
temperature.  
· McDonald indicates if anything 
happened, he would not want to 
have to explain to Board of Inquiry.  
· McDonald indicates he would 
cancel launch since (1) O-ring 
problem at low temperatures; (2) 
booster recovery ships heading 
into wind toward shore due to high 
seas, and (3) icing conditions on 
launch pad.  
· McDonald is told it is not his 
concern and that his above 
concerns will be passed on in 
advisory capacity.   
Approximately  
11:45 PM (EST)  
 
· Telefax . Kilminster faxes Thiokol's 
recommendation to launch at 9:45 M 
EST, 27 January 1986 ( 11 :45 EST  
· Fax is signed by Kilminster.  
· McDonald retrieves fax at KSC.   
Approximately  
11:30 PM to 12:00 AM 
(EST)  
At Kennedy Space Center  
(1) Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, 
SRB Projects Office, MSFC;  
(2) Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, 
Shuttle Projects, MSFC;  
(3) Arnold D. Aldrich, Manager, 
National Space Transportation 
System Program Office, JSC.  
   
· Teleconference. Discussion 
centers around the recovery ships' 
activities and brief discussion of 
the ice issue on the launch 
complex area.  
· Reinartz and Mulloy place call to 
Aldrich.  
· McDonald delivers fax to Jack 
Buchanan's office at Kennedy 
Space Center and overhears part 
of conversation.  
· Aldrich is apparently not informed 
of the O-ring concerns.  
Approximately  
12:01 AM (EST)  
January 28   
· Kennedy Space Center meeting breaks 
up.  
   
Approximately  
1:30 to 3:00 AM (EST)  
At Kennedy Space Center  
(1) Charles Stevenson, Supervisor of Ice 
Crew; KSC  
(2) B.K. Davis, Ice Team Member, MSFC  
· Ice Crew Inspection of Launch Pad B.  
· Ice crew finds large quantity of ice on 
Fixed Service Structure, mobile launch 
platform, and pad apron; and reports 
conditions.  
Approximately  
5:00 AM (EST)  
At Kennedy Space Center  
(1) Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, SRB 
Project, MSFC;  
(2) Dr. William Lucas, Director, (MSFC);  
(3) Jim Kingsbury, Director of Science and 
Engineering, MSFC.  
· Conversation. Mulloy tells Lucas of 
Thiokol's concerns over temperature 
effects on O-rings and final resolution.  
· Lucas is shown copy of Thiokol telefax. 
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[Approximately  
7:00-9:00 AM (EST)  
At Kennedy Space Center  
(1) Charles Stevenson, Supervisor of 
Ice Crew, KSC;  
(2) B. K. Davis, Ice Team Member 
MSFC .  
· Ice Crew Inspection of Launch Pad 
B. Ice crew inspects Launch Pad B 
and Challenger for ice formation.  
· Davis measures temperatures on 
SRBs, External Tank, Orbiter, and 
launch pad with infrared 
pyrometer.  
· Left-hand SRB appears to be 
about 25 degrees F. and right-
hand SRB appears to be about 8 
degrees F. near the aft region.  
· Ice crew is not concerned since 
there is no Launch Commit Criteria 
on surface temperatures and does 
not report.  
· Crew reports patches of sheet ice 
on lower segment and skirt of left 
Solid Rocket Booster.  
.  
Approximately  
8:00 AM (EST)  
At Marshall Space Flight Center  
(1) Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy 
Manager, Shuttle Projects Office, 
MSFC;  
(2) Jack Lee, Deputy Director MSFC.  
· Conversation. Lovingood informs 
Lee of previous night's 
discussions.  
· He indicates that Thiokol had at 
first recommended not launching, 
and then after Wasatch 
conference recommended 
launching.  
· He also informs Lee that Thiokol is 
providing in writing their 
recommendation for launch.  
.  
Approximately  
9:00 AM (EST)  
NASA Levels I and Level II 
Management With Appropriate Project 
Managers and Contract Personnel.  
· Mission Management Team 
Meeting. Ice conditions at launch 
complex are discussed. There is 
no apparent discussion of 
temperature effects on O-ring seal. 
Approximately  
10:30 AM (EST)  
At Kennedy Space Center  
(1) Charles Stevenson, Supervisor of 
Ice Crew;  
(2) B.K. Davis, Ice Team Member  
· Ice Crew Inspection of Launch Pad 
B. Ice crew inspects Launch Pad B 
for third time.  
· Crew removes ice from water 
troughs, returns to Launch Control 
Center at T-20 minutes, reports 
conditions to Mission Management 
Team including fact that ice is still 
on left Solid Rocket Booster.  
11:38 AM (EST)  
 
· Launch. Challenger (STS 51-L) is 
launched.  
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Final Teleconference Participants 
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center  Morton Thiokol Wasatch Division  
.  .  
1. George B. Hardy, Deputy Director, Science and 
Engineering, MSFC   
1. Jerald Mason, Senior Vice President, Wasatch 
Operations, MTI  
2. Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy Manager, Shuttle 
Projects Office, MSFC  
2. Calvin Wiggins, Vice President and General 
Manager, Space Division, MTI  
3. Leslie F. Adams, Deputy Manager, SRB Project, 
MSFC  
3. Joe C. Kilminster, Vice President, Space 
Booster Programs, MTI  
4. Lawrence O. Wear, Manager, SRM Project Office, 
MSFC  
4. Robert K. Lund, Vice President, Engineering, 
MTI  
5. John Q. Miller, Technical Assistant, SRM Project, 
MSFC  
5. Larry H. Sayer, Director, Engineering and 
Design, MTI  
6. J. Wayne Littles, Associate Director for 
Engineering, MSFC   
6. William Macbeth, Manager, Case Projects, 
Space Booster Project Engineering, Wasatch 
Division, MTI  
7. Robert J. Schwinghamer, Director, Material and 
Processes Laboratory, MSFC   
7. Donald M. Ketner, Supervisor, Gas Dynamics 
Section and Head Seal Task Force, MTI  
8. Wilbur A. Riehl, Chief, Nonmetallic Materials 
Division, MSFC  
8. Roger Boisjoly, Member, Seal Task Force, MTI  
9. John P. McCarty, Deputy Director, Structures and 
Propulsion Laboratory, MSFC   
9. Arnold R. Thompson, Supervisor, Rocket Motor 
Cases, MTI  
10. Ben Powers , Engineering Structures and 
Propulsion Laboratory, MSFC   
10. Jack R. Kapp, Manager, Applied Mechanics 
Department, MTI  
11. James Smith, Chief Engineer, SRB Program, 
MSFC  
11. Jerry Burn, Associate Engineer, Applied 
Mechanics, MTI  
12. Keith E. Coates, Chief Engineer, Special 
Projects Office, MSFC  
12. Joel Maw, Associate Scientist, Heat Transfer 
Section, MTI  
13. John Schell, Retired Engineer, Materials 
Laboratory, MSFC  
13. Brian Russell, Manager, Special Projects, SRM 
Project, MTI  
Present at KSC  14. Robert Ebeling, Manager, Ignition System and Final Assembly, SRB Project, MTI  
14. Cecil Houston, MSFC Resident Manager, at 
KSC  Present at MSFC  
15. Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, Shuttle Projects 
Office, MSFC  
15. Boyd C. Brinton, Manager, Space Booster 
Project, MTI  
16. Kyle Speas, Ballistics Engineer, MTI  
Present at KSC  
17. Allan J. McDonald, Director, SRM Project, MTI  
16. Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, SRB Project, 
MSFC  
. 
   
18. Jack Buchanan, Manager, KSC Operations, 
MTI  
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 Above, Shuttle 51-L on Kennedy Space Center Pad 39B in the early morning of launch day. Temperatures 
were well below freezing, as indicated by the lower left photo, which shows thick ice in a water trough 
despite the use of an anti-freeze solution.  
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Ambiguities In The Decision Making Process 
During the night and early morning of January 
28, another problem was developing due to the 
extreme cold weather, predicted to be in the low 
20s for approximately 11 hours. Reaction control 
system heaters on the Orbiter were activated and 
the Solid Rocket Booster recovery batteries were 
checked and found to be functioning within 
specifications. There were no serious concerns 
regarding the External Tank. The freeze 
protection plan for the launch pad was 
implemented, but the results were not what had 
been anticipated. The freeze protection plan 
usually involves completely draining the water 
system. However, this was not possible because 
of the imminent launch of 51-L. In order to 
prevent pipes from freezing, a decision was 
made to allow water to run slowly from the 
system. This had never been done before, and the 
combination of freezing temperatures and stiff 
winds caused large amounts of ice to form below 
the 240-foot level of the fixed service structure 
including the access to the crew emergency 
egress slide wire baskets. Ice also was forming in 
the water trays beneath the vehicle. 
These conditions were first identified by 
the Ice Team at approximately 2:00 a.m. on 
January 28 and were assessed by management 
and engineering throughout the night, 
culminating with a Mission Management Team 
meeting at 9:00 a.m. At this meeting, 
representatives for the Orbiter prime contractor, 
Rockwell International, expressed their concern 
about what effects the ice might have on the 
Orbiter during launch. Rockwell had been alerted 
about the icing conditions during the early 
morning and was working on the problem at its 
Downey, California, facility. 
During Commission hearings, the 
president of Rockwell's Space Transportation 
Systems Division, Dr. Rocco Petrone, and two of 
his vice presidents, Robert Glaysher and Martin 
Cioffoletti, all described the work done regarding 
the ice conditions and the Rockwell position at 
the 9:00 a.m. meeting with regard to launch. Dr. 
Petrone had arrived at Kennedy on Friday, 
January 24. On Monday the 27th he left to return 
to Rockwell's facility in California, but Glaysher 
and Cioffoletti remained at Kennedy. Dr. Petrone 
testified that he first heard about the ice at 4:00 
a.m. Pacific Standard Time. He explained what 
followed: 26 
"I had gotten up and went to the support room to 
support this launch. We have people monitoring 
consoles, and I checked in, and they told me 
there was a concern, and when I arrived at about 
4:30, 4:40 (PST), I was informed we were 
working the problem with our aerodynamicist 
and debris people, but very importantly, we 
would have to make an input to Kennedy for a 
meeting scheduled at 6:00 o'clock our time and 
9:00 o'c lock Florida time. 
"We had approximately an hour of work 
to bring together. The work had been underway 
when I arrived and was continuing. 
"At that time I got on the phone with my Orbiter 
program managers just to discuss background of 
where we were, how things stood, and what their 
concerns were locally. They described what they 
knew in Florida, and we also in Downey did 
television input, and we could see some of the 
ice scenes that were shown here this morning. 
"We arrived through a series of 
meetings to a top level discussion at 
approximately 5:30 Pacific Standard Time, from 
which we drew the following conclusions: Ice on 
the mobile launcher itself, it could be debris. We 
were very concerned with debris of any kind at 
the time of launch. With this particula r ice, one, 
could it hit the Orbiter? There was wind blowing 
from the west. That appeared not to be so, that it 
wouldn't hit the Orbiter but would land on the 
mobile launcher. The second concern was what 
happens to that ice at the time you light your 
liquid fuel engines, the SSMEs, and would it 
throw it around and ricochet and potentially hit 
the Orbiter. 
"The third aspect is the one that has 
been discussed here of aspiration, what would 
happen when the large SRM [Solid Rocket 
Motors] motors ignite and in effect suck in air, 
referred to as aspiration, and ice additionally 
would come down, how much unknown. 
"The prime thing we were concerned about was 
the unknown base line. We had not launched in 
conditions of that nature, and we just felt we had 
an unknown. 
"I then called my program managers over in 
Florida at 5:45 (PST) and said we could  
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not recommend launching from here, from what 
we see. We think the tiles would be endangered, 
and we had a very short conversation. We had a 
meeting to go through, and I said let's make sure 
that NASA understands that Rockwell feels it is 
not safe to launch, and that was the end of my 
conversation . " 
Mr. Glaysher, who was at Kennedy, came to the 
center at approximately 7:45 a.m. EST. He 
conferred with Rockwell's Chief Engineer as 
well as the Vice President of Engineering, Dr. 
John Peller, at Rockwell's Downey plant. At 9:00 
a.m., after the ice debris team had reported back 
from the pad inspection, Glaysher was asked for 
Rockwell's position on launch. He discussed 
aspiration effects, the possible ricochet of ice 
from the fixed service structure, and what the ice 
resting on the mobile launch platform would do 
at ignition. Glaysher said he told the Mission 
Management Team when it met at 9:00 a.m. that 
the ice was an unknown condition, and Rockwell 
was unable to predict where the ice would go or 
the degree of potential damage to the Orbiter 
thermal protection system if it were struck by the 
ice. He testified that his recommendation to 
NASA was: 27 
"[M]y exact quote-and it comes in two parts. The 
first one was, Rockwell could not 100 percent 
assure that it is safe to fly which I quickly 
changed to Rockwell cannot assure that it is safe 
to fly . 
Rockwell's other vice president at Kennedy, 
Martin Cioffoletti, described the concern about 
ice in a slightly different manner: 28 
Mr. Cioffoletti: Similarly, I was called in and 
told about the problem and came into the 6:00 
o'clock meeting which you heard about a few 
minutes ago, and at the conclusion of that 
meeting I spoke with Mr. Dick Kohrs, the deputy 
program manager from Johnson Space Flight 
Center, and he asked if we could get the Downey 
folks to look at the falling ice and how it might 
reverse toward the vehicle, and also, did we have 
any information on aspiration effects. 
So I did call back to Downey and got the John 
Peller folks working on that problem, and they 
did, as you saw from Charlie Stevenson's 
sketches, predict that the ice would travel only 
about halfway to the vehicle, freefalling ice 
carried by the winds. So we felt that ice was not 
a problem. However, it would land on the mobile 
launch platform. That we considered a problem. 
We also investigated the aspiration data base we 
had, and we had seen the aspiration effect on 
previous launches where things were pulled into 
the SRB [Solid Rocket Booster] hole after 
ignition, but we had never seen anything out as 
far as the fixed surface tower. So we felt in fact it 
was an unknown. We did not have the data base 
to operate from an aspiration effect. 
At the 9:00 o'clock meeting, I was asked by 
Arnie Aldrich, the program manager, to give him 
the results of our analysis, and I essentially told 
him what I just told you and felt that we did not 
have a sufficient data base to absolutely assure 
that nothing would strike the vehicle, and so we 
could not lend our 100 percent credence, if you 
will, to the fact that it was safe to fly . 
I said I could not predict the trajectory that the 
ice on the mobile launch platform would take at 
SRB ignition. 
Chairman Rogers: But I think NASA's position 
probably would be that they thought that you 
were satisfied with the launch. Did you convey 
to them in a way that they were able to 
understand that you were not approving the 
launch from your standpoint? 
Mr. Cioffoletti: I felt that by telling them we did 
not have a sufficient data base and could not 
analyze the trajectory of the ice, I felt he 
understood that Rockwell was not giving a 
positive indication that we were for the launch. 
After Cioffoletti's testimony at the Commission 
hearings, Dr. Petrone was pressed for a more 
detailed description of Rockwell's launch 
recommendation: 29 
General Kutyna: Dr. Petrone, you've got a lot 
more experience than I have in this business, but 
the few launch conferences that I have been on 
the question is very simple. Are you go or are 
you no-go for launch, and `` maybe" isn't an 
answer. I hear all kinds of qualifications and 
cautions and considerations here. 
Did someone ask you are you go or nogo? Was 
that not asked? 
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Dr. Petrone: At this particular meeting, as far as-
and I was not in Florida, and so I cannot answer 
that. It had been done at earlier meetings. This 
was a technical evaluation of a series of 
problems, and we talked about debris hitting the 
TPS [thermal protection system] and the tiles, 
and the long series of reviews that we had done 
that morning and all led us to a conclusion that 
they were not safe to fly. 
And we transmitted that to program managers 
along with the technical evaluation quickly of 
why we had arrived at that. 
So much of it is how the question gets raised 
because earlier we had aspiration work, ricochet 
work, a number of things which we did, and then 
we came up with our recommendation. 
Chairman Rogers: And your recommendation 
now you say it was, it was unsafe to fly? 
Dr. Petrone: Correct, sir. 
Two things are apparent from the Rockwell 
testimony. First, Rockwell did not feel it had 
sufficient time to research and resolve the ice on 
the pad problem. Second, even though there was 
considerable discussion about ice, Rockwell's 
position on launch described above was not 
clearly commu nicated to NASA officials in the 
launch decision chain during the hours preceding 
51-L's launch. 
At a meeting with Commission investigators on 
March 4, 1986, at Kennedy, Horace Lamberth, 
NASA director of Shuttle Engineering, said he 
did not interpret Rockwell's position at the 9:00 
a.m. Mission Management Team meeting on 
January 28 as being "no-go." Lamberth said the 
the language used by Rockwell was "we can't 
give you 100 percent assurance" but there was no 
feeling in his mind that Rockwell was voicing a 
no-go recommendation. "It just didn't come 
across as the normal Rockwell nogo safety of 
flight issues come across." 30 This conclusion is 
confirmed in part by an interview of Dr. John 
Peller, Rockwell's Vice President of Engineering, 
who was assigned the ice problem early Tuesday 
morning. Dr. Peller, in describing a telephone 
conversation with the Johnson Director of 
Engineering, Tom Moser, stated:31 
Dr. Peller: That was a call from Tom Moser to 
me, in which he asked again to understand my 
concerns. And I just repeated the same concerns. 
And he asked, "Did I think that it was likely that 
the vehicle would take safety critical damage?" 
And I said, "From the possibility that the vehicle 
would take safety critical damage," I said, 
"there's a probability in a sense that it was 
probably an unlikely event, but I could not prove 
that it wouldn't happen . . ."  
. . . I never used the words "no-go" for launch. I 
did use the words that we cannot prove it is safe. 
And normally that's what we were asked to do. 
We were unable to do that in this particular case, 
although it was a strange case, that we normally 
don't get involved in. 
Arnold Aldrich, NASA Mission Management 
Team Leader, described NASA's view of the ice 
situation and his recollection of Rockwell's 
position. He said that on Tuesday morning the 
mission management team did a detailed analysis 
of the ice on the fixe d service structure. 
Representatives from the ice team, Rockwell, 
and the directors of Engineering (Horace 
Lamberth) and the Orbiter project (Richard 
Colonna) all considered the problem. Aldrich 
reported this discussion as follows : 32 
"Following the discussion of the acceptability of 
the ice threat to the Orbiter, based upon the 
conditions described in detail of the fixed service 
structure-and some of that you've seen here 
portrayed well this morning-I asked the NASA 
managers involved for their position on what 
they felt about the threat of that to the Orbiter. 
"Mr. Lamberth reported that KSC [Kennedy 
Space Center] engineering had calculated the 
trajectories, as you've heard, of the falling ice 
from the fixed service structure east side, with 
current 10-knot winds at 300 degrees, and 
predicted that none of this ice would contact the 
Orbiter during its ignition or launch sequence; 
and that their calculations even showed that if 
the winds would increase to 15 knots, we still 
would not have contact with the Orbiter. 
"Mr. Colonna, Orbiter project manager, reported 
that similar calculations had been performed in 
Houston by the mission evaluation team there. 
They concurred in this assessment. And further, 
Mr. Colonna stated that, even if these 
calculations were  
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significantly in error, that it was their belief that 
falling ice from the fixed service structure, if it 
were in fact to make its way to the Orbiter, it 
would only be the most lightweight ice that was 
in that falling stream, and it would impact the 
Orbiter at a very oblique angle. 
"Impacts of this type would have very 
low probability of causing any serious damage to 
the Orbiter, and at most would result in post-
flight turnaround repairs. 
"At this point I placed a phone call to 
Mr. Moser that I had previously mentioned, 
director of Engineering at the Johnson Space 
Center, who was in the mission evaluation room, 
and he confirmed the detailed agreement with Mr. 
Lamberth's and Mr. Colonna's position.... 
"And both Mr. Lamberth and Mr. 
Colonna reported that their assessment was that 
the time it took for the ice to fall, to hit the 
Orbiter and to rebound, and the location of the 
fixed service structure on the MLP [mobile 
launch platform] would not cause that ice in their 
view to be a concern to rebound and come up 
and impact the rear end of the Orbiter. 
"Following these discussions, I asked 
for a position regarding proceeding with the 
launch. Mr. Colonna, Mr. Lamberth, and Mr. 
Moser all recommended that we proceed. 
"At that time, I also polled Mr. Robert 
Glaysher, the vice president, Orbiter project 
manager, Rockwell International STS Division, 
and Mr. Marty Cioffoletti, Shuttle Integration 
Project Manager, Rockwell International STS 
Division. Mr. Glaysher stated-and he had been 
listening to this entire discussion and had not 
been directly involved with it, but had been party 
to this the whole time. 
"His statement to me as best I can reconstruct it 
to report to you at this time was that, while  he 
did not disagree with the analysis that JSC 
(Johnson Space Center) and KSC had reported, 
that they would not give an unqualified go for 
launch as ice on the launch complex was a 
condition which had not previously been 
experienced, and thus this posed a small 
additional, but unquantifiable, risk. Mr. Glaysher 
did not ask or insist that we not launch, however. 
"At the conclusion of the above review, I felt 
reasonably confident that the launch should 
proceed." 
In addition to Rockwell's input, Mr. 
Aldrich also had reports from other contractors 
and the ice, frost and debris team at the 9:00 
session. Ice on the vehicle assembly appeared to 
be of no concern; sheet ice in the noise 
suppression trays had been broken up and 
removed; as previously noted the ice team 
reported that there was ice on the fixed service 
structure between 95 feet above ground and 215 
feet; no ice above 255 feet. The north and west 
sides had large amounts of ice and icicles. The 
final assessment was made that the ice on the 
fixed service structure would not strike or 
damage the Orbiter tiles or the vehicle assembly 
during ignition or ascent, owing to the 
considerable horizontal distance between the 
service structure and the vehicle assembly. The 
decision was made to launch pending a final ice 
team review of the launch complex in order to 
assess any changes in the situation. This 
inspection was completed following the Mission 
Management Team meeting and the ice team 
report indicated no significant change. 
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Findings 
 
The Commission is concerned about three 
aspects of the ice-on-the-pad issue. 
 
1. An analysis of all of the testimony and 
interviews establishes that Rockwell's 
recommendation on launch was ambiguous. The 
Commission finds it difficult, as did Mr. Aldrich, 
to conclude that there was a no-launch 
recommendation. Moreover, all parties were 
asked specifically to contact Aldrich or Moore 
about launch objections due to weather. 
Rockwell made no phone calls or further 
objections to Aldrich or other NASA officials 
after the 9:00 Mission Management Team 
meeting and subsequent to the resumption of the 
countdown. 
2. The Commission is also concerned about the 
NASA response to the Rockwell position at the 
9:00 a.m. meeting. While it is understood that 
decisions have to be made in launching a Shuttle, 
the Commission is not convinced Levels I and II 
appropriately considered Rockwell's concern 
about the ice. However ambiguous Rockwell's 
position was, it is clear that they did tell NASA 
that the ice was an unknown condition. Given 
the extent of the ice on the pad (see photos pages 
112 and 113), the admitted unknown effect of the 
Solid Rocket Motor and Space Shuttle Main 
Engines ignition on the ice, as well as the fact 
that debris striking the Orbiter was a potential 
flight safety hazard, the Commission finds the 
decision to launch questionable under those 
circumstances. In this situation, NASA appeared 
to be requiring a contractor to prove that it was 
not safe to launch, rather than proving it was safe.  
Nevertheless, the Commission has 
determined that the ice was not a cause of the 51-
L accident and does not conclude that NASA's 
decision to launch specifically overrode a no-
launch recommendation by an element contractor. 
3. The Commission concluded that the freeze 
protection plan for launch pad 39B was 
inadequate. The Commission believes that the 
severe cold and presence of so much ice on the 
fixed service structure made it inadvisable to 
launch on the morning of January 28, and that 
margins of safety were whittled down too far. 
Additionally, access to the crew 
emergency slide wire baskets was hazardous due 
to ice conditions. Had the crew been required to 
evacuate the Orbiter on the launch pad, they 
would have been running on an icy surface. The 
Commission believes the crew should have been 
made aware of the situation, and based on the 
seriousness of the condition, greater 
consideration should have been given to delaying 
the launch.  
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Chapter VI: An Accident Rooted in History 
  
Early Design 
[120] The Space Shuttle's Solid Rocket 
Booster problem began with the faulty design of 
its joint and increased as both NASA and 
contractor management first failed to recognize it 
as a problem, then failed to fix it and finally 
treated it as an acceptable flight risk. 
Morton Thiokol, Inc., the contractor, 
did not accept the implication of tests early in the 
program that the design had a serious and 
unanticipated flaw.1 NASA did not accept the 
judgment of its engineers that the design was 
unacceptable, and as the joint problems grew in 
number and severity NASA minimized them in 
management briefings and reports. 2 Thiokol's 
stated position was that "the condition is not 
desirable but is acceptable."  3 
Neither Thiokol nor NASA expected 
the rubber O-rings sealing the joints to be 
touched by hot gases of motor ignition, much 
less to be partially burned. However, as tests and 
then flights confirmed damage to the sealing 
rings, the reaction by both NASA and Thiokol 
was to increase the amount of damage 
considered "acceptable." At no time did 
management either recommend a redesign of the 
joint or call for the Shuttle's grounding until the 
problem was solved. 
Thiokol was selected to receive the 
NASA contract to design and build the Solid 
Rocket Boosters on November 20, 1973.4 The 
booster was the largest Solid Rocket Motor ever 
produced in the United States; it was also the 
first solid motor progra m managed by NASA's 
Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, 
Alabama. 
Costs were the primary concern of 
NASA's selection board, particularly those 
incurred early in the program. 
Thiokol's three competitors were 
Aerojet Solid Propulsion Co., Lockheed 
Propulsion Co. and United Technologies. The 
Source Evaluation Board on the proposals rated 
Thiokol fourth under the design, development 
and verification factor, second under the 
manufacturing, refurbishment and product 
support factor and first under the management 
factor.5 
Thiokol received the second highest 
overall Mission Suitability score, tied with 
United Technologies.6 
In a December 12, 1973, report, NASA 
selection officials said Thiokol's "cost 
advantages were substantial and consistent 
throughout all areas evaluated." 7 They also 
singled out Thiokol's joint design for special 
mention. 
"The Thiokol motor case joints utilized 
dual O-rings and test ports between seals, 
enabling a simple leak check without 
pressurizing the entire motor," the officials' 
report said. "This innovative design feature 
increased reliability and decreased operations at 
the launch site, indicating good attention to low 
cost (design, development, testing and 
engineering) and production." 8 
"We noted that the [NASA Source 
Selection] board's analysis of cost factors 
indicated that Thiokol could do a more 
economical job than any of the other proposers 
in both the development and the production 
phases of the program; and that, accordingly, the 
cost per flight to be expected from a Thiokol-
built motor would be the lowest," the officials 
said. "We, therefore, concluded that any 
selection other than Thiokol would give rise to 
an additional cost of appreciable size." 9 
The Selection officials said they "found 
no other  
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factors bearing upon the selection that ranked in 
weight with the foregoing." 
Cost consideration overrode any other- 
objections, they decided. We concluded that the 
main criticisms of the Thiokol proposal in the 
Mission Suitability evaluation were technical in 
nature, were readily correctable, and the costs to 
correct did not negate the sizable Thiokol cost 
advantage," the selection officials concluded. 
The cost-plus-award-fee contract, estimated to be 
worth $800 million, was awarded to Thiokol. 
The design of the Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster 
was primarily based on the Air Force's Titan III 
solid rocket, one of the most reliable ever 
produced. Thiokol hoped to reduce new design 
problems, speed up the development program 
and cut costs by borrowing from the Titan design. 
In Thiokol's Solid Rocket Motor proposal, the 
rocket fuel is contained in four- forged steel 
cases which are stacked one on top of the other. 
The casings were connected by a circumferential 
tang and clevis, as were the Titans.10 
Despite their many similarities, the Thiokol 
Solid Rocket Booster and the Titan motors had 
some significant design differences. For example, 
the joints of the Titan were designed so that the 
insulation of one case fits tightly against the 
insulation of the adjacent case to form a more 
gastight fit than the Thiokol design. One O-ring 
bore seal was used in each Titan joint to stop any 
hot gas pressure that might pass by the insulation 
overlap, 11 but in the Titan design the O-ring was 
able but not intended to take the brunt of the 
combustion pressure. In contrast, the Thiokol O-
rings were designed to take the brunt of the 
combustion pressure, with no other gas barriers 
present except an insulating putty. Also, the 
Solid Rocket Motor joint had two O-rings, the 
second to provide a backup in case the primary 
seal failed. 
Asbestos-filled putty was used in the Solid 
Rocket Motor to pack the space between the two 
case segments to prevent O-ring damage from 
the heat of combustion gases. 12 Thiokol believed 
the putty was plastic, so when acted on by the 
combustion pressure at the motor's ignition the 
putty flow towards the O-ring would compress 
the air in the gap between the putty and the 
primary O-ring.13 The compressed air, in turn, 
would
 
Figure 1 
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cause the primary O-ring to extrude into the gap 
between the clevis and the tang, behind the 
primary O-ring groove, thereby sealing the 
opening. If the primary O-ring did not seal, the 
intent was that the secondary would pressurize 
and seal the joint by extruding into the gap 
behind its groove.14 
Another difference in the Solid Rocket Motor 
and the Titan was that the tang portion of the 
Thiokol joint was longer in order to 
accommodate two O-rings instead of one. It was 
more susceptible to bending under combustion 
pressure than the Titan joint, as post-design tests 
and later flight experience demonstrated.15 
The initial Thiokol design proposal was changed 
before the production motors were manufactured. 
Originally, the joint seal design incorporated 
both a face seal and a bore seal.16 (Figure 1.) 
However, the motor that was eventually used had 
double bore O-rings. The original bore seal/face 
seal design was chosen because it was 
anticipated that it "provides [better] redundance 
over a double bore ring seal since each is 
controlled by different manufacturing tolerances, 
and each responds differently during joint 
assembly. " 17 Because the early design 
incorporated tolerances similar to the Titan and it 
also incorporated a face seal, Thiokol believed it 
possessed "complete, redundant seal capability." 
18 Nevertheless, as the Solid Rocket Motor 
program progressed, Thiokol-with NASA's 
concurrence-dropped the face/bore seal design 
for one using a double bore seal (Figure 1). 
NASA engineers at Marshall said the original 
design would have required tapered pins to 
maintain necessary tolerances and assure 
enough"squeeze" on the face-sealing  O-ring.19 
However, design analysis determined that motor 
ignition would create tension loads on the joint 
sufficient to cause the tapered pins to pop out. 
Solving that would have meant designing some 
type of pin-retainers. Moreover, the rocket 
assembly was much easier with the dual bore 
seals. Because inspections and tests had to be 
conducted on the Solid Rocket Motor stack, 
horizontal assembly was required. Thiokol 
engineer, Howard McIntosh, described this in a 
Commission interview on April 2, 1986: 
"We were concerned very much about the 
horizontal assembly that we had to do to do the 
static tests. The Titan had always been 
assembled vertically, and so there had never 
been a larger rocket motor to our knowledge that 
was assembled (horizontally)".20 
Because of the extremely tight tolerances in the 
joints caused by horizontal assembly, McIntosh 
noted, "We . . . put the bore seals in there, and 
we opened the tolerance in the gaps slightly to 
accommodate that."21 To tighten the joint's fit 
and to increase the squeeze in the O-rings to 
compensate for the larger tolerances, Thiokol 
subsequently put thin metal shims between the 
outer walls of the tang and clevis. 
Another significant feature of the Thiokol design 
was a vent, or port, on the side of the motor case 
used after assembly to check the sealing of the 
O-rings. As will be noted later, this leak check 
eventually became a significant aspect of the O-
ring erosion phenomenon.22The manufacture of 
the O-rings themselves constituted another 
difference between the Titan and the Thiokol 
Solid Rocket Motor. While both O-rings were 
Viton rubber, the Titan O-rings were molded in 
one piece. The Solid Rocket Motor O-rings were 
made from sections of rubber O-ring material 
glued together. The specifications allowed five 
such joints, a number chosen arbitrarily, and the 
vendor routinely made repairs of voids and 
inclusions after getting the material supplies. 
Only surface inspections were performed by 
Thiokol and by the manufacturer. 
Finally, unlike the Titan, the Thiokol Solid 
Rocket Motor was designed for multiple firings. 
To reduce program costs, each Thiokol motor 
case for the Shuttle was to be recovered after 
flight and reused up to 20 times.23 
Early Tests 
Thiokol began testing the Solid Rocket Motor in 
the mid-1970's. One of the early important tests 
was a 1977 "hydroburst test."24Its purpose was to 
test the strength of the steel cases by simulating a 
motor firing. The case was pressurized with 
water to about one and one-half times the 
pressure of an ignited motor (about 1,500 pounds 
per square inch) to make certain the case had 
adequate structural margin.25 Also, to measure 
the pressure between the O-rings, engineers 
attached instruments to the leak test port at a 
segment joint. Although the test was successful 
in that it demonstrated the case met strength 
requirements, test measurements showed that, 
contrary to design expectations, the joint  
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tang and inside clevis bent away from each other 
instead of toward each other and by doing so 
reduced-instead of increased-pressure on the 0-
ring in the milliseconds after ignition.26 This 
phenomenon was called "joint rotation." 
Testifying before the Commission, Arnold 
Thompson, Thiokol's supervisor of structures, 
said, 
"We discovered that the joint was opening rather 
than closing as our original analysis had 
indicated, and in fact it was quite a bit. I think it 
was up to 52 onethousandths of an inch at that 
time, to the primary O-ring."27 Thiokol reported 
these initial test findings to the NASA program 
office at Marshall. Thiokol engineers did not 
believe the test results really proved that "joint 
rotation" would cause significant problems,28 and 
scheduled no additional tests for the specific 
purpose of confirming or disproving the joint 
gap behavior. 
 Design Objections  
Reaction from Marshall to the early Solid Rocket 
Motor test results was rapid and totally opposite 
of Thiokol's. In a September 2, 1977 
memorandum, Glenn Eudy, Marshall's Chief 
Engineer of the Solid Rocket Motor Division, 
informed Alex McCool, Director of the 
Structures and Propulsion Laboratory, that the 
assembly of a developmental motor provided 
early indications that the Thiokol design: 
"Allowed O-ring clearance.... Some people 
believe this design deficiency must be corrected 
by some method such as shimming and perhaps 
design modification to the case joint for 
hardware which has not been final machined.... I 
personally believe that our first choice should be 
to correct the design in a way that eliminates the 
possibility of O-ring clearance.... Since this is a 
very critical SRM issue, it is requested that the 
assignment results be compiled in such a manner 
as to permit review at the S&E Director's level as 
well as project manager."  
After seeing the data from the September 1977 
hydroburst test, Marshall engineer Leon Ray 
submitted a report entitled "Solid Rocket Motor 
Joint Leakage Study" dated October 21, 1977. It 
characterizes "no change" in the Thiokol design 
as "unacceptable"-"tang can move outboard and 
cause excessive joint clearance resulting in seal 
leakage. Eccentric tang/clevis interface can cause 
O-ring extrusion when case is pressurized." Ray 
recommended a "redesign of the tang and reduce 
tolerance on the clevis" as the "best option for a 
long-term fix." 29 After Ray's 1977 report, John 
Q. Miller, chief of the Solid Rocket Motor 
branch at Marshall, signed and sent a 
memorandum on January 9, 1978 to his superior, 
Glenn Eudy, describing the problems evident in 
the Solid Rocket Motor joint seal. "We see no 
valid reason for not designing to accepted 
standards," the memo said, and it emphasized 
that proper sealing of the joint by use of shims to 
create necessary O-ring pressure was "mandatory 
to prevent hot gas leaks and resulting 
catastrophic failure."30 
One year later, not having received a response to 
his 1978 memo, Miller signed and forwarded a 
second memo strenuously objecting to Thiokol's 
Solid Rocket Motor joint seal design. This memo, 
dated January 19, 1979, opened with: "We find 
the Thiokol position regarding design adequacy 
of the clevis joint to be completely 
unacceptable...." 31 The memorandum made three 
principal objections to Thiokol's joint design. 
The first was the "large sealing surface gap 
created by extensive tang/clevis relative 
movement." The memo said this movement, the 
so-called"joint rotation," caused the primary O-
ring to extrude into the gap, "forcing the seal to 
function in a way which violates industry and 
government O-ring application practices." 32 
Moreover, joint rotation allowed the secondary 
O-ring to "become completely disengaged from 
its sealing surface on the tang." Finally, the 
memorandum noted that although Thiokol's 
contract required all high pressure case seals to 
be verifiable, "the clevis joint secondary O-ring 
seal has been verified by tests to be 
unsatisfactory."33 A copy of the second 
memorandum was sent to George Hardy, then 
Solid Rocket Booster project manager at 
Marshall. Thiokol apparently did not receive 
copies of either Miller memorandum, and no 
reply from Eudy to Miller has been found. 
The Commission has learned that Leon Ray 
actually authored the Miller memos to Eudy, 
although Miller signed them and concurred in 
the objections raised.34 During February, 1979, 
Ray also reported on a visit he made to two O-
ring manufacturers-the Precision Rubber 
Products Corporation at Lebanon Tennessee, and 
the Parker Seal Co. at Lexington, Kentucky.35 
Eudy  
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accompanied Ray on the Precision visit. The 
purpose of the trips was to give the 
manufacturers the data on the O-ring experiences 
at Thiokol and to "seek opinions regarding 
potential risks involved," Ray wrote in a 
February 9, 1979, memo describing the visit. 
Officials at Precision did "voice concern for the 
design, stating that the Solid Rocket Motor O-
ring extrusion gap was larger than that covered 
by their experience," Ray reported. "Their first 
thought was that the O-ring was being asked to 
perform beyond its intended design and that a 
different type of seal should be considered," Ray 
added.36 
During the Commission hearing on May 2, 1986, 
Ray was asked why the 1978 and 1979 
memoranda were written:  
Mr. Ray: The reason they were written was as a 
result of test data that we had, and I have to go 
back to, I guess, a little bit further back in time 
than these memos. When the joint was first 
designed, the analysis produced by Thiokol says 
the joint would close, the extrusion gap would 
actually close. We had quite a debate about that 
until we did a test on the first couple of segments 
that we received from the manufacturer, which in 
fact showed that the joint did open. Later on we 
did some tests with the structural test article, and 
this is mentioned in the memo as STA-1 
[Structural Test Article]. 
At that time, we really nailed it down. We got 
some very accurate numbers on joint rotation, 
and we know for a fact that during these tests 
that, just what the memo says, the joint rotated. 
The primary O-ring was extruded up into the 
joint. The secondary O-ring did in fact detach 
from the seat.37 No records show Thiokol was 
informed of the visits, and the O-ring design was 
not changed. 
Thiokol's phase 1 certification review on March 
23, 1979, mentioned leak check failures, and 
forces during case joint assembly that resulted in 
clevis O-ring grooves not conforming with tang 
sealing surfaces. However, this was not listed as 
a problem or a failure.38 
Verification and Certification Committee 
While Ray was warning of problems with joint 
rotation, static motor tests in July 1978 and April 
1980 again were demonstrating that inner 
tang/clevis relative movement was greater than 
originally predicted.39 Thiokol continued to 
question the validity of these joint rotation 
measurements and their effect on the availability 
of the secondary O-ring. 
In 1980, NASA empanelled a Space Shuttle 
Verification/Certification Committee to study the 
flight worthiness of the entire Shuttle system. A 
subdivision of that group, the Propulsion 
Committee, met with NASA Solid Rocket Motor 
program personnel and raised several concerns 
about the joint design.40 The Committee pointed 
out that the booster's leak test pressurized the 
primary O-ring in the wrong direction so that the 
motor ignition would have to move the ring 
across its groove before it sealed. The 
Committee added that the effect of the insulation 
putty was not certain. Redundancy of the O-rings 
was also listed as a verification concern. The 
same report, however, said "the Committee 
understands from a telecon that the primary 
purpose of the second O-ring is to test the 
primary and that redundancy is not a 
requirement." George Hardy testified that the 
Committee's statement conflicted with his 
understanding: 
"The discussion there or the reference there to a 
telecon-and I don't know who that was with-that 
implies there was no intent for the joint to be 
redundant is totally foreign to me. I don't know 
where they would have gotten that information 
because that was the design requirement for the 
joint." 41 
In May 1980, the Verification/Certification 
Committee recommended that NASA conduct 
full-scale tests to verify the field joint integrity, 
including firing motors at a mean bulk propellant 
temperature range of 40-90 degrees Fahrenheit. 
The panel also asked NASA to: 
"Perform case burst test with one O-ring 
removed. During the burst test for final 
verification of the motor case safety factor, one 
of the two O-rings failed by extrusion and leaked. 
The analysis used for additional verification did 
not include further gap openings caused by joint 
deflection at pressurization or any deflections 
caused by bending loads. The panel considers the 
above to be inadequate to provide operational 
program reliability, and marginal to provide 
adequate 
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safety factor confidence on [Shuttle flight] one." 
42 
The NASA program response to these issues was 
included in the final Committee report in 
September 1980. It said that the original 
hydroburst tests and the lightweight case tests, 
being conducted at the time, satisfied the intent 
of the Committee's recommendations. Moreover, 
the response stated: "NASA specialists have 
reviewed the field joint design, updated with 
larger O-rings and thicker shims and found the 
safety factors to be adequate for the current 
design. Re-analysis of the joint with larger O-
rings and thicker shims is being accomplished as 
part of the lightweight case program.... The joint 
has been sufficiently verified with the testing 
accomplished to date (joint lab tests, structural 
test article, and seven static firings and the two 
case configuration burst tests) and currently 
scheduled for lightweight case program."43 
Criticality Classification and Changes 
The Solid Rocket Motor certification was 
deemed satisfactory by the Propulsion 
Committee of the Verification/Certification 
Group on September 15, 1980. Shortly thereafter, 
on November 24, 1980, the Solid Rocket Booster 
joint was classified on the Solid Rocket Booster 
Critical Items List as criticality category 1 R. 
NASA defines "Criticality 1R" as any subsystem 
of the Shuttle that contains "redundant hardware, 
total element failure of which could cause loss of 
life or vehicle."44 The use of "R", representing 
redundancy, meant that NASA believed the 
secondary O-ring would pressurize and seal if 
the primary O-ring did not. Nonetheless, the 
1980 Critical Items List (CIL) states: 
"Redundancy of the secondary field joint seal 
cannot be verified after motor case pressure 
reaches approximately 40 percent of maximum 
expected operating pressure. It is known that 
joint rotation occurring at this pressure level with 
a resulting enlarged extrusion gap causes the 
secondary O-ring to lose compression as a seal. 
It is not known if the secondary O-ring would 
successfully reseal if the primary O-ring should 
fail after motor case pressure reaches or exceeds 
40 percent of maximum expected operating 
pressure." 
When asked about the text of the 1980 Criticality 
1R classification, Arnold Aldrich, NASA 
Manager of the National Space Transportation 
System, said, 
"The way that . . . language [reads], I would call 
it [criticality] 1."45 
Notwithstanding this apparent contradiction in 
the classification 1R and the questionable status 
of the secondary described in the text of the CIL, 
the joint carried a 1 R classification fro m 
November 1980 through the flight of STS-5 
(November 1982). The Space Shuttle first flew 
on April 12-14, 1981. After the second flight, 
STS-2, in November 1981, inspection revealed 
the first in-flight erosion of the primary O-ring.46 
It occurred in the right Solid Rocket Booster's aft 
field joint and was caused by hot motor gases.47 
The damage to the ring proved to be the worst 
ever found on a primary O-ring in a field joint on 
any recovered Solid Rocket Booster.48 Post-
flight examination found an erosion depth 
of .053 inches on the primary O-ring; 
nonetheless, the anomaly was not reported in the 
Level I Flight Readiness Review for STS-3 held 
on March 9, 1982. Furthermore, in 1982 the 
STS-2 O-ring erosion was not reported on the 
Marshall problem assessment system and given a 
tracking number as were other flight anomalies.49 
In mid- 1982, two significant developments took 
place. Because Thiokol believed blow holes in 
the insulating putty were a cause of the erosion 
on STS-2, 50 they began tests of the method of 
putty layup and the effect of the assembly of the 
rocket stages on the integrity of the putty. The 
manufacturer of the original putty, Fuller-
O'Brien, discontinued the product and a new 
putty, from the Randolph Products Company, 
was tested and selected in May 1982.51 The new 
Randolph putty was eventually substituted for 
the old putty in the summer of 1983, for the 
STS-8 Solid Rocket Motor flow.52 
A second major event regarding the joint seal 
occurred in the summer of 1982. As noted before, 
in 1977-78, Leon Ray had concluded that joint 
rotation caused the loss of the secondary O-ring 
as a backup seal. Because of May 1982 high 
pressure O-ring tests and tests of the new 
lightweight motor case, Marshall management  
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[126] finally accepted the conclusion that the 
secondary O-ring was no longer functional after 
the joints rotated when the Solid Rocket Motor 
reached 40 percent of its maximum expected 
operating pressure. It obviously followed that the 
dual O-rings were not a completely redundant 
system, so the Criticality 1R had to be changed 
to Criticality 1.53 This was done at Marshall on 
December 17, 1982. The revised Critical Items 
List read (See pages 157 and 158): 
"Criticality Category 1.  
"Failure Mode and Causes: Leakage at case 
assembly joints due to redundant O-ring seal 
failures or primary seal and leak check port O-
ring failure. 
"Note. Leakage of the primary O-ring seal is 
classified as a single-failure point due to 
possibility of loss of sealing at the secondary O-
ring because of joint rotation after motor 
pressurization. 
"Failure Effect Summary: Actual Loss- Loss of 
mission, vehicle and crew due to metal erosion, 
burn through, and probable case burst resulting 
in fire and deflagration. . 
"Rationale for Retention: 
"The Solid Rocket Motor case joint design is 
common in the lightweight and regular weight 
cases having identical dimensions. The joint 
concept is basically the same as the single O-ring 
joint successfully employed on the Titan III 
Solid Rocket Motor.... On the Shuttle Solid 
Rocket Motor, the secondary O-ring was 
designed to provide redundancy and to permit a 
leak check, ensuring proper installation of the O-
rings. Full redundancy exists at the moment of 
initial pressurization. However, test data shows 
that a phenomenon called joint rotation occurs as 
the pressure rises, opening up the O-ring 
extrusion gap and permitting the energized ring 
to protrude into the gap. This condition has been 
shown by test to be well within that required for 
safe primary O-ring sealing. This gap may, 
however, in some cases, increase sufficiently to 
cause the unenergized secondary O-ring to lose 
compression, raising question as to its ability to 
energize and seal if called upon to do so by 
primary seal failure. Since, under this latter 
condition only the single O-ring is sealing, a 
rationale for retention is provided for the simplex 
mode where only one O-ring is acting" 
[emphasis added] . 54 The retention rationale for 
the "simplex" or single O-ring seal was written 
on December 1, 1982, by Howard McIntosh, a 
Thiokol engineer.55 This document gave the 
justification for flight with the single functional 
O-ring. It reported that tests showed the Thiokol 
design should be retained, citing the Titan 
history, the leak and hydroburst tests, and static 
motor firings as justification. However, it also 
contained the following rationale which appeared 
to conflict with the Criticality 1 classification 
that the secondary O-ring was not redundant: 
"Initial information generated in a lightweight 
cylinder-to-cylinder proof test shows a total 
movement of only .030 inch at pounds per 
square inch, gauge pressure in the center joint. 
This . . . indicates that the tang-to-clevis 
movement will not unseat the secondary O-ring 
at operating pressures."56 Testimony in hearings 
and statements given in Commission interviews 
support the view that NASA management and 
Thiokol still considered the joint to be a 
redundant seal even after the change from 
Criticality 1R to 1. For example, McIntosh's 
interview states: 
 Question: [After the Criticality I classification], 
what did you think it would take to make [the 
joint seal] 1R? 
Mr. McIntosh: I thought it was already 1R. I 
thought that after those tests that would have 
been enough to do it. 
Question: Well, you knew it was 1 but you were 
hoping for 1R? 
Mr McIntosh: Yeah, I was hoping for 1R, and I 
thought this test data would do it, but it didn't.57 
At the time (in 1982-83), the redundancy of the 
secondary O-ring was analyzed in terms of joint 
or hardware geometry, with no consideration 
being given to the resiliency of the ring as 
affected by temperatures.58 Moreover, Marshall 
engineers like Ray and Miller disagreed with 
Thiokol's calculations on the measurement of 
joint opening.59 That engineering debate 
eventually went to a "referee" for testing which 
was not concluded until after the 51-L accident. 
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Notwithstanding the view of some of Marshall 
engineers that the secondary ring was not 
redundant, even at the time of the Criticality 
revision, Marshall Solid Rocket Motor program 
management appeared to believe the seal was 
redundant in all but exceptional cases. Dr. 
Judson Lovingood told the Commission: 
" . . . [T]here are two conditions you have to 
have before you don't have redundancy. One of 
them is what I call a spatial condition which says 
that the dimensional tolerances have to be such 
that you get a bad stackup, you don't have proper 
squeeze, etc. On the O-ring so that when you get 
joint rotation, you will lift the metal surfaces off 
the O-ring. All right, that's the one condition, and 
that is a worst case condition involving 
dimensional tolerances. 
"The other condition is a temporal condition 
which says that you have to be past a point of 
joint rotation, and of course, that relates back to 
what I just said. 
"So first of all, if you don't have this bad stackup, 
then you have full redundancy. Now, secondly, if 
you do have the bad stackup, you had 
redundancy during the ignition transient up to 
the 170 millisecond point, whatever it is, but that 
is the way I understand the [Critical Items 
List]."60 
George Hardy and Lawrence Mulloy shared 
Lovingood's view that the secondary seal was 
redundant in all but situations of worst case 
tolerances.61 However, there is no mention of 
this caveat in the Critical Items List itself, nor 
does it appear in the subsequent "waiver" of the 
Criticality 1 status granted by NASA Levels  I 
and II in March, 1983.62 This waiver was 
approved to avoid the obligations imposed on the 
Shuttle Program by Paragraph 2.8 of the Space 
Shuttle Program Requirements Document, Level 
I, dated June 30, 1977. That paragraph states: 
"The redundancy requirements for all flight 
vehicle subsystems (except primary structure, 
thermal protection system, and pressure vessels) 
shall be established on an individual subsystems 
basis, but shall not be less than fail-safe. 'Fail-
safe' is defined as the ability to sustain a failure 
and retain the capability to successfully 
terminate the mission. Redundant systems shall 
be designed so that their operational status can 
be verified during ground turnaround and to the 
maximum extent possible while in flight." 63 
Glynn Lunney, the former manager of the STS 
Program (Level II at JSC) described the 
Criticality 1 change and resulting waiver to the 
Commission on May 2: 
 Mr. Lunney: Well, the approval of the waiver in 
March of 83, at the time I was involved in that. I 
was operating on the assumption that there really 
would be redundancy most of the time except 
when the secondary O-ring had a set of 
dimensional tolerances add up, and in that 
extreme case there would not be a secondary seal. 
So I was dealing with what I thought was a case 
where there were two seals unless the 
dimensional tolerances were such that there 
might only be one seal in certain cases.  
Chairman Rogers: Now, to me, if you will 
excuse the expression, that sounds almost 
contradictory, what you just said. What you first 
said was you came to the conclusion that you 
could only rely on the primary seal and therefore 
you removed the R. 
Mr. Lunney: Yes, sir. 
Chairman Rogers: And now you're saying, if I 
understand it, that experience showed that there 
was redundancy after all. 
Mr. Lunney: No, I don't know of any experience 
showing that. What I'm saying is that the 
removal of the R is an indicator that under all 
circumstances we did not have redundancy. 
There were a certain number of cases under 
which we would not have redundancy of the 
secondary O-ring. Recognizing that, even though 
there were a lot of cases where we expected we 
would have redundancy we changed the 
criticality designation. 
Chairman Rogers: It was saying to everybody 
else you can't necessarily rely on the primary 
seal, and if the primary seal fails, as you've said 
here, there may be loss of vehicle, mission and 
crew.  
Mr. Lunney: I would adjust that to only say you 
cannot rely on the secondary O-ring  
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but we would expect the primary O-ring to 
always be there.64 
The criticality waiver was processed outside the 
formal NASA Program Requirements Control 
Board, however, representatives of that group 
"signed off" on the document.65 It was forwarded 
to Level I and approved by Associate 
Administrator for Space Flight (Technical), L. 
Michael Weeks on March 28, 1983. Weeks told 
the Commission he signed the waiver because of 
the Certification/Verification Review of the 
Propulsion Committee in 1980. Weeks explained, 
"We felt at the time -all of the people in the 
program I think felt that this Solid Rocket Motor 
in particular or the Solid Rocket Booster was 
probably one of the least worrisome things we 
had in the program." 66 The waiver was signed 
less than one week prior to the launch of STS-6 
on April 4. According to interviews of Arnold 
Aldrich and of Richard Kohrs, the latter having 
been involved with the waiver review at Johnson 
Level II, the waiver was approved so that STS-6 
could fly.67 However, Weeks denied any 
connection between the Level I waiver approval 
and the flight of STS-6.68 
Although some Thiokol engineers and officials 
claimed that they had no notice of the Criticality 
change and waiver in December, 1982 and in 
March, 1983, from the approval signatures 
(including Thiokol's Operations Manager at 
Marshall, Maurice Parker) and the distribution of 
the Criticality and Waiver documents, apparently 
Thiokol officials were sent copies and were 
involved in the criticality reclassification. 69 
Nonetheless, the Commission has also 
determined that several documents tracking the 
O-ring erosion at Thiokol and Marshall refer to 
the Solid Rocket Motor field joint seal as 
Criticality 1-R, long after the status was changed 
to Criticality 1. 70 
 STS 41-B O-Ring Erosion 
As Figure 2 shows,71 prior to STS 41-B, the O-
ring erosion/blow-by problem was infrequent, 
occurring on a field joint of STS-2 (November, 
1981), nozzles of STS-6 (April, 1983) and a 
nozzle of QM -4 (March, 1983), a qualification 
test motor fired by Thiokol.72 However, when 
STS 41-B flew on February 3, 1984, the left 
Solid Rocket Booster forward field joint and the 
right nozzle joint primary O-rings both suffered 
erosion damage. Thiokol engineers reacted to 
this discovery by filing a problem report on the 
O-ring erosion found on STS 41 -B. Thiokol 
presented a series of charts to the Marshall Solid 
Rocket Booster Engineering Office about the 41-
B  O-ring erosion. Thiokol told Marshall that 
recent joint rotation measurements in tests 
indicated the secondary O-ring will not unseat, 
providing confidence that the secondary was an 
adequate backup. Keith Coates described his 
view about Thiokol's data in a February 29, 1984 
memorandum to George Hardy: 
"We have two problems with their rationale. The 
effect of 0.065 inch erosion on O-ring sealing 
capability is not addressed. We have asked 
Thiokol to provide their data to justify their 
confidence in the degraded O-ring. The second 
concern is the amount of joint rotation. L. Ray 
does not agree with Thiokol numbers, and he has 
action to discuss his concern with R. Boisjoly 
(Thiokol) and reach agreement. 
"Thiokol definition of their plans on resolution 
of the problem is very weak." 
The erosion problem was identified and tracked 
by the Marshall Problem Assessment System as 
Marshall Record A07934 and by Thiokol as 
Thiokol Contractor Record DR4-5/30, "Slight 
char condition on primary O-ring seal in forward 
field joint on SRM A57 of STS-11 flight, 
Mission 41B." 73 The Marshall Problem 
Assessment System Report states: 
"Remedial action-none required; problem 
occurred during flight. The primary O-ring seal 
in the forward field joint exhibited a charred area 
approximately 1 inch long .03-.050 inches deep 
and .100 inches wide. This was discovered 
during post-flight segment disassembly at KSC." 
A March 8, 1984 entry on the same report 
continues: 
"Possibility exists for some O-ring erosion on 
future flights. Analysis indicates max erosion 
possible is .090 inches according to Flight 
Readiness Review findings for STS-13. 
Laboratory test shows sealing integrity at 3,000 
psi using an O-ring with simulated erosion depth 
of .095 inches Therefore, this is not a constraint 
to future launches." 74 
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[129-131] Figure 2. O-Ring Anomalies Compared with Joint Temperature and Leak Check 
Pressure. 
  
Pressure (psi) Flight or 
Motor Date  
(Solid 
Rocket 
Booster) 
Joint/O-Ring  
Field  Nozzle 
Erosion Blow-
by  
Joint 
Temp °F 
.  
DM-1  07/18/77  -  -  NA  NA  -  -  84  
DM-2  01/18/78  -  -  NA  NA  -  -  49  
DM-3  10/19/78  -  -  NA  NA  -  -  61  
DM-4  02/17/79  -  -  NA  NA  -  -  40  
QM-1  07/13/79  -  -  NA  NA  -  -  83  
QM-2  09/27/79  -  -  NA  NA  -  -  67  
QM-3  02/13/80  -  -  NA  NA  -  -  45  
STS-1  04/12/81  -  -  50  50  -  -  66  
STS-2  11/12/81  (Right)  Aft Field/Primary  50  50  X  -  70  
STS-3  03/22/81  -  -  50  50  NA  NA  80  
STS-4  06/27/82  Unknown: hardware lost at sea 50  50  NA  NA  80  
DM-5  10/21/82  -  -  NA  NA  -  -  58  
STS-5  11/11/82  -  -  50  50  -  -  68  
QM-4  03/21/83  -  Nozzle/Primary  NA  NA  X  -  60  
(Right)  Nozzle/Primary  50  50  (1)  -  67  STS-6  04/04/83  
(Left)  Nozzle/Primary  50  50  (1)  -  67  
STS-7  06/18/83  -  -  50  50  -  -  72  
STS-8  08/30/83  -  -  100  50  -  -  73  
STS-9  12/28/83  -  -  1002  100  -  -  70  
(Right)  Nozzle/Primary  200  100  X  -  57  STS 41-
B  
02/03/84  
(Left)  Forward 
Field/Primary  200  100  X  -  57  
(Right)  Nozle/Primary  200  100  X  -  63  
(Left)  Aft Field/Primary  200  100  (3)  -  63  
STS 41-
C  
04/06/84  
(Right)  Igniter/Primary  NA  NA  -  X  63  
(Right)  Forward Field/Primary  200  100  X  -  70  
(Left)  Nozzle/Primary  200  100  X  X  70  
STS 41-
D  
08/30/84  
(Right)  Igniter/Primary  NA  NA  -  X  70  
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STS 41-
G  10/05/84  -  -  200  100  -  -  67  
DM-6  10/25/84  -  Inner Gasket/Primary  NA  NA  X  X  52  
STS 51-
A  11/08/84  -  -  200  100  -  -  67  
(Right)  Center Field/Primary  200  100  X  X  53  
(Right)  Center Field/Secondary  200  100  (
4)  -  53  
(Right)  Nozzle/Primary  200  100  -  X  53  
(Left)  Forward Field/Primary  200  100  X  X  53  
STS 51-
C  
01/24/85  
(Left)  Nozzle/Primary  200  100  -  X  53  
(Right)  Nozzle/Primary  200  200  X  -  67  
(Right)  Igniter/Primary  NA  NA  -  X  67  
(Left)  Nozzle/Primary  200  200  X  -  67  
STS 51-
D  
04/12/85  
(Left)  Igniter/Primary  NA  NA  -  X  67  
(Right)  Nozzle/Primary  200  100  X  -  75  
(Left)  Nozzle/Primary  200  100  X  X  75  
STS 51-
B  
04/29/85  
(Left)  Nozzle/Primary  200  100  X  -  75  
DM-7  05/09/85  .  Nozzle/Primary  NA  NA  X  -  61  
(Right)  Nozzle/Primary  200  200  X5  X  70  
(Left)  Nozzle/Primary  200  200  X  X  70  
STS 51-
G  
06/17/85  
(Left)  Igniter/Primary  NA  NA  -  X  70  
STS 51-
F  07/29/85  (Right)  Nozzle/Primary  200  200  (
6)  -  81  
STS 51-I 08/27/85  (Left)  Nozzle/Primary  200  200  X7  -  76  
STS 51-
J  10/03/85   -  200  200  -  -  79  
(Right)  Nozzle/Primary  200  200  X  -  75  
(Left)  Aft Field/Primary  200  200  -  X  75  
STS 61-
A  
10/30/85  
(Left)  Center Field/Primary  200  200  -  X  75  
(Right)  Nozzle/Primary  200  200  X  -  76  STS 61-
B  
11/26/85  
(Left)  Nozzle/Primary  200  200  X  X  76  
(Right)  Nozzle/Primary  200  200  X  -  58  
(Left)  Aft Field/Primary  200  200  X  -  58  
STS 61-
C  
01/12/86  
(Left)  Nozzle/Primary  200  200  -  X  58  
STS 51-
L  01/28/86  .  .  200  200  .  .  31  
Dash (-) denotes no anomaly.  
NA denotes not applicable.  
NOTE: A list of the sequence of launches (1-25), identified by STS mission designation, is 
provided on pages 4 thru 6. 
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1 On STS-6, both nozzles had a hot gas path detected in the putty with an indication of heat on 
the primary O-ring.  
2 On STS-9, one of the right Solid Rocket Booster field joints was pressurized at 200 psi after a 
destack.  
3 On STS 41-C, left aft field had a hot gas path detected in the putty with an indication of heat on 
the primary O-ring.  
4 On a center field joint of STS 51-C, soot was blown by the primary and there was a heat effect 
on the secondary.  
5 On STS 51-G, right nozzle has erosion in two places on the primary O-ring.  
6 On STS 51-F, right nozzle had hot gas path detected in putty with an indication of heat on the 
primary O-ring.  
7 On STS 51-I, left nozzle had erosion in two places on the primary O-ring.  
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This last entry is also a summary of the briefing 
given by Thiokol to Lawrence Mulloy about the 
41-B erosion at the Level III Flight Readiness 
Review for STS 41-C held at Marshall on March 
8, 1984. At that same briefing, the Chief 
Engineer for United Space Boosters, George 
Morefield, raised prior Titan experience with O-
ring problems. He explained in a memorandum 
to Mulloy the following day: 
"I alluded to the Titan III SRM history which is 
quite similar to the current STS Solid Rocket 
Motor experience. Post-fire inspection of Titan 
Solid Rocket Motor static test motors showed 
that pressurization of the single O-rings in the 
pressure vessel routinely occurred via a single 
break-down path across the joint putty. There 
was also evidence that some O-rings never see 
pressure in the Titan motor. The segment -to-
segment case insulation design results in a 
compression butt joint which apparently is often 
sufficient to withstand Pc, .... 
"Your review showed that there was sufficient 
margin of O-ring remaining to do the job. I'm 
sure you have considered that if it does burn 
through, the secondary O-ring will then be 
similarly pressurized through a single port. So, 
some concern remains. 
"I recommend that you set up a panel to study 
the use of putty and consider some alternatives: 
"1) Is putty needed at all? 
"2) If the tradition can't be broken, can the putty 
be applied with multiple (6 or 8) pressurization 
paths built in? 
"I think that the primary seal should be allowed 
to work in its classical design mode. Both the 
Titan and STS Solid Rocket Motors have been 
designed for this not to happen. Titan has flown 
over a thousand pressure joints with no failure. 
My opinion is that the potential for failure of the 
joint is higher for the STS Solid Rocket Motor, 
especially when occasionally the secondary seal 
may not be totally effective." 75 
When the 41-B erosion was taken to the Level I 
Flight Readiness Review for 41-C on March 30, 
1984, it was briefed as a"technical issue". A 
recommendation to fly 41-C was approved by 
Level I "accepting the possibility of some O-ring 
erosion due to the hot gas impingement." 76 The 
rationale for acceptance was the same as that 
given at the Level III Flight Readiness Review 
and entered into the Marshall problem 
assessment report. An outgrowth of this review 
was an April 5, 1984, directive from NASA 
Deputy Administrator Dr. Hans Mark to 
Lawrence Mulloy at Marshall. This 
"Programmatic Action Item" was signed by 
Weeks and asked Mulloy to conduct a "formal 
review of' the Solid Rocket Motor case-to-case 
and case-to-nozzle joint sealing procedures to 
ensure satisfactory consistent closeouts." 77 This 
action item had been preceded by a letter written 
from NASA Associate Administrator for Space 
Flight General Abrahamson to Marshall Center 
Director Lucas.78 That letter, sent January 18, 
1984, requested that Marshall develop a plan of 
action to make improvement in NASA's ability 
to design, manufacture and fly Solid Rocket 
Motors. Abrahamson pointed out that NASA 
was flying motors where basic design and test 
results were not well understood. The letter 
addressed the overall general Solid Rocket 
Motor design but did not specifically mention O-
ring erosion. 
After Mulloy received the April 5, 1984 STS 41-
C action item on the O-rings, he had Lawrence 
Wear for-ward a letter- to Thiokol which asked 
for a formal review of' the booster field joint and 
nozzle joint sealing procedures. Thiokol was to 
identify the cause of the erosion, determine 
whether it was acceptable. define necessary 
changes, and reevaluate the putty then in use. 
The Wear letter also requested small motor tests 
reflecting joint dynamics as well as analysis of 
the booster assembly process.79 
Thiokol replied to the Marshall STS 41-C action 
item on May 4, 1984, with a program plan 
entitled "Protection of' SRM Primary Motor 
Seals." The plan was prepared by Brian Russell, 
then Thiokol's Manager of Systems Engineering. 
It outlined a systematic program to isolate the 0-
ring erosion and charring problem and to 
eliminate damage to the joint seals. 80 Proposed 
areas of inquiry included the leak check 
pressures, assembly loads, case eccentricity and 
putty layup. The Thiokol response in May 1984 
was merely a proposal. The actual final response 
to the directive from Marshall was not completed 
until the August 19, 1985 briefing on the Solid 
Rocket Motor seal held at NASA headquarters 
some 15 months later. 81 
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Leak Check and Putty 
In addition to the action item from NASA 
Headquarters, another result of the 41-B erosion 
was a warning written by John Q. Miller, 
Marshall chief of the solid motor branch, to 
George Hardy, through Keith Coates.82 Miller 
was worried about the two charred rings on 41-B 
and the "missing putty" found when the Solid 
Rocket Boosters were recovered and 
disassembled. He specifically identified the 
putty's sensitivity to humidity and temperature as 
potential sources of problems. "The thermal 
design of the [Solid Rocket Motor] joints 
depends on thermal protection of the O-ring by 
the [putty]," Miller said. Failure of the putty to 
"provide a thermal barrier can lead to burning 
both O-rings and subsequent catastrophic 
failure." The memorandum also said that "the O-
ring leak check procedure and its potential effect 
on the (putty) installation and possible 
displacement is also an urgent concern which 
requires expedition of previously identified full 
scale tests."  
From the beginning, Thiokol had suspected the 
putty was a contributing factor in O-ring erosion, 
even after STS-2.83 In April 1983, Thiokol 
reported on tests conducted to study the behavior 
of the joint putty. One conclusion of the report 
was that the STS-2 erosion was probably caused 
by blow holes in the putty, which allowed a jet 
of hot gas to focus on a point on the primary O-
ring. Thiokol discovered the focused jet ate away 
or "impinged" on portions of the O-ring. Thiokol 
calculated that the maximum possible 
impingement erosion was .090 inch, and that lab 
test proved that an O-ring would seal at 3,000 psi 
when erosion of .095 inches was simulated. This 
"safety margin" was the basis for approving 
Shuttle flights while accepting the possibility of 
O-ring erosion. 84 
Shortly after Miller's routing slip to Hardy about 
the "urgent concern" of the missing putty on 41-
B, at Thiokol, Brian Russell authored a letter to 
Robert Ebeling which analyzed the erosion 
history and the test data. Russell's April 9, 1984 
conclusion was that the putty itself and its layup 
were not at fault but that the higher stabilization 
pressure adopted in leak check procedures, first 
implemented in one field joint on STS-9, may 
increase the chances of O-ring erosion. The 
conclusion by Miller and Russell was that the air 
pressure forced through the joint during the O-
ring leak check was creating more putty blow 
holes, allowing more focused jets on the primary 
O-ring, thereby increasing the frequency of 
erosion.85 
This hypothesis that O-ring erosion is related to 
putty blow holes is substantiated by the leak 
check history (Figure 3). Prior to January, 1984, 
and STS 41-B, when the leak check pressure was 
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50 or 100 psi, only one field joint O-ring 
anomaly had been found during the first nine 
flights. However, when the leak check 
stabilization pressure was officially boosted to 
200 psi for STS 41-B, over half the Shuttle 
missions experienced field joint O-ring blow-by 
or erosion of some kind. 86 Moreover, the nozzle 
O-ring history of problems is similar. The nozzle 
joint leak check was changed from 50 psi to 100 
psi before STS-9 launched in November 1983. 
After this change, the incidence of O-ring 
anomalies in the nozzle joint increased from 12 
percent to 56 percent of all Shuttle flights. The 
nozzle pressure was increased to 200 psi for 
mission 51-D in April, 1985, and 51-G in June, 
1985, and all subsequent missions. Following the 
implementation of the 200 psi check on the 
nozzle, 88 percent of all flights experienced 
erosion or blow-by. 87 oth Thiokol and NASA 
witnesses agreed that they were aware that the 
increase in blow holes in the putty could 
contribute to O-ring erosion. The Commission 
testimony of May 2, 1986, reads: 
 Dr. Walker: The analysis that some of our staff 
has done suggests that after you increase the test 
pressure to 200 pounds, the incidence of blow-by 
and erosion actually increased. 
Mr. Russell: We realized that. 
 Lawrence Mulloy was also questioned above the 
blow holes in the putty: 
 Dr. Walker: Do you agree that the primary cause 
of the erosion is the blow holes in the putty? 
Mr. Mulloy: I believe it is. Yes. 
Dr. Walker: And so your leak check procedure 
created blow holes in the putty? 
Mr. Mulloy: That is one cause of blow holes in 
the putty. 
Dr. Walker: But in other words, your leak check 
procedure could indeed cause what was your 
primary problem. Didn't that concern you? 
Mr. Mulloy: Yes, sir. 88 
 Notwithstanding the knowledge that putty blow 
holes caused erosion and that higher pressure in 
the leak check caused more blow holes, Thiokol 
recommended and NASA accepted the increased 
pressure to ensure that the joint actually passed 
the integrity tests.89 
The documentary evidence produced by NASA 
and Thiokol demonstrates that Marshall was very 
concerned about the putty erosion/blow hole 
problem after STS 41-B. In addition to John 
Miller's routing slip about putty on STS 41-B 
discussed above, there is a report of a June 7, 
1984, telephone conference between Messrs. 
Thompson, Coates and Ray (Marshall) and 
Messrs. Sayer, Boisjoly, Russell and Parker 
(Thiokol), among others.90 Marshall told Thiokol 
that NASA was very concerned about the O-ring 
erosion problem and that design changes were 
necessary, including possible putty changes. The 
Thiokol engineers discussed Marshall's 
suggestions after the telephone conference, but 
decided they could not agree a change was 
mandatory. A follow-up telephone conference 
was held between Ben Powers of Marshall and 
Lawrence Sayer of Thiokol on July 2. Powers 
told Saver that NASA would not accept the 
removal of the putty from the joint and that 
everyone expected the tests to show that gas jets 
would damage an O-ring. However, Powers 
expressly stated that Marshall would not accept 
Thiokol's opinion that no further tests were 
necessary. In mid-1984, the early tests after 
NASA's action item for 41-C led Thiokol to the 
conclusion that O-ring erosion was a function of 
the putty blow hole size and the amount of free 
volume between the putty orifice and the O-ring. 
The damage to the O-ring was judged to be 
worse when the blow hole was smaller and the 
free volume was larger.91 hile Thiokol did 
establish plans for putty tests to determine how it 
was affected by the leak check in response to the 
41-C action item, their progress in completing 
the tests was slow. The action item was supposed 
to be completed by May 30, 1984, but as late as 
March 6, 1985, there are Marshall internal 
memos that complain that Thiokol had not taken 
any action on Marshall's December 1983 
directive to provide data on putty behavior as 
affected by the joint leak check stabilization 
pressure.92 
 STS 51-C and Cold Te mperature   
On January 24, 1985, STS 51-C was launched. 
The temperature of the O-rings at launch was 53  
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degrees, the coldest to that date. O-ring erosion 
occurred in both solid boosters. The right and 
left nozzle joint showed evidence of blow-by 
between the primary and secondary O-rings. The 
primary O-ring in the left booster's forward field 
joint was eroded and had blow-by, or soot 
behind the ring.97 The right booster's damage 
was in the center field joint-the first time that 
field joint seal was damaged. Both its primary 
and secondary O-rings were affected by heat, 
and the primary ring also had evidence of blow-
by of soot behind it. This was also the first flight 
where a secondary O-ring showed the effect of 
heat. 
STS 51-C was the second example of O-ring 
damage in flight where there was evidence of 
blow-by erosion as well as impingement erosion. 
As noted previously, impingement erosion 
occurs where the O-ring has already sealed and a 
focused jet of hot gas strikes the surface of the 
ring and removes a portion of it. Blow-by 
erosion happens when the O-ring has not yet 
sealed the joint gap and the edge of the ring 
erodes as the hot gas flows around it. 
Roger Boisjoly described the blow-by erosion 
seen in 51-C: 
"SRM 15 [STS 51-C] actually increased [our] 
concern because that was the first time we had 
actually penetrated a primary,, O-ring on a field 
joint with hot gas, and we had a witness of that 
event because the grease between the O-rings 
was blackened just like coal . . . and that was so 
much more significant than had ever been seen 
before on any blow-by on any joint . . . the fact 
was that now you introduced another 
phenomenon. You have impingement erosion 
and bypass erosion, and the O-ring material gets 
removed from the cross section of the O-ring 
much, much faster when you have bypass 
erosion or blow-by." 98 
NASA Official  Position  Description of Awareness of O-Ring Problems  
John Young  Chief, Astronaut Office  "The secret seal, which no one that we know knew about." 93  
Milton Silveira  Chief Engineer  ". . .If I had known . . . I'm sure in the '82 time 
period when we first came to that conclusion 
[that the seal was not redundant], I would have 
insisted that we get busy right now on a design 
change and also look for any temporary fix we 
could do to improve the operation of the seal. " 
94  
James Beggs   (Former) NASA Administrator  "I had no specific concerns with the joint, the 
O-rings or the putty...." 95  
Arnold Aldrich  Manager, National Space 
Transportation System   
Jesse Moore  (Former) Associate Administrator for 
Space Flight  
Richard Smith   Director, Kennedy Space Center  
James A. Thomas   Deputy Director, Kennedy Launch and 
Landing Operations   
None were aware of Thiokol's concern about 
negative effect of cold temperature on O-ring 
performance, nor were they informed of the 
same concern raised after STS 51-C. 96  
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Boisjoly also said blow-by erosion was where 
the primary O-ring "at the beginning of the 
transient cycle . . . is still being attacked by hot 
gas, and it is eroding at the same time it is trying 
to seal, and it is a race between, will it erode 
more than the time allowed to have it seal." He 
described the blow-by on 51-C as "over 100 
degrees of arc, and the blow-by was absolutely 
jet black. It was totally intermixed in a 
homogeneous mixture in the grease." When the 
blow-by material was chemically analyzed, 
Boisjoly said, "we found the products of putty in 
it, we found the products of O-ring in it."99 
On the Marshall problem assessment report that 
was started to track field joint erosion after STS 
41-B, the STS 51 -C O-ring anomaly was 
described as "O-ring burns were as bad or worse 
than previously experienced . . . Design changes 
are pending test results." 100 The changes being 
considered included modifying the O-rings and 
adding grease around the O-rings to fill the void 
left by putty blow holes.On January 31, 1985, 
Marshall Solid Rocket Booster Project Manager 
Mulloy sent an urgent message to Lawrence 
Wear with the stated subject: "51-C O-Ring 
Erosion Re: 51-E FRR." The message ordered 
that the Flight Readiness Review for the 
upcoming flight: 
"Should recap all incidents of O-ring erosion, 
whether nozzle or case joint, and all incidents 
where there is evidence of flow past the primary 
O-ring. Also, the rationale used for accepting the 
condition on the nozzle O-ring. Also, the most 
probable scenario and limiting mechanism for 
flow past the primary on the 51 -C case joints. If 
[Thiokol] does not have all this for today I would 
like to see the logic on a chart with blanks [to be 
filled in ] . " 101 
On February 8, 1985, Thiokol presented its most 
detailed analysis to date of the erosion problems 
to the Solid Rocket Motor project office at 
Marshall for what was then called Shuttle 
mission 51-E, but later changed to 51-D. Thiokol 
included a report on damage incurred by the O-
rings during flight 51-C at the left forward and 
right center field joints. The right center joint had 
hot gas past the primary O-ring. Thiokol said 
that caused a concern that the gas seal could be 
lost, but its resolution was "accept risk." 102 
Thiokol presented test results showing 
"maximum expected erosion" and "maximum 
erosion experienced" for both primary and 
secondary O-rings for- the field and nozzle joints. 
Accepting damage to the primary O-ring was 
being justified, in part, based on an assumption 
of the secondary O-ring working even with 
erosion. However, the Criticality classification 
indicated the primary seal was a "single point 
failure." During this flight readiness assessment 
at Marshall, for the first time Thiokol mentioned 
temperature as a factor in O-ring erosion and 
blow-by. Thiokol said in its conclusions that 
"low temperature enhanced probability of blow-
by-[flight] 51 -C experienced worst case 
temperature change in Florida history." Thiokol 
concluded that while the next Shuttle flight 
"could exhibit same behavior," nonetheless "the 
condition is not desirable but is acceptable." 103 
At the Level I Flight Readiness Review 
conducted on February 21, there was no detailed 
analysis of O-ring problems presented or any 
reference made to low temperature effects. 
Instead, a single reference indicated the O-ring 
erosion and blow-by experienced was 
"acceptable" because of 'limited exposure time 
and redundancy." 
 STS 51-B and the Launch Constraint 
Joint seal problems occurred in each of the next 
four Shuttle flights. Flight 51-D, launched April 
12, 1985 had nozzle O-ring erosion and blow-by 
on an igniter joint. STS 51-B, launched 17 days 
later, experienced both nozzle O-ring erosion and 
blow-by as did 51-G, which flew on the 
following June 17. STS 51-F, launched duly 29, 
1985 had nozzle O-ring blow-by.104 
In response to the apparent negative effect of 
cold leading to the extensive O-ring problems on 
flight 51 -C in January, Thiokol conducted some 
O-ring resiliency tests in early 1985. 105 The tests 
were conducted to quantify the seal timing 
function of the secondary O-ring and the effect 
of joint rotation on its ability to back up the 
primary ring. The key variable was temperature. 
The June 3 test report, which was described in an 
August 9, 1985 letter from Brian Russell at 
Thiokol to Jim Thomas at Marshall, showed: 
"Bench test data indicates that the O-ring 
resiliency (its capability to follow the metal) is a 
function of temperature and rate of case 
expansion. [Thiokol] measured the force of the 
O-ring against Instron platens, which 
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simulated the nominal squeeze on the O-ring and 
approximated the case expansion distance and 
rate. 
"At 100°F, the O-ring maintained contact. At 
75°F the O-ring lost contact for 2.4 seconds. At 
50°F, the O-ring did not reestablish contact in 
ten minutes at which time the test was 
terminated." 106 
On June 25, 1985, the left nozzle joint of STS 
51-B (launched April 29) was disassembled and 
inspected after it had been shipped back to 
Thiokol. What Thiokol found was alarming. The 
primary O-ring seal had been compromised 
because it eroded .171 inches and it did not seal. 
The secondary O-ring did seal, but it had 
eroded .032 inches. Lawrence Mulloy described 
the 51-B problem as follows: 
"This erosion of a secondary O-ring was a new 
and significant event . . . that we certainly did not 
understand. Everything up to that point had been 
the primary O-ring, even though it had 
experienced some erosion does seal. What we 
had evidence of was that here was a case where 
the primary O-ring was violated and the 
secondary O-ring was eroded, and that was 
considered to be a more serious observation than 
previously observed . . .107 
"What we saw [in 51-B], it was evident that the 
primary ring never sealed at all, and we saw 
erosion all the way around that O-ring, and that 
is where the .171 came from, and that was not in 
the model that predicated a maximum of .090, 
the maximum of .090 is the maximum erosion 
that can occur if the primary O-ring seals. 
"But in this case, the primary O-ring did not seal; 
therefore, you had another volume to fill, and the 
flow was longer and it was blow-by and you got 
more erosion." 108 
Upon receiving the report of the 51-B primary 
ring failure, Solid Rocket Booster Project 
Manager Mulloy and the Marshall Proble m 
Assessment Committee placed a "launch 
constraint" on the Shuttle system. 109 A 1980 
Marshall letter which references "Assigning 
Launch Constraints on Open Problems 
Submitted to MSFC PAS" defines launch 
constraint as: 
"All open problems coded Criticality 1, 1R, 2, or 
2R will be considered launch constraints until 
resolved (recurrence control established and its 
implementation effectivity determined) or 
sufficient rationale, i.e., different configuration, 
etc., exists to conclude that this problem will not 
occur- on the flight vehicle during pre-launch, 
launch, or flight." 110 
Lawrence Mulloy told the Commission that the 
launch constraint was "put on after we saw the 
secondary O-ring erosion on the [51-B] nozzle." 
"Based on the amount of charring," the problem 
report listing the constraint said, "the erosion 
paths on the primary O-ring and what is 
understood about the erosion phenomenon, it is 
believed that the primary O-ring [of the joint] 
never sealed." 111 The constraint applied to STS 
51-F and all flights subsequent, including STS 
51-L. Although one Marshall document says that 
the constraint applied to all O-ring anomalies, 112 
no similar launch constraint was noted on the 
Marshall Problem Assessment Report that 
started tracking the field joint erosion after STS 
41-B. Thiokol officials who testified before the 
Commission all claimed they were not aware of 
the July 1985 launch constraint; 113 however, 
Thiokol letters referenced Marshall Record 
number A09288, the report that expressly 
identified the constraint. 114 
After the launch constraint was imposed, Project 
Manager Mulloy waived it for each Shuttle flight 
after July 10, 1985. Mr. Mulloy and Mr. 
Lawrence Wear outlined the procedure in the 
following manner: Chairman Rogers: To you, 
what does a constraint mean, then?  
Mr. Mulloy: A launch constraint means that we 
have to address the observations, sec if we have 
seen anything on the previous flight that changes 
our previous rationale and address that at the 
Flight Readiness Review. 
Chairman Rogers: When you say»address it," I 
always get confused by the word. Do you mean 
think about it? Is that what you mean? 
Mr. Mulloy: No, sir. I mean present the data as 
to whether or not what we have seen in our most 
recent observation, which may not be the last 
flight, it may be the flight before that, is within  
our experience base and whether or not the 
previous analysis and 
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tests that previously concluded that was an 
acceptable situation is still valid, based upon 
later observations.... 
The constraint was put on after we saw the 
secondary O-ring erosion on the nozzle, I believe. 
Chairman Rogers: Who decided that? 
Mr. Mulloy: I decided that, that that would be 
addressed, until that problem was resolved, it 
would be considered a launch constraint, and 
addressed at Flight Readiness Reviews to assure 
that we were staying within our test experience 
base.... 
Chairman Rogers: Do you have ultimate 
responsibility for waiving the launch constraints? 
Mr. Mulloy: Yes, sir, I have ultimate 
responsibility for the launch readiness of the 
Solid Rocket Boosters. 
Chairman Rogers: So there was a launch 
constraint, and you waived it. 
Mr. Mulloy: Yes, sir-, all flights subsequent to. 
Dr. Ride : I'm trying to understand how you deal 
with the launch constraint. How important do 
you think a launch constraint is and how unusual 
is it in your system? 
Mr. Wear : I think a launch constraint is a 
significant event in our system, and it is one that 
has to be addressed within the Flight Readiness 
cycle because I don't have the authority to not do 
that. . 
Dr. Ride : Why didn't you put a launch constraint 
on the field joint at the same time? 
Mr. Mulloy: I think at that point, and I will react 
to that question in real time, because I haven't 
really thought about it, but I think the logic was 
that we had been observing the field joint, the 
field and nozzle joint primary O-ring erosion. 
This erosion of a secondary O-ring was a new 
and significant event, very new and significant 
even that we certainly did not understand. 
Everything up to that point had been that the 
primary O-ring, even though it had exp erienced 
some erosion, does seal. What we had evidence 
of was that here was a case where the primary O-
ring was violated and the secondary O-ring was 
eroded, and that was considered to be a more 
serious observation than previously observed. 
Dr. Ride : Correct me if I am wrong, but weren't 
you basing most of your decisions on the field 
joint on analysis of what was the maximum, 
what you believed to be the maximum possible 
erosion, and you had that analysis for the field 
joint and for the nozzle joint. When you saw the 
complete erosion of the primary O-ring on the 
nozzle joint, that showed you that your analysis 
on the nozzle joint wasn't any good, I would 
think. That would indicate to you that your 
analysis on the field joint wasn't very good, 
either, or at least should be suspect. 
Mr. Mulloy: The conclusion, rightly or wrongly, 
for the cause of the secondary O-ring erosion on 
the nozzle joint, it was concluded from test data 
we had that 100 psi pressurization leak check, 
that the putty could mask a primary O-ring that 
was not sealing. The conclusion was -and that 
one was done at 100 psi. The conclusion was that 
in order to get that type of erosion that we saw 
on the primary O-ring, that that O-ring never 
sealed, and therefore the conclusion was that it 
never was capable of sealing. The leak check on 
subsequent nozzles, all subsequent nozzles was 
run at 200 psi, which the test data indicated 
would always blow through the putty, and in 
always blowing through the putty we were 
guaranteed that we had a primary O-ring seal 
that was capable of sealing, and then we further 
did, and we already had that on the field joints at 
that time.115 
While Mulloy and Wear both testified that the 
constraint was still in effect and waived for 
Challenger's flight, they told the Commission 
that there had been two erroneous entries on the 
O-ring erosion nozzle problem assessment report 
stating the O-ring erosion problem had been 
resolved or closed. 116 Thiokol had suggested this 
closure on December 10, 1985 (at Marshall's 
request according to Brian Russell) but Wear and 
Mulloy told the Commission they rejected that 
recommendation and the problem was still being 
addressed in Flight Readiness Reviews.117 
NASA Levels I and II apparently did not realize 
Marshall had assigned a launch constraint within 
the Problem Assessment System.118 This
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Figure 5. August 19,1985 Headquarters Briefing. 
General Conclusions   Recommendations  
· All O-ring erosion has occurred where gas paths in 
the vacuum putty are formed  
· Gas paths in the vacuum putty can occur during 
assembly, leak check, or during motor 
pressurization  
· Improved filler materials or layup configurations 
which still allow a valid leak check of the primary O-
rings may reduce frequency of O-ring erosion but 
will probably not eliminate it or reduce the severity 
of erosion  
· Elimination of vacuum putty in a tighter joint area 
will eliminate O-ring erosion if circumferential flow 
is not present-if it is present, some baffle 
arrangement may be required  
· Erosion in the nozzle joint is more severe due to 
eccentricity; however, the secondary seal in the 
nozzle will seal and will not erode through  
· The primary O-ring in the field joint should not 
erode through but if it leaks due to erosion or lack 
of sealing the secondary seal may not seal the 
motor  
· The igniter Gask-O-Seal design is adequate 
providing proper quality inspections are made to 
eliminate overfill conditions   
· The lack of a good secondary seal in the field 
joint is most critical and ways to reduce joint 
rotation should be incorporated as soon as 
possible to reduce criticality   
· The flow conditions in the joint areas during 
ignition and motor operation need to be 
established through cold flow modeling to 
eliminate O-ring erosion  
· QM-5 static test should be used to qualify a 
second source of the only flight certified joint filler 
material (asbestos -filled vacuum putty) to protect 
the flight program schedule  
· VLS-1 should use the only flight certified joint 
filler material (Randolph asbestos -filled vacuum 
putty) in all joints   
· Additional hot and cold subscale tests need to be 
conducted to improve analytical modeling of O-
ring erosion problem and for establishing 
margins of safety for eroded O-rings  
· Analysis of existing data indicates that it is safe 
to continue flying existing design as long as all 
joints are leak checked with a 200 psig 
stabilization pressure, are free of contamination 
in the seal areas and meet O-ring squeeze 
requirements  
· Efforts need to continue at an accelerated pace 
to eliminate SRM seal erosion  
communication failure was contrary to the 
requirement, contained in the NASA Problem 
Reporting and Corrective Action Requirements 
System, that launch constraints were to be taken 
to Level II. 
 Escalating Concerns  
When the burn through of the primary nozzle O-
ring on the left Solid Rocket Booster of STS 51-
B was discovered in Utah on dune 25, 1985, an 
engineer from the NASA headquarters Shuttle 
Propulsion Group was on the scene. Three days 
after the 51-B inspection, a memorandum was 
written to Michael Weeks, also at Headquarters, 
reporting on the primary O-ring burn through.119 
The memo blamed the problem on the faulty 100 
psi leak check and reminded Weeks that Thiokol 
had not yet responded to the O-ring erosion 
action item sent out after STS 41-B one year 
earlier. Engineers at Thiokol also were 
increasingly concerned about the problem. On 
July 22, 1985, Roger Boisjoly of the structures 
section wrote a memorandum predicting NASA 
might give the motor contract to a competitor or 
there might be a flight failure if Thiokol did not 
come up with a timely solution. 120 Nine days 
later (Ju ly 31) Boisjoly wrote another 
memorandum titled "O-ring Erosion/Potential 
Failure Criticality" to R. K. Lund, Thiokol's Vice 
President of Engineering: 
"The mistakenly accepted position on the joint 
problem was to fly without fear of failure and to 
run a series of design evaluations which would 
ultimately lead to a solution or at least a 
significant reduction of the erosion problem. 
This position is now changed as a result of the 
[51-B] nozzle joint erosion which eroded a 
secondary O-ring with the primary O-ring never 
sealing. If the same scenario should occur in a 
field joint (and it could), then it is a jump ball 
whether as to the success or failure of the joint 
because the secondary O-ring cannot respond to 
the clevis opening rate and may not be capable of 
pressurization. The result would be a catastrophe 
of the highest order-loss of human life." 
Boisjoly recommended setting up a team to solve 
the O-ring problem, and concluded by stating: 
"It is my honest and very real fear that if we do 
not take immediate action to dedicate a team to 
solve the problem, with the field joint having the 
number one priority, then we stand in jeopardy 
of losing a flight along with all the launch pad 
facilities." 121 
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In reply to specific questions from Marshall on 
August 9, Thiokol's Brian Russell reported the 
test data on the dune 3 resiliency tests. As noted 
previously, he indicated O-ring resiliency was a 
function of the temperature and case expansion. 
Also, he wrote, Thiokol had no reason to suspect 
that the primary O-ring would fail after motor 
ignition transient. He said the secondary O-ring 
would seal within the period after ignition from 0 
to 170 milliseconds.122 From 170 to 330 
milliseconds, the probability of the sealing of the 
secondary O-ring was reduced. From 330 to 600 
milliseconds, there was only a slight chance the 
secondary seal would hold. 
On August l9, 1985, Thiokol and 
Marshall program managers briefed NASA 
Headquarters on erosion of the motor pressure 
seals.123 The briefing paper concluded that the O-
ring seal was a critical matter, but it was safe to 
fly. The briefing was detailed, identifying all 
prior instances of field joint, nozzle joint and 
igniter O-ring erosion. It recommended an 
"accelerated pace" to eliminate seal erosion but 
concluded with the recommendation that "it is  
safe to continue flying existing design as long as 
all joints are leak checked with a 200 psig 
stabilization pressure, are free of contamination 
in the seal areas and meet O-ring squeeze 
requirements." The briefing conclusions and 
recommendations appear in Figure 5. 124 
Thiokol's Robert Lund, Vice President-
Engineering, noting that "the result of a leak at 
any of the joints would be catastrophic," 
announced the establishment of a Thiokol O-ring 
task force on August 20, 1985, to "investigate the 
Solid Rocket Motor case and nozzle joints, both 
materials and configurations, and recommend 
both short -term and long-term solutions." 125 
Two days later, A. R. Thompson, 
Thiokol's supervisor of structures design, said in 
a memorandum to S. R. Stein, project engineer, 
that the "O-ring seal problem has lately become 
acute." Thompson recommended near-term 
solutions of increasing the thickness of shims 
used at the tang and clevis mating, and 
increasing the diameter of the O-ring. "Several 
long-term solutions look good; but, several years 
are required to incorporate some of them," 
Thompson wrote. "The simple short-term 
measures should be taken to reduce flight risks." 
126  
During a Commission hearing, 
Thompson was asked about the larger diameter 
O-ring solution: 
Dr. Walker: Why didn't you go to the larger O-
ring, then?  
Mr. Thompson: One problem in going to larger 
O-rings is in field joints-plant joints, excuse me. 
In the plant joints, if you put in the 295 and you 
take the worst on worst, when the joint is raised 
to a temperature of 325 degrees during the curing 
of the insulation, it is an overfill condition 
because of the alpha problems with the case, and 
the rubber. 
Dr. Walker: There is no reason why a field joint 
and a plant joint had to have the same O-ring, is 
there? 
Mr. Thompson: There were some that were 
afraid of the QC people, that were afraid of the 
confusion that might be developed between two 
nearly the same sized O-ring.127 
 Thiokol's revised O-ring protection plan, dated 
August 30, 1985, indicated that NASA and 
Thiokol were still not in agreement on the 
magnitude of the joint rotation phenomenon. It 
said that "presently there are conflicting data 
from Solid Rocket Motor case hydrotest and 
[static tests] concerning the magnitude of case 
field joint rotation under motor pressure. A 
referee test will be devised, which is mutually 
acceptable to NASA and Thiokol, to determine 
joint opening characteristics." 128 
 
 Design Questions Resurface 
 
Also in late August, Thiokol submitted 
"Preliminary Solid Rocket Motor Nozzle/Field 
Joint Seal Concepts" to NASA, which were 
"formulated to solve the [Solid Rocket Motor] 
sealing problems." The document contained 43 
possible design concepts for field joints and 20 
for nozzle joints. The report said Thiokol "feels 
the case field joint poses the greatest potential 
risk in that its secondary seal may not maintain 
metal contact throughout motor operation. The 
nozzle joint is also of major concern because the 
frequency and severity of seal damage 
experienced has been greater than any other 
joint." 
In September 1985, Thiokol's plans 
called for test-firing a static motor with various 
O-ring configurations. In a September 10 
presentation to Marshall, Thiokol discussed 
erosion predictions, and evaluated primary 
engineering concerns including joint deflection 
and secondary O-ring resiliency. Temperature 
was not mentioned.129 
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Prior to that Thiokol presentation, Marshall 
Science and Engineering Director Kingsbury had 
informed Solid Rocket Booster Program 
Manager Mulloy: 
"I am most anxious to be briefed on plans for 
improving the Solid Rocket Motor O-ring seals. 
Specifically, I want to review plans which lead to 
flight qualifications and the attendant schedules. 
I have been apprised of general ongoing 
activities but these do not appear to carry the 
priority which I attach to this situation. I 
consider the O-ring seal problem on the Solid 
Rocket Motor to require priority attention of 
both Morton Thiokol/Wasatch and MSFC." 130  
Early in October, internal warnings about the 
lack of results from the O-ring task force came 
when Thiokol's management got two separate 
memoranda complaining about administrative 
delays and lack of cooperation. One 
memorandum was written by Roger Boisjoly on 
October 4, 1985, and it warned Thiokol 
management about lack of management support 
of the O-ring team's efforts.131 He said that "even 
NASA perceives that the team is being blocked 
in its engineering efforts to accomplish its task. 
NASA is sending an engineering representative 
to stay with us starting October 14th. We feel 
that this is the direct result of their feeling that 
we [Thiokol] are not responding quickly enough 
on the seal problem." 
R. V. Ebeling, manager of Thiokol's Solid 
Rocket Motor ignition system, began his October 
1, 1985, report to McDonald with the alarming 
word "HELP!" Ebeling said the seal task force 
was "constantly being delayed by every possible 
means." "Marshall Space Flight Center," he said, 
"is correct in stating that we do not know how to 
run a development program." Ebeling continued: 
"The allegiance to the O-ring investigation task 
force is very limited to a group of engineers 
numbering 8-10. Our assigned people in 
manufacturing and quality have the desire, but 
are encumbered with other significant work. 
Others in manufacturing, quality, procurement 
who are not involved directly, but whose help we 
need, are generating plenty of resistance. We are 
creating more instructional paper than 
engineering data. We wish we could get action 
by verbal request, but such is not the case. This 
is a red flag." 132 
Shuttle flight 61-A was launched October 30, 
1985. It experienced nozzle O-ring erosion and 
field joint O-ring blow-by. 133 These anomalies 
were not mentioned at the Level I Flight 
Readiness Review for flight 61-B. That flight 
was launched on November 26, 1985, and 
sustained nozzle O-ring erosion and blow-by. 134 
The following month (December) Thiokol's 
problem status report which tracked the field 
joint erosion anomaly stated that the O-ring task 
force had made one hot gas test and preliminary 
results indicated the test chamber needed to be 
redesigned.135 Mr. Ebeling of Thiokol became so 
concerned about the gravity of the O-ring 
problem that he told fellow members of the seal 
task force that he believed Thiokol should not 
ship any more motors until the problem was 
fixed. 
In testimony before the Commission, Ebeling 
said: 
  
Mr. Ebeling: Well, I am a hydraulics engineer 
by profession, and O-rings and seals and 
hydraulics are very sacred, but for the most part, 
a hydraulics or pneumatics engineer controls the 
structure, the structural design, the structural 
deformation to make sure that this neat little part 
that is so critical is given every thing it needs to 
operate. In Solid Rocket Motors I have been 
there now pushing 25 years. They had a different 
attitude on O-rings when I came there, and it is 
not just Thiokol, it is universal. 
Dr. Covert: By universal, you mean the solid 
rocket industry? 
Mr. Ebeling: The entire solid rocket industry. It 
gets around from one, the competitors' 
information eventually gets to me by one track or 
another, and mine to them, but my experience on 
O-rings was and is to this date that the O-ring is 
not a mechanism and never should be a 
mechanism that sees the heat of the magnitude of 
our motors, and I think before I do retire, I'm 
going to make sure that we discontinue to fly 
with round seals which I am against round seals 
anyway. I think seals with memories, not 
pressure-activated, but energized through 
mechanical means, and in all cases, keep the heat 
of our rocket 
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] motors away from those seals. Whatever it is, 
you do not need chamber pressure to energize a 
seal. 
Dr. Covert: In this regard, then, did you have an 
increasing concern as you saw the tendency first 
to accept thermal distress and then to say, well, 
we can model this reasonably and we can accept 
a little bit of erosion, and then etc., etc. ? Did this 
cause you a feeling of if not distress, then 
betrayal in terms of your feeling about O-rings? 
Mr. Ebeling: I'm sure sorry you asked that 
question. 
Mr. Covert: I'm sorry I had to. 
Mr. Ebeling: To answer your question, yes. In 
fact, I have been an advocate, I used to sit in on 
the O-ring task force and was involved in the 
seals since Brian Russell worked directly for me, 
and I had a certain allegiance to this type of thing 
anyway, that I felt that we shouldn't ship any 
more rocket motors until we got it fixed.  
Dr. Covert: Did you voice this concern? 
Mr. Ebeling : Unfortunately, not to the right 
people.136 
 The Closure Issue 
On December 6, 1985, Thiokol's Brian Russell 
wrote Al McDonald, Thiokol Solid Rocket 
Motor Project Director, requesting "closure of 
the Solid Rocket Motor O-ring erosion critical 
problems."137 He gave 17 reasons for the closure, 
including test results, future test plans and the 
work to date of Thiokol's task force. Four days 
later (December 10) McDonald wrote a 
memorandum to NASA's Wear asking for 
closure of the O-ring problem. All O-ring 
erosion problems, including the problem 
containing the July 1985 launch constraint, were 
among the referenced matters that Thiokol 
suggested should be closed. McDonald noted 
that the O-ring problem would not be fully 
resolved for some  time, and he enclosed a copy 
of Thiokol's August 30 plan for improving the 
motor seals.138 
Brian Russell described the problem tracking 
process and gave the reason for the closure 
recommendation during the following exchange: 
  
Mr. Russell : We have our reliability engineering 
department, who is responsible to complete the 
monthly problem report, and in addition to that 
we have our monthly problem review board 
telephone conference with NASA and the 
contractors, of which we are a part, and the 
monthly problem review or the monthly problem 
report that reliability prepares, they get the 
information from engineering or from the office 
as necessary to complete their status of what has 
happened during that month, whether the 
problem originated that month or what has been 
done to close the problem out, and that is 
submitted every month, and I for one do review 
that before it is submitted to the Marshall Space 
Flight Center, and so much of the information 
that I would read in these reports would be the 
same information that we had given in that 
monthly problem report or over the telephone on 
the teleconference. 
Chairman Rogers : Mr. Russell, when you say 
close the problem out, what do you mean by that? 
How do you close it out normally? 
Mr. Russell: Normally, whether it takes 
engineering analysis or tests or some corrective 
action, a closeout to the problem would occur 
after an adequate corrective action had been 
taken to satisfy those on the problem review 
board that the problem had indeed been closed 
out. That is the way that that happens; for 
example, we had found a loose bolt on the 
recovery one time, and we had to take corrective 
action in our procedures and in the engineering 
to make sure that that wouldn't happen again, 
and then to verify that corrective action, and at 
that point that problem would be ready to be 
closed out. It generally involves a report or at 
least a mention by the review board stating what 
had been done to adequately close it out, and 
then it is agreed upon by the parties involved. . 
Question: What do you understand a launch 
constraint to mean? 
Mr. Russell : My understanding of a launch 
constraint is that the launch cannot proceed 
without adequately-without everyone's 
agreement that the problem is under control. 
 144 
Chairman Rogers : Under control meaning what? 
You just said a moment ago that you would 
expect some corrective action to be taken. 
Mr. Russell: That is correct, and in this 
particular case on this 51-B nozzle O-ring 
erosion problem there had been some corrective 
action taken, and that was included in the 
presentation made as a special addendum to the 
next Flight Readiness Review, and at the time 
we did agree to continue to launch, which 
apparently had lifted the launch constraint, 
would be my understanding. 
Chairman Rogers: But really my question is: 
Did you gentlemen realize that it was a launch 
constraint? 
Mr. Russell: I would like to answer for myself. I 
didn't realize that there was a formal launch 
constraint on this one, any different than some of 
the other erosion and blow-by that we had seen 
in the past. 
Mr. Ebeling : I agree. . 
Question: . . . Mr. Russell, you wrote a letter, 
did you not, or a memorandum indicating that 
the problem should be closed.Could you explain 
to the Commission what you meant by that? 
Mr. Russell: Yes. In our December telephone 
call on the Problem Review Board -and I can't 
remember the date-it was around the 9th or so-
there was a request to close the problems out and 
particularly the ones that had been open for a 
long time, of which this was one, and a long time 
meaning six months or more. 
There was a request from the Director of 
Engineering, as I recall it, that we close these 
problems out. . 
Dr. Walker: That was the Director of 
Engineering at Marshall? 
Mr. Russell: Yes, at Marshall Space Flight 
Center. Now, he wasn't in that call. My 
understanding is what they told us and my 
recollection was that Mr. Kingsbury would like 
to see these problems closed out. 
Now, the normal method of closing them out is 
to implement the corrective action, verify the 
corrective action, and then the problem is closed, 
it comes off the board and is no longer under 
active review. . 
Chairman Rogers: What was being done to fix 
it? 
Mr. Russell: Well, we had a task force created 
of full-time people at Thiokol, of which I was a 
member of that task team, and we had done some 
engineering tests. We were trying to develop 
concepts. We had developed some concepts to 
block the flow of hot gas against the O-ring to 
the point where the O-ring would no longer be 
damaged in a new configuration. 
And we had run some cold gas tests and some 
hot gas motor firing tests and were working 
toward a solution of the problem and we had 
some meetings scheduled with the Marshall 
Space Flight Center. We had weekly telephone 
calls where we statused our progress and there 
was a team at Marshall also of engineering 
people who were monitoring the things that we 
were doing to fix the problem with the goal of 
implementing a fix in our qualification motor No. 
5, which was scheduled at that time in January, 
this timeframe being about the December 
timeframe of last year. 
Chairman Rogers: Can I interrupt? So you're 
trying to figure out how to fix it, right? And 
you're doing some things to try to help you 
figure out how to fix it. Now, why at that point 
would you close it out? . 
Mr. Russell: Because I was asked to do it. 
Chairman Rogers: I see. Well, that explains it. 
Mr. Rummel: It explains it, but really doesn't 
make any sense. On one hand you close out 
items that you've been reviewing flight by flight, 
that have obviously critical implications, on the 
basis that after you close it out, you're going to 
continue to try to fix it. So I think what you're 
really saying is, you're closing it out because you 
don't want to be bothered. Somebody doesn't 
want to be bothered with flight-by-flight reviews, 
but you're going to continue to work on it after 
it's closed out. 139 
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Marshall received the Thiokol letter asking for 
the closure and an entry was placed on all 
Marshall Problem Reports referenced in 
McDonald's December 10 letter 
indicating"contractor closure received" on 
December 18, 1985. 140 On January 23, 1986, 
another entry was placed on the same reports 
indicating the "problem is considered closed." 141 
Lawrence Mulloy and Lawrence Wear testified 
those entries were "in error." They said: 
 Mr. Mulloy: The problem assessment system 
was put in place to provide visibility throughout 
the Shuttle system for the types of problems that 
do occur, not just in flight, but also in 
qualification tests, and in failure of hardware that 
is back for refurbishment at a vendor or whatever. 
And it is a closed loop tracking system that lists 
the anomaly . 
Now, the entry that is shown in there that the 
problem was closed prior to 51-L is in error. 
What happened there was, one of your 
documents here which we did not discuss is the 
letter from Mr. McDonald to Mr. Wear which 
proposed that this problem be dropped from the 
problem assessment system and no longer be 
tracked for the reasons stated in Mr. McDonald's 
letter. 
That letter was in the review cycle. The letter, I 
believe, was dated 10 December 1985. It came 
into the center, it was in the review cycle. After 
Mr. Wear brought this letter to my attention, my 
reaction was, we are not going to drop this from 
the problem assessment system because the 
problem is not resolved and it has to be dealt 
with on a flight-by-flight basis. 
Since that was going through the review cycle, 
the people who run this problem assessment 
system erroneously entered a closure for the 
problem on the basis of this submittal from 
Thiokol. Having done that then for the 51-L 
review, this did not come up in the Flight 
Readiness Review as an open launch constraint, 
so you won't find a project signature because the 
PAS system showed the problem was closed, and 
that was an error. 
Chairman Rogers: Who made the error? Do 
you know? 
Mr. Mulloy: The people who do the problem 
assessment system. 
Mr. Wear : Mr. Fletcher, and he reports within 
our quality organization at the Flight Readiness 
Reviews, . . . as I think have been described to 
you before. There is one from Thiokol to me, and 
there is one from my group to Larry, and then 
Larry, of course, does one with the Shuttle 
project office, and so forth, on up the line. At my 
review and at Larry's revie w, here is a heads up 
given to the quality representative at that board 
for what problems the system has open, and they 
cross-check to make sure that we address that 
problem in the readiness review. 
On this particular occasion, there was no heads 
up given because their Problem Assessment 
System considered that action closed. That is 
unfortunate. 142 
Project Manager Mulloy was asked during 
Commission hearings about the original response 
to O-ring erosion: 
Mr. Hotz: Mr. Mulloy, I would like to try to 
understand this in somewhat simpler terms than 
you people are used to using. Is it correct to state 
that when you originally designed this joint and 
looked at it, that you did not anticipate erosion of 
any of the O-ring during flights? 
Mr. Mulloy: That is my understanding. I entered 
this program in November of 1982 and I wasn't 
there on the original design of the joint, but when 
I took over the program there was no O-ring 
erosion anticipated.  
Mr. Hotz : So that when you did run into signs of 
O-ring erosion, this was a bad sign. 
Mr. Mulloy: Yes, sir. . 
Mr. Hotz : So then you decided to introduce a 
standard based on the measurement or the 
possibility of the limits of O-ring erosion. And as 
those limits, as the experience went up, your 
criteria for, say, flight went up too. n other words, 
when you experienced more than maximum 
anticipated O-ring erosion, you waived the flight 
and said "Well, it's possible to tolerate that. We 
still have a margin left." 
Mr. Mulloy: Are you speaking of the case where 
we did not have a primary seal. 
Mr. Hotz: Yes. 
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Mr. Mulloy: Yes, sir. That is correct. . 
Mr. Hotz : Then you finally, you're talking about 
these margins of safety, and I wonder if you 
could express in either percentages or actual 
measurement terms -you have used the term 
"wide margin." I wonder if you could give us a 
quantitative measurement as to what you 
consider a wide margin? 
Mr. Mulloy: Yes, sir. Well, as I said we had 
demonstrated that we could stand 125 
thousandths of erosion and still seat. The 
maximum erosion that we had seen in the case 
joint was on STS-2, which was 53 thousandths, 
so that is a factor of two and a half . 
Dr. Keel: . . . I think, Larry, if you go back and 
look at your Flight Readiness Reviews, that you 
were relying on less margins than that. You were 
arguing in the Flight Readiness Reviews where 
you briefed the problems of primary O-ring 
erosion that for the worst case for the field joint 
also that it would be 90 thousandths. 
Mr. Mulloy: That is correct. 
Dr. Keel: At that point you were pointing out 
that's okay, because you can seal at 95, not at 
125 but at 95. It wasn't until later on during the 
process that you determined you could seal at 
125. 
Mr. Mulloy: That is when we got the hot gas 
test data. 
Dr. Keel: So that's a five percent margin, 
roughly, five and a half. 
Mr. Mulloy: On the 90 to 95 on a max 
predictable, yes. 143 
 Temperature Effects 
The record of the fateful series of NASA and 
Thiokol meetings, telephone conferences, notes, 
and facsimile transmissions on January 27th, the 
night before the launch of flight 51 -L, shows 
that only limited consideration was given to the 
past history of O-ring damage in terms of 
temperature. The managers compared as a 
function of temperature the flights for which 
thermal distress of O-rings had been observed-
not the frequency of occurrence based on all 
flights (Figure 6). In such a comparison, there is 
nothing irregular in the distribution of O-ring 
"distress" over the spectrum of joint 
temperatures at launch between 53 degrees 
Fahrenheit and 75 degrees Fahrenheit. When the 
entire history of flight experience is considered, 
including"normal" flights with no erosion or 
blow-by, the comparison is substantially 
different (Figure 7). 
This comparison of flight history indicates that 
only three incidents of O-ring thermal distress 
occurred out of twenty flights with O-ring 
temperatures at 66 degrees Fahrenheit or above, 
whereas, all four flights with O-ring 
temperatures at 63 degrees Fahrenheit or below 
experienced O-ring thermal distress. 
Consideration of the entire launch temperature 
history indicates that the probability of O-ring 
distress is increased to almost a certainty if the 
temperature of the joint is less than 65. 
Flight Readiness Reviews  
It is clear that contractor and NASA program 
personnel all believed that the O-ring 
erosion/blow-by anomaly, and even the launch 
constraint, were problems that should be 
addressed in NASA's Flight Readiness Review 
process. The Flight Readiness Review is a multi-
tiered review that is designed to create an 
information flow from the contractor up through 
Level III at Marshall, then to Level II officials 
from Johnson and Level I at Headquarters. With 
regard to the Solid Rocket Booster, the process 
begins at the element level and culminates in a 
coordinated Marshall position at the subsequent 
Levels II and I Flight Readiness Review. 144 
NASA policy manuals list four objectives of the 
Shuttle Projects Flight Readiness Review, an 
intermediate review between Level III and Level 
I, when contractors and Level III program 
personnel consider the upcoming launch. The 
stated objectives are: 
"1.To provide the review team with sufficient 
information necessary for them to make an 
independent judgment regarding flight readiness. 
"2. Review solved problems and previous flight 
anomalies and establish confidence in solution 
rationale. 
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"3. Address all problems, technical issues, open 
items and constraints requiring resolution before 
flight. 
 
"4. Establish the flight baseline configuration 
particularly as it differs from previous missions." 
145 
The Commission has reviewed the 
various documentary presentations made by 
Thiokol and NASA program people for Flight 
Readiness Reviews on all Shuttle flights. The O-
ring presentations in those Flight Readiness 
Reviews have been summarized in an Appendix 
to this report. 
The erosion on STS-2 was not 
considered on any level of the Flight Readiness 
Review for STS-3.146 Similarly the heat effect on 
STS-6's primary O-ring in the nozzle was not 
mentioned on the STS-7 Flight Readiness 
Review in 1983. However, the rationale for 
acceptance of the "secondary seal condition" for 
the lightweight case first flown on STS-6 
contained the observation that an O-ring sealed 
during a Thiokol test under 3,000 psi where .125 
inches had been cut out of the O-ring.147 
The inattention to erosion and blow-by 
anomaly changed when Thiokol filed a problem 
report on the field joint erosion after STS 41-B. 
The O-ring problems (field and nozzle) on 41-B 
were briefed as a "technical issue" in the 41-C 
Flight Readiness Review. "Probable causes" 
were defined as: 
 
"Putty blow-through at ignition causes cavity 
between putty and primary O-ring to fill during 
pressurization. Inability of putty to withstand 
motor pressure. Air entrapment in putty during 
mating. Blow holes in putty during joint leak 
test."  
Thiokol presented the question at its 41-
C preboard to Marshall, "If primary O-ring 
allowed a hot gas jet to pass through, would the 
secondary O-ring survive impingement?" 148 At 
the 41 -C Level I Flight Readiness Review, on 
March 30, 1984, Marshall said the erosion 
phenomenon was "acceptable" and that blow 
holes in the putty were the"most probable 
cause." The rationale for the acceptance of the 
possibility of erosion on STS 41-C was: 
"Conservative analysis indicates max 
erosion possible: 
".090 in. (field joint) 
".090 in. (nozzle joint) 
"Laboratory test of full scale O-ring/joint cross 
section shows capability to sustain joint sealing 
integrity at 3,000 psi pressure using an O-ring 
with a simulated .095 in. erosion depth. 
"Recommendation: 
"Fly STS 41-C accepting possibility of some O-
ring gas impingement." 149 
The next significant treatment of the 
problem occurred after the coldest flight, 51-C at 
53 degrees in January 1985. In part, Thiokol's 
extensive analysis for the 51-E Flight Readiness 
Review was due to the fact that four joints on 51-
C had problems. 150 Additionally, Mr. Mulloy's 
specific request for a recap of the O-ring history 
undoubtedly prompted a full treatment. 
Temperature was highlighted as a concern when 
Mulloy took Thiokol's analysis up to the Shuttle 
Projects Office Flight Readiness Review. That 
18-page briefing concluded with the statement 
that: "STS 51-C consistent with erosion data 
based. Low temperature enhanced probability of 
blow-by. STS 51-C experienced worst case 
temperature change in Florida history. STS 51-E 
could exhibit the same behavior. Condition is 
acceptable." 151 
At the Level I Flight Readiness Review 
for 51-E on February 21, 1985, the previous 18-
page analysis had been reduced to a one page 
chart with the resolution: "acceptable risk 
because of limited exposure and redundancy 
(Ref. STS 41-C FRR)". 152 No mention of 
temperature was found in the Level I report. 
The last major discussion of erosion 
was at the Level I Flight Readiness Review for 
STS 51-F (July 2, 1985).153 An analysis of the 
failure of the nozzle primary O-ring to seal due 
to erosion on flight STS 51-B (April 29, 1985) 
was presented. This serious erosion was 
attributed to leak check procedures. An increase 
in the nozzle leak check to 200 psi was proposed 
to be a cure. There was no mention of the fact 
that .171 inches of erosion on the primary O-ring 
far exceeded a more recent analysis model 
prediction of .070 inches maximum possible 
erosion. This was a revision of the former 
prediction of .090 inches. The launch constraint 
activated after STS 51-B was not specifically 
listed in the Level I Flight Readiness Review for 
51-F. The Commission has also not found any 
mention of the duly 1985 constraint, or its 
waiver for subsequent Shuttle flights, in any 
Flight Readiness Review briefing documents. 
The Commission's review of the Marshall and 
Thiokol documentary presentations at the 
various Flight Readiness Reviews revealed 
several significant trends. First, O-ring erosion 
was not considered early in the program when it 
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first occurred. Second, when the problem grew 
worse after STS 41-B, the initial analysis of the 
problem did not produce much research; instead, 
there was an early acceptance of the 
phenomenon. Third, because of a belief that in-
flight O-ring erosion was "within the data base" 
of prior experience, later Flight Readiness 
Reviews gave a cursory review and often 
dismissed the recurring erosion as within 
"acceptable" or "allowable" limits. Fourth, both 
Thiokol and Marshall continued to rely on the 
redundancy of the secondary O-ring long after 
NASA had officially declared that the seal was a 
non-redundant single point failure. Finally, in 
1985 when temperature became a major concern 
after STS 51-C and when the launch constraint 
was applied after 51-B, NASA Levels l and II 
were not informed of these developments in the 
Flight Readiness Review process. 
 Findings 
The genesis of the Challenger accident-the 
failure of the joint of the right Solid Rocket 
Motor-began with decisions made in the design 
of the joint and in the failure by both Thiokol 
and NASA's Solid Rocket Booster project office 
to understand and respond to facts obtained 
during testing. 
The Commission has concluded that neither 
Thiokol nor NASA responded adequately to 
internal warnings about the faulty seal design. 
Furthermore, Thiokol and NASA did not make a 
timely attempt to develop and verify a new seal 
after the initial design was shown to be 
deficient. . Neither organization developed a 
solution to the unexpected occurrences of O-ring 
erosion and blow-by even though this problem 
was experienced frequently during the Shuttle 
flight history. Instead, Thiokol and NASA 
management came to accept erosion and blow-by 
as unavoidable and an acceptable flight risk. 
Specifically, the Commission has found that: 
1.The joint test and certification program was 
inadequate. There was no requirement to 
configure the qualifications test motor as it 
would be in flight, and the motors were static 
tested in a horizontal position, not in the vertical 
flight position. 
2. Prior to the accident, neither NASA nor 
Thiokol fully understood the mechanism by 
which the joint sealing action took place. 
3. NASA and Thiokol accepted escalating risk 
apparently because they "got away with it last 
time." As Commissioner Feynman observed, the 
decision making was: 
"a kind of Russian roulette. . 
[The Shuttle] flies [with O-ring erosion] and 
nothing happens. Then it is suggested, therefore, 
that the risk is no longer so high for the next 
flights. We can lower our standards a little bit 
because we got away with it last time.... You got 
away with it but it shouldn't be done over and 
over again like that . " 154 
4. NASA's system for tracking anomalies for 
Flight Readiness Reviews failed in that, despite a 
history of persistent O-ring erosion and blow-by, 
flight was still permitted. It failed again in the 
strange sequence of six consecutive launch 
constraint waivers prior to 51-L, permitting it to 
fly without any record of a waiver, or even of an 
explicit constraint. Tracking and continuing only 
anomalies that are "outside the data base" of 
prior flight allowed major problems to be 
removed from, and lost by, the reporting system. 
5. The O-ring erosion history presented to Level 
I at NASA Headquarters in August 1985 was 
sufficiently detailed to require corrective action 
prior to the next flight. 
6. A careful analysis of the flight history of O-
ring performance would have revealed the 
correlation of O-ring damage and low 
temperature. Neither NASA nor Thiokol carried 
out such an analysis; consequently, they were 
unprepared to properly evaluate the risks of 
launching the 51-L mission in conditions more 
extreme than they had encountered before. 
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Chapter VII: The Silent Safety Program. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
The Commission was surprised to realize after many 
hours of' testimony that NASA's safety staff was never 
mentioned. No witness related the approval or 
disapproval of the reliability engineers, and none 
expressed the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the 
quality assurance staff. No one thought to invite a 
safety representative or a reliability and quality 
assurance engineer to the January 27, 1986, 
teleconference between Marshall and Thiokol. 
Similarly, there was no representative of safety on the 
Mission Manage-ment Team that made key decisions 
during the countdown on January 28, 1986. The 
Commission is concerned about the symptoms that it 
sees. 
The unrelenting pressure to meet the demands of an 
accelerating flight schedule might have been 
adequately handled by NASA if it had insisted upon 
the exactingly thorough procedures that were its 
hallmark during the Apollo program. An extensive and 
redundant safety program comprising interdependent 
safety, reliability and quality assurance functions 
existed during and after the lunar program to discover 
any potential safety problems. Between that period 
and 1986, however, the program became ineffective. 
This loss of effectiveness seriously degraded the 
checks and balances essential for maintaining flight 
safety. 
On April 3, 1986, Arnold Aldrich, the Space Shuttle 
program manager, appeared before the Commission at 
a public hearing in Washington, D.C. He described 
five different communication or organization failures 
that affected the launch decision on January 28, 1986.1 
Four of those failures relate directly to faults within 
the safety program. These faults include a lack of 
problem reporting requirements, inadequate trend 
analysis, misrepresentation of criticality and lack of 
involvement in critical discussions. 2 A properly 
staffed, supported, and robust safety organization 
might well have avoided these faults and thus 
eliminated the communication failures. 
NASA has a safety program to ensure that the 
communication failures to which Mr. Aldrich referred 
do not occur. In the case of mission 51-L, that 
program fell short. 
  
NASA's Safety Program 
The NASA Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance 
Program should play an important role in agency 
activities, for the three concerns indicated in the 
program title are its functions. In general terms, the 
program monitors the status of equipment, validation 
of design, problem analysis and system acceptability. 
Each of these has flight safety implications.  
More specifically, safety includes the preparation and 
execution of plans for accident prevention, flight 
system safety and industrial safety requirements. 
Within the Shuttle program, safety analyses focus on 
potential hazards and the assessment of acceptable 
risks. 
Reliability refers to processes for determining that 
particular components and systems can be relied on to 
work as planned. One product of such processes is a 
Critical Items List that identifies how serious the 
failure of a particular item or system would be. 
Quality assurance is closely related to both safety and 
reliability. All NASA elements prepare 
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plans and institute procedures to insure that high 
standards of quality are maintained. To 
accomplish that goal, elements charged with 
responsibility for quality assurance establish 
procedural controls, assess inspection programs, 
and participate in a problem identification and 
reporting system . 
The Chief Engineer at NASA Headquarters, has 
overall responsibility for safety, reliability and 
quality assurance. The ability of the Chief 
Engineer to manage NASA's safety program is 
limited by the structure of safety, reliability and 
quality assurance organizations within the 
agency. His limited staff of 20 persons3 includes 
only one who spends 25 percent of his time on 
Shuttle maintainability, reliability and quality 
assurance and another who spends 10 percent of 
his time on these vital aspects of flight safety.4 
At Johnson, a large number of government and 
contractor engineers support the safety, 
reliability and quality assurance program, but 
needed expertise concerning Marshall hardware 
is absent. Thus the effectiveness of the oversight 
responsibilities at Level II was limited.5 
Kennedy has a myriad of safety, reliability and 
quality assurance organizations. In most cases, 
these organizations report to supervisors who are 
responsible for processing. The clear implication 
of such a management structure is that it fails to 
provide the kind of independent role necessary 
for flight safety. At Marshall, the director of 
Reliability and Quality Assurance reports to the 
director of Science and Engineering who 
oversees the development of Shuttle hardware. 
Again, this results in a lack of independence 
from the producer of hardware and is 
compounded by reductions in manpower, 6 the 
net bringing about a decrease in effectiveness 
which has direct implications for flight safety. 
Monitoring Safety Critical Items   
As part of the safety, reliability and quality 
assurance effort, components of the Shuttle 
system are assigned to criticality categories as 
follows: 
Criticality 1  Loss of life or vehicle if the component fails.  
Criticality 2  Loss of mission if the component fails.  
Criticality 3  All others.  
Criticality 
1R  
Redundant components, the failure 
of both could cause loss of life or 
vehicle.  
Criticality 
2R  
Redundant components, the failure 
of both could cause loss of mission.  
The assignment of criticality follows a highly 
detailed analysis of each Space Shuttle 
component to determine the effect of various 
ways the component could fail. This analysis 
always assumes the most adverse conditions with 
the most conservative assumptions. Any 
component that does not meet the fail-safe 
design requirement is designated a Criticality 1 
item and must receive a waiver for use. A 
Critical Items List is produced that contains 
information about all Criticality 1 components. 
The Solid Rocket Booster Critical Items List 
entry for the field joint, dated December 17, 
1982 is an example of this process. 
Component criticality is related to test 
requirements in the Operational Maintenance 
Requirements and Specifications Document 
published and maintained by Level II at Johnson. 
For the Orbiter, the references from the Critical 
Items List to the requirements and specifications 
document are complete and traceable in both 
directions. The Solid Rocket Booster Critical 
Items List, however, does not include references 
to the requirements and specifications 
document.7 Such references would make the 
Critical Items List a more efficient management 
tool for tracking activities concerned with items 
critical for flight safety. 
The next step in procedures documentation is the 
Operations and Maintenance Instruction, which 
develops the directives into step-by-step 
procedures used at Kennedy by technicians, 
inspectors and test personnel to accomplish each 
step of the hardware preparations for flight. The 
current Operations and Maintenance Instruction 
does not indicate the criticality level of 
components. 
If the Operations and Maintenance Instruction 
clearly indicated when the work to be performed 
related to a Criticality 1 component, all 
concerned would be alerted that a higher than 
normal level of care should be used. The same 
point applies to production activities at Thiokol 
where criticality should be directly incorporated 
into manufacturing quality planning. 
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Problem Reporting 
Prior to 1983, Level III was required to report all 
problems, trends, and problem closeout actions 
to Level II unless the problem was associated 
with hardware that was not flight critical.8 
Unfortunately, this requirement was substantially 
reduced to include only those problems which 
dealt with common hardware items or physical 
interface elements. The revision eliminated 
reporting on flight safety problems, flight 
schedule problems, and problem trends. 
The change to the reporting requirements was 
signed by James B. Jackson, Jr., for Glynn 
Lunney, who was at that time manager of the 
National Space Transportation System (Level II 
manager). The change was submitted by Martin 
Raines, director of Safety, Reliability and 
Quality Assurance at Johnson.9 With this action, 
Level II lost all insight into safety, operational 
and flight schedule issues resulting from Level 
III problems. On May 19, 1986, Mr. Raines 
wrote a memo in which he explained that the 
documentation change was made in an attempt to 
streamline the system since the old requirements 
were not productive for the operational phase of 
the Shuttle program.10 In retrospect, it is still 
difficult to understand why the director of Safety, 
Reliability and Quality Assurance at Johnson 
initiated this action, and it is even more difficult 
to understand why Level II approved it. 
A review of all Level III monthly problem 
reports (Open Problem List) issued by Marshall 
during 1984 and 1985 indicates that none was 
distributed to Level II management. From a 
lengthy list of recipients, only a single copy was 
sent to Johnson, and that one was sent to an 
engineer in the flight control division. Mr. 
Aldrich's office and the entire Johnson safety, 
reliability and quality assurance directorate were 
not on the distribution list for the problem 
reports. A Rockwell International safety, 
reliability and quality assurance contractor at 
Johnson received a statistical summary of 
problem status, but not the actual problems 
descriptions. 
 Reporting of In-flight Anomalies  
A second method of notifying Level II of 
problems would have been through the in-flight 
anomaly reporting channels. The identification 
and resolution of anomalies that occur during 
flight are addressed in Space Shuttle Program 
Directive 34E. For the Solid Rocket Booster, the 
Huntsville Operations Support Center is charged 
with these activities as well as other evaluations 
and documentation of' mission results. 
"The Space Shuttle Project Managers at Kennedy, 
Johnson, and Marshall, and the Manager for 
Systems Integration are responsible for the 
implementation of' this directive in their 
respective areas."11 
A letter dated October 20, 1981, from the 
manager of' the National Space Transportation 
System (Level II) addressed flight anomaly 
resolution: 
"Beginning with the STS-2 evaluations, the 
enclosed new form and instructions, outlined in 
enclosure 1, will be utilized for all official flight 
anomaly closeouts. Flight anomalies will be 
presented for review and closeout at the Noon 
Special PRCB [Program Requirements Change 
Board]. The briefing charts will be prepared by 
the Project elements, and should include a 
schematic/graph/sketch of the problem area. This 
material, along with the closeout form and 
appropriate signatures, will become a part of the 
permanent closeout record. Enclosure 2 provides 
a sample of' closeout material from STS- 1 that 
would be acceptable. 
"Your cooperation in this activity will be 
appreciated." 12 
Since O-ring erosion and blow-by were 
considered by Marshall to be highs anomalies,13 
the letter above would appear to require 
reporting by the Solid Rocket Booster Project 
Office to Level II. However, the sample closeout 
material attached to the 1981 letter was identified 
as pertaining to "Flight Test" (the first four 
flights). The 1983 change might well have been 
interpreted as superseding the 1981 Lunney letter, 
particularly since the program officially 
became"operational" in late 1982. The reporting 
of anomalies (unexpected events or unexplained 
departures from past experience) that occur 
during mission performance is a key ingredient 
in any reliability and quality assurance program. 
Through accurate reporting, careful analysis and 
thorough testing, problems or recurrence of 
problems can be prevented. In an effective 
program, reporting, analysis, testing and 
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implementation of corrective measures must be 
fully documented. The level of management that 
should be informed is a function of the 
seriousness of the problem. For Criticality 1 
equipment anomalies, the communications must 
reach all levels of management. Highly detailed 
and specific procedures for reporting anomalies 
and problems are essential to the entire process. 
The procedures must be understood and followed 
by all. Unfortunately, NASA does not have a 
concise set of problem reporting requirements. 
Those in effect are found in numerous individual 
documents, and there is little agreement about 
which document applies to a given level of 
management under a given set of circumstances 
for a given anomaly. 
Safety Program Failures 
The safety, reliability and quality assurance 
program at Marshall serves a dual role. It is 
responsible for assuring that the hardware 
delivered for use on the Space Shuttle meets 
design specifications. In addition, it acts as a 
"watch dog" on the system to assure that sound 
engineering judgment is exercised in the use of 
hardware and in appraising hardware problems. 
Limited human resources and an organization 
that placed reliability and quality assurance 
functions under the director of Science and 
Engineering reduced the capability of the "watch 
dog" role.  
Much of what follows concerns engineering 
judgments and decisions by engineers and 
managers at Marshall and Morton Thiokol. It is 
the validity of these judgments that the 
Commission has examined closely. In its "watch 
dog" role, an effectively functioning safety, 
reliability and quality assurance organization 
could have taken action to prevent the 51-L 
accident. In the discussion that follows, various 
aspects of the Solid Rocket Booster joint design 
issue discussed earlier will be reviewed in the 
context of safety, reliability and quality 
assurance. The critical issue, discussed in detail 
elsewhere, involves the O-rings installed to seal 
the booster joints.  
 Trend Data 
Development of trend data and the possible 
relationships between problems is a standard and 
expected function of any reliability and quality 
assurance program. As previously noted, the 
history of problems with the Solid Rocket 
Booster O-ring took an abrupt turn in January, 
1984, when an ominous trend began. Until that 
date, only one field joint O-ring anomaly had 
been found during the first nine flights of the 
Shuttle. Beginning with the tenth mission, 
however, and concluding with the twenty-fifth, 
the Challenger flight, more than half of the 
missions experienced field joint O-ring blow-by 
or erosion of some kind . 
In retrospect, this trend is easily recognizable. 
According to Wiley Bunn, director of Reliability 
and Quality Assurance at Marshall: 
"I agree with you from my purview in quality, 
but we had that data. It was a matter of 
assembling that data and looking at it in the 
proper fashion. Had we done that, the data just 
jumps off the page at you." 14 
This striking change in performance should have 
been observed and perhaps traced to a root cause. 
No such trend analysis was conducted. While 
flight anomalies involving the O-rings received 
considerable attention at Morton Thiokol and at 
Marshall, the significance of the developing 
trend went unnoticed. The safety, reliability and 
quality assurance program, of course, exists to 
ensure that such trends are recognized when they 
occur. 
A series of changes to Solid Rocket Booster 
processing procedures at Kennedy may be 
significant: on-site O-ring inspections were 
discontinued; O-ring leak check stabilization 
pressure on the field joint was increased to 200 
pound per square inch from 100, sometimes 
blowing holes through the protective putty; the 
patterns for positioning the putty were changed; 
the putty type was changed; re-use of motor 
segment casings increased; and a new 
government contractor began management of 
Solid Rocket Booster assembly. One of these 
developments or a combination of them was 
probably the cause of the higher anomaly rate. 
The safety, reliability and quality assurance 
program should have tracked and discovered the 
reason for the increasing erosion and blow-by.  
The history of problems in the nozzle joint is 
similar to that of the Solid Rocket Booster field 
joint. While several of the changes mentioned 
above also could have influenced the frequency  
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Pressure tests at 200 pounds per square inch of the Solid Rocket Booster joints produced bubbles in putty 
used to line the joints.  
 
  
of nozzle O-ring problems, the frequency 
correlates with leak check pressure to a 
remarkable degree. 
Again, development of trend data is a standard 
and expected function of any reliability and 
quality assurance program. Even the most 
cursory examination of failure rate should have 
indicated that a serious and potentially disastrous 
situation was developing on all Solid Rocket 
Booster joints. Not recognizing and reporting 
this trend can only be described, in NASA terms, 
as a "quality escape," a failure of the program to 
preclude an avoidable problem. If the program 
had functioned properly, the Challenger accident 
might have been avoided. The trend should have 
been identified and analyzed to discover the 
physical processes damaging the O-ring and thus 
jeopardizing the integrity of the joint.  
A likely cause of the O-ring erosion appears to 
have been the increased leak check pressure that 
caused hazardous blow holes in the putty. Such 
holes at booster ignition provide a ready path for 
combustion gases directly to the O-ring. The 
blow holes were known to be created by the 
higher pressure used in the leak check. The 
phenomenon was observed and even 
photographed prior to a test firing in Utah on 
May 9, 1985. In that particular case, the grease 
from the O-ring was actually blown through the 
putty and was visible on the inside core of the 
Solid Rocket Booster. 
The trends of flight anomalies in relation to leak 
check stabilization pressure are illustrated for the 
field joint and the nozzle joint in Figure 3, on 
page 133. While the data point concerning the 
100 pound per square inch field joint leak check 
is not conclusive since it is based on only two 
flights, the trend is apparent. 
Management Awareness 
During its investigation, the Commission 
repeatedly heard witnesses refer to redundancy 
in the Solid Rocket Motor joint and argue over 
the criticality of the joint. While the field joint 
has been categorized as a Criticality 1 item since 
1982 (page 157), most of the problem reporting 
paperwork generated by Thiokol and Marshall 
listed it as Criticality 1 R, perhaps leading some 
managers to believe-wrongly-that redundancy 
existed. The Problem Assessment System 
operated by Rockwell contractors at Marshall, 
which routinely updates the problem status still 
listed the field joint as Criticality 1R on March 
7,1986, more than five weeks after the accident. 
Such misrepresentation of criticality must also be 
categorized as a failure of the safety, reliability 
and quality assurance program. As a result, 
informed decision making by key managers was 
impossible. 
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["SRB Critical Items List; Dated: December 17, 1982. Failure mode & causes: Leakage at case assembly 
joints due to redundant O-ring seal failures or primary seal and leak check port O-ring failure." text added for 
clarity, Chris Gamble, html editor]  
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Mr. Bunn, the director of Reliability and Quality 
Assurance at Marshall, stated on April 7, 1986: 
"But the other thing you will notice on those 
problem reports is that for some reason on the 
individual problem reports we kept sticking 
[Criticality] 1-R on them and that is just a sheer 
quality escape." 15 
 The Impact of Misinformation  
 The manner in which misinformation influences 
top management has been illustrated by former 
Associate Administrator for Space Flight Jesse 
Moore. 
"And then we had a Flight Readiness Review, I 
guess, in July, getting ready for a mid-July or a 
late July flight, and the action had come back 
from the project office. I guess the Level III had 
reported to the Level II Flight Readiness Review, 
and then they reported up to me that-they 
reported the two erosions on the primary (O-ring) 
and some 10 or 12 percent erosion on the 
secondary (O-ring) on that flight in April, and 
the corrective actions, I guess, that had been put 
in place was to increase the test pressure, I think, 
from 50 psi [pounds per square inch] to 200 psi 
or 100 psi-I guess it was 200 psi is the number-
and they felt that they had run a bunch of 
laboratory tests and analyses that showed that by 
increasing the pressure up to 200 psi, this would 
minimize or eliminate the erosion, and that there 
would be a fairly good degree of safety factor 
margin on the erosion as a result of increasing 
this pressure and ensuring that the secondary seal 
had been seated. And so we left that FRR [Flight 
Readiness Review] with that particular action 
closed by the project ," 16 
Not only was Mr. Moore misinformed about the 
effectiveness and potential hazards associated 
with the long-used "new" procedure, he also was 
misinformed about the issue of joint redundancy. 
Apparently, no one told (or reminded) Mr. 
Moore that while the Solid Rocket Booster 
nozzle joint was Criticality 1R, the field joint 
was Criticality 1. No one told him about blow 
holes in the putty, probably resulting from the 
increased stabilization pressure, and no one told 
him that this "new" procedure had been in use 
since the exact time that field joint anomalies 
had become dangerously frequent. At the time of 
this briefing, the increased pressure already had 
been used on four Solid Rocket Motor nozzle 
joints, and all four had erosion. Erosion was the 
enemy, and increased pressure was its ally. 
While Mr. Moore was not being intentionally 
deceived, he was obviously misled. The 
reporting system simply was not making trends, 
status and problems visible with sufficient 
accuracy and emphasis. 
 Reporting Launch Constraints  
The Commission was surprised to learn that a 
launch constraint had been imposed on the Solid 
Rocket Booster. It was further surprised to learn 
that those outside of Marshall were not notified. 
Because of the seriousness of the mission 51 -B 
nozzle O-ring erosion incident, launch 
constraints were placed against the next six 
Shuttle flights. A launch constraint arises from a 
flight safety issue of sufficient seriousness to 
justify a decision not to launch. The initial 
problem description stated that, "based on the 
amount of charring, the erosion paths on the 
primary O-ring and what is understood about the 
erosion phenomenon, it is believed that the 
primary O-ring of SRM 16A [the Solid Rocket 
Motor on flight 51-B] never seated."17 The 
maximum erosion depth was 0.171 inches on the 
primary O-ring and 0.032 inches on the 
secondary. On February 12, at a Level III Flight 
Readiness Review, maximum expected erosion 
on nozzle joint O-rings had been projected as 
0.070 inches for the primary and 0.004 inches for 
the secondary. Thus, the results far exceeded the 
maximum expected. If this same ratio of actual 
to projected erosion were to occur on a field joint, 
the erosion would be 0.225 inches. With 
secondary seal inadequacy, as indicated by 
Criticality 1 status, that degree of erosion could 
result in joint failure and loss of vehicle and crew. 
The Problem Reporting and Corrective Action 
document (JSC 08126A, paragraph 3.2d) 
requires project offices to inform Level II of 
launch constraints. That requirement was not met. 
Neither Level II nor Level I was informed. 
 Implications of an Operational 
Program 
Following successful completion of the orbital 
flight test phase of the Shuttle program, the 
system was declared to be operational.  
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Subsequently, several safety, reliability and 
quality assurance organizations found 
themselves with reduced and/or reorganized 
functional capability. Included, notably, were the 
Marshall offices where there was net attrition 18 
and NASA Headquarters where there were 
several reorganizations and transfers. 
The apparent reason for such actions was a 
perception that less safety, reliability and quality 
assurance activity would be required during 
"routine" Shuttle operations. This reasoning was 
faulty. The machinery is highly complex, and the 
requirements are exacting. The Space Shuttle 
remains a totally new system with little or no 
history. As the system matures and the 
experience changes, careful tracking will be 
required to prevent premature failures. As the 
flight rate increased, more hardware operations 
were involved, and more total in-flight anomalies 
occurred. 19 Tracking requirements became more 
rather than less critical because of implications 
for the next flight in an accelerating program. 
Two problems on mission 61 -C were not 
evaluated as part of the review process for the 
next flight, 51 -L. A serious failure of the Orbiter 
wheel brake was not known to the crew as 
mission 51 -L lifted off with a plan to make the 
first Kennedy landing since a similar problem 
halted such operations in April, 1985. 20 
Secondly, an O-ring erosion problem had 
occurred on mission 61-C, and while it had been 
discovered, it had not been incorporated into the 
Problem Assessment System when mission 51 -L 
was launched. 21 If the program cannot come to 
grips with such critical safety aspects before 
subsequent flights are scheduled to occur, it 
obviously is moving too fast, or its safety, 
reliability and quality assurance programs must 
be strengthened to provide more rapid response. 
The inherent risk of the Space Shuttle program is 
defined by the combination of a highly dynamic 
environment, enormous energies, mechanical 
complexities, time consuming preparations and 
extremely time -critical decision making. 
Complacency and failures in supervision and 
reporting seriously aggravate these risks. 
Rather than weaken safety, reliability and quality 
assurance programs through attrition and 
reorganization, NASA must elevate and 
strengthen these vital functions. In addition, 
NASA's traditional safety, reliability and quality 
assurance efforts need to be augmented by an 
alert and vigorous organization that oversees the 
flight safety program. 
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel  
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (the 
"panel" in what follows) was established in the 
aftermath of the Apollo spacecraft fire January 
27, 1967. Shortly thereafter the United States 
Congress enacted legislation (Section 6 of the 
NASA Authorization Act, 1968; 42 U.S.C. 2477) 
to establish the panel as a senior advisory 
committee to NASA. The statutory duties of the 
panel are: 
"The panel shall review safety studies and 
operations plans referred to it and shall make 
reports thereon, shall advise the Administrator 
with respect to the hazards of proposed 
operations and with respect to the adequacy of 
proposed or existing safety standards, and shall 
perform such other duties as the Administrator 
may request." 
The panel membership is set by statute at no 
more than nine members, of whom up to four 
may come from NASA. The NASA Chief 
Engineer is an ex-officio member. The staff 
consists of full-time NASA employees, and the 
staff director serves as both executive secretary 
and technical assistant to the panel. The role of 
the panel has been defined and redefined by the 
members themselves, NASA senior management 
and members of the House and Senate of the U.S. 
Congress. The panel began to review the Space 
Shuttle program in 1971, and in its 1974 annual 
report, it documented a shift in focus: 
"The panel feels that [a] broader examination of 
the programs and their management gives them 
more confidence than in limiting their inquiry to 
safety alone." 22 
Over ensuing years, the panel continued to 
examine the Space Shuttle program including 
safety, reliability and quality assurance; systems 
redundancy; flight controls; and ground 
processing and handling, though management 
issues continued to dominate their concerns. 
Following the first flight of the Shuttle, the panel 
investigated a wide variety of specific subjects, 
to include the lightweight External Tank, the  
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Centaur and Inertial Upper Stage programs, 
Shuttle logistics and spare parts, landing gear, 
tires, brakes, Solid Rocket Motor nozzles and the 
Solid Rocket Motor using the filament-wound 
case. There is no indication, however, that the 
details of Solid Rocket Booster joint design or 
in-flight problems were ever the subject of a 
panel activity. The efforts of this panel were not 
sufficiently specific and immediate to prevent 
the 51 -L accident. 
Space Shuttle Program Crew Safety Panel 
The Space Shuttle Crew Safety Panel, 
established by Space Shuttle Program Directive 
4A dated April 17, 1974, served an important 
function in NASA flight safety activities, until it 
went out of existence in 1981. If it were still in 
existence, it might have identified the kinds of 
problems now associated with the 51-L mission. 
The purpose of the panel was twofold: (1) to 
identify possible hazards to Shuttle crews and (2) 
to provide guidance and advice to Shuttle 
program management concerning the resolution 
of such conditions. 
The membership of the panel comprised 10 
representatives from Johnson and a single 
representative each from Dryden (the NASA 
facility at Edwards Air Force Base, California), 
Kennedy, Marshall and the Air Force. 
The panel was to support the Level II Program 
Requirements Control Board chaired by the 
project manager, and recommendations were 
subject to Control Board approval. 
From 1974 through 1978, the panel met on a 
regular basis (24 times) and considered vital 
issues ranging from mission abort contingencies 
to equipment acceptability. The membership of 
the panel from engineering, project management 
and astronaut offices ensured a minimum level of 
safety communications among those 
organizations. This ceased to exist when the 
panel effectively ceased to exist in 1980. 23 
NASA had expected the panel to be functional 
only "during the design, development and flight 
test phases" and to "concern itself with all 
vehicle systems and operating modes." 24 When 
the original chairman, Scott H. Simpkinson, 
retired in 1981, the panel was merged with a 
safety subpanel that assumed neither the 
membership nor the functions of the safety panel. 
After that time, the NASA Shuttle program had 
no focal point for flight safety. 
The Need for a New Safety Organization 
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
unquestionably has provided NASA a valuable 
service, which has contributed to the safety of 
NASA's operations. Because of its breadth of 
activities, however, it cannot be expected to 
uncover all of the potential problems nor can it 
be charged with failure when accidents occur 
that in hindsight were clearly probable. The 
ability of any panel to function effectively 
depends on a focused scope of responsibilities. 
An acceptable level of operational safety 
coverage requires the total combination of 
NASA and contractor organizations, working 
more effectively on a coordinated basis at all 
levels. The Commission believes, therefore, that 
a top-to-bottom emphasis on safety can best be 
achieved by a combination of a strong central 
authority and a working level panel devoted to 
the operational aspects of Shuttle flight safety. 
 Findings 
1. Reductions in the safety, reliability and quality 
assurance work force at Marshall and NASA 
Headquarters have seriously limited capability in 
those vital functions. 
2. Organizational structures at Kennedy and 
Marshall have placed safety, reliability and 
quality assurance offices under the supervision 
of the very organizations and activities whose 
efforts they are to check. 
3. Problem reporting requirements are not 
concise and fail to get critical information to the 
proper levels of management. 
4. Little or no trend analysis was performed on 
O-ring erosion and blow-by problems. 
5. As the flight rate increased, the Marshall 
safety, reliability and quality assurance work 
force was decreasing, which adversely affected 
mission safety. 
6. Five weeks after the 51-L accident, the 
criticality of the Solid Rocket Motor field joint 
was still not properly documented in the problem 
reporting system at Marshall.   
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Chapter VIII: Pressures on the System. 
 
 
 
 
  
  
With the 1982 completion of the orbital flight 
test series, NASA began a planned acceleration 
of the Space Shuttle launch schedule. One early 
plan contemplated an eventual rate of a mission a 
week, but realism forced several downward 
revisions. In 1985, NASA published a projection 
calling for an annual rate of 24 flights by 1990. 
Long before the Challenger accident, however, it 
was becoming obvious that even the modified 
goal of two flights a month was overambitious. 
In establishing the schedule, NASA had not 
provided adequate resources for its attainment. 
As a result, the capabilities of the system were 
strained by the modest nine-mission rate of 1985, 
and the evidence suggests that NASA would not 
have been able to accomplish the 15 flights 
scheduled for 1986. These are the major 
conclusions of a Commission examination of the 
pressures and problems attendant upon the 
accelerated launch schedule. 
On the same day that the initial orbital tests 
concluded-July 4, 1982-President Reagan 
announced a national policy to set the direction 
of the U. S. space program during the following 
decade. As part of that policy, the President 
stated that:  
"The United States Space Transportation System 
(STS) is the primary space launch system for 
both national security and civil government 
missions."  
Additionally, he said: 
"The first priority of the STS program is to make 
the system fully operational and cost-effective in 
providing routine access to space." 
From the inception of the Shuttle, NASA had 
been advertising a vehicle that would make space 
operations "routine and economical." The greater 
the annual number of flights, the greater the 
degree of routinization and economy, so heavy 
emphasis was placed on the schedule. However, 
the attempt to build up to 24 missions a year 
brought a number of difficulties, among them the 
compression of training schedules, the lack of 
spare parts, and the focusing of resources on 
nearterm problems. 
One effect of NASA's accelerated flight rate and 
the agency's determination to meet it was the 
dilution of the human and material resources that 
could be applied to any particular flight. 
The part of the system responsible for turning the 
mission requirements and objectives into flight 
software, flight trajectory information and crew 
training materials was struggling to keep up with 
the flight rate in late 1985, and forecasts showed 
it would be unable to meet its milestones for 
1986. It was falling behind because its resources 
were strained to the limit, strained by the flight 
rate itself and by the constant changes it was 
forced to respond to within that accelerating 
schedule. Compounding the problem was the 
fact that NASA had difficulty evolving from its 
singleflight focus to a system that could 
efficiently support the projected flight rate. It 
was slow in developing a hardware maintenance 
plan for its reusable fleet and slow in developing 
the capabilities that would allow it to handle the 
higher volume of work and training associated 
with the increased flight frequency. 
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Pressures developed because of the need to meet 
customer commitments, which translated into a 
requirement to launch a certain number of flights 
per year and to launch them on time. Such 
considerations may occasionally have obscured 
engineering concerns. Managers may have 
forgotten-partly because of past success, partly 
because of their own well-nurtured image of the 
program-that the Shuttle was still in a research 
and development phase. In his testimony before 
a U.S. Senate Appropriations subcommittee on 
May 5, 1982, following the third flight of the 
Space Shuttle, James Beggs, then the NASA 
Administrator, expressed NASA's commitment: 
"The highest priority we have set for NASA is to 
complete development of the Shuttle and turn it 
into an operational system. Safety and reliability 
of flight and the control of operational costs are 
primary objectives as we move forward with the 
Shuttle program."1 
Sixteen months later, arguing in support of the 
Space Station, Mr. Beggs said, "We can start 
anytime.... There's no compelling reason [why] it 
has to be 1985 rather than '86 or '87. The point 
that we have made is that the Shuttle is now 
operational." 2 The prevalent attitude in the 
program appeared to be that the Shuttle should 
be ready to emerge from the developmental stage, 
and managers were determined to prove it 
"operational."  
Various aspects of the mission design and 
development process were directly affected by 
that determination. The sections that follow will 
discuss the pressures exerted on the system by 
the flight rate, the reluctance to relax the 
optimistic schedule, and the attempt to assume 
an operational status. 
Planning of a Mission 
The planning and preparation for a Space Shuttle 
flight require close coordination among those 
making the flight manifest, those designing the 
flight and the customers contracting NASA's 
services. The goals are to establish the manifest; 
define the objectives, constraints and capabilities 
of the mission; and translate those into hardware, 
software and flight procedures. There are major 
program decision points in the development of 
every Shuttle flight. At each of these points, 
sometimes called freeze points, decisions are 
made that form the basis for further engineering 
and product development. The disciplines 
affected by these freeze points include 
integration hardware, engineering, crew timeline, 
flight design and crew training. The first major 
freeze point is at launch minus 15 months. At 
that time the flight is officially defined: the 
launch date, Orbiter and major payloads are all 
specified, and initial design and engineering are 
begun based on this information. 
The second major freeze point is at launch minus 
7.7 months, the cargo integration review. During 
this review, the integration hardware design, 
Orbiter vehicle configuration, flight design and 
software requirements are agreed to and 
specified. Further design and engineering can 
then proceed. 
Another major freeze point is the flight planning 
and stowage review at launch minus five months. 
At that time, the crew activity timeline and the 
crew compartment configuration, which includes 
middeck payloads and payload specialist 
assignments, are established. Final design, 
engineering and training are based on these 
products. 
 Development of Flight Products  
The "production process" begins by collecting all 
mission objectives, requirements and constraints 
specified by the payload and Space Shuttle 
communities at the milestones described above. 
That information is interpreted and assimilated 
as various groups generate products required for 
a Space Shuttle flight: trajectory data, 
consumables requirements, Orbiter flight 
software, Mission Control Center software and 
the crew activity plan, to name just a few. 
Some of these activities can be done in parallel, 
but many are serial. Once a particular process 
has started, if a substantial change is made to the 
flight, not only does that process have to be 
started again, but the process that preceded it and 
supplied its data may also need to be repeated. If 
one group fails to meet its due date, the group 
that is next in the chain will start late. The delay 
then cascades through the system. 
Were the elements of the system meeting their 
schedules? Although each group believed it had 
an adequate amount of time allotted to perform 
its function, the system as a whole was falling 
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Graph depicts beginning of simulator training for Shuttle crews in days before launch for missions 41-B 
through 61-E.  
  
behind. An assessment of the system's 
overall performance is best made by 
studying the process at the end of the 
production chain: crew training. 
Analysis of training schedules for 
previous flights and projected training 
schedules for flights in the spring and 
summer of 1986 reveals a clear trend: 
less and less time was going to be 
available for crew members to 
accomplish their required training. (See 
the Shuttle mission simulator training 
chart.) 
The production system was disrupted by 
several factors including increased flight 
rate, lack of efficient production 
processing and manifest changes. 
 Changes in the Manifest 
Each process in the production cycle is 
based on information agreed upon at one 
of the freeze points. If that information is 
later changed, the process may have to 
be repeated. The change could be a 
change in manifest or a change to the 
Orbiter hardware or software. The 
hardware and software changes in 1985 
usually were mandatory changes; 
perhaps some of the manifest changes 
were not. 
The changes in the manifest were caused 
by factors that fall into four general 
categories: hardware problems, customer 
requests, operational  
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constraints and external factors. The significant 
changes made in 1985 are shown in the 
accompanying table. The following examples 
illustrate that a single proposed change can have 
extensive impact, not because the change itself is 
particularly difficult to accommodate (though it 
may be), but because each change necessitates 
four or five other changes. The cumulative effect 
can be substantial. (See the Impact of Manifest 
Changes chart.) 
When a change occurs, the program must choose 
a response and accept the consequences of that 
response. The options are usually either to 
maximize the benefit to the customer or to 
minimize the adverse impact on Space Shuttle 
operations. If the first option is selected, the 
consequences will include short-term and/or 
longterm effects. 
Hardware problems can cause extensive changes 
in the payload manifest. The 51-E mission was 
on the launch pad, only days from launch, with a 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite and Telesat 
satellite in the cargo bay, when a hardware 
problem in the tracking satellite was discovered. 
That flight was canceled and the payload 
reassigned. The cancellation resulted in major 
changes to several succeeding flights. Mission 
51 -D, scheduled to fly two months later, was 
changed to add the Telesat and delete the 
retrieval of the Long Duration Exposure Facility. 
The retrieval mission was then added to mission 
61-I, replacing another satellite. A new mission 
(61-M) was scheduled for July, 1986, to 
accommodate the Tracking and Data Relay 
Satellite and the displaced satellite, and all 
flights scheduled later in 1986 slipped to make 
room for 61-M. 
Customers occasionally have notified NASA 
Headquarters of a desire to change their 
scheduled launch date because of development 
problems, financial difficulties or changing 
market conditions. NASA generally accedes to 
these requests and has never imposed the 
penalties available. An example is the request 
made to delay the flight of the Westar satellite 
from mission 61-C (December, 1985) to a flight 
in March, 1986. Westar was added to flight 61-E, 
and the Getaway Special bridge assembly was 
removed to make room for it; the HS-376 
satellite slot was deleted from 51-L and added to 
61-C; the Spartan-Halley satellite was deleted 
from 61-D and added to 51 -L. Thus, four flights 
experienced major payload changes as a result of 
one customer's request. 
  
1985 Changes in the Manifest 
Hardware Problems 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (canceled 51 -E, added 61 -M). 
Synchronous Communication Satellite (added to 61-C). 
Synchronous Communication Satellite (removed from 61-C). 
OV- 102 late delivery from Palmdale (changed to 51 -G, 51 -I, and 61 -A). 
Customer Requests 
HS-376 (removed from 51-I). G-Star (removed from 61-C). Satellite Television Corporation-Direct 
Broadcast Satellite (removed from 61-E). 
Westar (removed from 61-C). 
Satellite Television Corporation-Direct Broadcast Satellite (removed from 61-H). 
Electrophoresis Operations in Space (removed from 61-B). 
Electrophoresis Operations in Space (removed from 61-H). 
Hubble Space Telescope (swap with Earth Observation Mission). 
Operational Constraints 
No launch window for Skynet/Indian Satellite Combination (61-H). 
Unacceptable structural loads for Tracking and Data Relay Satellite/Indian Satellite (61-H). 
Landing weight above allowable limits for each of the following missions: 61-A, 61-E, 71-A, 61 -K. 
External Factors 
Late addition of SenatorJake Garn (A -Utah) (51 -D) 
Late addition of Representative Bill Nelson (D-Florida) (61-C). 
Late addition of Physical Vapor Transport Organic Solid experiment (51-I). 
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Graph shows that changes to the payload manifest for Shuttle missions can boost Johnson Space Center 
workload as much as 130 percent.  
  
Operational constraints (for example, a 
constraint on the total cargo weight) are 
imposed to insure that the combination 
of payloads does not exceed the Orbiter's 
capabilities. An example involving the 
Earth Observation Mission Spacelab 
flight is presented in the NASA Mission 
Planning and Operations Team Report in 
Appendix J. That case illustrates that 
changes resulting from a single instance 
of a weight constraint violation can 
cascade through the entire schedule. 
External factors have been the cause of a 
number of changes in the manifest as 
well. The changes discussed above 
involve major payloads, but changes to 
other payloads or to payload specialists 
can create problems as well. One small 
change does not come alone; it generates 
several others. A payload specialist was 
added to mission 61-C only two months 
before its scheduled lift off. Because 
there were already seven crew members 
assigned to the flight, one had to be 
removed. The Hughes payload specialist 
was moved from 61-C to 51-L just three 
months before 51-L was scheduled to 
launch. His experiments were also added 
to 51-L. Two middeck experiments were 
deleted from 51-L as a result, and the 
deleted experiments would have 
reappeared on later flights.  
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Graph depicts beginning of simulator training for Shuttle crews in days before launch for missions 51-L 
through 61-K. Launch minus 77 days is normal training date start.  
 
  
Again, a "single" late change affected at least 
two flights very late in the planning and 
preparation cycles. 
The effects of such changes in terms of budget, 
cost and manpower can be significant. In some 
cases, the allocation of additional resources 
allows the change to be accommodated with little 
or no impact to the overall schedule. In those 
cases, steps that need to be re-done can still be 
accomplished before their deadlines. The amount 
of additional resources required depends, of 
course, on the magnitude of the change and when 
the change occurs: early changes, those before 
the cargo integration review, have only a 
minimal impact; changes at launch minus five 
months (two months after the cargo integration 
review) can carry a major impact, increasing the 
required resources by approximately 30 percent. 
In the missions from 41-C to 51-L, only 60 
percent of the major changes occurred before the 
cargo integration review. More than 20 percent 
occurred after launch minus five months and 
caused disruptive budget and manpower 
impacts.3 
Engineering flight products are generated under 
a contract that allows for increased expenditures 
to meet occasional high workloads. 
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Even with this built-in flexibility, however, the 
requested changes occasionally saturate facilities 
and personnel capabilities. The strain on 
resources can be tremendous. For short periods 
of two to three months in mid-1985 and early 
1986, facilities and personnel were being 
required to perform at roughly twice the 
budgeted flight rate.  
If a change occurs late enough, it will have an 
impact on the serial processes. In these cases, 
additional resources will not alleviate the 
problem, and the effect of the change is absorbed 
by all downstream processes, and ultimately by 
the last element in the chain. In the case of the 
flight design and software reconfiguration 
process, that last element is crew training. In 
January, 1986, the forecasts indicated that crews 
on flights after 51-I. would have significantly 
less time than desired to train for their flights.4 
(See the Simulation Training chart.) 
According to Astronaut Henry Hartsfield: 
"Had we not had the accident, we were going to 
be up against a wall; STS 61-H . . . would have 
had to average 31 hours in the simulator to 
accomplish their required training, and STS 61-
K would have to average 33 hours. That is 
ridiculous. For the first time, somebody was 
going to have to stand up and say we have got to 
slip the launch because we are not going to have 
the crew trained." 5 
"Operational" Capabilities 
For a long time during Shuttle development, the 
program focused on a single flight, the first 
Space Shuttle mission. When the program 
became "operational," flights came more 
frequently, and the same resources that had been 
applied to one flight had to be applied to several 
flights concurrently. Accomplishing the more 
pressing immediate requirements diverted 
attention from what was happening to the system 
as a whole. That appears to be one of the many 
telling differences between a "research and 
development" program and an "operational 
program." Some of the differences are 
philosophical, some are attitudinal and some are 
practical. Elements within the Shuttle program 
tried to adapt their philosophy, their attitude and 
their requirements to the "operational era." But 
that era came suddenly, and in some cases, there 
had not been enough preparation for what 
"operational" might entail. For example, routine 
and regular post-flight maintenance and 
inspections are critical in an operational program; 
spare parts arc critical to flight readiness in an 
operational fleet; and the software tools and 
training facilities developed during a test 
program may not be suitable for the high volume 
of work required in an operational environment. 
In many respects, the system was not prepared to 
meet an "operational" schedule. 
As the Space Shuttle system matured, with 
numerous changes and compromises, a 
comprehensive set of requirements was 
developed to ensure the success of a mission. 
What evolved was a system in which the 
preflight processing, flight planning, flight 
control and flight training were accomplished 
with extreme care applied to every detail. This 
process checked and rechecked everything, and 
though it was both labor- and time-intensive, it 
was appropriate and necessary for a system still 
in the developmental phase. This process, 
however, was not capable of meeting the flight 
rate goals. After the first series of flights, the 
system developed plans to accomplish what was 
required to support the flight rate. The challenge 
was to streamline the processes through 
automation, standardization, and centralized 
management, and to convert from the 
developmental phase to the mature system 
without a compromise in quality. It required that 
experts carefully analyze their areas to determine 
what could be standardized and automated, then 
take the time to do it. 
But the increasing flight rate had priority- quality 
products had to be ready on time. Further, 
schedules and budgets for developing the needed 
facility improvements were not adequate. Only 
the time and resources left after supporting the 
flight schedule could be directed toward efforts 
to streamline and standardize. In 1985, NASA 
was attempting to develop the capabilities of a 
production system. But it was forced to do that 
while responding-with the same personnel-to a 
higher flight rate. At the same time the flight rate 
was increasing, a variety of factors reduced the 
number of skilled personnel available to deal 
with it. These included retirements, hiring 
freezes, transfers to other programs like the 
Space Station and transitioning to a single 
contractor for operations support. 
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The flight rate did not appear to be based on 
assessment of available resources and 
capabilities and was not reduced to 
accommodate the capacity of the work force. For 
example, on January 1, 1986, a new contract 
took effect at Johnson that consolidated the 
entire contractor work force under a single 
company. This transition was another 
disturbance at a time when the work force 
needed to be performing at full capacity to meet 
the 1986 flight rate. In some important areas, a 
significant fraction of workers elected not to 
change contractors. This reduced the work force 
and its capabilities, and necessitated intensive 
training programs to qualify the new personnel. 
According to projections, the work force would 
not have been back to full capacity until the 
summer of 1986. This drain on a critical part of 
the system came just as NASA was beginning 
the most challenging phase of its flight 
schedule.6 
Similarly, at Kennedy the capabilities of the 
Shuttle processing and facilities support work 
force became increasingly strained as the Orbiter 
turnaround time decreased to accommodate the 
accelerated launch schedule. This factor has 
resulted in overtime percentages of almost 28 
percent in some directorates. Numerous contract 
employees have worked 72 hours per week or 
longer and frequent 12-hour shifts. The potential 
implications of such overtime for safety were 
made apparent during the attempted launch of 
mission 61-C on January 6, 1986, when fatigue 
and shiftwork were cited as major contributing 
factors to a serious incident involving a liquid 
oxygen depletion that occurred less than five 
minutes before scheduled lift off. The issue of 
workload at Kennedy is discussed in more detail 
in Appendix G. 
Another example of a system designed during 
the developmental phase and struggling to keep 
up with operational requirements is the Shuttle 
Mission Simulator. There are currently two 
simulators. They support the bulk of a crew's 
training for ascent, orbit and entry phases of a 
Shuttle mission. Studies indicate two simulators 
can support no more than 12- 15 flights per year. 
The flight rate at the time of the accident was 
about to saturate the system's capability to 
provide trained astronauts for those flights. 
Furthermore, the two existing simulator s are 
out-of-date and require constant attention to keep 
them operating at capacity to meet even the rate 
of 12-15 flights per year. Although there are 
plans to improve capability, funds for those 
improvements are minimal and spread out over a 
10-year period. This is another clear 
demonstration that the system was trying to 
develop its capabilities to meet an operational 
schedule but was not given the time, opportunity 
or resources to do it.7 
Responding to Challenges and Changes 
Another obstacle in the path toward 
accommodation of a higher flight rate is NASA's 
legendary "can-do" attitude. The attitude that 
enabled the agency to put men on the moon and 
to build the Space Shuttle will not allow it to 
pass up an exciting challenge-even though 
accepting the challenge may drain resources 
from the more mundane (but necessary) aspects 
of the program. A recent example is NASA's 
decision to perform a spectacular retrieval of two 
communications satellites whose upper stage 
motors had failed to raise them to the proper 
geosynchronous orbit. NASA itself then 
proposed to the insurance companies who owned 
the failed satellites that the agency design a 
mission to rendezvous with them in turn and that 
an astronaut in a jet backpack fly over to escort 
the satellites into the Shuttle's payload bay for a 
return to Earth. 
The mission generated considerable excitement 
within NASA and required a substantial effort to 
develop the necessary techniques, hardware and 
procedures. The mission was conceived, created, 
designed and accomplished within 10 months. 
The result, mission 51-A (November, 1984), was 
a resounding success, as both failed satellites 
were successfully returned to Earth. The retrieval 
mission vividly demonstrated the service that 
astronauts and the Space Shuttle can perform . 
Ten months after the first retrieval mission, 
NASA launched a mission to repair another 
communications satellite that had failed in low-
Earth orbit. Again, the mission was developed 
and executed on relatively short notice and was 
resoundingly successful for both NASA and the 
satellite insurance industry. The satellite retrieval 
missions were not isolated occurrences. 
Extraordinary efforts on NASA's part in 
developing and accomplishing missions will, and 
should, continue, but such efforts will be a 
substantial additional drain on resources. NASA 
cannot both accept the relatively spur-of  
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the-moment missions that its "can-do" attitude 
tends to generate and also maintain the planning 
and scheduling discipline required to operate as a 
"space truck" on a routine and cost-effective 
basis. As the flight rate increases, the cost in 
resources and the accompanying impact on 
future operations must be considered when 
infrequent but extraordinary efforts are 
undertaken. The system is still not sufficiently 
developed as a "production line" process in terms 
of planning or implementation procedures. It 
cannot routinely or even periodically accept 
major disruptions without considerable cost. 
NASA's attitude historically has reflected the 
position that "We can do anything," and while 
that may essentially be true, NASA's optimism 
must be tempered by the realization that it cannot 
do everything. NASA has always taken a 
positive approach to problem solving and has not 
evolved to the point where its officials are 
willing to say they no longer have the resources 
to respond to proposed changes. Harold 
Draughon, manager of the Mission Integration 
Office at Johnson, reinforced this point by 
describing what would have to happen in 1986 to 
achieve the flight rate: 
"The next time the guy came in and said 'I want 
to get off this flight and want to move down two' 
[the system would have had to say,] We can't do 
that,' and that would have been the decision." 8 
Even in the event of a hardware problem, after 
the problem is fixed there is still a choice about 
how to respond. Flight 41-D had a main engine 
shutdown on the launch pad. It had a commercial 
payload on it, and the NASA Customer Services 
division wanted to put that commercial payload 
on the next flight (replacing some NASA 
payloads) to satisfy more customers. Draughon 
described the effect of that decision to the 
Commission: "We did that. We did not have to. 
And the system went out and put that in work, 
but it paid a price. The next three or four flights 
all slipped as a result." 9 
NASA was being too bold in shuffling manifests. 
The total resources available to the Shuttle 
program for- allocation were fixed. As time went 
on, the agency had to focus those resources more 
and more on the near term-worrying about 
today's problem and not focusing on tomorrow's. 
NASA also did not have a way to forecast the 
effect of a change of a manifest. As already 
indicated, a change to one flight ripples through 
the manifest and typically necessitates  changes 
to many other flights, each requiring resources 
(budget, manpower, facilities) to implement. 
Some changes are more expensive than others, 
but all have an impact, and those impacts must 
be understood. In fact, Leonard Nicholson, 
manager of Space Transportation System 
Integration and Operations at Johnson, in 
arguing for the development of a forecasting tool, 
illustrated the fact that the resources were spread 
thin: "The press of business would have hindered 
us getting that kind of tool in place, just the fact 
that all of us were busy . . . . "10 
The effect of shuffling major payloads can be 
significant. In addition, as stated earlier, even 
apparently "easy" changes put demands on the 
resources of the system Any middeck or 
secondary payload has, by itself, a minimal 
impact compared with major payloads. But when 
several changes are made, and made late, they 
put significant stress on the flight preparation 
process by diverting resources from higher 
priority problems. Volume III of JSC 07700, 
Revision B, specifies that all middeck 
experiments must be scheduled, and payload 
specialists assigned, 11 weeks before launch. 11 
That rule has not been enforced-in fact, it is more 
honored in the breach than in the observance. A 
review of missions 41-G through 61-C revealed 
that of the 16 payload specialists added to those 
flights, seven were added after launch minus five 
months. 
Even "secondary" payloads take a lot of time and 
attention when they are added to a flight late. 
Harold Draughon: 
"I spend more than half of my time working on 
things that are not very important because they 
get put in so late. Rather than working on PAM's 
[Payload Assist Modules] and IUS's [Inertial 
Upper Stages], I am working on chicken eggs." 
12 Those directing the changes in the manifest 
were not yet sensitive to the problem. Each 
change nibbles away at the operational resources, 
and the changes were occurring frequently, even 
routinely. Much of the capacity of the system 
was being used up responding to late changes in 
lower priority experiments. That flexibility 
toward secondary experiments tied up the 
resources that would have been better spent 
building capability to meet the projected flight 
rate. 
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Tommy Holloway, chief of the Johnson Flight 
Director Office, emphasized that, given finite 
resources, one must decide: "It's flight rate 
versus [manifest] flexibility.'' l3 
The portion of the system forced to respond to 
the late changes in the manifest tried to bring its 
concerns to Headquarters. As Mr. Nicholson 
explained, 
"We have done enough complaining about it that 
I cannot believe there is not a growing awareness, 
but the political aspects of the decision are so 
overwhelming that our concerns do not carry 
much weight.... The general argument we gave 
about distracting the attention of the team late in 
the process of implementing the flight is a 
qualitative argument .... And in the face of that, 
political advantages of implementing those late 
changes outweighed our general objections. "14 
It is important to determine how many flights 
can be accommodated, and accommodated safely. 
NASA must establish a realistic level of 
expectation, then approach it carefully. Mission 
schedules should be based on a realistic 
assessment of what NASA can do safely and 
well, not on what is possible with maximum 
effort. The ground rules must be established 
firmly, and then enforced.  
The attitude is important, and the word 
operational can mislead. "Operational" should 
not imply any less commitment to quality or 
safety, nor a dilution of resources. The attitude 
should be, "We are going to fly high risk flights 
this year; every one is going to be a challenge, 
and every one is going to involve some risk, so 
we had better be careful in our approach to 
each."15 
Effect of Flight Rate on Spare Parts 
As the flight rate increases, the demand on 
resources and the demand for spare parts 
increases. Since 1981, NASA has had logistics 
plans for Shuttle flight rates of 12 and 24 flights 
a year. It was originally forecast (in mid-1983) 
that the supply of spares required to support 12 
flights annually could be accomplished in the 
spring of 1986. Actual inventory of spare parts 
had run close to plan until the second quarter of 
fiscal year 1985. At that time, inventory 
requirements for spares began to increase faster 
than deliveries. A year later, when inventory 
stockage should have been complete, only 
32,000 of the required 50,000 items (65 percent) 
had been delivered. 16 
The spare parts plan to support 24 flights per 
year had called for completing inventory 
stockage by June, 1987. By mid-1985, that 
schedule was in jeopardy. 
The logistics plan could not be fully 
implemented because of budget reductions. In 
October, 1985, the logistics funding requirement 
for the Orbiter program, as determined by Level 
III management at Johnson, was $285.3 million. 
That funding was reduced by $83.3 million-a cut 
that necessitated major deferrals of spare parts 
purchases. Purchasing deferrals come at great 
cost. For example, a reduction due to deferral of 
$11.2 million in fiscal year 1986 would cost 
$11.2 million in fiscal year 1987, plus an 
additional $21.6 million in fiscal year 1988. This 
three-to-one ratio of future cost to current 
savings is not uncommon. Indeed, the ratio in 
many instances is as high as seven to one. This 
practice cannot make sense by any standard of 
good financial management. 
According to Johnson officials, reductions in 
spares expenditures provided savings required to 
meet the revised budgets. As Program Manager 
Arnold Aldrich reported to the Commission: 
"There had been fund contentions in the program 
for a number of years, at least starting in the mid-
seventies and running through into the early to 
mid-eighties . . . intentional decisions were made 
to defer the heavy build -up of spare parts 
procurements in the program so that the funds 
could be devoted to other more pressing 
activities. . . . It was a regular occurrence for 
several annual budget cycles. And once the flight 
rate really began to rise and it was really clear 
that spare parts were going to be a problem, 
significant attention was placed on that problem 
by all levels of NASA and efforts had been made 
to catch up. But . . . our parts availability is well 
behind the flight need . . ." 17 
Those actions resulted in a critical shortage of 
serviceable spare components. To provide parts 
required to support the flight rate, NASA had to 
resort to cannibalization. Extensive 
cannibalization of spares, i.e., the removal of 
components  
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from one Orbiter for installation in another, 
became an essential modus operandi in order to 
maintain flight schedules. Forty-five out of 
approximately 300 required parts were 
cannibalized for Challenger before mission 51-L. 
These parts spanned the spectrum from common 
bolts to a thrust control actuator for the orbital 
maneuvering system to a fuel cell. This practice 
is costly and disruptive, and it introduces 
opportunities for component damage. 
This concern was summarized in testimony 
before the Commission by Paul Weitz, deputy 
chief of the Astronaut Office at Johnson: 
"It increases the exposure of both Orbiters to 
intrusion by people. Every time you get people 
inside and around the Orbiter you stand a chance 
of' inadvertent damage of whatever type, 
whether you leave a tool behind or whether you, 
without knowing it, step on a wire bundle or a 
tube or something along those lines." 18 
Cannibalization is a potential threat to flight 
safety, as parts are removed from one Orbiter, 
installed in another Orbiter, and eventually 
replaced. Each handling introduces another 
opportunity for imperfections in installation and 
for damage to the parts and spacecraft. 
Cannibalization also drains resources, as one 
Kennedy official explained to the Commission 
on March 5, 1986:  
"It creates a large expenditure in manpower at 
KSC. A job that you would have normally used 
what we will call one unit of' effort to do the job 
now requires two units of effort because you've 
got two ships [Orbiters] to do the task with." 19 
Prior to the Challenger accident, the shortage of' 
spare parts had no serious impact on flight 
schedules, but cannibalization is possible only so 
long as Orbiters from which to borrow are 
available. In the spring of 1986, there would 
have been no Orbiters to use as "spare parts 
bins." Columbia was to fly in March, Discovery 
was to be sent to Vandenberg, and Atlantis and 
Challenger were to fly in May. In a Commission 
interview, Kennedy director of Shuttle 
Engineering Horace Lamberth predicted the 
program would have been unable to continue: 
"I think we would have been brought to our 
knees this spring [1986] by this problem [spare 
parts] if we had kept trying to fly " 20 
NASA's processes for spares provisioning 
(determining the appropriate spares inventory 
levels), procurement and inventory control are 
complicated and could be streamlined and 
simplified. 
As of spring 1986, the Space Shuttle logistics 
program was approximately one year behind. 
Further, the replenishment of all spares (even 
parts that are not currently available in the 
system) has been stopped. Unless logistics 
support is improved, the ability to maintain even 
a three-Orbiter fleet is in jeopardy.  
Spare parts provisioning is yet another 
illustration that the Shuttle program was not 
prepared for an operational schedule. The policy 
was shortsighted and led to cannibalization in 
order to meet the increasing flight rate.  
The Importance of Flight Experience 
In a developmental program it is important to 
make use of flight experience, both to understand 
the system's actual performance and to uncover 
problems that might not have been discovered in 
testing. Because Shuttle flights were coming in 
fairly rapid succession, it was becoming difficult 
to analyze all the data from one flight before the 
next was scheduled to launch. In fact, the Flight 
Readiness Review for 51-L was held while 
mission 61-C was still in orbit. Obviously, it was 
impossible to even present, much less analyze 
and understand, anomalies from that flight. 
The point can be emphasized by citing two 
problems that occurred during mission 61-C but 
were discovered too late to be considered at the 
51-L Flight Readiness Review:  
1. The Space Shuttle brakes and tires have long 
been a source of concern. In particular, after the 
51-D Orbiter blew a tire at Kennedy in April, 
1985, there was considerable effort (within 
budgetary constraints) to understand and resolve 
the problems, and Kennedy landings were 
suspended until certain improvements were made. 
(See section "Landing: Another Critical Phase!" 
page 186.) Mission 51 -L was to be the first 
flight to land  
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in Florida since 51 -D had experienced brake 
problems. STS 61-C landed at Edwards Air 
Force Base in California on January 19, 1986, 
four days after the 51-L Flight Readiness Review. 
The 61-C brakes were removed following 
landing and shipped to the vendor for further 
inspection and analysis. That inspection revealed 
major brake damage. The subsystem manager at 
Johnson in charge of the brakes did not receive 
the information until January 27, 1986, one day 
before 51-L was launched, and did not learn the 
extent of the problem until January 30, 1986. 
2. The inspection of the 61 -C Solid Rocket 
Booster segments was completed on January 19, 
1986, four days after the 51-L Level I Flight 
Readiness Review. The post-recovery inspection 
of the 61 -C Solid Rocket Booster segments 
revealed that there was O-ring erosion in one of 
the left booster field joints and additional O-ring 
anomalies on both booster nozzles. Although the 
information was available for Marshall's 51 -L 
Level III review at launch minus one day, it was 
clearly not available in time for consideration in 
the formal launch preparation process.21 These 
examples underscore the need to establish a list 
of mandatory post-flight inspections that must 
precede any subsequent launch. 
Effect on Payload Safety 
The payload safety process exists to ensure that 
each Space Shuttle payload is safe to fly and that 
on a given mission the total integrated cargo 
does not create a hazard. NASA policy is to 
minimize its involvement in the payload design 
process. The payload developer is responsible for 
producing a safe design, and the developer must 
verify compliance with NASA safety 
requirements. The Payload Safety Panel at 
Johnson conducts a phased series of safety 
reviews for each payload. At those reviews, the 
payload developer presents material to enable the 
panel to assess the payload's compliance with 
safety requirements. 
Problems may be identified late, however, often 
as a result of late changes in the payload design 
and late inputs from the payload developer. 
Obviously, the later a hazard is identified, the 
more difficult it will be to correct, but the 
payload safety process has worked well in 
identifying and resolving safety hazards. 
Unfortunately, pressures to maintain the flight 
schedule may influence decisions on payload 
safety provisions and hazard acceptance. This 
influence was evident in circumstances 
surrounding the development of two high 
priority scientific payloads and their associated 
booster, the Centaur. 
Centaur is a Space Shuttle-compatible booster 
that can be used to carry heavy satellites from the 
Orbiter's cargo bay to deep space. It was 
scheduled to fly on two Shuttle missions in May, 
1986, sending the NASA Galileo spacecraft to 
Jupiter and the European Space Agency Ulysses 
spacecraft first to Jupiter and then out of the 
planets' orbital plane over the poles of the Sun. 
The pressure to meet the schedule was 
substantial because missing launch in May or 
early June meant a year's wait before planetary 
alignment would again be satisfactory. 
Unfortunately, a. number of safety and schedule 
issues clouded Centaur's use. In particular, 
Centaur's highly volatile cryogenic propellants 
created several problems. If a return-to-launch-
site abort ever becomes necessary, the 
propellants will definitely have to be dumped 
overboard. Continuing safety concerns about the 
means and feasibility of dumping added pressure 
to the launch preparation schedule as the 
program struggled to meet the launch dates. 
Of four required payload safety reviews, Centaur 
had completed three at the time of the Challenger 
accident, but unresolved issues remained from 
the last two. In November, 1985, the Payload 
Safety Panel raised several important safety 
concerns. The final safety review, though 
scheduled for late January, 1986, appeared to be 
slipping to February, only three months before 
the scheduled launches. 
Several safety waivers had been granted, and 
several others were pending. Late design changes 
to  accommodate possible system failure would 
probably have required reconsideration of some 
of the approved waivers. The military version of 
the Centaur booster, which was not scheduled to 
fly for some time, was to be modified to provide 
added safety, but because of the rush to get the 
1986 missions launched, these improvements 
were not approved for the first two Centaur 
boosters. After the 51-L accident, NASA allotted 
more than $75 million to incorporate the 
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operational and safety improvements to these 
two vehicles.22 We will never know whether the 
payload safety program would have allowed the 
Centaur missions to fly in 1986. Had they flown, 
however, they would have done so without the 
level of protection deemed essential after the 
accident. 
Outside Pressure to Launch 
After the accident, rumors appeared in the press 
to the effect that persons who made the decision 
to launch mission 51-L might have been 
subjected to outside pressure to launch. Such 
rumors concerning unnamed persons, emanating 
from anonymous sources about events that may 
never have happened, are difficult to disprove 
and dispel. Nonetheless, during the 
Commission's hearings all persons who played 
key roles in that decision were questioned. Each 
one attested, under oath, that there had been no 
outside intervention or pressure of any kind 
leading up to the launch. There was a large 
number of other persons who were involved to a 
lesser extent in that decision, and they were 
questioned. All of those persons provided the 
Commission with sworn statements that they 
knew of no outside pressure or intervention. 23 
The Commission and its staff also questioned a 
large number of other witnesses during the 
course of the investigation. No evidence was 
reported to the Commission which indicated that 
any attempt was ever made by anyone to apply 
pressure on those making the decision to launch 
the Challenger. 
Although there was total lack of evidence that 
any outside pressure was ever exerted on those 
who made the decision to launch 51-L, a few 
speculative reports persisted. One rumor was that 
plans had been made to have a live 
communication hookup with the 51-L crew 
during the State of the Union Message. 
Commission investigators interviewed all of the 
persons who would have been involved in a 
hookup if one had been planned, and all stated 
unequivocally that there was no such plan. 
Furthermore, to give the crew time to become 
oriented, NASA does not schedule a 
communication for at least 48 hours after the 
launch and no such communication was 
scheduled in the case of flight 51-L. The flight 
activity officer who was responsible for 
developing the crew activity plan testified that 
three live telecasts were planned for the 
Challenger, but they related in no way to the 
State of the Union Message: 24 
· During the teacher activities on flight 
day 4.  
· During the phase partitioning 
experiment on flight day 5.  
· During the crew conference on flight 
day 6.  
The Commission concluded that the decision to 
launch the Challenger was made solely by the 
appropriate NASA officials without any outside 
intervention or pressure. 
Findings 
1. The capabilities of the system were stretched 
to the limit to support the flight rate in winter 
1985/1986. Projections into the spring and 
summer of 1986 showed a clear trend; the 
system, as it existed, would have been unable to 
deliver crew training software for scheduled 
flights by the designated dates. The result would 
have been an unacceptable compression of the 
time available for the crews to accomplish their 
required training. 
2. Spare parts are in critically short supply. The 
Shuttle program made a conscious decision to 
postpone spare parts procurements in favor of 
budget items of perceived higher priority. Lack 
of spare parts would likely have limited flight 
operations in 1986. 
3. Stated manifesting policies are not enforced. 
Numerous late manifest changes (after the cargo 
integration review) have been made to both 
major payloads and minor payloads throughout 
the Shuttle program. 
· Late changes to major payloads or 
program requirements can require 
extensive resources (money, manpower, 
facilities) to implement.  
· If many late changes to "minor" 
payloads occur, resources are quickly 
absorbed.  
· Payload specialists frequently were 
added to a flight well after announced 
deadlines.  
· Late changes to a mission adversely 
affect the training and development of 
procedures for subsequent missions.  
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4. The scheduled flight rate did not accurately 
reflect the capabilities and resources. 
· The flight rate was not reduced to 
accommodate periods of adjustment in 
the capacity of the work force. There 
was no margin in the system to 
accommodate unforeseen hardware 
problems.  
· Resources were primarily directed 
toward supporting the flights and thus 
not enough were available to improve 
and expand facilities needed to support 
a higher flight rate.  
5. Training simulators may be the limiting factor 
on the flight rate: the two current simulators 
cannot train crews for more than 12-15 flights 
per year. 
6. When flights come in rapid succession, current 
requirements do not ensure that critical 
anomalies occurring during one flight are 
identified and addressed appropriately before the 
next flight.  
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Chapter IX: Other Safety Considerations. 
 
 
 
In the course of its investigation, the 
Commission became aware of a number of 
matters that played no part in the mission 51-L 
accident but nonetheless hold a potential for 
safety problems in the future. 
Some of these matters, those involving 
operational concerns, were brought directly to 
the Commission's attention by the NASA 
astronaut office. They were the subject of a 
special hearing. 
Other areas of concern came to light as the 
Commission pursued various lines of 
investigation in its attempt to isolate the cause of 
the accident. These inquiries examined such 
aspects as the development and operation of each 
of the elements of the Space Shuttle-the Orbiter, 
its main engines and the External Tank; the 
procedures employed in the processing and 
assembly of 51-L, and launch damage. 
This chapter examines potential risks in two 
general areas. The first embraces critical aspects 
of a Shuttle flight; for example, considerations 
related to a possible premature mission 
termination during the ascent phase and the risk 
factors connected with the demanding approach 
and landing phase. The other focuses on testing, 
processing and assembling the various elements 
of the Shuttle. 
 Ascent: A Critical Phase 
The events of flight 51-L dramatically illustrated 
the dangers of the first stage of a Space Shuttle 
ascent. The accident also focused attention on 
the issues of Orbiter abort capabilities and crew 
escape. Of particular concern to the Commission 
are the current abort capabilities, options to 
improve those capabilities, options for crew 
escape and the performance of the range safety 
system . 
It is not the Commission's intent to second-guess 
the Space Shuttle design or try to depict escape 
provisions that might have saved the 51-L crew. 
In fact, the events that led to destruction of the 
Challenger progressed very rapidly and without 
warning. Under those circumstances, the 
Commission believes it is highly unlikely that 
any of the systems discussed below, or any 
combination of those systems, would have saved 
the flight 51-L crew. 
 Abort Capabilities  
Various unexpected conditions during ascent can 
require premature termination of a Shuttle 
mission. The method of termination, or abort, 
depends upon the nature of the unexpected 
condition and when it occurs. 
The Space Shuttle is lifted to orbit by thrust from 
its two solid rockets and three main engines. The 
design criteria for the Shuttle specify that, if a 
single main engine is lost at any time between 
lift off and normal main engine cut off, the 
Shuttle must be able to continue to orbit or to 
execute an intact abort, that is, make a survivable 
landing on a runway. That design requirement 
has been met. If a single main engine is lost early 
in ascent, the Shuttle can return to make an 
emergency landing at Kennedy (a return-to-
launch-site abort). If the failure occurs later, the 
Shuttle can make an emergency landing in Africa 
or Europe (a transatlantic abort landing). If the 
failure occurs during the last part of the ascent, 
the Shuttle can proceed around the Earth to a  
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landing in the continental United States (abort 
once around), or can continue to a lower-than-
planned orbit (abort to orbit). Indeed, if the 
failure occurs late enough, the Shuttle will 
achieve the intended orbital conditions. 
Return-to-Launch-Site Abort. If the 
termination is necessary because of loss of a 
main engine during the first four minutes of 
flight, the Shuttle has the capability to fly back to 
the launch site. It continues downrange to burn 
excess propellant, and at the proper point it turns 
back toward Florida. The computers shutdown 
the remaining two engines and separate the 
Orbiter from the External Tank, which falls into 
the Atlantic Ocean. The Orbiter then glides to a 
landing on the runway at the Shuttle Landing 
Facility at Kennedy. 
Transatlantic Abort. During ascent there comes 
a time when the Shuttle is too far downrange to 
fly back to Kennedy. If it suffers an engine 
failure after that point, but has not yet achieved 
enough energy to continue toward orbit, it will 
have to land on the other side of the Atlantic. It 
will continue on a special flight path until it 
achieves the energy necessary to glide to the 
landing site. At that point the Shuttle computers 
will cut off the two remaining engines and 
separate the Orbiter from the External Tank. The 
  
 
 
Schematic shows  options available to Space Shuttle crews for aborts in the event of power loss at various 
stages in the ascent to space.  
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Shuttle will then re-enter the lower atmosphere 
much like a normal entry. The landing, however, 
will be at a pre -selected site in Africa or Europe. 
Design. The Shuttle design specifications do not 
require that the Orbiter be able to manage an 
intact abort (i.e., make it to a runway) if a second 
main engine should fail. If two (or all three) 
main engines fail within the first five to six 
minutes of the flight, the Space Shuttle will land 
in water. This maneuver is called a "contingency 
abort" and is not believed to be survivable 
because of damage incurred at water impact. The 
Shuttle design requirements did not specify that 
the Shuttle should be able to survive a Solid 
Rocket Booster failure. The system has no way 
to identify when a booster is about to fail, and no 
way to get the Orbiter or the crew away from a 
failing Solid Rocket Booster. Crew survival 
during ascent rests on the following assumptions: 
1. The Solid Rocket Boosters will work from 
ignition to planned separation. 
2. If more than one main engine fails, the crew 
must be able to survive a water landing. 
Shuttle Abort Enhancements 
Between 1973 and 1983, first stage 
abort provisions were assessed many times by all 
levels of NASA management. Many methods of 
saving the Orbiter and/or crew from emergencies 
during first stage were considered. 
Ejection seats (which afforded only 
limited protection during first stage) were 
provided for the two-man crews of the Orbital 
Flight Test program (the first four Shuttle 
flights). Other options for "operational" flights 
carrying crews of five or more astronauts were 
considered, but were not implemented because of 
limited utility, technical comp lexity and 
excessive cost in dollars, weight or schedule 
delays. Because of these factors, NASA adopted 
the philosophy that the reliability of first stage 
ascent must be assured, and that design and 
testing must preclude time critical failures that 
would require emergency action before normal 
Solid Rocket Booster burnout. That philosophy 
has been reviewed many times during the Space 
Shuttle program and is appropriately being 
reevaluated, as are all first stage abort options, in 
light of the 51-L accident. 
Early Orbiter Separation 
If a problem arose that required the 
Orbiter to get away from failing Solid Rocket 
Boosters, the separation would have to be 
performed extremely quickly. Time would be of 
the essence for two reasons. First, as 51-L 
demonstrated, if a problem develops in a Solid 
Rocket Booster, it can escalate very rapidly. 
Second, the ascent trajectory is carefully 
designed to control the aerodynamic loads on the 
vehicle; very small deviation from the normal 
path will produce excessive loads, so if the 
vehicle begins to diverge from its path there is 
very little time (seconds) before structural 
breakup will occur. 
The normal separation sequence to free 
the Shuttle from the rest of the system takes 18 
seconds, far too long to be of use during a 
firststage contingency. "Fast-separation" was 
formally established by Review Item 
Discrepancy 03.00.151, which stated the 
requirement to separate the Orbiter from the 
External Tank at any time. The sequence was 
referred to as fast-separation because delays 
required during normal separation were bypassed 
or drastically shortened in order to achieve 
separation in approximately three seconds. Some 
risk was accepted to obtain this contingency 
capability. Fast-separation was incorporated into 
the flight software, so that technically this 
capability does exist. Unfortunately, analysis has 
shown that, if it is attempted while the Solid 
Rocket Boosters are still thrusting, the Orbiter 
will "hang up" on its aft attach points and pitch 
violently, with probable loss of the Orbiter and 
crew. In summary, as long as the Solid Rocket 
Boosters are still thrusting, fast-separation does 
not provide a way to escape. It would be useful 
during first stage only if Solid Rocket Booster 
thrust could first be terminated. 
The current concept of fast-separation 
does, however, have some use. Contingency 
aborts resulting from loss of two or three main 
engines early in ascent are time-critical, and 
every fraction of a second that can be trimmed 
from the separation sequence helps. These abort 
procedures are executed after the Solid Rocket 
Boosters are expended, and fast-separation is 
used to reduce the time required for separation as 
the Shuttle must attain entry attitude very 
quickly. Unfortunately, all contingency aborts 
culminate in water impact. 
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 Thrust Termination 
Thrust termination (or thrust neutralization) as 
originally proposed for the Space Shuttle was a 
concept conceived for the Titan 3-M booster 
intended for use in the Manned Orbiting 
Laboratory Program. The objective of thrust 
termination is to either extinguish or reduce the 
thrust of the Solid Rocket Booster in an 
emergency situation. With this thrust terminated, 
emergency options such as crew ejection or fast-
separation might become feasible during the first 
two minutes of flight. 
The principal drawback is that thrust termination 
itself introduces high dynamic loads that could 
cause Shuttle structural components to fail. Early 
design reviews suggested that to strengthen the 
Orbiter to withstand the stresses caused by rapid 
thrust termination would require an additional, 
prohibitive 19,600 pounds. Thrust termination 
was deleted from design consideration on April 
27, 1973, by Space Shuttle Directive SS00040. 
Key factors in the decision were that (l) proper 
design would be stressed to prevent Solid Rocket 
Booster failure and (2) other firststage ascent 
systems provided enough redundancy to allow 
delaying an abort until after the Solid Rocket 
Boosters burned out. 
The subject arose again in 1979 when Space 
Shuttle Directive S13141 required the system 
contractor to determine the time over which 
thrust reduction must be spread so that the 
deceleration loads would not destroy the Orbiter. 
Marshall analyzed the thrust decay curves 
submitted by the contractor and concluded that 
achieving the required thrust decay rates was 
impractical. On July 12, 1982, the Associate 
Administrator for Space Transportation Systems 
requested reconsideration of thrust termination. 
Gerald Griffin, director of Johnson, responded to 
the request in a letter dated September 9, 1982, 
as follows: 
"In our opinion, further study of a thrust 
termination system for the SRB [Solid Rocket 
Booster] would not be productive. The potential 
failure modes which could result in a set of 
conditions requiring SRB thrust termination are 
either very remote or a result of primary 
structural failure. The structural failure risk 
would normally be accepted as a part of the 
factor of safety verification by analysis or test. In 
addition, any thrust termination system is going 
to be extremely heavy, very costly and, at best, 
present some risk to the Orbiter and ET [External 
Tank]. Venting of' trot gases and the shock load 
or pressure spike, have the potential for being as 
great a hazard as the problem to be corrected. It 
does not appear that a practical approach exists 
for achieving the desired pressure decay rate 
without a major redesign of the motor."1 In 
retrospect, the possibility of Solid Rocket 
Booster failures was neither very remote nor 
limited to primary structural failure. 
Although it would not have helped on mission 
51-L, thrust termination is the key to any 
successful first-stage abort, and new ideas and 
technologies should be examined. If a thrust 
termination system is eventually deemed feasible 
(that is, the Orbiter/External Tank will still be 
intact after the rapid deceleration), it cannot have 
failure modes that would cause an uncommanded 
neutralization of the thrust of one or both of the 
Solid Rocket Boosters. If thrust termination were 
to be implemented, reliable detection 
mechanisms and reliable decision criteria would 
be mandatory. 
 Ditching 
As previously discussed, most contingency 
aborts (those resulting from failure of two or 
three main engines during the first five to six 
minutes of flight) result in a water landing, or 
ditching. In addition, if the Space Shuttle did 
have a thrust termination capability to use with 
fast-separation to allow it to separate from failing 
solid rockets, the Orbiter would have to ditch in 
the water unless the failure occurred during a 
small window 50-70 seconds after launch. 
Accordingly, whether the crew can survive a 
water impact is a critical question. 
In 1974 and 1975, ditching studies were 
conducted at Langley Research Center. Although 
test limitations precluded definitive conclusions, 
the studies suggested that the loads at water 
impact would be high. The deceleration would 
most probably cause structural failure of the 
crew cabin support ties to the fuselage, which 
would impede crew egress and possibly flood the 
cabin. Furthermore, payloads in the cargo bay 
are not designed to withstand decelerations as 
high as those expected, 2 and would very 
possibly break free and travel forward to the 
crew cabin. The Langley report does state that 
the Orbiter shape and mass 
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 properties are good for ditching, but given the 
structural problems and deceleration loads, that 
is little consolation. 
Orbiter ditching was discussed by the Crew 
Safety Panel and at Orbiter flight techniques 
meetings before the first Shuttle flight. The 
consensus of these groups was that (1) ditching 
is more hazardous than suggested by the early 
Langley tests, and (2) ditching is probably not 
survivable. 
This view was reiterated in the September 9, 
1982, letter from Griffin to Abrahamson: 
"We also suggest no further effort be expended 
to study bailout or ditching. There is 
considerable doubt that either case is technically 
feasible with the present Orbiter design. Even if 
a technical solution can be found, the impact of 
providing either capability is so severe in terms 
of cost and schedule as to make them 
impractical." 
There is no evidence that a Shuttle crew would 
survive a water impact. Since all contingency 
aborts and all first stage abort capabilities that 
are being studied culminate in a water impact, an 
additional provision for crew escape before 
impact should also be considered. 
Astronaut Paul Weitz expressed this before the 
Commission on April 3, 1986: 
"My feeling is so strong that the Orbiter will not 
survive a ditching, and that includes land, water 
or any unprepared surface.... 
"I think if we put the crew in a position where 
they're going to be asked to do a contingency 
abort, then they need some means to get out of 
the vehicle before it contacts earth, the surface of 
the earth."3 
Crew Escape Options  
In a study conducted before the Orbiter contract 
was awarded, Rockwell International evaluated a 
range of ejection systems (Rockwell 
International, Incorporated, Phase B Study, 
1971). The table shows the results comparing 
three systems: ejection seats, encapsulated 
ejection seats and a separable crew compartment. 
The development costs are in 1971 dollars, and 
the costs and weights cited were those required 
to incorporate these systems into the developing 
Orbiter design, not to modify an existing Orbiter. 
The only system that could provide protection 
for more than the two-man experimental flight 
crew was the separable crew compartment, 
which would add substantial weight and 
development cost. All of these systems had 
limitations in their ability to provide successful 
escape, and all would require advance warning 
of an impending hazard from reliable data 
sources. 
The Request for Proposal, written in April, 1971 
(reference paragraph 1.3.6.2.1), states: 
"Provisions shall be made for rapid emergency 
egress of the crew during development test 
flights." Ejection seats were selected as the 
emergency escape system. The objective was to 
offer the crew some protection, though limited, 
from risks of the test flights. The philosophy was 
that after the test flights, all unknowns would be 
resolved, and the vehicle would be certified for 
"operational" flights. 
Conventional ejection seats similar to those 
installed in the Lockheed F-12/SR-71 were 
selected shortly after the Orbiter contract was 
awarded. They were subsequently incorporated 
into Columbia and were available for the first 
four flights. The ejection could be initiated by 
either crew member and would be used in the 
event of 
 1971 Rockwell Data on Ejection Systems  
.  
Type  Altitude (feet)  Velocity (feet/sec)  Weight (pounds) Development Cost  
.  
Open Ejection Seat  < 60,000 < 2,000 1,760 $10,000,000 
B-70 Encapsulated Seat  < 100,000 < 3,000 5,200 $7,000,000 
Separable Crew Compartment  < 100,000 8,000 or more  14,000 $292,000,000  
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uncontrolled flight, on-board fire or pending 
landings on unprepared surfaces. The escape 
sequence required approximately 15 seconds for 
the crew to recognize pending disaster, initiate 
the sequence and get a safe distance away from 
the vehicle. 
Although the seats were originally intended for 
use during first-stage ascent or during gliding 
flight below 100,000 feet, analysis showed that 
the crew would be exposed to the Solid Rocket 
Booster and main engine exhaust plumes if they 
ejected during ascent. During descent, the seats 
provided good protection from about 100,000 
feet to landing. After the Space Shuttle 
completed the four test flights it was certified 
for" operational" flights. But missions for the 
"operational" flights required more crew 
members, and there were no known ejection 
systems, other than an entire cabin escape 
module, that could remove the entire crew within 
the necessary time. The Orbiter configuration 
allowed room for only two ejection seats on the 
flight deck. With alternative ejection concepts 
and redesign of the flight deck, this number 
might have been increased slightly, but not to the 
full crew size. Thus, because of' limited utility 
during first- stage ascent and inability to 
accommodate a full crew, the ejection seats were 
eliminated for operational flights. 
The present Shuttle has no means for crew 
escape, either during first-stage ascent or during 
gliding flight. Conventional ejection seats do not 
appear to be viable Space Shuttle options 
because they severely limit the crew size and, 
therefore, prevent the Space Shuttle from 
accomplishing its mission objectives. The 
remaining options fall into three categories: 
1. Escape Module. The entire crew compartment 
would be separated from the Orbiter and descend 
by parachute. 
2. Rocket-assisted Extraction. Many military 
aircraft employ a system using a variety of small 
rocket-assisted devices to boost occupants from 
the plane. Such a system could be used in the 
Orbiter. 
3. Bail-Out System. The crew can exit unassisted 
through a hatch during controlled, gliding flight.  
Only one of these, the escape module, offers the 
possibility of escape during first-stage ascent. 
Its use would probably be practical only after 
thrust termination. It should be noted that in all 
cases of crew escape, the Orbiter would be lost, 
but in cases of Solid Rocket Booster failure or 
Orbiter ditching the vehicle would be lost 
anyway. The utility and feasibility of each 
method are described below. 
An escape module can offer an opportunity for 
crew escape at all altitudes during a first-stage 
time-critical emergency if the escape system 
itself is not damaged to the point that it cannot 
function. The module must be sufficiently far 
from the vehicle at the time of catastrophe that 
neither it nor its descent system is destroyed. 
Incorporation of an escape module would require 
significant redesign of the Orbiter: some 
structural reinforcement, pyrotechnic devices to 
sever the escape module from the rest of the 
Orbiter, modifications to sever connections that 
supply power and fluids, separation rockets and a 
parachute system. An additional weight penalty 
would result from the requirement to add mass in 
the rear of the Orbiter to compensate for the 
forward shift in the c enter of gravity. Recent 
estimates indicate this could add as much as 
30,000 pounds to the weight of' the Orbiter.4 
This increase in weight would reduce payload 
capacity considerably, perhaps unacceptably. 
There is no current estimate of the attendant cost. 
An escape module does theoretically offer the 
widest range of' crew escape options. The other 
two options, rocket extraction and bail-out, arc 
only practical during gliding flight. Both 
methods would be useful when the Orbiter could 
not reach a prepared runway, for they would 
allow the crew to escape before a very hazardous 
landing or a water ditching. Aerodynamic model 
tests showed that a crew member bailing out 
through either the side or overhead hatch would 
subsequently contact the wing, tail or orbital 
maneuvering system pod unless he or she could 
exit with sufficient velocity (> 5 to 10 feet per 
second) to avoid these obstacles. Slides and 
pendant rocket systems were evaluated as means 
of' providing this velocity, but all concepts of 
bail-out and rocket extraction that were studied 
require many minutes to get the entire crew out 
and would be practical only during controlled 
gliding flight. The results of these studies were 
presented at the Program Requirements Change 
Board session held on May 12, 1983, and 
subsequently to the NASA administrator, but 
none of the alternatives was 
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implemented because of limited capability and 
resulting program impacts. There is much 
discussion and disagreement over which escape 
systems are feasible, or whether any provide 
protection against a significant number of failure 
modes. 
The astronauts testifying before the Commission 
on April 3, 1986, agreed that it does not appear 
practical to modify the Orbiter to incorporate an 
escape module. The astronauts disagreed, 
however, about which of the other two systems 
would be preferable. As Astronaut Weitz 
testified: 
"John [Astronaut John Young] likes the rocket 
extraction system because it does cover a wider 
flight regime and allows you to get out perhaps 
with the vehicle only under partial control as 
opposed to complete control; however, any 
system that adds more parts like rockets gets 
more complex.... The only kind of a system that I 
think is even somehow feasible would be maybe 
some kind of a bail-out system that could be 
used subsonic."5 
In its 1982 Annual Report, the Aerospace Safety 
Advisory Panel listed "crew escape . . . at launch 
and prior to potential ditching" 6 as a priority 
item that warranted further study. The 
Commission fully supports such studies. In 
particular, the Commission believes that the crew 
should have a means of escaping the Orbiter in 
controlled, gliding flight. The Commission 
thinks it crucial that the vehicle that will carry 
astronauts into orbit through this decade and the 
next incorporate systems that provide some 
chance for crew survival in emergencies. It 
nonetheless accepts the following point made by 
Astronaut Robert Crippen: 
"I don't know of an escape system that would 
have saved the crew from the particular incident 
that we just went through [the Challenger 
accident] . " 7 
Range Safety 
Television coverage of the Challenger accident 
vividly showed the Solid Rocket Boosters 
emerging from the ball of fire and smoke. The 
erratic and uncontrolled powered flight of such 
large components could have posed a potential 
danger to populated areas. The responsible 
official accordingly destroyed the Solid Rocket 
Boosters. To understand how the booster rockets 
were destroyed, one must understand the purpose 
of a range safety system, its functions, and the 
special considerations that apply to Shuttle 
launches. 
The Eastern Space and Missile Center operates a 
range safety system for all Department of 
Defense and NASA launch activities in the Cape 
Canaveral area. The primary responsibility of the 
range safety system, run by the U.S. Air Force, is 
to protect people and property from abnormal 
vehicle flights during first stage ascent. To fulfill 
its range safety responsibilities, the Eastern 
Space and Missile Center staff supervises on-site 
launch preparations and tracks rockets and 
vehicles until they are far enough away from 
populated areas to remove any danger. When 
such a danger aris es during the ascent stage of a 
launch, the vehicle may have to be destroyed to 
minimize harm to persons and property on the 
ground. Every major vehicle flown from the 
Cape Canaveral area has carried an explosive 
destruct system that could be armed and fired by 
the range safety officer. Range safety procedures 
in launch activities from Kennedy are governed 
by Department of Defense and NASA 
documents. The primary regulatory publication 
is DOD Document 3200.11, Use, Management, 
and Operation of DOD Major Ranges and Test 
Facilities. 
Space Shuttle Range Safety System 
Both Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters and 
the External Tank are fitted with explosive 
charges. These can be detonated on the 
command of the range safety officer if the 
vehicle crosses the limits established by flight 
analysis before launch and the vehicle is no 
longer in controlled flight. The determination of 
controllability is made by the flight director in 
Mission Control, Houston, who is in 
communication with the range safety officer. 
Following an encoded"arm" command, the 
existing package on the Shuttle System is 
detonated by a subsequent encoded "fire" 
command. The range safety officer who sends 
the commands is the key decision maker who is 
finally responsible for preventing loss of life and 
property that could result if the vehicle or 
components should fall in populated areas. The 
destruct criteria are agreed to by NASA and the 
Eastern Space and Missile Center. 
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A range safety system for the Shuttle launches 
was approved in concept in 1974. Under that 
concept, the capability to destroy the system in 
flight 
from the ground was to be installed in the form 
of radio detonated explosive charges triggered by 
encoded signals. Such a range safety package 
appeared necessary for a variety of reasons based 
upon the initial Shuttle design that included 
ejection seats. If the crew were to eject, the 
unmanned vehicle would be uncontrollable and 
thus a much greater danger than a manned 
system. 
After the first four test flights, however, the 
ejection seats were deactivated. Retaining the 
range safety package when the crew could no 
longer escape was an emotional and 
controversial decision. In retrospect, however, 
the Challenger accident has demonstrated the 
need for some type of range safety measure. 
Since the current range safety system does not 
allow for selective destruction of components, 
the Commission believes that NASA and the Air 
Force should critically re-examine whether the 
destruct package on the External Tank might be 
removed. 
 Range Safety Activities, January 28, 1986 
The range safety officer for the Challenger flight 
on January 28 was Maj. Gerald F. Bieringer, U.S. 
Air Force. He reported that the mission was 
normal until about 76 seconds after launch. The 
following description is from Maj. Bieringer's 
written statement prepared approximately two 
hours after the accident:  
"Watching the IP [impact point] displays and 
optics I observed the primary and alternate 
sources diverge significantly at about T + 76 [76 
seconds into the flight]. At about the same time I 
heard . . [through monitored communications] 
the vehicle had exploded. Concurrently, I saw 
the explosion on the video monitor on my right. 
A white cloud seemed to envelop the vehicle, 
small pieces exploded out of it. The IP displays 
PRI and ALT indications were jumping around 
wildly I was about to recommend we do nothing 
as it appeared the entire vehicle had exploded 
when I observed what appeared to be an SRB 
[Solid Rocket Booster] stabilized and flying 
toward the upper left corner of the display. As it 
appeared stabilized I felt it might endanger land 
or shipping and as the ET [External Tank] had 
apparently exploded I recommended to the 
SRSO [senior range safety officer] we send 
functions. I sent ARM, waited about 10 seconds, 
and sent FIRE.... FIRE was sent at about 110 
[seconds].''8 
During the flight and prior to the accident, 
tracking and control functions performed 
normally. There were no communications 
problems throughout the range or with the 
NASA flight dynamics officer in Mission 
Control Houston. 
Range safety data displays did not provide useful 
information immediately after the accident. The 
range safety officer depended upon the video 
displays for evidence concerning the 
performance of the Solid Rocket Boosters. 
Without that information, the range safety officer 
would not have sent the destruct signals. 
Detailed studies from Marshall had indicated that 
Solid Rocket Boosters would tumble if 
prematurely separated. That assumption made 
possible the prediction of impact points. When 
the Challenger Solid Rocket Boosters separated 
after the explosion, however, they continued 
powered, stabilized flight and did not tumble, 
contrary to the expectations upon which range 
safety rules had been based Without the live 
television pictures, the range safety officer would 
not have known about the unexpected 
performance of' the boosters The Eastern Space 
and Missile Center and NASA have 
appropriately initiated a comprehensive 
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review of the Shuttle range safety requirements 
and their implementation. The events of' the 
Challenger accident demonstrate the need for a 
range safety package of some type on the Solid 
Rocket Boosters. However, the review should 
examine whether technology exists that would 
allow combining the range safety function for the 
Solid Rocket Boosters with a thrust termination 
system, and whether, if technically feasible, it 
would be desirable. 
 Postflight Analysis 
The Mission Control Center in Houston had no 
more warning of' the impending disaster than the 
range safety officer had. All information that 
might be useful in recognizing problems that the 
crew or the mission control flight team could do 
something about is available to flight controllers 
during the launch, but that information 
constitutes only a fraction of the electronic data 
being telemetered from the Shuttle. To ensure 
that nothing was overlooked during the launch, 
Johnson flight controllers conducted a thorough 
analysis of the telemetry data on January 29 and 
30, 1986.  
Their review of the recorded events revealed that 
the chamber pressure inside the right Solid 
Rocket Booster began to differ from that of the 
left booster approximately 60 seconds after lift 
off. A sampling of that information is available 
to a flight controller during ascent, but the 
internal pressures of the boosters are normally 
not monitored during the first stage. The 
readings are used only to indicate whether the 
crew can expect an on-time or slightly delayed 
separation of the boosters from the Orbiter and 
External Tank. The difference in pressure during 
the brief ascent of Challenger was small, and 
pressures were within acceptable limits. The 
replay of the data also indicated that the vehicle 
flight control system was responding properly to 
external forces and continued to control the 
Shuttle until the accident. No unusual motion 
responses occurred, and inside the cockpit there 
were no alarms. There are no indications that the 
crew had any warning of a problem before the 
fire and the disintegration of the Space Shuttle. 
Findings 
1. The Space Shuttle System was not designed to 
survive a failure of the Solid Rocket Boosters. 
There are no corrective actions that can be taken 
if the boosters do not operate properly after 
ignition, i.e., there is no ability to separate an 
Orbiter safely from thrusting boosters and no 
ability for the crew to escape the vehicle during 
first-stage ascent. 
· Neither the Mission Control Team nor 
the 51-L crew had any warning of 
impending disaster.  
· Even if there had been warning, there 
were no actions available to the crew or 
the Mission Control Team to avert the 
disaster.  
Landing: Another Critical Phase  
The consequences of faulty performance in any 
dynamic and demanding flight environment can 
be catastrophic. The Commis sion was concerned 
that an insufficient safety margin may have 
existed in areas other than Shuttle ascent. Entry 
and landing of the Shuttle are dynamic and 
demanding with all the risks and complications 
inherent in flying a heavyweight glider with a 
very steep glide path. Since the Shuttle crew 
cannot divert to any alternate landing site after 
entry, the landing decision must be both timely 
and accurate. In addition, the landing gear, which 
includes wheels, tires and brakes, must function 
properly. These considerations will be discussed 
for both normal and abort landings. 
Abort Site Weather 
The acceptability of the weather at abort landing 
sites, both inside and outside the continental 
United States, is a critical factor in the launch 
decision process. The local weather minima for 
the actual launch are necessarily restrictive. The 
minima for acceptably safe abort landings are 
even more restrictive. Of course, the wider the 
range of acceptable weather conditions, the 
greater the possibility of launch on any given day. 
As a result of past efforts to increase the 
likelihood of launch, abort landing weather 
criteria are currently less restrictive than the 
criteria for planned landings. 
The program also allows consideration of 
launching with a light rain shower over the 
Kennedy runway. Although engineering 
assessments  
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indicate that the tile damage that would result 
would not affect Shuttle controllability, it would 
be a serious setback to the program in terms of 
budget and schedule. This rule is designed to 
allow the program to weigh the probability of a 
return-to-launch-site abort and decide whether it 
is worthwhile to launch and accept the risk of a 
setback because of tile damage should a return-
to-launch-site abort be required. This risk 
appears to be unnecessary. The programmatic 
decision to accept worse weather for an abort 
landing, in a situation where other conditions are 
also less than optimal, is not consistent with a 
conservative approach to flight safety. The desire 
to launch is understandable, and abort landings 
are indeed improbable. However, if an abort is 
required, it is irrelevant that it was unlikely. An 
emergency, the loss of a Space Shuttle Main 
Engine, has already occurred to produce the 
necessity. Abort situations will require landing 
under emergency conditions on limited runways 
with Orbiter weights higher than normal. The 
difficulties should not be compounded by high 
crosswinds or reduced visibility. The 
Commission recommended that this subject be 
reviewed, and those reviews are currently 
underway. 
Orbiter Tires and Brakes 
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has shared 
NASA's concern over the Orbiter wheels, tires 
and brakes since the beginning of the Shuttle 
program. This is summarized in its 1982 Annual 
Report. 
"The landing gear including wheels, tires, and 
brakes is vital for safe completion of any mission. 
With the future flights going to higher weights 
and lower margins, possibly even negative 
margins, it is imperative that existing capabilities 
be fully explored, documented and improved 
where necessary." 9 
Orbiter Tires 
Orbiter tires are manufactured by B. F. Goodrich 
and are designed to support a Space Shuttle 
landing up to 240,000 pounds at 225 knots with 
20 knots of crosswind. The tires have a 34-ply 
rating using 16 cords. Though they have 
successfully passed testing programs, they have 
shown excessive wear during landings at 
Kennedy, especially when crosswinds were 
involved. The tires are rated as Criticality 1 
because loss of a single tire could cause loss of 
control and subsequent loss of vehicle and crew. 
Based upon approach and landing test experience, 
crosswind testing was added to the Space Shuttle 
tire certification testing. To date, Orbiters have 
landed with a maximum of 8 knots of crosswind 
at the Kennedy runway resulting in heavy tire 
wear: both spinup wear that occurs initially at 
touchdown and crosswind wear induced by side 
forces and differential braking. While 
dynamometer tests indicated that these tires 
should withstand conditions well above the 
design specification, the tests have not been able 
to simulate runway surface effects accurately. A 
Langley Research Center test track has been used 
to give a partial simulation of the strains caused 
by a landing at Kennedy. This test apparatus will 
be upgraded for further testing in the summer of 
1986 in an attempt to include all the 
representative flight loads and conditions. The 
tires have undergone extensive testing to 
examine effects of vacuum exposure, 
temperature extremes, and cuts. They also have 
undergone leakage, side force, load, storage, and 
durability tests. The tires have qualified in all 
these areas.  
To date, tests using the simulated Kennedy 
runway at Langley indicate that spinup wear by 
itself will not lead to tire failure. Tests using the 
Kennedy test surface do indicate that spinup 
wear is worse if the tire is subjected to crosswind. 
For this reason, the crosswind allowable for 
normal landings is limited to 10 knots. This 
restriction also permits a safe stop if the 
nosewheel steering system fails. The limitation is 
being reviewed to see if it is too high for abort 
landings involving nosewheel steering failure. 
Testing has not been conducted to ensure that 
excessive crosswind wear will not be a hazard 
when landing on the various hard surface 
runways with maximum crosswinds and failed 
nosewheel steering. Main tire loads are increased 
substantially after nosewheel touchdown because 
of the large downward wing force at its negative 
angle of attack. The total force on each side can 
be nearly 200,000 pounds, which exceeds the 
capability of a single tire. In fact, the touchdown 
loads alone can exceed the load bearing ability of 
a single tire. The obvious result is that if a single 
tire fails before nosegear touchdown, the vehicle 
will have serious if not catastrophic directional 
control problems following the expected failure 
of the 
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adjacent tire. This failure case has led to a 
Criticality 1 rating on the tires. Before nosegear 
touchdown, control is maintained through the 
rudder. However, it loses effectiveness as the 
speedbrake is opened and the vehicle decelerates. 
After nosegear touchdown, simulations have 
shown that directional control is possible using 
the nosewheel steering system for most 
subsequent failures, but not for some cases in 
which crosswinds exceed the current flight rule 
limits. Because of the consequences of this 
failure, crew members strongly recommend that 
the nosewheel steering system be modified to 
achieve full redundancy. Tire side loads have 
been difficult to measure and subsequently 
model because of test facility limitations. Two 
mathematical models were developed from early 
dynamometer tests and extrapolation from 
nosewheel tire tests. New dynamic tests of main 
gear tires show a more flexible side response, 
which has been incorporated into the latest 
mathematical model. A reasonably accurate 
model is required both for nosewheel steering 
engineering studies and for crew training 
simulators. 
 
The Orbiter tire in use meets 
specifications and has been certified through 
testing. However, testing has not reproduced 
results observed on Kennedy runways. To date, 
the only blown tire has been caused by a brake 
lockup and the resulting skid wear. 
Several improvements have been 
considered to increase protection against the 
high-speed blowntire case. One would add a skid 
at the bottom of the main gear strut to take the 
peak load during nosegear touchdown; another 
would add a roll-on-rim capability to the main 
gear wheel. None of the possible improvements 
has been funded, however, nor has any been 
seriously studied. In summary, two blown tires 
before nosegear touchdown would likely be 
catastrophic, and the potential for that occurrence 
should be minimized. NASA has directed testing 
in the fall of 1986 to examine actual tire, wheel, 
and strut failures to better understand this failure 
case. 
 
Orbiter Brakes 
 
The Orbiter brake design chosen in 
1973 was based on the Orbiter's design weight. It 
used beryllium rotors and stators with carbon 
lining. However, as the actual Orbiter weight 
grew, the response from the Shuttle program 
management was not a redesign of the brakes, 
but an extension of required runway length from 
10,000 to 12,500 feet. Thus, the brakes for many 
years have been known to have little or no 
margin, even if they performed as originally 
designed. 
There are four brake assemblies, one for 
each main landing gear wheel. Each assembly 
uses four rotors and three stators, the stators 
being attached to a torque tube. Carbon pads are 
attached to provide the friction surface. The 
Orbiter brakes were designed to absorb 36.5 
million foot-pounds of energy for normal stops 
and 55.5 million footpounds of energy for one 
emergency stop. The brakes were tested and 
qualified using standard dynamometer tests. 
Actual flight experience has shown brake 
damage on most flights. The damage is classified 
by cause as either dynamic or thermal. The 
dynamic damage is usually characterized by 
damage to rotors and carbon lining chipping, 
plus beryllium and pad retainer cracks. On the 
other hand, the thermal damage has been due to 
heating of the stator caused by energy absorption 
during braking. The beryllium becomes ductile 
and has a much reduced yield strength at 
temperatures possible during braking. Both types 
of damage are typical of early brake 
development problems experienced in the 
aviation industry. 
Brake damage has required that special 
crew procedures be developed to assure 
successful braking. To minimize dynamic 
damage and to keep any loose parts together, the 
crews are told to hold the brakes on constantly 
from the time of first application until their speed 
slows to about 40 knots. For a normal landing, 
braking is initiated at about 130 knots. For abort 
landings, braking would be initiated at about 150 
knots. Braking speeds are established to avoid 
exceeding the temperature limits of the stator. 
The earlier the brakes are applied, the higher the 
heat rate. The longer the brakes are applied, the 
higher the temperature will be, no matter what 
the heat rate. To minimize problems, the 
commander must get the brake energy into the 
brakes at just the right rate and just the right 
time-before the beryllium yields and causes a 
low-speed wheel lockup. 
At a Commission hearing on April 3, 
1986, Astronaut John Young described the 
problem the Shuttle commander has with the 
system: 
"It is very difficult to use precisely right now. In 
fact, we're finding out we don't really 
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have a good technique for applying the brakes.... 
We don't believe that astronauts or pilots should 
be able to break the brakes." 10 
Missions 5, 51-D and 61-C had forms 
of thermal stator damage. The mission 51 -D 
case resulted in a low-speed wheel lockup and a 
subsequent blown tire at Kennedy. The mission 
61-C case did not progress to a lockup but came 
very close. The amount of brake energy that can 
be obtained using normal braking procedures is 
about 40 million foot-pounds before the first 
stator fails. The mission 61-C damage occurred 
at 34 million foot-pounds but had not progressed 
to the lockup condition. Inspection of failed 
stators clearly shows the ductile failure response 
of the beryllium, and, hence, it appears that this 
failure mechanism cannot contribute to a high-
speed lockup and subsequent tire failure. It 
should be noted that the brake specification 
called for a maximum energy of 55 million foot-
pounds. Qualification testing of the abort braking 
profile showed that 55 million foot-pounds was 
the point of first stator failure. During 
qualification tests, the brakes continued to 
operate until all stators failed, providing about 
another 5 million footpounds of energy. Based 
upon the thermal response of beryllium under 
load, it appears that the early heavy braking 
required for transatlantic abort landings produces 
more than the 40 million foot-pounds that have 
resulted in thermal failure of the brakes during 
the normal braking profile. No numbers are 
certain, however, and clearly the qualification 
testing did not point out the current thermal 
problems. 
The assumed normal and abort brake 
energy limits for the current design should be 
reinvestigated. The 61-C damage resulted from 
only 34 million foot-pounds of energy. If this 
same brake design is to continue to fly, the 
mission 61-C damage should be fully understood, 
and destructive testing should be accomplished 
to establish the short runway (transatlantic abort 
landing) brake limit and appropriate abort 
landing planning factors. 
NASA is considering stator 
improvements, including steel or thicker 
beryllium stators, and has undertaken a carbon 
brake program that would provide a major 
margin improvement and less dynamic damage 
because of fewer parts. Additional testing is 
currently underway, and more is planned, to 
evaluate these brake modifications and to 
perform destructive testing. The testing results 
are expected to conform more closely to flight 
conditions because landing gear dynamics have 
been included. Early tests have confirmed the 
energy levels for the abort braking profile with a 
modified brake, and future tests may provide 
confidence in the normal braking profile. 
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
recognized NASA's efforts in its 1985 Annual 
Report: 
"A carbon brake review was conducted by 
NASA in early December, 1985, and re-sulted in 
agreement to procure a carbon brake system for 
the Orbiter.... There is concern by the STS 
[Space Transportation System] management 
about the availability of resources to support the 
development of the carbon brakes given the 
many com-peting requirements and the projected 
con-strained budget during the 1986 period. The 
program management considers the development 
of the carbon brake system to be of the highest 
priority . . . and the Panel sup-ports this position 
as it has in the past." 11 
Because of the brake problems 
encountered in the program, two reviews have 
been conducted by NASA. The third review will 
take place during the summer of 1986. The 
review board members have studied all of the 
Orbiter brake data and have compared Orbiter 
problems to industry problems. Improvements 
suggested have been implemented. It is the 
consensus of NASA and industry experts that 
high priority should be placed on correcting 
Orbiter brake problems, and that brake redesign 
should proceed with emphasis on developing 
higher energy and torque capacity. 
Concern within the program about the 
entire deceleration system (landing gear, wheels, 
tires, brakes and nosewheel steering) has been 
the subject of numerous reviews, meetings and 
design efforts. These concerns continued to be 
expressed by the Aerospace Safety Advisory 
Panel in 1982: 
 
"Studies of Shuttle landings to date show that tire, 
wheel and brake stresses are approaching 
limits."12 
 
"Short runways, with inadequate overruns, are 
cause for concern, for instance, a transatlantic 
abort to Dakar." 13 
 
The issues are difficult, and the required 
technology is challenging, but most agree that it 
is appropriate and important that NASA resolve 
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each of these problems. A conservative approach 
to the landing phase of flight demands reliable 
performance by all critical systems. 
 Kennedy Space Center Landings  
The original Space Shuttle plan called for routine 
landings at Kennedy to minimize turnaround 
time and cost per flight and to provide an 
efficient operation for both the Shuttle system 
and the cargo elements. While those 
considerations remain important, other concerns, 
such as the performance of the Orbiter tires and 
brakes, and the difficulty of accurate weather 
prediction in Florida, have called the plan into 
question. When the Shuttle lands at Edwards Air 
Force Base, California, approximately six days 
are added to the turnaround time compared with 
a landing at Kennedy. That is the time required 
to load the Orbiter atop the Shuttle carrier 
aircraft, a specially modified Boeing 747, and to 
ferry it back to Florida for processing. Returning 
the Orbiter to Kennedy from Edwards costs not 
only time but also money: nearly $1,000,000, not 
including the cost of additional ground support 
equipment, extra security and other support 
requirements. Further, the people necessary to 
accomplish the turnaround tasks must be drawn 
from the staffs at Kennedy and Vandenberg Air 
Force Base, California. They are the same people 
needed for the preparation for subsequent flights. 
Returning the Orbiter also imposes an additional 
handling risk to the vehicle in both the loading 
operation and the ferry flight itself. Encountering 
light precipitation during the ferry flight has 
caused substantial damage to the Orbiter thermal 
protection system. These costs and risks, 
however, are minimal when compared with those 
of a Space Shuttle mission. The Kennedy runway 
was built to Space Shuttle design requirements 
that exceeded all Federal Aviation 
Administration requirements and was 
coordinated extensively with the Air Force, 
Dryden Flight Research Center, NASA 
Headquarters, Johnson, Kennedy, Marshall and 
the Army Corps of Engineers. The result is a 
single concrete runway, 15,000 feet long and 300 
feet wide. The grooved and coarse brushed 
surface and the high coefficient of friction 
provide an all-weather landing facility. 
The Kennedy runway easily meets the intent of 
most of the Air Force, Federal Aviation 
Administration and International Civil Aviation 
Organization specification requirements. 
According to NASA, it was the best runway that 
the world knew how to build when the final 
design was determined in 1973. 
In the past several years, questions about weather 
predictability and Shuttle systems performance 
have influenced the Kennedy landing issue. 
Experience gained in the 24 Shuttle landings has 
raised concerns about the adequacy of the Shuttle 
landing and rollout systems: tires, brakes and 
nosewheel steering. Tires and brakes have been 
discussed earlier. The tires have shown excessive 
wear after Kennedy landings, where the rough 
runway is particularly hard on tires. Tire wear 
became a serious concern after the landing of 
mission 51-D at Kennedy. Spinup wear was 
three cords deep, crosswind wear (in only an 8-
knot crosswind) was significant and one tire 
eventually failed as a result of brake lock-up and 
skid. This excessive wear, coupled with brake 
failure, led NASA to schedule subsequent 
landings at Edwards while attempting to solve 
these problems. At the Commission hearing on 
April 3, 1986, Clifford Charlesworth, director of 
Space Operations at Johnson, stated his reaction 
to the blown-tire incident: 
"Let me say that following 51-D . . . one of the 
first things I did was go talk to then program 
manager, Mr. Lunney, and say we don't want to 
try that again until we understand that, which he 
completely agreed with, and we launched into 
this nosewheel steering development." 14 
There followed minor improvements to the 
braking system. The nosewheel steering system 
was also improved, so that it, rather than 
differential braking, could be used for directional 
control to reduce tire wear. 
These improvements were made before mission 
61-C, and it was deemed safe for that mission 
and subsequent missions to land at Kennedy. 
Bad weather in Florida required that 61-C land at 
Edwards. There were again problems with the 
brakes, indicating that the Shuttle braking system 
was still suspect. Mr. Charlesworth provided this 
assessment to the Commission: 
"Given the problem that has come up now with 
the brakes, I think that whole question still needs 
some more work before I would 
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be satisfied that yes, we should go back and try 
to land at the Cape." 15  The nosewheel steering, 
regarded as fail-safe, might better be described 
as fail-passive: at worst, a single failure will 
cause the nosewheel to castor. Thus, a single 
failure in nosewheel steering, coupled with 
failure conditions that require its use, could 
result in departure from the runway. There is a 
long-range program to improve the nosewheel 
steering so that a single failure will leave the 
system operational. 
Eight flights have been launched with plans to 
land in Florida. Of those, three have been 
diverted to California because of bad weather. 
Moreover, it is indicative of the dynamic weather 
environment in Florida that twice in the 
program's history flights have been waved off for 
one orbit to allow for weather conditions to 
improve enough to be acceptable for landing. 
Thus, even if NASA eventually were to resume 
routine operations at Kennedy, experience 
indicates the Orbiter will divert into Edwards 
more than 30 percent of the time. NASA must 
therefore plan to use Edwards routinely. This 
requires reserving six days in the post-landing 
processing schedule for the Orbiter's ferry trip 
back to Florida. It also requires redundancy in 
the ferry aircraft. The single Shuttle carrier 
aircraft, with some one-of-a-kind support items, 
is presently the only way to get the Orbiter from 
California back to its launch site in Florida. 
 Landing Site Changes  
.  
Mission  Wave-offs Reason 
Scheduled 
Landing  
Actual 
Landing  
.  
STS-3  1 Flooding Edwards  
Northrup 
Strip, (New 
Mexico) 
STS-7  2 Rain/ceiling Kennedy Edwards  
STS 41-
C  1 Rain/ceiling Kennedy Edwards  
STS 61-
C  
5 Rain/ceiling Kennedy Edwards  
The most serious concern is not that the weather 
in Florida is bad, but that the atmospheric 
conditions are frequently unpredictable. Captain 
Robert Crippen testified before the Commission 
on April 3, 1986: 
"I don't think the astronaut office would disagree 
with the premise that you are much safer landing 
at Edwards. There are some things you could do, 
as was indicated, to make Kennedy better, but 
you're never going to overcome the weather 
unpredictability." 16 
Once the Shuttle performs the deorbit burn, it is 
going to land approximately 60 minutes later; 
there is no way to return to orbit, and there is no 
option to select another landing site. This means 
that the weather forecaster must analyze the 
landing site weather nearly one and one-half 
hours in advance of landing, and that the forecast 
must be accurate. Unfortunately, the Florida 
weather is particularly difficult to forecast at 
certain times of the year. In the spring and 
summer, thunderstorms build and dissipate 
quickly and unpredictably. Early morning fog 
also is very difficult to predict if the forecast 
must be made in the hour before sunrise. In 
contrast, the stable weather patterns at Edwards 
make the forecaster's job much easier.  Although 
NASA has a conservative philosophy, and 
applies conservative flight rules in evaluating 
end-of-mission weather, the decision always 
comes down to evaluating a weather forecast. 
There is a risk associated with that. If the 
program requirements put forecasters in the 
position of predicting weather when weather is 
unpredictable, it is only a matter of time before 
the crew is allowed to leave orbit and arrive in 
Florida to find thunderstorms or rapidly forming 
ground fog. Either could be disastrous. 
The weather at Edwards, of course, is not always 
acceptable for landing either. In fact, only days 
prior to the launch of STS-3, NASA was forced 
to shift the normal landing site from Edwards to 
Northrup Strip, New Mexico, because of 
flooding of the Edwards lakebed. This points out 
the need to support fully both Kennedy and 
Edwards as potential end-of-mission landing 
sites. In summary, although there are valid 
programmatic reasons to land routinely at 
Kennedy, there are concerns that suggest that 
this is not wise under the present circumstances. 
While planned landings at Edwards carry a cost 
in dollars and days, the realities of weather 
cannot be ignored. Shuttle program officials 
must recognize that Edwards is a permanent, 
essential part of the program. The cost associated 
with regular, scheduled landing and turnaround 
operations at Edwards is thus a necessary 
program cost. Decisions governing Space Shuttle 
operations must be consistent with the 
philosophy that unnecessary risks have to be 
eliminated. Such 
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decisions cannot be made without a clear 
understanding of margins of safety in each part 
of the system. 
Unfortunately, margins of safety cannot 
be assured if' performance characteristics are not 
thoroughly understood, nor can they be deduced 
from a previous flight's "success." 
The Shuttle Program cannot afford to 
operate outside its experience in the areas of tires, 
brakes, and weather, with the capabilities of the 
system today. Pending a clear understanding of 
all landing and deceleration systems, and a 
resolution of the problems encountered to date in 
Shuttle landings, the most conservative course 
must be followed in order to minimize risk 
during this dynamic phase of flight. 
 
Shuttle Elements 
 
The Space Shuttle Main Engine teams 
at Marshall and Rocketdyne have developed 
engines that have achieved their performance 
goals and have performed extremely well. 
Nevertheless the main engines continue to be 
highly complex and critical components of the 
Shuttle that involve an element of risk 
principally because important components of the 
engines degrade more rapidly with flight use 
than anticipated. Both NASA and Rocketdyne 
have taken steps to contain that risk. An 
important aspect of the main engine program has 
been the extensive "hot fire" ground tests. 
Unfortunately, the vitality of the test program 
has been reduced because of budgetary 
constraints. 
The ability of the engine to achieve its 
programed design life is verified by two test 
engines. These "fleet leader" engines are test 
fired with sufficient frequency that they have 
twice as much operational experience as any 
flight engine. Fleet leader tests have 
demonstrated that most engine components have 
an equivalent 40-flight service life. As part of the 
engine test program, mayor components are 
inspected periodic ally and replaced if wear or 
damage warrants. Fleet leader tests have 
established that the low-pressure fuel turbopump 
and the low-pressure oxidizer pump have lives 
limited to the equivalent of 28 and 22 flights, 
respectively. The high-pressure fuel turbopump 
is limited to six flights before overhaul; the high-
pressure oxidizer pump is limited to less than six 
flights.17 An active program of flight engine 
inspection and component replacement has been 
effectively implemented by Rocketdyne, based 
on the results of' the fleet leader engine test 
program.  
The life -limiting items on the high-
pressure pumps are the turbine blades, impellers, 
seals and bearings. Rocketdyne has identified 
cracked turbine blades in the high - pressure 
pumps as a primary concern. The contractor has 
been working to improve the pumps' reliability 
by increasing bearing and turbine blade life and 
improving dynamic stability. While considerable 
progress has been made, the desired level of 
turbine blade life has not yet been achieved. A 
number of' improvements achieved as a result of 
the fleet leader program are now ready for 
incorporation in the Space Shuttle Main Engines 
used in future flights, but have not been 
implemented due to fiscal constraints.18 
Immediate implementation of these 
improvements would allow incorporation before 
the next Shuttle flight. 
The number of engine test firings per 
month has decreased over the past two years. Yet 
this test program has not yet demonstrated the 
limits of engine operation parameters or included 
tests over the full operating envelope to show 
full engine capability. In addition, tests have not 
yet been deliberately conducted to the point of 
failure to determine actual engine operating 
margins. 
The Orbiter has also performed well. 
There is, however, one serious potential failure 
mode related to the disconnect valves between 
the Orbiter and the External Tank. The present 
design includes two 17-inch diameter valves, one 
controlling the oxygen flow, and the other the 
hydrogen flow from the tank to the Orbiter's 
three engines. Each of the disconnect valves has 
two flappers that close off the flow of the liquid 
hydrogen and oxygen when the External Tank 
separates from the Orbiter. An inadvertent 
closure by any of the four flappers during normal 
engine operation would cause a catastrophe due 
to rupture of the supply line and/or tank. New 
designs are under study, incorporating 
modifications to prevent inadvertent valve 
closures. Redesigned valves could be qualified, 
certified and available for use on the Shuttle's 
next flight.  
While the External Tank has performed 
flawlessly during all Shuttle flights, one area of 
concern pertains to the indicators for the two 
valves which vent the liquid hydrogen and liquid 
oxygen. These valves can indicate they are 
closed when they might be partially open. This 
condition 
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is potentially hazardous, since leaks of either 
gaseous oxygen or hydrogen prior to launch, or 
in flight, could lead to fires. This could, in turn, 
lead to catastrophic failure of the External Tank. 
NASA is currently studying design 
modifications to the valve position indicators. 
This effort could be expedited and the redesigned 
indicators installed before the next flight of the 
Shuttle. 
 
Processing and Assembly 
During the processing and assembly of the 
elements of flight 51-L, various problems were 
seen in the Commission's review which could 
bear on the safety of future flights. 
 
Structural Inspections  
 
During the 51-L processing, waivers were 
granted on 60 of 146 required Orbiter structural 
inspections. Seven of these waivers were second-
time waivers of inspections. A formal structural 
inspection plan for the Shuttle fleet had not been 
fully developed, and not all of the 146 
inspections had been scheduled for the 51-L 
processing. In order to minimize the flight delay 
until the implementation plan could be fully 
developed, the waivers were documented, 
requested and granted by Level II at Johnson. 
The structural inspection requirements are 
relatively new and not completely mature. A 
working group was formed in December 1985, to 
expedite a structural inspection plan. A plan now 
exists for future structural inspections. The 
Commission believes that these inspections 
should not be waived. The fleet of Orbiters has 
no counterpart anywhere in the world. There is 
no data base relative to reusable spacecraft. The 
Orbiter's operating environment is totally 
different from that of airliners, and the program 
must closely track the effects of the Orbiters' age 
and use.19 
 
Recor ds 
Throughout the Commission's review of the 
accident, a large number of errors were noted in 
the paperwork for the Space Shuttle Main 
Engine/Main Propulsion System and for the 
Orbiter. The review showed, however, that in the 
vast majority of cases the problem lay in the 
documentation itself and not in the work that was 
actually accomplished. The review led the 
Commission to conclude that the Operations and 
Maintenance Instructions are in need of an 
overall review and update, and the performance 
of Operations and Maintenance Instructions 
needs to be improved. 
 
Missed Requirements  
At the time of launch, all items called for by the 
Operational Maintenance Requirements and 
Specifications Document were to have been met, 
waived or excepted. The 51-L audit review has 
revealed additional areas where such 
requirements were not met and were not formally 
waived or excepted: 
1. A formal post-flight inspection of the forward 
External Tank attach plate was not documented.  
2. A forward avionics bay closeout panel was not 
verified as installed during Orbiter 
rollover/stacking operations (the area was 
properly configured prior to flight with 
installation of a locker). 
3. Flight 51-L was launched with only one of 
two crew hatch microswitches showing the 
proper indication. This condition was 
documented by a Problem Report and was 
deferred; no waiver was obtained, however. 
4. Post-flight hydraulic reservoir sampling was 
not performed prior to connection of ground 
hydraulic support equipment at Dryden Flight 
Research Facility, but was performed in the 
Orbiter Processing Facility. 
5. During Auxiliary Power Unit hypergolic 
loading operations, the Number 2 tank 
evacuation prior to loading was not maintained 
above 20 inches of mercury for five minutes as 
required (19.8 inches maintained for 2 hours). 
This incident was documented as an acceptable 
condition by Kennedy, Johnson and Launch 
Support Service, but no waiver was submitted. 
6. Landing gear voids were not replenished and 
crew module meters were not verified during 
final vehicle closeouts. The additional 
requirement to replenish the landing gear voids 
during launch countdown was performed. 20 
Inspection by Proxy 
Another aspect of the processing activities that 
warrants particular attention is the Shuttle 
Processing Contractor's policy of using 
"designated 
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 verifiers" to supplement the quality assurance 
force. A designated verifier is a senior technician 
who is authorized to inspect and approve his own 
and his fellow technicians' work in specific 
nonflight areas, instead of NASA quality 
assurance personnel inspecting the work. The 
aviation industry follows this practice in 
performing verifications for the Federal Aviation 
Administration. The Shuttle Processing 
Contractor has about 770 designated verifiers 
(nearly 15 % of the work force).21 The NASA 
quality assurance inspection program no longer 
covers 100 percent of the inspection areas. Due 
to reduced manpower NASA personnel now 
inspect only areas that are considered more 
critical. Thus the system of independent checks 
that NASA maintained through several programs 
is declining in effectiveness. The effect of this 
change requires careful evaluation by NASA.  
 Accidental Damage Reporting 
While not specifically related to the Challenger 
accident, a serious problem was identified during 
interviews of technicians who work on the 
Orbiter. It had been their understanding at one 
time that emp loyees would not be disciplined for 
accidental damage done to the Orbiter, provided 
the damage was fully reported when it occurred. 
It was their opinion that this forgiveness policy 
was no longer being followed by the Shuttle 
Processing Contractor. They cited examples of 
employees being punished after acknowledging 
they had accidentally caused damage. The 
technicians said that accidental damage is not 
consistently reported, when it occurs, because of 
lack of confidence in management's forgiveness 
policy and technicians' consequent fear of losing 
their jobs. This situation has obvious severe 
implications if left uncorrected.  
 Launch Pad 39B 
All launch damage and launch measurement data 
from Pad B ground systems anomalies were 
considered to be normal or minor with three 
exceptions: the loss of the springs and plungers 
on the booster hold-down posts; the failure of the 
gaseous hydrogen vent arm to latch; and the loss 
of bricks from the flame trench. These three 
items are treated in Appendix I, the NASA Pre-
Launch Activities Team Report (May, 1986). 
None contributed to the accident.  
Loss of bricks from the flame trench was also 
experienced during the launch of STS-1 (April, 
1981) and STS-2 (November, 1981) from Pad A, 
though at locations closer to the centerline of the 
vehicle. Since the brick was blown out of the 
flame trench and away from the vehicle, there is 
no evidence to indicate that the loose brick might 
have endangered the 51-L vehicle, but it may be 
possible for damage to occur if the condition 
remains uncorrected. The Pad B fire brick is to 
be replaced by refractory concrete, as was done 
on Pad A. 
 Involvement of Development  
Contractors   
The Space Shuttle program, like its predecessors 
Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and Apollo-
Soyuz, is clearly a developmental program and 
must be treated as such by NASA. Indeed, the 
chief differences between the Shuttle and 
previous developmental programs are that the 
Shuttle is principally a transportation system and 
employs reusable hardware. Reusability implies 
a new set of functions such as logistics support, 
maintenance, refurbishment, lifetime concerns 
and structural inspections that must be addressed 
by the program. 
In order to enhance post-flight "turnaround" 
schedule and efficiency, NASA is striving to 
implement processing procedures accepted by 
the transportation industry. While this effort is 
useful, there is not an exact industry analogy to 
the Orbiter vehicles' flight operations, because 
each successive Shuttle mission expands system 
and performance requirements. Consequently, 
the Shuttle configuration is evolving as design 
changes and improvements are incorporated. The 
demands of individual payloads can cause 
significant additional developmental changes. 
These developmental aspects make significant 
demands, which can be met only by the 
following strategies:  
1. Maintain a significant engineering design and 
development capability among the Shuttle 
contractors and an ongoing engineering 
capability within NASA.  
2. Maintain an active analytical capability so that 
the evolving capabilities of the  
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Shuttle can be matched to the demands on the 
Shuttle. 
The Shuttle's developmental status demands that 
both NASA and all its contractors maintain a 
high level of in-house experience and technical 
ability. 
All Shuttle contractors and their corresponding 
NASA project organizations expressed concern 
about the organization of contractor services. 
When Shuttle operations were begun, the prime 
development contractors had total responsibility 
for all Shuttle activities. The concept of a single 
Shuttle Processing Prime Contractor was 
adopted as NASA policy in 1981, and 
implemented in 1983 when a team led by 
Lockheed Space Operations was selected. The 
Lockheed team includes Lockheed Missiles & 
Space Company, responsible for processing the 
Orbiter; Grumman Aerospace Corporation, 
responsible for operation and maintenance of the 
launch processing system; Pan American World 
Airways, charged with introducing and 
maintaining airline methods and techniques in 
the processing system; Morton Thiokol, Inc., 
responsible for processing the Solid Rocket 
Boosters and External Tank; and Rocketdyne, 
responsible for processing the Shuttle main 
engines. 
Lockheed's performance as Shuttle Processing 
Contractor is judged on the basis of a NASA 
grading system using agreed criteria. In 
September, 1984, the company was marked 
down for failure to form a coordinated contractor 
team. As a result of that grading, Lockheed 
earned for that period an award fee of about one-
quarter of one percent of cost, on a maximum fee 
scale at that time of one percent of cost. 
Lockheed reviewed the findings of NASA's 
grading and did not quarrel with its major thrust. 
The award fee presently is a composite of 
incentives to be earned on mission success and 
cost control. It can vary along a scale of one to 
14 percent of cost. The Shuttle Processing 
Contractor was earning, at the time of the 
Challenger accident, about six percent of cost, or 
nearly midpoint on the scale. 
Although the performance of' the Shuttle 
Processing Contractor's team has improved 
considerably, serious processing problems have 
occurred, especially with respect to the Orbiter. 
An example is provided by the handling of the 
critical 17-inch disconnect valves during the 51-
L flight preparations.  
During External Tank propellant loading in 
preparation for launch, the liquid hydrogen 17-
inch disconnect valve was opened prior to 
reducing the pressure in the Orbiter liquid 
hydrogen manifold, through a procedural error 
by the console operator. The valve was opened 
with a six pounds per square inch differential. 
This was contrary to the critical requirement that 
the differential be no greater than one pound per 
square inch. This pressure held the valve closed 
for approximately 18 seconds before- it finally 
slammed open abruptly. These valves are 
extremely critical and have very stringent 
tolerances to preclude inadvertent closure of the 
valve during mainstage thrusting. Accidental 
closing of' a disconnect valve would mean 
catastrophic loss of' Orbiter and crew. The 
slamming of this valve (which could have 
damaged it) was not reported by the operator and 
was not discovered until the post-accident data 
review. Although this incident did not contribute 
to the 51-L incident, this type of error cannot be 
tolerated in future operations, and a policy of 
rigorous reporting of anomalies in processing 
must be strictly enforced. 
During the pre-launch processing and postflight 
refurbishment of the Orbiter, Rockwell- the 
development contractor-acts largely as an adviser 
to the Shuttle Processing Contractor. Martin 
Marietta has a similar role regarding the pre-
launch processing of the External Tank. In 
contrast, NASA directed the Shuttle Processing 
Contractor to subcontract with Rocketdyne and 
Thiokol for the processing and refurbishment of 
the main engines and the Solid Rocket Motors, 
respectively. If Rockwell and Martin Marietta, as 
the development contractor, had a similar direct 
involvement with their elements of the Shuttle 
system, the likelihood of difficulties caused by 
improper processing would probably be 
decreased. Furthermore, all Shuttle elements 
would benefit from the advantages of beginning-
to-end responsibility vested in individual 
contractors, each responsible for the design, 
development, manufacturing, operation, and 
refurbishment of' their respective Shuttle 
elements. 
  
 197 
References 
1. Letter from Gerald D. Griffin, LO-82-90, September 9, 1982.  
2. NASA Memo, April 14, 1986, PC 076109-076113.  
3. Commission Hearing Transcript, April 3, 1986, pages 2439-2440.  
4. Commission Work Session, Mission Planning and Operations Panel, April 14, 1986, JSC, page 138.  
5. Commission Hearing Transcript, April 3, 1986, pages 2436-2437.  
6. page 28.  
7. Commission Hearing Transcript, April 3, 1986, page 2429.  
8. Visual Aid, Range Safety Officer Statement, Commission Work Session, March 24, 1986, JSC, PC 
02267-02268.  
9. Page 15.  
10. Commission Hearing Transcript, April 3, 1986, page 2474.  
11. Page 41.  
12. Pages 7-8.  
13. Page 8.  
14. Commission Hearing Transcript, April 3, 1986, page 2254.  
15. Commission Hearing Transcript, April 3, 1986, page 2255.  
16. Commission Hearing Transcript, April 13, 1986, page 2485.  
17. Rocketdyne Report, BC 86-38, President Comments on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 
Development and Production Panel, April 2,  1986, pages 170, 171, 260-268.  
18. Rocketdyne Report, BC 86-38, pages 315-324.  
19. NASA Pre-Launch Activities Team Report, Appendix D, page 188.  
20. NASA Pre-Launch Activities Team Report, Appendix D, page 186.  
21. Commission Work Session, Pre-Launch, March 4, 1986, page 206.  
 198 
 
Recommendations  
  
The Commission has conducted an extensive 
investigation of the Challenger accident to 
determine the probable cause and necessary 
corrective actions. Based on the findings and 
determinations of its investigation, the 
Commission has unanimously adopted 
recommendations to help assure the return to 
safe flight. 
The Commission urges that the Administrator of 
NASA submit, one year from now, a report to 
the President on the progress that NASA has 
made in effecting the Commission's 
recommendations set forth below: 
 
- I - 
  
Design. The faulty Solid Rocket Motor joint and 
seal must be changed. This could be a new 
design eliminating the joint or a redesign of the 
current joint and seal. No design options should 
be prematurely precluded because of schedule, 
cost or reliance on existing hardware. All Solid 
Rocket Motor joints should satisfy the following 
requirements:  
· The joints should be fully understood, tested 
and verified.  
· The integrity of the structure and of the seals 
of all joints should be not less than that of 
the case walls throughout the design 
envelope.  
· The integrity of the joints should be 
insensitive to:  
o Dimensional tolerances.  
o Transportation and handling.  
o Assembly procedures.  
o Inspection and test procedures.  
o Environmental effects.  
o Internal case operating pressure.  
o Recovery and reuse effects.  
o Flight and water impact loads.  
· The certification of the new design should 
include:  
o Tests which duplicate the actual launch 
configuration as closely as possible.  
o Tests over the full range of operating 
conditions, including temperature.  
· Full consideration should be given to 
conducting static firings of the exact flight 
configuration in a vertical attitude.  
 Independent Oversight. The Administrator of 
NASA should request the National Research 
Council to form an independent Solid Rocket 
Motor design oversight committee to implement 
the Commission's design recommendations and 
oversee the design effort. This committee should: 
· Review and evaluate certification 
require ments.  
· Provide technical oversight of the design, 
test program and certification.  
· Report to the Administrator of NASA on the 
adequacy of the design and make 
appropriate recommendations.  
  
 199 
- II - 
  
Shuttle Management Structure. The Shuttle 
Program Structure should be reviewed. The 
project managers for the various elements of the 
Shuttle program felt more accountable to their 
center management than to the Shuttle program 
organization. Shuttle element funding, work 
package definition, and vital program 
information frequently bypass the National STS 
(Shuttle) Program Manager. 
A redefinition of the Program Manager's 
responsibility is essential. This redefinition 
should give the Program Manager the requisite 
authority for all ongoing STS operations. 
Program funding and all Shuttle Program work 
at the centers should be placed clearly under the 
Program Manager's authority. 
  
Astronauts in Management. The Commission 
observes that there appears to be a departure 
from the philosophy of the 1960s and 1970s 
relating to the use of astronauts in management 
positions. These individuals brought to their 
positions flight experience and a keen 
appreciation of operations and flight safety. 
· NASA should encourage the transition 
of qualified astronauts into agency 
management positions.  
· The function of the Flight Crew 
Operations director should be elevated 
in the NASA organization structure.  
  
Shuttle Safety Panel. NASA should establish an 
STS Safety Advisory Panel reporting to the STS 
Program Manager. The Charter of this panel 
should include Shuttle operational issues, launch 
commit criteria, flight rules, flight readiness and 
risk management. The panel should include 
representation from the safety organization, 
mission operations, and the astronaut office. 
 
- III - 
  
Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis . 
NASA and the primary Shuttle contractors 
should review all Criticality 1, 1R, 2, and 2R 
items and hazard analyses. This review should 
identify those items that must be improved prior 
to flight to ensure mission safety. An Audit 
Panel, appointed by the National Research 
Council, should verify the adequacy of the effort 
and report directly to the Administrator of 
NASA. 
  
 
- IV - 
  
Safety Organization. NASA should establish an 
Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality 
Assurance to be headed by an Associate 
administrator, reporting directly to the NASA 
Administrator. It would have direct authority for 
safety, reliability, and quality assurance 
throughout the agency. The office should be 
assigned the work force to ensure adequate 
oversight of its functions and should be 
independent of other NASA functional and 
program responsibilities. 
The responsibilities of this office should include: 
· The safety, reliability and quality 
assurance functions as they relate to all 
NASA activities and programs.  
· Direction of reporting and 
documentation of problems, problem 
resolution and trends associated with 
flight safety.  
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- V - 
  
[200] Improved Communications . The 
Commission found that Marshall Space Flight 
Center project managers, because of a tendency 
at Marshall to management isolation, failed to 
provide full and timely information bearing on 
the safety of flight 51-L to other vital elements of 
Shuttle program management. 
· NASA should take energetic steps to 
eliminate this tendency at Marshall 
Space Flight Center, whether by 
changes of personnel, organization, 
indoctrination or all three.  
· A policy should be developed which 
governs the imposition and removal of 
Shuttle launch constraints.  
· Flight Readiness Reviews and Mission 
Management Team meetings should be 
recorded.  
· The flight crew commander, or a 
designated representative, should attend 
the Flight Readiness Review, participate 
in acceptance of the vehicle for flight, 
and certify that the crew is properly 
prepared for flight.  
  
 
- VI - 
  
Landing Safety . NASA must take actions to 
improve landing safety. 
· The tire, brake and nosewheel steering 
systems must be improved. These 
systems do not have sufficient safety 
margin, particularly at abort landing 
sites.  
· The specific conditions under which 
planned landings at Kennedy would be 
acceptable should be determined. 
Criteria must be established for tires, 
brakes and nosewheel steering. Until 
the systems meet those criteria in high 
fidelity testing that is verified at 
Edwards, landing at Kennedy should 
not be planned.  
· Committing to a specific landing site 
requires that landing area weather be 
forecast more than an hour in advance. 
During unpredictable weather periods at 
Kennedy, program officials should plan 
on Edwards landings. Increased 
landings at Edwards may necessitate a 
dual ferry capability.  
  
 
- VII - 
  
Launch Abort and Crew Escape . The Shuttle 
program management considered first-stage 
abort options and crew escape options several 
times during the history of the program, but 
because of limited utility, technical infeasibility, 
or program cost and schedule, no systems were 
implemented. The Commission recommends that 
NASA:  
· Make all efforts to provide a crew 
escape system for use during controlled 
gliding flight.  
· Make every effort to increase the range 
of flight conditions under which an 
emergency runway landing can be 
successfully conducted in the event that 
two or three main engines fail early in 
ascent.  
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- VIII - 
  
Flight Rate. The nation's reliance on the Shuttle 
as its principal space launch capability created a 
relentless pressure on NASA to increase the 
flight rate. Such reliance on a single launch 
capability should be avoided in the future. 
NASA must establish a flight rate that is 
consistent with its resources. A firm payload 
assignment policy should be established. The 
policy should include rigorous controls on cargo 
manifest changes to limit the pressures such 
changes exert on schedules and crew training. 
  
 
- IX - 
  
Maintenance Safeguards . Installation, test, and 
maintenance procedures must be especially 
rigorous for Space Shuttle items designated 
Criticality 1. NASA should establish a system of 
analyzing and reporting performance trends of 
such items. 
Maintenance procedures for such items should 
be specified in the Critical Items List, especially 
for those such as the liquid-fueled main engines, 
which require unstinting maintenance and 
overhaul. 
With regard to the Orbiters, NASA should: 
· Develop and execute a comprehensive 
maintenance inspection plan.  
· Perform periodic structural inspections 
when scheduled and not permit them to 
be waived.  
· Restore and support the maintenance 
and spare parts programs, and stop the 
practice of removing parts from one 
Orbiter to supply another.  
  
 
Concluding Thought   
  
The Commission urges that NASA continue to 
receive the support of the Administration and the 
nation. The agency constitutes a national 
resource that plays a critical role in space 
exploration and development. It also provides a 
symbol of national pride and technological 
leadership. 
The Commission applauds NASA's spectacular 
achievements of the past and anticipates 
impressive achievements to come. The findings 
and recommendations presented in this report 
are intended to contribute to the future NASA 
successes that the nation both expects and 
requires as the 21st century approaches.  
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Appendix A: Commission Activities. 
  
 
An Overview 
President Reagan, seeking to ensure a thorough 
and unbiased investigation of the Challenger 
accident, announced the formation of the 
Commission on February 3, 1986. The mandate 
given by the President, contained in Executive 
Order 12546, required Commission members to: 
(1) Review the circumstances surrounding the 
accident to establish the probable cause or causes 
of the accident; and 
(2) Develop recommendations for corrective or 
other action based upon the Commission's 
findings and determinations. 
Following their swearing in by Chairman Rogers 
on February 6th, Commission members 
immediately began a series of hearings during 
which NASA officials outlined agency 
procedures covering the Shuttle program and the 
status of NASA's investigation of the accident. 
Shortly thereafter, on February 10th, Dr. Alton G. 
Keel, Jr., Associate Director of the Office of' 
Management and Budget, was appointed 
Executive Director. Dr. Keel began gathering a 
staff of 15 experienced investigators from 
various government agencies and the military 
services, and administrative personnel to support 
Commission activities. 
During a closed session on February 10, 1986, 
the Commission began to learn of the troubled 
history of the Solid Rocket Motor joint and seals. 
Moreover, it discovered the first indication that 
the contractor, Morton Thiokol, initially 
recommended against launch on January 27, 
1986, the night before the launch of 51-L, 
because of concerns regarding low temperature 
effects on the joint and seal. To investigate this 
disturbing development, additional closed 
sessions were scheduled for February 13th and 
14th at Kennedy. The February 13, 1986, session 
was an extensive presentation of film, video and 
telemetry data relating to the Challenger accident. 
It provided the Commission the first evidence 
that the Solid Rocket Motor joint and seal may 
have malfunctioned, initiating the accident. 
The session on February 14th included NASA 
and contractor participants involved in the 
discussion on January 27, 1986, not to launch 
51-L. After testimony was received, an executive 
session of the Commission was convened. The 
following statement was subsequently issued by 
the Chairman on February 15, 1986, reflecting 
the conclusion and view of the Commission: 
"In recent days, the Commission has been 
investigating all aspects of the decision making 
process leading up to the launch of the 
Challenger and has found that the process may 
have been flawed. The President has been so 
advised. 
"Dr. William Graham, Acting Administrator of 
NASA, has been asked not to include on the 
internal investigating teams at NASA, persons 
involved in that process. 
"The Commission will, of course, continue its 
investigation and will make a full report to the 
President within 120 days." 
The role of the Commissioners thus changed 
from that of overseers to that of active 
investigators and analysts of data presented by 
NASA and its contractors. 
 207 
The Commission itself divided into four 
investigative panels: 
1. Development and Production, responsible for 
investigating the acquisition and test and 
evaluation processes for the Space Shuttle 
elements; 
2. Pre-Launch Activities, responsible for 
assessing the Shuttle system processing, launch 
readiness process and pre-launch security; 
3. Mission Planning and Operations, responsible 
for investigating mission planning and 
operations, schedule pressures and crew safety 
areas; and 
4. Accident Analysis, charged with analyzing the 
accident data and developing both an anomaly 
tree and accident scenarios. 
By February 17th, the panel organization had 
been finalized and, on February 18th, Chairman 
Rogers described the Commission's new 
approach before Congress. Working groups were 
sent to Marshall, Kennedy and Thiokol to 
analyze data relating to the accident and to 
redirect efforts. NASA's investigation was also 
reorganized to reflect the structure of the 
Commission's panels. A series of public hearings 
were planned on February 25th, 26th and 27th to 
assure an orderly and fair presentation of all the 
facts that the Commission had discovered 
concerning the launch decision making process 
for flight 51-L. At these hearings, additional 
information about the launch decision was 
obtained from the testimony of Thiokol, 
Rockwell and NASA officials. Details about the 
history of problems with the then suspect Solid 
Rocket Motor joints and seals also began 
emerging and served to focus the Commission's 
attention on a need to document fully the extent 
of knowledge and awareness about the problems 
within both Thiokol and NASA. Following these 
hearings, a substantial portion of the 
investigative efforts of the Commission was 
conducted by the separate panels in parallel with 
full Commission hearings. The Accident 
Analysis Panel, chaired by Major General 
Donald Kutyna, made several trips to both 
Kennedy and Marshall and traveled to Thiokol 
facilities in Utah to review photographic and 
telemetric evidence as well as the results of the 
salvage operation and to oversee the tests being 
conducted by NASA and Thiokol engineers. The 
Accident Analysis Panel followed standard 
investigative procedures. An extensive effort was 
needed to establish the design, manufacturing 
and processing baseline configuration of the 
Shuttle vehicle for STS 51-L. A data base was 
established for the examination and analysis of 
information related to all flight elements and 
segments. From these data and a compilation of 
possible and observed deviations from the norm, 
scenarios that might have led to the accident 
were developed. Tests and analyses were then 
performed to determine the specific scenarios 
most likely to have caused loss of Challenger.  
Early in March, at the request of the Chairman, 
this group assembled and directed the 
Commission's independent team of technical 
observers with extensive experience in Solid 
Rocket Motor technology and accident 
investigation to validate and interpret the tests 
and analyses performed on the Thiokol motor by 
NASA and Thiokol. 
The Development and Production Panel, 
chaired by Joseph Sutter, centered its 
investigation on the production and testing 
activities of the Shuttle element contractors. 
Starting at Johnson, the panel and staff 
investigators  looked at how these contractors and 
their NASA counterparts interact. They next 
traveled to the Wasatch plant of Thiokol in 
Promontory, Utah. Thiokol personnel briefed the 
group on the details of the design, manufacturing, 
verification and certification of the Solid Rocket 
Motors. Similar sessions took place in April in 
Downey, California, at the headquarters of 
Rocketdyne, Inc., the Shuttle main engine 
contractor; in Canoga Park, California, at the 
facilities of Rockwell International, the Orbiter 
contractor; in Michoud, Louisiana, at the plant of 
Martin Marietta, the External Tank contractor; 
and in Berea, Kentucky, at the facilities of Parker 
Seal Company, the manufacturers of the O-ring 
seals of the Thiokol Solid Rocket Motors. 
In addition, the panel traveled to Marshall to 
learn about Marshall's interaction with Thiokol 
and to discuss issues that had been raised during 
the visits to the contractors' plants. The Pre-
Launch Activities Panel, chaired by David 
Acheson, centered its investigation at Kennedy 
where the Shuttle elements are assembled and all 
other final launch preparations are completed. 
This panel, in conjunction with the Mission 
Planning and Operations Panel, chaired by Dr. 
Sally Ride, met with its NASA counterparts in 
early March. This series of meetings identified 
for the Commission the various aspects of the 
pre 
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 launch process that required thorough review, 
not only for the purpose of the Challenger 
accident investigation but also to increase safety 
margins for the future. 
Later in March the Pre-Launch Panel again met 
at Kennedy to receive the NASA Team's 
preliminary reports and to focus on the spare 
parts issue and Solid Rocket Booster assembly 
operations. Panel members also met with 
contractor personnel involved in Shuttle 
processing and Kennedy security work. 
After the joint meeting at Kennedy with the Pre-
Launch Activities Panel, the Mission Planning 
and Operations Panel traveled to Johnson to 
begin working with its NASA counterparts and 
to initiate its own investigative efforts. A specific 
focus of its work was the mission planning and 
crew preparation for STS 51-L and details of 
NASA's safety, reliability and quality assurance 
programs. Later meetings at both Johnson and 
Marshall dealt with range safety, weather criteria 
for launch, flight delays and hardware testing. 
While the work of the individual panels and their 
investigative staffs was ongoing, a general 
investigative staff began a series of individual 
interviews to document fully the factual 
background of various areas of the Commission's 
interest, including the telecon between NASA 
and Thiokol officials the night before the launch; 
the history of joint design and O-ring problems; 
NASA safety, reliability and quality assurance 
functions; and the assembly of the right Solid 
Rocket Booster for STS 51-L. Subsequent 
investigative efforts by this group were directed 
in the area of the effectiveness of NASA's 
organizational structure, particularly the Shuttle 
program structure, and allegations that there had 
been external pressure on NASA to launch on 
January 28th. 
More than 160 individuals were interviewed and 
more than 35 formal panel investigative sessions 
were held generating almost 12,000 pages of 
transcript (Table 1 and Table 2). Almost 6,300 
documents, totaling more than 122,000 pages, 
and hundreds of photographs were examined and 
made a part of the Commission's permanent data 
base and archives. These sessions and all the data 
gathered added to the 2,800 pages of hearing 
transcript generated by the Commission in both 
closed and open sessions. 
In addition to the work of the Commission and 
the Commission staff, NASA personnel 
expended a vast effort in the investigation. More 
than 1,300 employees from all NASA facilities 
were involved and were supported by more than 
1,600 people from other government agencies 
and over 3,100 from NASA's contractor 
organizations. Particularly significant were the 
activities of the military, the Coast Guard and the 
NTSB in the salvage and analysis of the Shuttle 
wreckage. 
  
Table 1 
Commission Investigative Interviews  
.  
Interviews of January 27, 1986 Teleconference (8:15 PM EST) Participants  
.  
Ben Powers   John Schell  William Macbeth   Jerry E Mason  
Frank Adams   Keith Coates   Brian Russell  Robert Lund  
Larry Wear  George Hardy  Jack Kapp  Joseph Kilminster  
James Smith   Jud Lovingood  Ron Ebeling   Roger Boisjoly  
Boyd Brinton  Jack Buchanan  Calvin Wiggins   Arnold Thompson  
Robert Schwinghamer  Allan McDonald  Larry Sayer  Jerry Peoples   
William Reihl   Carver Kennedy  Joel Maw  James Kingsbury  
Wayne Littles   Cecil Houston  Kyle Speas    
John Q Miller  Lawrence Mulloy  Jerry Burn   
John McCarty  Stanley Reinartz  Don Ketner   
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Interviews of Personnel Involved in Stacking of Right SRB for Flight 51-L  
.  
Howard Fichtl   Ed O'Neal  Mike Sesti le  Jim Gardner  
Jack Roberts   Leslie Lake  Granville Goad  John Taris   
Curtis J. Newsome  Buddy Rogers   David Mumpower  Kenneth Koby  
Mark Vigil  Mario Duran  Robin Nix  Allen R. Hyde  
Bob Heinbaugh  Jim St. John  Glenn Charron  Jerry Wilkerson  
Howard Christy  Billy Massey  Stewart Dalton  Alex McCool  
Jackie Walden  Mike Sieglitz  Sharron Whitaker  Charles D. Newman   
Alvie Hicks   Jim Jordan    
Interviews on Ice on Pad  
Thomas Moser  
John Peller  
Interviews on Security  
Marvin Jones  
Herbert Weisner  
 Interviews on History of SRB Joint Design and Problem  
.  
Leon Ray  Robert Lindstrom   James Kingsbury  Ben Powers   
Alex McCool  James Brier  Sam Lowry  Michael Mann  
Jerry Peoples   Jesse Moore  Stanley Reinartz  Richard Kohrs   
Glenn Eudy  Joseph Kilminster  Calvin Wiggins   Maurice Parker  
Ben Powers   Arnold Thompson  Mark Salita   Keith Coates   
John Miller  Irving Davids   Joe Pelham   John Schell  
Bill Rice   Arnold Aldrich  Phillip Dykstera  James W. J homes   
Bill Horton   Hans Mark  Ed Dorsey  Boyd Brinton  
Jerry Cox  Glynn Lunney  Roger Boisjoly  James Abrahamson  
Bill Bush  Walt C. Williams   Brian Russel  Jerry Mason  
Paul Wetzel  George Hardy  Jack Kemp  Jack Kapp  
David Winterhalter  Larry Mulloy  Robert Lund  Ronald Ebeling   
William Ham by  Fred Uptagrafft  Howard McIntosh  Arnold Aldrich  
Michael Weeks   Richard Cook  Glenn Eudy  Hazel Saunders   
Paul Herr  Walter Dankhoff  Robert Gaffin   
 Interview on Launch Coverage Camera Failures  
Charles Alsworth  
 Interviews on Outside Pressure To Launch  
.  
Michael Weeks   Phil Culbertson   Jerry E. Mason  Karen Ehlers   
Jesse Moore  George Hardy  Arnold Aldrich  George Johnson  
Charles Kupperman  Larry Mulloy  Lawrence Wear  James Beggs   
Shirley Green  Joseph Kilminster  John Q. Miller  William  R. Graham   
Vera Herschberg  Stanley Reinartz  James Smith   Richard Cook  
Richard Smith   Robert Lund  Norman Terrell  Ben Powers   
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Interviews on Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance  
.  
David Brown  Jackie C. Walker  Howard Gittens   Wayne Frazier  
Richard M. Henritze   Benny Nunnelly  Brian Russell  Norman R. Schulze   
James 0. Batte   George Butler  Haggai Cohen  Stanley Reinartz  
Arthur M. Carr  Henry P. Smith   Harry Quong  Milton Silveira  
Wiley C. Bunn  Wesley Hawkins   Dallas N. Vickers    
David Austin  John Maxson    
  
Interviews on Management Structure  
.  
Dick Kohrs   James Smith   Jerry Cox  Richard A. Colonna  
Jesse Moore  Arnold Aldrich  Jerry Griffin  Walt C. Williams  
Dr. Hans Mark  John J. McCarty  Stanley Reinartz  George Bridwell  
William Hamby  Scott Simpkinson  James Kingsbury  George Johnson  
Michael Weeks   James Brier  Thomas J. Lee  Richard Cook  
Lawrence Wear  Jud A. Lovingood  William F. Taylor  Michael Mann  
John Q. Miller  Bill Bush    
William Lucas      
  
Interviews on Human Factors  
.  
Louis E. Toole  Jenny Howard  Ray Hallard  Gregory Haywood Williams   
James B. Hill  Greg Oliver  Ken McCrary  Robert L. Brayant  
Leonard J. Riche  Robert Yackovetsky  Joe Kenneth Patterson  Keith Coates   
Heather M. Mitchell  Morton O'Hare    
Interview on Wreckage Reconstruction 
Terry Armentrout 
Interview on Crew Activities  
George Abbey 
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[211] Table 2. Commission Panel Sessions   
.  
Date   Location   Subject  
Accident Analysis Panel  
March 3, 4, 5  Marshall   Accident Data Review, Fault Tree Analysis   
March 6, 7  Kennedy  Film & Wreckage Review  
March 11  Kennedy  Coordination with NASA Task Force  
March 12, 13  Marshall   Accident Data Review, Fault Tree Analysis, Test Requirements   
March 19  Thiokol-Utah  Test Coordination  
March 26  Marshall   Test Review  
April 10, 11  Marshall   Test Review  
April 14, 15, 16, 17 Marshall   Final Review  
.  
Design, Development and Production Panel  
March 5  Johnson   Preliminary Briefing  
March 17  Thiokol-Utah  Fact-Finding Session  
March 18  Thiokol-Utah  Design-Production  
April 2  Rocketdyne-California  Main Engines   
April 3  Rocketdyne & Rockwell-California  Development-Orbiter  
April 4  Rockwell-California  Orbiter  
April 7  Marshall   Development and Production  
April 8,9   Martin Marietta-Louisiana   Development-External Tank  
April 11  Parker Seal-Kentucky  O-rings   
.  
Pre-Launch Activities Panel  
.  
March 4, 5, 6  Kennedy  Training, Workload, Schedule, Spares, Pre-launch Investigation Update, Security  
March 17, 18, l9  Kennedy  Manpower, Spare Parts, Shuttle Processing, Security, Hold-
down Post Spring 51-L, Booster Flow, Salvage Status, SRB 
Recovery, Launch Readiness Process   
.  
Mission Planning and Operations Panel  
March 4, 5  Kennedy  Preliminary Briefing  
March 11, 12  Johnson   Crew Activity Planning, Training, Abort Modes, Safety, Manifesting   
March 20  Johnson   Objectives Review  
March 24, 25  Johnson   Range Safety, Mission Operations, Landing Operations, 
Weather, Tile Damage, Main Engines, Safety, Reliability 
and Quality Assurance  
March 31, April 1   Johnson   Payload Safety, Hardware Testing, Training, 51-L Flight Design   
April 7  Marshall   Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance   
April 8, 9   Johnson   Workload, Software, Manifesting, Landing Considerations   
April 14, 15  Johnson   Ascent/Entry Envelope, Abort Option History, Safety, 
Reliability and Quality Assurance  
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Executive Order 12546, dated February 3, 1986, which established the Presidential Commission on the 
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. 
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Appendix B: Commission Documentation System. 
  
 
Overview 
One of the Commission's initial concerns was to 
make certain that Commission members and 
staff would have ready access to the tens of 
thousands of pages of technical information, 
hearing transcripts, witness interviews, and 
correspondence relating to the Challenger 
accident. Several aspects of the investigation 
made gathering, controlling, and cataloging such 
information a formidable task. One was the 
massive volume of information collected. In 
addition, the fairly short response time required 
of the Commission made it imperative that all 
information be immediately and completely 
accessible. Finally, the Commission needed to 
make sure that it could account for and retrieve 
every piece of information that it collected and 
generated.  
To address those issues, the Commission enlisted 
the support of the Justice Department's Office of 
Litigation Support, Civil Division. 
With existing capabilities, the Office of 
Litigation Support mounted a rigorous 
cataloging effort, developed and implemented a 
document control system, created the automated 
data bases, and established a Commission 
documents Support Center for document 
processing and research activities. 
The resulting system enabled the Commission to 
manage the volume and assortment of 
information received and generated in the course 
of the investigation, and provided Commission 
staff with rapid access to needed information. 
The system was designed to enable access to 
either hard copy or microfilm for future research 
after the Commission completed its work. 
The Commission was able to meet its 
commitment to ensuring the integrity of this 
extensive collection of information; all 
information pertaining to the investigation can be 
easily located and its origin readily traced. 
  
The Commission Information Management 
System 
The Commission developed procedures to assure 
that it received all documents requested from 
NASA and other sources and that all documents 
and other correspondence were properly 
processed. 
  
Document Control  
The Commission had control procedures and 
systems to track all types of documents relevant 
to the investigation. Specific procedures were 
used to process (1) Commission requests for 
information from NASA, and NASA's responses; 
(2) NASA Task Force Reports; (3) other 
correspondence to and from the Commission; (4) 
other documents obtained by the Commission; 
and (5) reports and transcripts generated by the 
commission. 
The document control system ensured that all 
requests, documents, transcript and interview 
tapes, and other source materials were properly 
accounted for, and became part of the 
Commission's permanent records and data base. 
  
Documents Requested from NASA  
Most documents relevant to the investigation 
came directly from NASA in response to 
Commission requests. The Commission 
requested documents from NASA in writing or 
verbally at 
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hearings. The Commission followed up verbal 
requests with written requests. To handle the 
flow of paper, the Commission assigned a staff 
member to be document coordinator. The 
document coordinator assigned every written 
request a unique control number. The number 
identified the date of the request and its order of 
occurrence on that date. NASA set up a 
complementary system. The NASA coordinator 
received and logged Commission request letters, 
assigned unique NASA tracking numbers to each 
item or group of documents requested, and 
followed up to ensure that NASA staff 
responded promptly and fully. When documents 
were received from NASA corresponding to 
each numbered request, one copy of each was 
sent to the Support Center for microfilming, 
analysis (coding), and inclusion in the computer 
data base. 
Correspondence 
 
Each individual piece of nonpersonal 
mail arriving at the Commission was assigned a 
correspondence control number. Technical staff 
evaluated correspondence for investigative value. 
On a microcomputer-based system, staff 
captured critical information about each 
correspondence item, including correspondence 
control number, date of receipt, addressee, author, 
type of correspondence, and response date and 
type. 
 
Other Documents 
 
The Commission also received many 
documents other than those requested from 
NASA. These included relevant materials that 
Commission members themselves had gathered 
or generated, those from NASA and from the 
various NASA contractors as a result of 
Commission investigative activities, and 
incoming correspondence that staff decided 
would be of use to the investigation. These 
documents were also entered into the 
Commission's data base, and relevant 
correspondence was also entered into the 
microcomputer tracking system. 
Transcripts and Commission-Generated 
Documents 
The Commission used a court reporting 
firm to transcribe hearings, interviews, and 
meetings. The firm created magnetic computer 
tapes with the full text of the transcripts and 
delivered the tapes to be loaded into the 
computer data base.  
The firm also provided hard copies of 
the transcripts to all participants of the hearing, 
interview, or meeting so that they could correct 
any mistakes made in transcription. Quick entry 
of the transcripts into the data base allowed 
timely search of transcript records on a word-by-
word basis. 
Processing of Documents and Tapes by the 
Support Center 
 
As described in the previous section on 
document control, the Commission forwarded 
most documents to the Support Center for 
microfilming, coding, inclusion in the computer 
data base, and filing in the library. These 
documents included NASA reports and 
documents, selected correspondence, and other 
documents received by the Commission. 
Assignment of Control Numbers  
When the Support Center received a 
document, Center staff immediately applied a 
unique preliminary control (PC) number to each 
page of the document. This number was a 
sequential number to indicate where the original 
copy of the document would be located in the 
library files. 
 
Microfilming 
After control identifiers were assigned, 
Center staff microfilmed the document and 
placed the original hard copy in the library. The 
Center made daily deliveries of completed 
microfilm reels to the microfilm processing 
facility, which produced two copies of each reel. 
The Support Center maintained one copy in the 
microfilm library, and used it to respond to 
information requests from Commission members 
and staff. 
The second copy was used to produce hard 
copies of the documents for coding purposes. 
Coding and Data Entry of Microfilmed 
Documents 
The purpose of coding was to develop a 
comprehensive computerized index of all 
microfilmed documents. Using hard copies 
produced from microfilm, each document was 
reviewed and bibliographic, control, and subject 
matter information was recorded on a coding 
form designed specifically for the Commission 
investigation. 
The bibliographic information included 
items such as document tit le and date, and names 
and organizations of people mentioned in the 
documents. The control information included the
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preliminary control number, microfilm number 
and other information useful in identifying and 
locating documents. 
To capture information on subject matter, coders 
read each document and noted what subjects 
were mentioned. The coders used a list of 
"subject terms" developed specifically for 
Commission purposes. Each subject term had a 
unique six-character identifier. Every document 
was assigned at least one such subject code. 
Documents that covered many subjects were 
assigned multiple codes. Data entry operators 
keyed the index information from the completed 
coding forms onto magnetic tape to be loaded 
into the computer data base. 
From the date a document was received, it was 
microfilmed, filed in the hard copy and 
microfilm libraries, coded, and entered on the 
computer data base within one week. Throughout 
the process, there were numerous quality checks 
to ensure the readability of the microfilm,  the 
accuracy of the document coding, and the overall 
integrity of the data base. 
 Creation and Data Entry of Index 
Information from Transcripts and 
Commission Generated Documents  
For the Commission generated documents and 
the transcripts, index information was captured 
and entered into the computer. This information 
included date of the hearing or report; names of 
all attendees, Commission members or witnesses; 
and other cross-reference data. 
The index information was added to the fulltext 
versions on the magnetic computer tapes, and 
loaded into the computer data base. 
 Creation of the Computer Data Base 
Through the processes described above, the 
Commission created two computer data bases. 
The first-called the document data base, named 
INQUIRE-contained the index (bibliographic, 
control, and subject matter information) of all 
microfilmed documents, representing more than 
100,000 pages. The second-called the full-text 
data base, named JURIS-contained the full text 
of (1) transcripts of all Commission hearings, 
interviews, and panel meetings; and (2) 
Commission reports, hearing digests, and 
affidavits. 
 Libraries  
Documents and Microfilm 
As noted above, the Support Center maintained 
libraries of Commission documents. 
One contained the microfilmed versions of the 
more than 122,000 pages of materials indexed on 
the document data base. The microfilm was filed 
by reel number and cross-referenced to the 
preliminary control number assigned to the 
original hard copy of each document. 
Microfilmed documents could be quickly located 
through the computer search capability and hard 
copies printed, if desired. The second library 
contained hard copies of transcripts and other 
Commission generated documents (those 
documents stored in the fulltext data base), plus 
the originals of the microfilmed documents, 
which could be located by using the preliminary 
control number. 
Other Materials  
The Commission also maintained a library of 
video tapes of presentations, hearings, 
photographic and film records relating to the 
accident itself, and the salvage operations. These 
tapes were filed chronologically by date received 
and labeled according to subject. Use of these 
materials was controlled through a library 
checkout system. Audio tapes of interviews were 
labeled and maintained at the Support Center. 
These were filed chronologically by interview 
date and controlled through a library check-out 
system. 
 Use of the Data Bases  
The Support Center provided personnel to 
perform searches of both the document data base 
(INQUIRE) and the full-text data base JURIS). 
Access to INQUIRE and JURIS was gained from 
terminals at the Support Center and the 
Commission offices. Detailed information on the 
use of these systems is available in the following 
OLS documentation: "INQUIRE Users Manual," 
"JURIS Users Manual," and "Challenger Data 
Bases-Sample Searches for JURIS and 
INQUIRE. " 
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The Document Data Base Accessible Through 
INQUIRE 
The INQUIRE system allowed rapid retrieval 
and review of the index information that 
constituted the document data base. 
Users who wanted to locate documents on a 
particular subject (such as O-ring erosion) could 
search the document data base using the 
bibliographic information or subject codes 
captured for each document. INQUIRE provided 
a listing of all documents matching the criteria 
specified in the search. The user could then 
decide which of the listed documents would be 
useful and, using the document number provided, 
obtain a copy of the document from the library. 
The user could ask INQUIRE to list a variety of 
information on selected documents, including the 
preliminary control number (used to locate the 
material in the library), date, title, and document 
type. INQUIRE could also print all the subject 
terms associated with each selected document 
(not just the subject term(s) that matched the 
search criteria), and all the names mentioned in 
the text. Users could also choose the order in 
which INQUIRE listed the documents (e. g., 
chronologically by document date, alphabetically 
by author name, or numerically by document 
number). 
The Full-Text Data Base Accessible Through 
JURIS  
The Department of Justice developed JURIS 
specifically for retrieval of full-text information, 
and designed it for easy use by nontechnical 
personnel. Users could ask JURIS to locate all 
documents containing specific words or phrases. 
Users could specify multiple words or phrases, 
and could include index information as one of 
the search criteria. Users could request that 
JURIS print a list of documents that were 
selected, or print the full text of the documents. 
Final Disposition of Commission Report and 
Investigation-Related Materials  
The entire collection of documents and 
microfilm is permanently housed in the National 
Archives. In addition, several different indices 
and other supporting documentation were 
compiled to assist historians and others in using 
and gaining access to this large and very 
important collection. 
These materials were provided to the National 
Archives in accordance with the procedures 
described in FPMR 101-1 1 .4, "General Records 
Schedules," published by the National Archives 
and Records Administration, and specifically 
Schedule 24 which focuses on "Temporary 
Commissions, Committees, and Boards 
Records." 
 Materials Provided 
The following materials were turned over to the 
Archives at the conclusion of the investigation: 
· The Commission's Report, including all 
appendices;  
· All materials requested and received by 
the Commission from NASA and its 
contractors, including the NASA Task 
Force reports;  
· All documents provided to the 
Commission and its  staff at hearings, 
meetings, presentations, and interviews;  
· The entire microfilm collection 
containing those materials (both in 
open-reel and cartridge format), as well 
as a file-level index to each reel;  
· All transcripts of hearings, panel 
meetings and interviews;  
· Summaries of all hearing transcripts and 
significant interview transcripts;  
· Indices to the INQUIRE (document) 
data base, listing all of the documents 
by document number, date, and subject 
term;  
· All correspondence and respective 
responses, as well as indices to the 
entire correspondence collection sorted 
by author, correspondence type, and 
date of receipt;  
· Computer tapes containing the entire 
INQUIRE data base prepared for and 
used by the Commission in the course 
of its investigation;  
· Complete set of the request letters sent 
by the Commission to NASA, the 
resulting Action Item forms, and the 
responsive memoranda that closed out 
each of those Action Items;  
· All press releases produced by the 
Commission;  
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· All video and audio tapes received by 
the Commission, including indices to 
those two collections; and  
· All planning and instructional materials 
related to the creation and use of the 
INQUIRE and JURIS data bases.  
  
Public Access 
To gain access to the Commission's documents, 
requests can be made to: 
Office of National Archives  
National Archives and Records Administration  
Washington, DC 20408  
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Appendix C: Observations Concerning the Processing and Assembly of 
Flight 51-L. 
  
  
The following examples of Operational 
Maintenance Requirements and Specifications 
Document violations were noted during the 
Commission's inquiry:1 
1. The Operational Maintenance Requirements 
and Specifications Document indicated that the 
External Tank liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen 
ullage pressure control and redundancy 
verification using simulated transducers was a 
requirement for this processing. However, the 
entire sequence was marked "not performed" in 
the documentation, indicating that it had not 
been completed. Missing any of these steps has 
implications for safety of flight. 
2. The three requirements that verify the main 
engine pneumatic isolation valve actuation were 
not met as specifically called for in the 
Operational Maintenance Requirements and 
Specifications Document. The intent of the 
requirement was met. 
3. One requirement (main engine pneumatic 
isolation check valve individual follow-through 
test) was not met in the Operations & 
Maintenance Instructions. The main engine flight 
readiness tests gave assurance that at least one of 
two check valves per system was working. 
4. A main engine pneumatic regulator functional 
test, which checks the redundancy of individual 
regulators, was not verified under flow 
conditions. 
5. The results of helium pneumatic low pressure 
system decay check (with closing solenoids 
energized) exceeded the allowable limit. The 
decay rate was recorded as 0.98 pounds per 
square inch per minute; however, a recalculation 
of the data revealed that the decay rate was 
actually 1.4 pounds per square inch per minute. 
The calculated allowable decay rate was 1.35 
pounds per square inch per minute maximum. 
6. The leak check steps for test port Number 4, 
after installation of the plug, were inadvertently 
omitted from the Operations & Maintenance 
Instructions. 
7. Main engine protective covers were not 
installed at times required. A revision to the 
requirement is needed. 
8. Several requirements cannot be satisfied 
during a 24-hour launch scrub turnaround due to 
lack of access. A revision to the requirement is 
needed. 
9. The humidity indicator inspection requirement 
was not met because the engines were not in the 
controlled environment with a trickle purge on. 
The requirement needs to be updated. 
  
Representative samples were taken from the 
Orbiter processing paper. Of 121 Operations & 
Maintenance Instructions reviewed, 47 percent 
had paper errors. Incomplete, incorrect or 
missing data recording points were found in 
about 13 percent of the cases and 32 percent had 
Quality Control buy-off stamps missing. 
Also reviewed were 479 Work Authorization 
Documents in the Interim Problem Report, 
Problem Report and Test Preparation Sheet 
categories. Of those documents, 70 percent had  
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anomalies, including inaccurate/inadequate level 
of detail (36 percent), missing stamps (24 
percent), correct signatures not obtained (29 
percent), and inaccurately detailed summary for 
closure or deferral (20 percent). 
In addition to normal processing, there were 22 
Modification Change Requests applicable to 
flight 51-L. Those requests generated 51 Work 
Authorization Documents, all of which were 
reviewed as part of the post-accident study of 
flight 51-L processing. Although not accident 
related, 96 percent of the Work Authorization 
Documents were found to have errors of an 
administrative or format nature. Those examples 
led to the conclusion that there was a pervasive 
lack of discipline and lack of proper training 
with respect to how Work Authorization 
Documents are written and implemented. 2 
The same lack of completeness and accuracy was 
discovered in review of nearly all types of 
paperwork in the processing system. The amount 
of flawed paper work-approximately 50 percent-
is unacceptable. There are several contributing 
factors, among them signature requirements that 
are lengthy and require people to travel long 
distances to accomplish, excessively long times 
required to close out paper, as compared with 
doing the actual work; lack of understanding of 
the paper system; a complicated tiered control 
and status trail for Quality Assurance personnel; 
and the fact that no single organization has the 
responsibility for final review for closure. 
Basically, the system is not simplified for the 
originator, performer, or verifier. Therefore, it is 
not a useful tool, which would be the only reason 
for its existence. Rather, it is an impediment to 
good work and good records.3 
The work control documentation system is 
cumbersome and difficult to use. Consequently, 
the work force does not try very hard to use it. 
The result is that the real-time execution of tasks 
and their subsequent traceability suffer. The 
system needs to be simplified so that it becomes 
"user friendly." Once it is, the work force should 
be trained to use it and management should place 
proper emphasis on rigorous observance of the 
documentation requirements. 
 Flight 51-L Booster Processing   
With Shuttle mission STS-6 in April 1983, 
NASA introduced the "lightweight" version of 
the Solid Rocket Booster, about 4,000 pounds 
lighter than its 185,000-pound (empty weight) 
predecessors. The weight reduction was achieved 
by shaving the thickness of each steel casing by 
two to four hundredths of an inch. On flight 51-L, 
all but the forward segments of the two boosters 
had lightweight casings. 
There are 11 separate case components in each 
Solid Rocket Booster. Only two of the 22 
components in the 51-L stack were new. The 
remaining 20 components had been used a 
combined total of 29 times previously, in ground 
tests and in flight. The new components were the 
right forward center tang and the left forward 
dome. The right forward segment (Number 085) 
had been part of the flight 51-C (January 24-27, 
1985) left forward field joint that had 
experienced O-ring erosion and deposited soot 
behind the primary O-ring. None of the other 51-
L case segments had experienced O-ring 
problems on previous use. 
Segment L-60, the right aft center tang 
component, had been flown on 41-D (August 30-
September 5, 1984) as the left forward center 
tang component. Segment L-06, the right aft 
clevis component, had been flown on 51-C as the 
left aft clevis member. Segment L-06 had 
undergone another burn in addition to 51-C; it 
had been used as part of the left aft segment in a 
static test firing.4 The first of the eight motor 
segments for flight 51-L arrived by rail at 
Kennedy Space Center on October 11, 1985. The 
last reached Kennedy on November 4. The 
segments for 51-L were designated booster 
integration set BI026. Grain inspection and 
offloading began on October 24. Stacking 
preliminaries for the left booster got under way 
on October 28 with the mating of the aft segment 
to the skirt that surrounds the nozzle. The 
stacking of the right booster began on December 
4. During the stacking operation, which involves 
assembling the components of the Solid Rocket 
Booster one atop the other on the Mobile Launch 
Platform (MLP), a number of minor deviations 
and a few unusual situations were experienced. 
They were carefully reviewed by the NASA 
report team and by the Commission. With one 
possible exception, explained below, these 
incidents did not have significant impact on the 
performance of the Solid Rocket Boosters. 
Before stacking of the right hand booster, 
measurements of the right aft center tang and the 
right aft clevis diameters indicated a potential for 
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stacking interference. Taken across the 0-180 
degree axis, the tang diameter measurement 
exceeded the corresponding clevis dimension by 
+.512 inch. The maximum allowable tang to 
clevis difference is +.250 inch. 
Normal Operations and Maintenance Instructions 
procedures were followed for bringing the out-
of-round segment into allowable tolerances. 
While the right aft center segment was hanging 
from four points on a lifting beam, the first step 
was to adjust the lifting beam to create a two-
point lift across the 90-270 degree axis. The 
weight of the segment itself would decrease the 
tang diameter across the 0-180 degree axis. This 
process reduced the excess measurement to 
+ .334 inch, but it was still outside the allowable 
tolerance. 
The next step in the procedure was to install the 
circumferential alignment tool. It was installed 
across the 16-196 degree axis and maximum 
allowable pressure of 1,200 pounds per square 
inch gauge was applied to the tool. This 
produced a further improvement, but again fell 
short of the measurement requirements. 
Additional deflection was obtained by turning 
the hex nut on the alignment tool. This caused 
the hydraulic pressure on the tool to increase to 
1,300-1,500 pounds per square inch gauge, 
which exceeded the limit on the tool. The 
procedure produced a force of 3,254-3,766 
pounds on the 
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Table 1 Right Aft Center Segment Tang to Aft Segment Clevis Diameter Measurement Differentials 
Taken on December 7, 1985 (Positive is Tang Larger)  
.  
Circumferential 
Location  
4-Point 
Lift  
0145 hrs  
Initial 2-
point Lift 
0305 hrs  
Intermediate 2-
Point Lift  
0354 hrs  
Final 2-Point 
Lift  
0415 hrs  
Alignment 
Tool Installed 
16°/196°  
0925 hrs  
Alignment Tool 
Removed 
0945 hrs  
.  
0°  + .512 + .393 + .334 + .334 + .138 + .216 
30° + .158 + .295 + .315 + .315 N/A  + .158 
60° - .334  - .236 - .157 - .157 - .079 - .118 
90° - .728 - .571 - .531 - .531 - .295 - .334 
120° - .669 - .571 - .531 - .531 - .374 - .393 
150° + .059 0 + .020 + .020 - .39 - .059 
.  
NOTE: Measurements to nearest .001 inch are approximate   
 
segment case, which was within manufacturer 
specifications. Although this procedure was at 
that time authorized by the Operations and 
Maintenance Instruction, it has since been 
deleted because the application of increased 
pressure on the alignment tool risks damage to 
the tool. 
Following all of these procedures, measurement 
of the tang showed the differential between the 
tang and clevis along the 0-180 degree axis to be 
+ .138 inch, which was considered suitable for 
mate. The right aft center segment was hoisted 
from the transfer aisle and lo wered into position 
above the aft segment in the Vehicle Assembly 
Building high bay. The alignment tool was 
removed and final tang measurements showed a 
differential of + .216 inch, indicating mating was 
possible. Installation of both O-rings and 
successful stacking of the segments then took 
place without incident. No further problems were 
identified during engagement of the two 
segments. Table 1 shows the measurements 
taken at various stages of the entire procedure.5 
The several sets of tang/clevis diametric 
measurements referred to in the foregoing 
discussion, and presented in Table 1, were 
reported by the stacking crews at Kennedy.  
Two conspicuous aspects of the 51-L right aft 
field joint warrant comparison with joint history 
of earlier flights. Those aspects are the use of the 
circumferential alignment tool and the large 
tang-to-clevis negative diameter difference of -
 .393 inch along the 120-300-degree axis. 
However, the NASA Operations and 
Maintenance Instructions do not specify a limit 
to negative differences between tang and clevis. 
The alignment tool had been used five times 
previously; its usage is shown in Table 2. 6 
 Table 2. Alignment Tool Use History  
.  
Mission  Field Joint O-Ring Damage  
.  
51-B  Left Aft  None  
51-F  Left Fwd  None  
61-B  Left Aft  None  
Left Aft  Erosion  61-C (2 joints)  
Right Aft  None  
  
Of the five field joints on which the alignment 
tool was used, one experienced erosion.  
There were 13 Solid Rocket Booster joints 
on missions 51-C (January 1985) through 
61-C (January 1986) that had negative 
differences greater than -.320 inch. Three of 
those joints had negative differences greater 
than the 51-L right aft field joint. None of 
those 13 earlier joints experienced O-ring 
damage. Table 3 indicates the joints and 
missions with negative differences greater 
than -.320 inch.7 
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 Table 3. Negative Diameter Differences 
Greater Than .320 Inches for Field Joints: STS 
51-C Through 61-C  
.  
Mission Difference (Inches)  
Location 
(Degrees)  
.  
51-C  Right Fwd  - .360 120 
- .360 90 51 - 
B  
Right Aft  
- .372 120 
Right Fwd  - .336 0 
Left Aft  - .324 120 
51 - 
D  
Left Fwd  - .372 120 
51 - 
G  Right Aft  - .354 120 
- .385 0 51 - 
F  
Right 
Center  - .433* 150 
Left 
Center  - .335 0 
51 - I  
Right Aft  - .327 30 
Left 
Center  - .334 150 
61 - 
B  
Right 
Center  - .473* 120 
- .355 150 Left 
Center  - .354 0 
61-C  
Right 
Center  
- .394* 120 
.  
* Negative diameter differences greater than 51-L 
 It was found that the negative dimension 
differences on 51-L were not the most 
troublesome ever experienced and that a 
significant number of joints on other flights had 
initial negative differences in excess of the 
worst-case design clearance between the tang 
and the clevis. One significant uncertainty is the 
degree to which segments may tend to circularity 
after being mated. The procedures used in 
mating the right side aft and aft center segments 
were carefully examined and appear normal, 
properly followed and executed by well-
experienced personnel according to 
specifications. 
The 51 -L joint negative diameter difference has 
been examined for the light it may shed on 
whether this discrepancy may have contributed 
to the fatal booster joint failure. 
The large negative diameter difference indicates 
a potential for an interference between the tang 
and inner clevis leg that can lead to a flat on flat 
condition when the tang section is lowered into 
the clevis section on assembly. 
Subscale test on sections of the full scale joint 
cross section were performed which purposely 
produced a flat on flat condition as these sector 
sections were forced together. Test results 
showed that metal slivers were sheared from the 
flats, and that these slivers could be pulled into 
the O-ring region during assembly. 
However, a flat on flat condition probably did 
not exist on the STS 51-L lower joint. Past 
assembly practice has shown that if the 
difference of all diametrical readings of the 
mating halves is less than + .250 inches a flat on 
flat condition will not occur. Furthermore during 
the mating process the halves are brought slowly 
together with stacking personnel positioned 
around the joint. A potential for flat on flat is 
looked for during this critical period. It has been 
shown through experience that a flat on flat 
condition is readily apparent when viewing the 
mating section while the upper tang section is 
suspended just above the inner leg of the clevis. 
Thus both the physical measurements and 
assembly procedures make a flat on flat 
condition unlikely during assembly. 
While the tang of the 51-L right aft center 
segment was burned through near the 300 degree 
arc point where the largest negative dimension 
occurred, this dimension was an assembly 
condition only and it is not certain that it 
persisted until launch. Examination of the STS 
61 -E destacked segments subsequent to the 51-L 
accident indicated that their ovality had changed 
after assembly while awaiting launch. 
If the very tight tang-to-clevis assembly gap did 
persist to time of launch, it could have resulted in 
near maximum compression of the O-rings. Such 
compression, in conjunction with cold 
temperatures, joint dynamics, and the variable 
performance of the insulating putty has been 
shown to have detrimental influences on the 
joint's ability to seal. Several joints on STS 51-L, 
however, may have had areas where the O-ring 
was at near ma ximum compression. 
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· John F. Kennedy Space Center (incumbents as of January 28, 1986).  
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· Center Organization (incumbents as of January 28, 1986).  
· Science and Engineering Directorate (incumbents as of January 28, 1986).  
· Shuttle Projects Office (incumbents as of January 28, 1986).  
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· Morton Thiokol, Inc. (incumbents as of January 28, 1986).  
· Morton Thiokol 27 Jan 1986 Meeting Participants.  
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2. Temperature Definitions (as applicable to this report) 
Parameter  Definition  
.  
Field Joint (O-ring) 
Temperature  
A calculated temperature for the surface of the Solid 
Rocket Booster in the vicinity of the tang/clevis joint. The 
O-ring temperature is assumed to be the same. Calculations 
are based on a thermal model which includes ambient 
temperature among the variables. (See references 1 and 2.)  
.  
Ambient Temperature (at 
launch)  
Measured atmospheric temperature at: (See reference 3) 
· Camera Site 3, approximately 1,000 feet, bearing 
150 degrees from Launch Pad 39B (36 degrees 
Fahrenheit at launch.)  
· At a weather observation site approximately 3,000 
feet east of the Kennedy Shuttle Landing Facility; 
(reported minimum of 24 degrees Fahrenheit and 
maximum of 43 degrees Fahrenheit for January 28, 
1986).  
References: 
1. Report, "Accident Analysis Team Report, Solid Rocket Motor Working Group, NASA, April 1986", 
pages B-105 through B-114.  
2. Commission Panel Work Session (Solid Rocket Booster matters) Design and Production Panel; Brigham 
City, Utah, March 18, 1986, pages 392 through 403.  
3. Report, "Accident Analysis Team Report, Space Shuttle Systems Working Group. NASA, April 1986", 
pages 18 through 23, Tables B.1 and B.2.  
Note: A comparison of atmospheric environmental data (wind, temperature, precipitation) for Flights STS-
1 through STS-61C in included in Tables B.5 and B.6 of reference 3. 
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3. Early Marshall documents and memoranda raising design objections. 
 
 
This briefing chart is the earliest known indication that the joint design was 
unacceptable. Leon Ray, in a 1977 briefing on a planned Structural Test Article test 
indicates that no changing the design is unacceptable since the tang can move 
outboard and cause excessive joint clearance resulting in seal leakage.  
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This memorandum, written by Leon Ray and signed by John Q. Miller, strongly 
urged that the clevis joint be redesigned.  
 236 
This memorandum, also written by Leon Ray and signed by John Q. Miller, strongly questions the clevis joint 
design. It is the earliest known official document which questions the redundancy of the seal.  
 237 
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· This Leon Ray memorandum documents his visits to two O-ring manufacturers, 
both of whom expressed concern relative to the O-ring performing properly in the 
joint design.  
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4. Documents relating to the change from Criticality 1R to 1, and the waiver of the 
redundancy requirements for the Solid Rocket Motor seal. 
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This original Critical Items List entry for the Solid Rocket Motor case joint seals 
establishes them as Critically 1R (redundant).  
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In late 1982, Marshall Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance engineers reviewed test and analysis 
results and determined that the case joints should be reclassified as Critically 1 (not redundant). This 
form was signed by Maurice (Bud) Parker, a local Thiokol Reliability engineer, beginning the process 
of management approval of the Criticality change.  
 243 
 
On January 21, 1983, the Marshall Configuration Control Board, chaired by 
Lawrence Mulloy, approved the change from Criticality 1R to Criticality 1 and 
approved it for forwarding to Level II.  
 244 
After receiving written concurrence from certain Johnson organizations, Glynn Lunney, the Shuttle Program 
Manager, approved the Criticality change, based on a telephone conversation with Lawrence Mulloy, the Solid 
Rocket Booster Project Manager. The action was taken without convening a meeting of the Program Requirements 
Control Board. This action authorized submittal of a waiver of the "fail-safe" design requirement to Level I.  
 
Glynn Lunney signed this request for Level I to approve for the field joint a waiver of the "fail-safe requirement" 
for Shuttle component, in that the joint had been reclassified as Criticality 1 (no redundancy). The waiver was 
approved for Level I by L. Michael Weeks on March 28, 1983. 
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 5. Memoranda written following the field joint O-ring erosion on STS 41-B (flight 10). 
 
This internal Marshall note was written by John W. Miller after the O-ring erosion experience on STS 41-B (flight 
10), indicating concern that the leak check procedures may displace putty ("blow-holes") leading to O-ring 
burning ("erosion"). STS 41-B was the first flight for which a 200 psi leak check stabilization pressure was used.  
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In this memorandum to Lawrence Mulloy, George Morefield compares the Titan joint with the Shuttle joint and 
assesses a higher failure probability for the shuttle joint, indicating concern that putty may cause "single point 
pressurization" of the primary O-ring.  
 6. Marshall urgent request for briefing after the STS 51-C mission (flight 15). 
 
Following the discovery of the STS 51-C (flight 15) O-ring erosion and blow-by, Lawrence Mulloy sent this 
"Certified Urgent" message to the Solid Rocket Motor manager, Larry Wear. This message was passed on to 
Thiokol as direction to prepare a detailed briefing on O-ring problems for the next Flight Readiness Review.  
 248 
 7. Internal NASA Headquarters memorandum after visit to Marshall. 
 
This memorandum to Level I describes a visit to Marshall by Irving Davids of NASA Headquarters. Davids' visit 
was prompted by the nozzle O-ring problems suffered on STS 51-B (flight 17).  
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8. Thiokol letters and memoranda written after O-ring concern escalates. 
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· Roger Boisjoily's first attempt after STS 51-B (flight 17) to convince his 
management of the seriousness of the O-ring erosion problem.  
 251 
 
In this memorandum to S.R. Stein, A.R. Thompson indicates the O-ring seal problem is acute and short-term 
measures should be taken to reduce flight risk.  
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In this weekly activity report, Robert Ebeling attempts ("Help!") to draw management attention to the difficulties 
experienced by the seal task force in getting adequate support, indicating "This is a red flag."  
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S.R. Stein echoes the concerns about the seal task force not getting full support.  
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In this activity report , Roger Boisjoly expresses his frustration with the slow progress of and lack of management 
attention to the seal task force.  
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 9. Marshall internal memorandum in the fall of 1985. 
 
In this memorandum, J. E. Kingsbury informs Lawrence Mulloy that he places high priority on the O-ring seal 
problem and desires additional information on plans for improving the situation 
 
